ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOKS

Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora

Edited by Tan Chee-Beng

Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora

With around 40 million people worldwide, the ethnic Chinese and the Chinese in diaspora form the largest diaspora in the world. The economic reform of China which began in the late 1970s marked a huge phase of migration from China, and the new migrants, many of whom were well educated, have had a major impact on local societies and on China.

This is the first interdisciplinary Handbook to examine the Chinese diaspora, and provides a comprehensive analysis of the processes and effects of Chinese migration under the headings of:

- Population and distribution
- Mainland China and Taiwan's policies on the Chinese overseas
- Migration: past and present
- Economic and political involvement
- Localization, transnational networks and identity
- Education, literature and media

The *Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora* brings together a significant number of specialists from a number of diverse disciplines and covers the major areas of the study of Chinese overseas. This Handbook is therefore an important and valuable reference work for students, scholars and policy makers worldwide who wish to understand the global phenomena of Chinese migration, transnational connections and their cultural and identity transformation.

Tan Chee-Beng is Professor at the Department of Anthropology, Sun Yat-sen University, China.

Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora

Tan Chee-Beng

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Contributors

Jiemin BAO （包洁敏） is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley. Her first book, *Marital Acts: Gender, Sexuality, and Identity among the Chinese Thai Diaspora*, was published by the University of Hawaii Press in 2005. In 2008, Bao co-edited a special issue of *Ethnology* on polygyny (Vol. 47, No. 3) with William Jankowiak. Currently, she is finishing her second book, *Temple of Happiness: Race, Class, and Spirituality in Thai American Buddhism* which will be published by Temple University Press.

Dean P. CHEN （陈鼎） is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Ramapo College of New Jersey, USA. He is the author of *US Taiwan Strait Policy: The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012). His research interests are US–China–Taiwan relations, international security, and East Asian politics.

CHEN Tien-shi (Lara) （陈天玺） is Associate Professor at the National Museum of Ethnology in Osaka, Japan. Her research topics are Chinese diaspora, statelessness, and global migration. Her doctoral dissertation "The Networks and Identities of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs" was given the Asian Pacific Research Award from Asian Pacific Forum, Awaji Conference Japan in 2002. Her recent publications, in Japanese, include *Chinese Diaspora* (Akashi Shoten, 2001), *Stateless* (Shinchosha, 2005), and *Stateless* (Shincho Bunko, 2011), as editor, *"Forgotten people" – Stateless People in Japan* (Akashi Shoten, 2010), and as co-editor, *Diaspora in East Asia* (Akashi Shoten, 2011). She founded the NGO group *Stateless Network* in 2009.

CHIA Oai Peng（谢爱萍） (Ph.D., University of Malaya) is retired Associate Professor from the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur; she was head of the Centre for China Studies at Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman in Malaysia. Currently, she is working as a freelance researcher on topics related to overseas Chinese and their culture. Her publications include "China-ASEAN relation: toward global stability, peace and sustainable growth" (2006); "Chinese education in Malaysia: challenges in the globalisation era" (2003); "Intertwining of social life and business strategies: Chinese businessmen in Malaysia" (1997); and as editor, *Papers on The Guangdong People in Malaysia* (2007).

Flemming CHRISTIANSEN is Professor of the Social Sciences of East Asia: China's Political Economy at the University of Duisburg-Essen in Germany. His main publications are *Encyclopedia of Modern China*, 4 volumes, edited by D. Pong, F. Christiansen *et al.*, Farmington: Charles Scribner's Sons (Thomson Gale Group), 2009. *The Politics of Multiple Belonging. Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe and East Asia,* edited by F. Christiansen and U. Hedetoft,

Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2004 and *Chinatown, Europe. An Exploration of Overseas Chinese Identity in the 1990s*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

Charles A. COPPEL is a Principal Fellow in the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies and an Associate of the Asian Law Centre at the University of Melbourne. He is the author of *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis* (1983) and *Studying Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia* (2002) and editor of *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, Representation, Resolution* (2006).

HARA Fujio （原不二夫） was Professor at the Department of Asian Studies, Faculty of Foreign Studies, Nanzan University (until March 2012). His recent publications include *Malayan Chinese and China: Conversion of Identity Consciousness* (1997 in English, 2001 in Japanese, 2006 in Chinese), *Unaccomplished International Cooperation: The Malayan Communist Party and its Fraternal Parties* (2009 in Japanese).

Karen L. HARRIS is Professor in the Department of Historical and Heritage Studies at the University of Pretoria in South Africa. She is also the Director of the University Archives. Her doctorate was on the history of the Chinese in South Africa and she has produced numerous articles, chapters and papers on this subject. She recently assisted the South African Chinese in the legal action regarding their status in the new South African dispensation.

Evelyn HU-DeHart （胡其瑜）is Professor of History, and Director of the Center for the Study of Race and Ethnicity in America at Brown University. In 2011–12, she was the Santander Visiting Scholar at Tsinghua University, in Beijing. As a historian of Latin America and the Caribbean, her research has focused on the Chinese and other Asian diasporas in these regions of the Americas. She has published extensively in English, as well as Chinese and Spanish. She is currently writing a comparative study of the Chinese diaspora worldwide, with particular attention to the Americas.

Manying IP （叶宋曼瑛） is Professor at the School of Asian Studies, University of Auckland. Her research interest is on Chinese migration, race relations, and ethnic identity. Her recent publications include *Transmigration and the New Chinese* (2011), *The Dragon and the Taniwha: Maori and Chinese in New Zealand* (2009); *Being Maori-Chinese: Mixed Identities* (2008); *Aliens at My Table: Asians as New Zealanders See Them* (2005); *Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: the Chinese in New Zealand* (2003). Her current research is on how the Chinese Internet has affected overseas Chinese identity. She is a fellow of the Royal Society of New Zealand.

Alexander G. LARIN is a leading researcher, Head of Chinese Diaspora and Taiwan Studies Section, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. His recent publications include: *The Chinese in Russia Yesterday and Today: An Historical Essay* (2003), *China and Chinese Overseas* (2008), *The Chinese Migrants in Russia: History and the Present* (2009).

Isabelle LAUSENT-HERRERA is a researcher at the French National Research Center (CNRS) and she has taught Asiatic immigration in the Americas at the Latin American Institute (IHEAL), University of Paris III and at the Catholic University of Peru. She holds a doctorate degree in geography from the University of Paris VII and graduated also in anthropology. She has published widely on different aspects of Peruvian-Chinese community such as religious syncretism, evangelist movements, Chinese temples and societies, Chinese graves,

economic ties between China and Peru, Lima's Chinatown, concubines and spouses of Chinese immigrants. Ongoing research focuses on new Chinese immigration flows.

LI Anshan （李安山）is Professor of History at the School of International Studies, Peking University. He is also Consultant of Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of State Council, PRC. He is Vice President of both Chinese Society of African Historical Studies and Chinese Association of African Studies, and he has published various books and articles including, *A History of Chinese Overseas in Africa* (Beijing, 2000), *British Rule and Rural Protest in Southern Ghana* (New York, 2002), *Studies on African Nationalism* (Beijing, 2004), *Social History of Chinese Overseas in Africa: Selected Documents, 1800–2005* (Hong Kong, 2006). He is also Director of the Institute of Afro-Asian Studies and Center for African Studies at Peking University.

LI Minghuan （李明欢） is Professor at the Department of Sociology and Social Work, Xiamen University. She is also Consultant of Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of State Council, PRC. Her recent publications include, in Chinese, *A Study of International Migration Policies* (2011), *A Fieldwork Report of Fujian Qiaoxiang* (2005), *A History of Chinese Immigrants in Europe* (2003) and dozens of papers.

Peter S. LI （李胜生）is Professor of Sociology at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada. His research areas are Chinese Canadians, the Chinese disapora, race and ethnicity, and immigration. He has published over 80 academic papers and 11 books, including *The Chinese in Canada* (OUP, 1988, 1998) and *Destination Canada* (OUP, 2003). In 2002, he received the Outstanding Contribution Award from the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association. He was editor of *Journal of International Migration and Integration* (2005–9), and president of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association (2004–5). He is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

Eva Xiaoling LI （李晓玲） is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada. She is completing a doctoral thesis on immigrant enclaves in Canada. She has published three journal articles and one book chapter with Peter Li on Vancouver Chinatown, immigration from China, and related topics.

Pei-te LIEN （连培德） is Professor and Graduate Advisor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her primary research interest is the political participation and representation of Asian and other nonwhite Americans. She publishes widely on the subject of the intersection of race, ethnicity, gender, and nativity in political behavior, both of the elites and the masses. Her latest book, *The Transnational Politics of Asian Americans* (Temple University Press, 2009), is co-edited with Chris Collet and explores the world of political transnationalism regarding various Asian ethnic groups in the USA.

Linda Yuen-Ching LIM （林愿清） is Professor of Strategy at the Stephen M. Ross School of Business, the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, where she formerly served as Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies and is an executive committee member of the Center for Chinese Studies. Her research on economic development and business in Southeast Asia includes *The Chinese in Southeast Asia*, Vols. 1 & 2 (co-edited with L.A. Peter Gosling, 1983) and various journal articles and book chapters including a Special Issue on Ethnic Chinese Business in Southeast Asia for the *Journal of Asian Business*, Vol.16, No. 1 (2000). She is currently researching China's foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia.

Huping LING（令狐萍） is Professor of History at Truman State University and the Executive Editor for the *Journal of Asian American Studies*. She has published 11 books and over a hundred articles on immigration, race, gender, and Asian American community. Her recent books include *Surviving on the Gold Mountain* (1998, Ford Foundation Award for its Chinese edition), *Chinese St. Louis: From Enclave to Cultural Community* (2004), *Chinese in St Louis, 1857–2007* (2007), *Voices of the Heart: Asian American Women on Immigration, Work, and Family* (2007), *Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans* (2008), *Asian America: Forming Communities, Expanding Boundaries* (2009), *Asian American History and Culture: An Encyclopedia* (2 Vols., 2010, *Booklist/Reference Books Bulletin* Editors' Choice Award), *Chinese Chicago: Race, Transnational Migration and Community since 1870s* (Stanford, 2012). She is currently writing a book on Asian American history.

Tansen SEN（沈丹森） is Associate Professor of Asian History and Religions at Baruch College, The City University of New York. He is the author of *Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations, 600–1400* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2003). With Victor H. Mair he has written *Traditional China in Asian and World History* (Association for Asian Studies, 2012). He has also guest edited a special issue of *China Report* (December 2007) on the connections between Kolkata (India) and China.

Yoshiko SHIBATA（柴田佳子） is Professor of Cultural Anthropology and American/Latin American Studies at the Graduate School and Faculty of Intercultural Studies, Kobe University, Japan, specializing on the Caribbean and its Diaspora societies and the Americas. Her recent publications in English include: "Revisiting Chinese hybridity: negotiating categories and re-constructing ethnicity in contemporary Jamaica," *Caribbean Quarterly* 51 (2005); "Searching for a niche: creolizing religious tradition: negotiation and reconstruction of ethnicity among Chinese in Jamaica, in P. Pratap Kumar (ed.) *Religious Pluralism in the Diaspora* (2006), "Linda's agonies: intermarriage, 'racial politics' and gender in contemporary Guyana', *Latin American Studies* 6 (2008).

Wanning SUN（孙皖宁） is Professor of Chinese Media and Cultural Studies at China Research Centre, University of Technology, Sydney. She was with the School of Media, Communication and Creative Arts from 2000 to 2008 at Curtin University, Western Australia. Wanning's main areas of research include Chinese media and cultural studies, gender, migration, and social change in contemporary China, and diasporic Chinese media. She is the author of *Leaving China: Media, Migration, and Transnational Imagination* (2002) and *Maid in China: Media, Morality and the Cultural Politics of Boundaries* (2009), and editor of *Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communications and Commerce* (2006).

Leo SURYADINATA（廖建裕）is Director of the Chinese Heritage Centre and Adjunct Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is also President of the International Society for the Study of Chinese Overseas. His recent books include *China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension* (1985, reissued in 2005 with a postscript), *Understanding Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia* (2007), *Peranakan Chinese in a Globalizing Southeast Asia* (2010, editor and contributor) and *Migration, Indigenization and Interaction: Chinese Overseas and Globalization* (2011, editor)

TAN Chee-Beng（陈志明） is Professor at the Department of Anthropology, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou. He was formerly with the Department of Anthropology at The

Chinese University of Hong Kong, from where he retired in July 2012. His recent publications include *Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues* (2004), as editor, *Southern Fujian: Reproduction of Traditions in Post-Mao China* (2006), *Chinese Transnational Networks* (2007), *Chinese Food and Foodways in Southeast Asia and Beyond* (2011), and as co-editor, *The Chinese in Malaysia* (2000), *Changing Chinese Foodways in Asia* (2001), *Food and Foodways in Asia* (2007) and *The World of Soy* (2008).

Bernard P. WONG （王保华） is a Faculty Research Associate of the Center of US-China Policy Studies and he has been professor of anthropology at San Francisco State University. He has conducted fieldwork on the Chinese in Peru, the USA, Japan and the Philippines. He is the author of many journal articles and book chapters. His major publications include *A Chinese American Community: Ethnicity and Survival Strategies* (1979), *Chinatown: Economic Adaptation and Ethnic Identity of the Chinese* (1982), *Patronage, Brokerage, Entrepreneurship and the Chinese Community of New York* (1988), *Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship* (1997), *Family, Kin and Community* (2001), *Chinese in Silicon Valley* (2006).

Wenying XU （徐文英） is Professor of English and Vice President of Academic Affairs at Chatham University. She is the author of three books: *Historical Dictionary of Asian American Literature and Theater* (2012), *Eating Identities: Reading Food in Asian American Literature* (2008), and *Ethics and Aesthetics of Freedom in American and Chinese Realism* (2003). Her essays have appeared in numerous journals and anthologies, and in addition, she has published stories in *Prairie Schooner*, *Room of One's Own*, *Sistersong*, and *American Intercultural Magazine*. She is President of MELUS from 2009 through 2012.

Philip Q. YANG （楊飛） is Professor of Sociology and the director of the sociology graduate program at Texas Woman's University. He is the author of three books, including the latest *Asian Immigration to the United States* (2011), and the editor of three books. He has published numerous articles on Chinese immigration and immigrants, Asian Americans/immigrants, immigration, citizenship, transnationalism, race/ethnicity, and demography in many peer-reviewed journals and edited volumes and won the Research Paper Award of the Asia and Asian America Section of the American Sociological Association in 2011. His research has received funding from various sources including the National Science Foundation.

YEN Ching-hwang （颜请湟） is Adjunct Professor in School of History and Politics, University of Adelaide, Australia. He was Chair Professor and Head of the Department of History, at the University of Hong Kong from 1989 to 1990. His recent publications include *The Chinese in Southeast Asia and Beyond* (Singapore, World Scientific, 2008), *Chuanxing zai dongxifang wenhua zhi jian* (Moving between Eastern and Western Cultures) (Hong Kong Social Sciences Press, 2008), *Dongnanya huaren zhi yanjiu* (Studies on the Chinese in Southeast Asia) (Hong Kong Social Sciences Press, 2008) and *Haiwai huaren de chuantong yu xiandaihua* (Tradition and Modernity of the Chinese Overseas) (Singapore, Nanyang Technological University and Global Publishing, 2010).

YOW Cheun Hoe （游俊豪）is Assistant Professor at the Division of Chinese, Nanyang Technological University. He is currently working on diasporic Chinese literature, new Chinese migrants, and multiculturalism. He has published articles on *qiaoxiang* (hometowns for Chinese sojourners), ethnic Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia as well as Chinese writers and their literary works outside China. One of his recent publications is a book in Malay

entitled *Antara China dengan Tanah Tempatan Ini: Satu Kajian Pemikiran Dwipusat Penulis Cina 1919–1957* (Between China and this Local Land: A Study of Dual-Centred Mentality of Chinese Writers in Malaya, 1919–1957) (2011).

Henry YU（余全毅）is Principal of St. John's College, University of British Columbia, and an Associate Professor in History at UBC as well as the Project Lead of the "Chinese Canadian Stories" project (*chinesecanadian.ubc.ca*). He is the author of *Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America* (Oxford University Press, 2001), and is currently working on a trio of projects: "Pacific Canada," which explores the history of Canada as an engagement between trans-Pacific migrants, trans-Atlantic migrants, and aboriginal peoples; "The Cantonese Pacific," and "How Tiger Woods lost his stripes," which examines the fascination with interracial sex.

ZHANG Xing（張幸） is Lecturer at the Department of South Asian Studies, Peking University. She has studied in China, Bangladesh and Germany. Her research focuses on Bengali literature and culture as well as the Chinese community in Calcutta, India. She has co-edited a special issue of the journal *Huaqiao Huaren Lishi Yanjiu* (Overseas Chinese History Studies) devoted to the Chinese community in India. She is author of *Preserving Cultural Identity through Education: The Schools of the Chinese Community in Calcutta, India* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).

ZHUANG Guotu（庄国土） is Chair Professor at the Institute of Overseas Chinese Studies, Huaqiao University of China, and Professor at the School for Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University. His recent publication is *Dongya Huaren Shehui de Xingcheng he Fazhan* (Formation and Development of Ethnic Chinese in East Asia), Xiamen University Press (2009).

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Introduction

Tan Chee-Beng

The study of Chinese in diaspora is now a well developed field of study with diverse topics across different disciplines and involving scholars from different parts of the world, many of whom are increasingly themselves migrants or descendants of migrants. This Handbook brings together a significant number of specialists of different disciplines and specialties to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese worldwide, showing the range of subjects that have been researched and the contribution of the study of Chinese migration, settlement and remigration to the study of migration processes, politics and ethnic relations, localization and cultural formation, ethnicity and identity as well as globalization and transnationalism. The study of the Chinese in diaspora in broader spatial and disciplinary perspectives has been advanced over the years with the publication of a significant number of edited books that result from academic conferences, such as Gosling and Lim (1983); Lim and Gosling (1983); Cushman and Wang (1988); Wang and Wang (1998); and Ong and Nonini (1997), etc. There are also four volumes of selected published works edited by Liu (2006), while Benton and Pieke (1998) contributes to the consolidation of the study of the Chinese in Europe. All of these and many others show the development and scope of the study of the Chinese diasporas. There are a few encyclopedias, a significant one is that edited by Lynn Pan (1999). Published in both English and Chinese, this comprehensive work is well known. As to the Chinese encyclopedia, the 12 volumes compiled by Zhou Nanjing and his team are most comprehensive and useful for those who read Chinese (Zhou 1999–2002). Various encyclopedias on minorities have significant entries on the Chinese diasporas. For example, *Asian American History and Culture: An Encyclopedia* has a big section on the Chinese Americans (Ling and Austin 2010).

This Handbook is not an encyclopedia that seeks to provide general description of all possible topics, at the same time it is also not just another edited volume that focuses on one or two theoretical themes. It provides in-depth description and analysis of selected topics that have been significantly studied. While it cannot cover everything because of space consideration – in fact each topic here can be developed into a book volume, and more topics can be included – it does provide a guide to the scope of the study of the Chinese in diaspora. For a long time the study of "overseas Chinese" has concentrated on Southeast Asia and North America, but the field has since expanded, and as this Handbook shows, there are now also significant English works on the Chinese in the Caribbean and Latin America, and there are an increasing number

of works on the new Chinese migrants that have spread all over the world since the 1980s, especially in Euro-American countries but also in Africa, where the study of the Chinese migrants there is an emerging field.

The theoretical concern in the study of overseas Chinese has changed and diversified over the years. The issue of cultural change and assimilation was an important concern in earlier study, as shown by William Skinner's classical study of the Chinese in Thailand (Skinner 1957). Since then there have been various works which reflect the theoretical interest of the time, such as on the Chinese overseas and the state, ethnicity and changing identity, and more recently transnationalism. This Handbook cannot focus on a particular theme but most of the theoretical issues are highlighted, including the latest interest in globalization and transnationalism. The chapters do show that Chinese migration and diasporic living have been influenced by changing local and global political economy: the colonial economy, new nation-building in Southeast Asia, the adoption of multi-cultural policies in the West, the opening up of China, and global capitalism have all influenced the processes of Chinese migration and remigration as well as their transnational networks.

In this introduction I shall briefly introduce the coverage of the Handbook under the themes of labels; Population and distribution; Mainland China and Taiwan's policies on the Chinese overseas; Migration: past and present; Economic and political involvement; Localization, transnational networks and identity; and Education, literature and media. These are section headings in the Handbook, but we should bear in mind that the division of the sections is just a matter of convenience, and a chapter may cover a number of themes that criss-cross sections. For example, the economic activities of the Chinese in Europe is not just discussed in the chapter by Li Minghuan in the Economic and political involvement section, but also in the chapter by Flemming Christiansen in the section of Migration: past and present. In fact Christiansen writes about transnational ethnic enclave. Indeed the chapters in the Migration section also deal with many other themes including politics and ethnic relations, transnational networks, etc. While gender is the focus of Huping Ling's chapter, it is also mentioned in some other chapters in the Migration section as well as in the chapters by Jiemin Bao, Isabelle Lausent-Herrera and Yoshiko Shibata. Education and media are described by Wanning Sun and Chia Oai Peng but there are also some discussions in the other sections, such as in the chapters by Zhang Xing and Tansen Sen, Li Minghuan, and Jiemin Bao who discusses Chinese education in contemporary Thailand. The issue of localization and identity is discussed not only in the section on Localization, transnational networks and identity but also in a number of chapters in the other sections such as in the chapter by Bernard Wong.

Labels

There is a need to explain the use of labels. This handbook is entitled *Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora*. The term Chinese diaspora is used here as this volume is part of the Routledge handbook series on diasporas. Also the term "Chinese diaspora" has been popularly used, especially in Euro-American countries, to refer to the Chinese living outside mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, all of which for convenience may be described as the Chinese lands. Some of the chapters, including that of Peter S. Li and Eva Xiaoling Li, have discussed the use of the terms overseas Chinese, Chinese overseas and *huaren*. The English term "overseas Chinese" has a long history of usage. Because of its earlier usage when the Chinese migrants were sojourners who did not intend to leave China for good, this term has come to be associated with the Chinese term *huaqiao* for "Chinese sojourners." Since the opening up of China in 1978, China has further clarified its stand on the Chinese in global distribution, restricting the

term *huaqiao* to Chinese citizens living abroad, while the Chinese who have adopted the citizenship of the countries of their residence are referred to as *haiwai huaren*. When referring to all Chinese outside China, both citizens of China and of other countries, *huaqiao/huaren* is used. Literally *haiwai huaren* means "overseas Chinese," but since the 1980s, Professor Wang Gungwu and others have popularized the use of "Chinese overseas" as equivalent to *haiwai huaren* and to distinguish "overseas Chinese" as mere sojourners. Although fairly widely accepted, "Chinese overseas" has difficulties in usage especially when used as a qualifying term such as "Chinese overseas investment" – overseas Chinese investment sounds better.

The difficulty of using a common label is related to the politics of identity, of adopting a term which takes note of historical development and respecting the feeling of the Chinese concerned, as in the transformation of a *huaqiao* status to one that emphasizes local citizenship and identification. This is rather difficult in English as no single term can accurately cover all the Chinese worldwide. In Chinese this is solved by the terms *huaqiao* and *haiwai huaren*. Still it is difficult to distinguish the citizens of China overseas and Chinese of other nationalities; and most scholars actually use the term *haiwai huaren* to cover all Chinese outside China and use *huaqiao* for citizens of China when referring to these Chinese specifically. The term *huaren* means ethnic Chinese and has the advantage of not associating with the Chinese nationality as the term *zhongguoren* (literally Chinese people, *zhongguo* means China) may imply, although the people in China may also use *zhongguoren* to refer to all Chinese irrespective of nationality. The term *huaren* is thus normally used when referring to Chinese irrespective of nationalities, such as *quanqiu huaren* or "Chinese worldwide," but also specifically to Chinese of other nationalities (not of China) as is usually implied in the term *haiwai huaren*. In fact *huaren* is now used worldwide, even in China at least when referring to the Chinese worldwide, that is, *quanqiu huaren*.

With the growing interest in the study of "diasporas" especially since the 1990s, scholars in America and Europe have used the term "Chinese diaspora" to refer to the Chinese outside the Chinese land. Academicians in Southeast Asia writing in English prefer the term "Chinese overseas" to "Chinese diaspora" because of the sensitivity of the term diaspora which may imply "not rooted" or the term may be perceived as China-centered. Nevertheless, given the common usage not only in the study of the Chinese in global distribution but also in the study of other ethnic diasporas, the term can be used without any connotation of identification with China. It is convenient as a common label, although in practice what constitutes a diaspora is often not clear. A stricter definition regards descendants who have become rooted in a country and integrated into that society as no more constituting a diaspora (cf. Cohen 2008: 61). Most scholars on diasporas are more interested in diaspora discourses without bothering to be precise about what constitutes a diaspora, paying attention to, in the words of Clifford (1997: 244), "experiences of displacement, of constructing homes away from home." In this Handbook, Chinese diaspora is used generally to refer to Chinese outside the Chinese lands. However, each scholar uses the term that he or she feels comfortable with or prefers. It is important that we hold a liberal attitude as long as we know what is meant. In this introduction I have intentionally used various labels such as the Chinese in global distribution, Chinese worldwide, Chinese overseas, and Chinese diasporas.

Population and distribution

Various scholars have estimated the total population of the Chinese overseas as between 30 million (lowest estimate) and 40 million (highest estimate) (cf. Tan 2009: 1675). In this Handbook, Peter S. Li and Eva Xiaoling Li, using the data provided by the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission in Taiwan, report that the population was 39.5 million in 2009 distributed

throughout the world in about 130 countries. Zhuang Guotu, however, estimates that there were about 45 million Chinese in 2008 distributed in more than 180 countries, of which 10 million are new Chinese migrants (see Chapter 3). Thus we can say that there are now between 40 million and 45 million Chinese in the diaspora.

The majority of the Chinese overseas are in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, with about 75%. The second largest concentration of the Chinese in diaspora is in America which accounts for 19%. Peter S. Li and Eva Xiaoling Li expect the Chinese population in America to continue to grow so that by 2040, Asia will account for 68% of the overseas Chinese population, while America will account for 26%. It is also estimated that, with the present annual rate of growth, the Chinese overseas population will reach 52 million in 2030 and 59 million in 2040. Indeed there has been continuous migration from China to different parts of the world as well as re-migration of the Chinese overseas from one country to another, including re-migrating back to China. These processes affect not only the ethnoscape and economy of the countries where the Chinese have migrated but also the internal diversity and social relations among the Chinese.

Mainland China and Taiwan's policies on the Chinese overseas

China's policies on the Chinese overseas are comprehensively introduced by Zhuang Guotu. Before the mid-nineteenth century, there were no such policies other than the policies toward overseas trade. In fact the Qing government banned emigration. With the lifting of the ban in 1893, the right of the Chinese to emigrate and to visit or return to their Chinese homeland was finally recognized. The promulgation of the Qing Nationality Law in 1909 affected the overseas Chinese too. This law adopted the *jus sanguinis* principle which regards persons born of Chinese father or mother (if father is unknown) to be Chinese citizens. The Nationalist government of China understandably paid attention to the Chinese overseas and in 1927 established the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau in Shanghai. The Communist government after 1949 continued with the work of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau (*qiaowu*) although it also paid much attention to the returned overseas Chinese in China (see also Peterson 2012). After 1978, much attention was paid to attracting overseas Chinese investment in China. The overseas Chinese affairs bureau was then called Qiaoban or State Council for Overseas Chinese Affairs. Zhuang's chapter describes the changing policies from the Qing dynasty to the Republican period and to the post-1949 People's Republic of China (PRC) period, of which post-1978 is significant in relating the policies on the Chinese overseas to economic development in China.

Chinese who migrated from Taiwan nowadays do not like to be lumped together with the *huaqiao* (overseas Chinese) from Mainland China, preferring to identify themselves as *taiqiao* (overseas Taiwanese). The chapter by Pei-te Lien and Dean P. Chen discusses Taiwan and its policies on the "overseas Taiwanese." Under the Nationalist (Guomintang) government from 1947 to 1989, the *qiaowu*, now called Overseas Compatriots Affairs Commission, continued to play an important role in reaching out to the Chinese overseas, initially to mobilize support for retaking the mainland. Between 1972 and 1989, as Lien and Dean point out, the (Nationalist) Kuomintang-controlled government increased the number of appointed overseas members in the Legislative Yuan. With democratization, the rights of the Taiwanese citizens from overseas to return to vote in Republic of China (ROC) elections are protected in the amended constitution. Returned overseas Taiwanese who do not have household registration in Taiwan may obtain a national identity card after living in Taiwan for a period of time. However, with the increase in Taiwanese consciousness, *qiaowu* comes to be seen as a KMT tool, and overseas Chinese representation is abandoned.

In the contemporary world, the Chinese migration most linked to China's foreign policy is the migration of many educated young people to Africa. While some Chinese had already migrated

to Africa toward the end of the Qing dynasty, it is China's new policies on development in Africa and its strategy of taking African countries as important allies that have encouraged Chinese investments in the continent, encouraging the migration of business people, professionals and laborers there, as Li Anshan describes in his chapter.

Migration: past and present

Various chapters in this Handbook have described Chinese migration to different parts of the world. The chapter by Yen Ching-hwang focuses on the coolie migration between 1845 and 1874. This is one type of early emigration at a time when the Chinese migrants were not protected by the Chinese government. Yen provides a vivid description of the deception, kidnapping and enslavement of the coolies. Their inhuman treatment aroused the sympathy of some high-ranking Qing officials, leading eventually to the push for measures to protect the Chinese abroad.

The coolie trade is also discussed by Evelyn Hu-DeHart whose transnational analysis gives us a dynamic picture of the process of migration not only between Asia and Latin America and Caribbean, Mexico in particular, but also what she appropriately describes as "strategic transnationalism" on the US–Mexico borderlands which provided the Chinese a space to live and work in the face of US exclusion. The description of the Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean is located in the global Chinese diaspora, of which the Spanish Manila was an important connection. Throughout the chapter the issues of integration and exclusion, including the symbiotic relationship between Chinese and American businesses, are discussed.

The migration from the Pearl River Delta to North America is described by Henry Yu who focuses his analysis on the Chinese in Canada. This migration created what Yu calls the "Cantonese Pacific." He describes the migrant networks as well as the discrimination encountered. The trans-Pacific Chinese migration has today created a new Canada, so much so that in some cities like Vancouver, the Chinese can no longer be described as a "visible minority" because the "visible minority" is now "white," writes Yu.

The migration of the Chinese to North America and their settlement is also described by Philip Q. Yang in three stages, namely, sojourning, settlement, and transnationalism. His focus is on the USA and the discussion includes the rise of Chinese immigrant transnationalism in more recent time. The discussion shows how the Chinese have adapted to the changing local and global circumstances, including coping with racial discrimination. Yang concludes that "transnationalism has emerged as a new mode of Chinese immigrant adaptation in the age of globalization."

In America, Europe and the Russian Empire, Chinese migrants had provided the labor, in the words of Flemming Christiansen in this Handbook, "to achieve industrial expansion in the late nineteenth century." In today's global capitalism, the new Chinese migrants, as the Wenzhou migrants in Europe, provide the cheap labor and services that are welcomed by the European mainstream companies. The Chinese business people provide inexpensive consumer goods although this has also caused the resentment of local traders who could not compete with the Chinese traders.

The early Chinese migrants to Australia and New Zealand were also attracted by gold mining. Manying Ip describes the Chinese immigration to Australasia from the mid-nineteenth century to the present time with focus on government policies and race relations as well as the internal development of the Chinese communities. The policies have changed from those that welcomed immigrants from the United Kingdom with the aim of creating a "new Britannia" to the present situation of using personal merits to admit immigrants from different countries,

although the countries remain essentially Anglophile. It was from 1973 onwards that the White Australia policy became defunct. The Racial Discrimination Act introduced in 1975 and the Racial Hatred Act introduced in 1995 further prohibit discrimination and prejudice based on racial hatred. In New Zealand, the similar Race Relations Act was introduced in 1993. Today the Chinese in Australia and New Zealand are very diverse, with origins from mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and elsewhere. However, the greatest change has been the increase of the new migrants from China since the 1980s.

There have been rather few academic studies on the Chinese in Africa until recently (see Chapter 4 by Li Anshan), and most of the studies have been on South Africa (cf. *Journal of Chinese Overseas* (4)1, 2008, special issue on The Chinese in South Africa). This is not surprising since Chinese were first recruited as indentured labor for gold mining there, and Chinese migration to Mauritius has long been noted mainly because many Chinese made their way to South Africa and Madagascar via Mauritius (cf. Yap and Man 1996: 37). Karen L. Harris has been the leading historian on the Chinese in South Africa. In this Handbook, she describes five centuries of the Chinese presence in South Africa, from the colonial to the apartheid and the post apartheid periods. As in other places of European settlement, this history of Chinese migration and settlement was accompanied by anti-Chinese sentiments.

Chinese indentured labor was associated not only with mining, especially gold mining, in the Americas, Australasia and South Africa, but also with railway construction in the late nineteenth century. In Russia, Chinese labor was also recruited for the construction of the railroad, and during the Russian Revolution and the Civil War many Chinese workers also fought with the revolutionaries. For example, Larin (1998: 289) writes that "three out of four Chinese miners in Donbass joined the Red Army." Because of the political development, by the 1930s few Chinese remained in European Russia (Larin 1998: 297). However, since the 1980s, Chinese sojourning merchants and workers have been visiting Russia, where they are welcomed but controlled. The ordinary Russians do not welcome the Chinese to settle down, thus Chinese migrants reside in Russia on a temporary basis only. Alexander G. Larin in his chapter follows up his earlier work to describe vividly the contemporary situation of the Chinese in Russia, pointing out that the new Chinese migrants do not form communities and cannot strictly be described as forming a diaspora.

Although small in number the Chinese had an early presence in South Asia, too, first establishing themselves in Calcutta, the British capital in India in the eighteenth century. Despite the unique presence of the Chinatown in Calcutta, not much was known about the Chinese there in the English academic world until the publication of Ellen Oxfeld's work (1993). Her studies have been followed up by recent scholars. In this Handbook, Zhang Xing and Tansen Sen provide a comprehensive introduction of the Chinese in South Asia. The early Chinese settlement in South Asia was in Calcutta which had links with Canton. In the 1940s, some Chinese also settled in Colombo (in today's Sri Lanka) and Karachi (in today's Pakistan); those in Karachi included Han and Uighur from Xinjiang. Most of the Chinese in South Asia are Hakka and Cantonese, and most of them in Calcutta are shoemakers and tannery owners. The Chinese were discriminated following the India–China conflict in 1962, and the population has since declined.

Early Chinese migrants were predominantly men, but women were also involved in migration, which was after all a family strategy. Most women were left behind in China as virtual widows, described in Chinese as *huo guafu* or "widows with living husbands abroad." Some women did migrate, although more did so only since the first few decades of the twentieth century. Huping Ling is one of the few scholars to have focused on the study of the migration of Chinese women. In her chapter she describes the early Chinese women migration and the involvement of women in productive labor in the diaspora. Using the case of the Chinese

women in the USA, she discusses the migration, intermarriage, transnational split marriage and the transformation of Chinese women's roles in America.

Economic and political involvement

The Chinese have played significant roles in business. In Southeast Asia, they also play important roles in national and regional economic development, as is obvious in Linda Yuen-Ching Lim's chapter. However, the perception of Chinese economic prominence gave rise to the excuse to discriminate against the Chinese in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and even Thailand, all of which introduced economic nationalism policies that aimed at restricting the economic dominance of the Chinese. While most of these countries have liberalized their policies against the Chinese, Malaysia continues to reinforce its racial policies in favor of Malays the majority people. Lim points out that the rise of China as an economic power may enhance the region's economic growth and increase "the value of Chinese ethnicity (language, culture) in regional business and economic relations." However, in taking the new opportunities, if the Chinese unwittingly serve as *compradors* to companies in China, this may invite the reintroduction of protective ethnic policies against the Chinese.

In America and Europe, Chinese businesses were in the past confined to restaurants and laundries. Since the 1980s, the new Chinese migrants have played important roles in transnational capitalism that link economic activities with *qiaoxiang*, the region in China where they have migrated from. This is especially evident in Europe where migrants from Zhejiang have played prominent roles, as analyzed by Li Minghuan. Li describes Chinese economic activities in Europe, from the catering business to garment and leather goods industries (especially in France, Italy and Spain) in the 1980s and 1990s to selling made in China goods in Europe (cheaper leather goods and clothing from China) since the late 1990s. She also discusses the newly emerged economic sectors, namely, tourist business and vegetable farming, as well as the expansion of Chinatowns. Such China-linked global capitalism is also expanding in Africa, where the Chinese economic activities will no doubt attract more research and writing.

Chinese economic visibility can lead to local reaction. Indeed the Chinese migrants and their descendants in different countries have experienced different kinds of local government policies. In Southeast Asia where the Chinese presence is very visible, the governments in these new nation-states have adopted various kinds of policies at different periods of time, varying from assimilation to cultural pluralism, as Leo Suryadinata analyzes in the chapter on Southeast Asian policies toward the ethnic Chinese. Except for Singapore, all the Southeast Asian governments have adopted policies that discriminate against the Chinese in one form or another, often under the pretext of promoting integration. The rise of China has led to these governments relaxing their policies, for instance, on Chinese education. Nevertheless, Leo Suryadinata points out that the arrival of the new Chinese immigrants is still seen as posing a challenge to "the nation-building process of Southeast Asian Chinese."

Nevertheless Chinese overseas, including the new migrants, do want to be part of the local society. Li Minghuan describes the collective effort of the Chinese in Europe in this regard, and to this end they formed the European Federation of Chinese Organizations (EFCO), while some individuals have stood in local elections. This is more so with the Chinese who have settled down in a country and have become localized. Bernard Wong describes Chinese migration to the USA and the migrants' experience of localization. This localization and Americanization include political participation. Despite globalization and returning to Asia to work, Wong points out that this does not mean less commitment and participation in the local politics in the USA. In fact returning to Asia is an adaptive strategy that includes dealing with racial

discrimination in the USA. Thus Bernard Wong concludes that "transnationalism can be useful for the establishment of roots and the protection of minorities in the context of globalization."

There remain some Chinese who are not allowed to be part of the country of their residence or who are caught in the political divide between the Nationalists and the Communists with the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan. The founding of PRC actually encouraged many overseas in diaspora to take up local citizenship where this was possible, but for many of those who could only choose between PRC and Taiwan nationality or who did not want to choose either, this was a dilemma, and this was the cause of "stateless Chinese" problem in countries like Japan and Korea. In the case of those who identified with Taiwan, when Japan recognized PRC in 1972, those who could not take up PRC citizenship became stateless. This is the issue discussed by Lara Chen Tien-shi. In some countries like Malaysia and Indonesia there are still some Chinese who for historical (such as the grandparents or parents did not choose to be citizens) and mainly political reasons (such as corruption and outright discrimination against individuals of Chinese descent) have remained stateless.

Chinese political involvement includes participation in national struggle, as in the fight for independence in Southeast Asian countries. The Chinese Communists in Malaya (Malaysia since 1963) even took up arms against the British and eventually against the new local government in their pursuit of an independent Communist state. In this Handbook Hara Fujio describes the communist movements in Southeast Asia, which involved mostly Chinese. These movements developed from anti-Japanese movements in support of China to post-war local politics and proletarian internationalism with solidarity with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The most prominent of the communist armed struggle in Southeast Asia involving the Chinese was that of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). With the withdrawal of support from China following China's reform policy and promise to Southeast Asian government not to support the local communist movements, the CPM concluded peace treaties with the Malaysia government and the Thai government. As Malaysia refused to let most CPM leaders and their followers return to Malaysia, most of these Chinese who had fought for the independence of Malaya from the British and for their vision of a new nation-state have remained stateless, living in southern Thailand.

Localization, transnational networks and identity

Having settled down in foreign lands, Chinese emigrants tried to reterritorialize their familiar Chinese ways of life, although this process was influenced by their need to adapt to the local conditions. Chinese migrants quickly learnt the local language and even acquired some local cultural features, such as eating local non-Chinese food. After one or two generations, the Chinese are obviously localized in some and even in significant aspects affecting their cultural identity. The need of the successful early migrants to marry local non-Chinese women for lack of Chinese women further contributed to the cultural localization of the Chinese descendants. In some cases they form distinct localized Chinese populations in contrast to the later arrived Chinese in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries before the Second World War. The most famous example is the Chinese Peranakan in Indonesia (cf. Tan G.L. 1963; Willmott 1960) and in the Straits Settlements (Penang, Malacca and Singapore) – now in Singapore and Malaysia – where they are more well-known as the "Baba" (cf. Tan C.B. 1988; Rudolph 1998). In this Handbook Indonesian specialist Charles A. Coppel describes the Peranakan Chinese in Indonesia, and he also compares Peranakan and Yiddish cultures.

The Caribbean is known for creolization arising from the interaction of different ethnic groups. Yoshiko Shibata describes Chinese creolization in Anglophone Caribbean. Through

describing naming (such as the use of bynames and double naming), language, intermarriage and mixed-roots offspring (such as the "Half Chiney"), Shibata provides a vivid picture of the localization of the Old Chinese who first arrived as indentured labor and later as free migrants who formed the core of the commercial sector. Intermarriage with diverse ethnic backgrounds especially with the Blacks and Colors intensified creolization. The arrival of what Shibata calls the New Chinese contrasts them with the creolized Old Chinese who have mostly lost their ancestral language. The new migrant, although many of them intend to re-migrate to USA or other countries, provide the new dynamics of "sinicization," a process that is catalyzed by the rise of China as an economic power. "Local contact zones became the negotiating space for localization, hybridization and ethnicization," Shibata points out.

The impact of the new Chinese migrants is also analyzed by Isabelle Lausent-Herrera, who describes the arrival of new Chinese immigrants to Peru and their impact on the local Chinese community and Peru in general. The localized Chinese, called Tusans, not only have to compete with the new immigrants economically and in communal politics, but they also find that the foundation of their local identity has been called into question. Putonghua (Mandarin) has become more important than "dialects." The new immigrants are very mobile and are quick to respond to opportunities, and many of them treat Peru as a transit to the USA. Thus unlike the Tusans who identify with their local Chinese community, the new immigrants, Isabelle Lausent-Herrera points out, generally do not form a community.

The cultural identities of the Chinese in diaspora are closely linked to the experiences and consequences of migration processes. Jiemin Bao discusses "transnational migration and identity formation in relation to learning the Chinese language and everyday gendered practices." The Chinese Thais who have migrated from Thailand to the USA have different connections with Thailand, the USA and China, and they may choose to emphasize one home over the others. Jiemin Bao also uses the significance of Chinese language and the selective use of Chinese and Thai names in relation to the Chinese expression of identity. Both the Thai State and the rise of China's economic influence have impacts on the fall and rise of popularity of learning Chinese.

While change is very much a feature of the Chinese in diaspora, there is also much cultural continuity, as the migrants tried to re-territorialize the Chinese ways of life that they were familiar with. This is most evident in the reterritorialization of Chinese beliefs and practices, as the chapter on the goddess Tianhou by Tan Chee-Beng illustrates. Originally a sea deity from Meizhou in eastern Fujian, the worship of Tianhou spread along the coasts of China and overseas with Chinese migration from southern China, Fujian in particular. Thus outside mainland China, the worship of Tianhou is especially important in Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and Southeast Asia; and in Minnan-speaking regions such as Taiwan and most of Southeast Asia, the goddess is also affectionately referred to as Mazu (literally Great Grandma). Chinese temples, such as Tianhou temples, express Chinese cultural identity while they also facilitate the promotion of Chinese cultures. The worship of Mazu is also linked to specific groups of Chinese, such as the Hainanese in Southeast Asia and the Lin surnamed associations. Being originally of China origin, the Tianhou temples in diaspora facilitate the transnational networks between the Chinese in diaspora and the original temple in Meizhou. Chinese religions thus have significance in ethnic Chinese cultural identities and transnational connection with China.

Education, literature, and media

The significance of Chinese cultural continuity is also seen in the promotion of Chinese-medium education and the printing of Chinese newspapers and magazines, which play important roles in Chinese cultural transmission. In this highly globalized and transnational world, the

Chinese media – the satellite television programs, newspapers and magazines – have great impacts on Chinese social imagination and identity formation. In this Handbook, Wanning Sun analyzes what she calls "Chinese mediasphere" in the global Chinese diaspora. These media serve transnational Chinese reading publics whose identity politics relate to both their host societies and the Chinese communities elsewhere. At the same time, Sun points out that one should not neglect the technological capacity of the PRC "to re-center transnational Chinese imagination."

Both Chinese education and Chinese media are important cultural pillars which have great implications for Chinese cultural identities. Their survival and promotion, perceived by most Chinese as crucial to their Chineseness, have not been easy, involving much negotiation with the colonial and indigenous political authorities. The rise of China since the 1980s has helped to promote the study of Chinese while the mass media from the Chinese lands have cultural impacts on the Chinese in diaspora. Chia Oai Peng in this Handbook describes the Chinese education in Southeast Asia. While she does not cover the Chinese education worldwide, we may note that the Chinese new migrants have significant impacts on revitalizing Chinese literacy and Chinese publications worldwide.

The presence of China is also noted by Yow Cheun Hoe in his chapter on the Chinese diaspora and their literature in Chinese. "China is never absent from diasporic Chinese literary sites," he writes. However, the Chinese overseas are very much influenced by the local and global political economy. They need to respond to the local social and political reality. Yow points out that in Southeast Asia where there are policies in favor of the indigenous peoples, the Chinese literature shows that the Chinese have the tendency to "look inward for Chinese ethnicity." Where there is onslaught of Westernization at the expense of Chinese culture, the writers write to defend Chinese language and culture. Where there is multiculturalism, as in Europe and America, the Chinese writers are more at ease crossing cultural boundaries, writes Yow.

The role of Chinese literature in responding to the local political situation is also powerfully described by Wenying Xu in her chapter on US immigration laws and Chinese American literature in English. By discussing the works of various Chinese American writers from the earlier ones like Lee Yan Phou, Sui Sin Far and Louis Chu to the more recent well-known writers like Maxine H. Kingston and Fae Myenne Ng, Xu shows that the Chinese American literature "has attempted to reflect historical reality by fictionalizing courageous acts of resistance, subversion, creative agency, love, and dignity."

Conclusion

Many topics on the Chinese in global distribution have been studied. Each chapter in this Handbook is written by a specialist in his or her particular field of study, and as a whole the Handbook shows the major areas of the study of Chinese overseas. It shows the diverse nature of the Chinese "diasporas," from hardly a diaspora in contemporary Russia to the diasporas formed by new Chinese migrants in different parts of the world, while there are many communities formed by the old migrants, which are so localized in cultural identity and in local consciousness that they are strictly not diasporas if a stricter definition of the term is adopted. Nevertheless, the chapters show that there is varying degree of connection to China, especially with the post-1980 China that has great impact in global capitalism and cultural formation.

The discussions in this Handbook show that Chinese migration and Chinese diasporas have always been influenced by the changing status of China and the global political economy. We may conceive of the Chinese migration in terms of these periods: before the nineteenth century when Chinese traders had been going to and fro between China and Southeast Asia, especially since the famous Ming maritime expeditions led by Admiral Zheng He; the nineteenth century to

the Chinese Revolution of 1911 when the political economy of the colonial powers had great impacts in the globalizing world at a time when China was politically weak; from 1911 to 1949 when China was trying to regain its dignity in the world but was divided by civil war until the establishment of PRC; from 1950 to 1978 when the socialist China under Mao Zedong had strict control on internal and international migration in a world marked by the Cold War; and since the opening up of China in 1978. The last and present period since the 1978 (or we can say since the 1980s) is marked by the rise of China as a global economic power and the migration of new immigrants to different parts of the world influenced by global capitalism that is increasingly China linked.

Migration from China is thus a continuing process, so is re-migration, and so the Chinese diasporas continue to persist and transform. The identity of the Chinese overseas has been influenced by all these processes. In the contemporary period, as most of the chapters in this Handbook have mentioned, the new Chinese migrants have great impacts on local societies, including on the local Chinese culture and identity. Identity is a matter of positioning, as pointed out by Stuart Hall (1999). The Chinese in diaspora are active agents and their positioning is influenced by the processes and histories of migration and re-migration, as well as by local political processes and social relations, and the status and influence of China in the globalizing world. This Handbook should help those who wish to learn about the global phenomena of Chinese migration, transnational connections and their cultural and identity transformation.

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Part I

Population and distribution

1

The Chinese overseas population

Peter S. Li and Eva Xiaoling Li

Much has been written about the history of emigration from China and the settlement of Chinese in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world (Benton and Pieke 1998; Fitzgerald 1972; Kwong and Miscevic 2005; Pan 1998; Wang 1981, 1991; Yen 1995). Despite this rich literature, relatively little has been published on the population of the Chinese overseas. The absence of longitudinal data, along with certain conceptual ambiguities in understanding the Chinese overseas, makes it difficult to estimate the past and future of this population. This chapter uses data from 1955 to 2009 to show the demographic trends of the population of the Chinese overseas, and provides an estimate of the future distribution based on its current rate of growth in different parts of the world.[1] The analysis indicates that even though Asia (not including China) accounts for the largest share of the Chinese overseas population, there has been a proportional shift in distribution from Asia to America. The shift is related to the differences in how the Chinese minority has been integrated in Southeast Asian and North American societies in the period after the Second World War.

The making of the Chinese overseas population

Past research on Chinese overseas stresses the influence of homeland on emigration from China and on the subsequent establishment of social organizations in destination societies (Pan 1998; Yen 1995). The emphasis on China as the original homeland is most evident in the way the history of Chinese overseas has been conceptualized.

Several ways have been proposed to demarcate the history of Chinese emigration and settlements overseas. For example, Chen (1989) proposed dividing the history of Chinese overseas into four periods based on the social and economic development of China. The first period of about four to five hundred years, from the beginning of the twelfth century to the latter part of the sixteenth century, was the beginning of merchant trade missions prompted by the rise in commodity production in China. The second period lasted for about 300 years from the latter half of the sixteenth century, when the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) lifted the imperial edict forbidding emigration, to the beginning of the Opium War (1839–42) that marked the beginning of domination of China by industrialized nations mainly of the West. Not only Chinese merchants traveled and settled outside of China, mainly Southeast Asia, but Chinese workers and laborers

too were also drawn overseas as areas of Southeast Asia were colonized by western industrial nations. The third period, from 1840 to the founding the People's Republic of China in 1949, saw massive emigration of Chinese laborers, sometimes under conditions of indentured servitude, to Southeast Asia, the Americas, Australia, and Africa to fill the labor shortages created by the decline of the slavery system. The last period, from 1949 to the present, represented a new era when China regained its international status and many overseas Chinese became assimilated in their adopted countries.

Zhuang (2001) proposed another scheme to periodize the history of Chinese overseas, linking it mainly to the historical trading relations between China and other nations and to the response of the imperial court to international trade. Accordingly, the history of Chinese migration prior to the twentieth century may be divided into three phases: (1) the phase prior to the thirteenth century when merchants and Buddhist monks travelled to and from China; (2) the second phase between the thirteenth and fifteenth century when the Chinese mercantile trade routes expanded; and (3) the third phase between the fifteenth and nineteenth century that witnessed the rise and fall of mercantile trade under the Ming dynasty,[2] and the expansion of Chinese trading and industrial activities in Southeast Asia during the seventeenth and eighteenth century despite the decline of the Chinese empire.

The two methods of periodization have in common using China as a reference point in marking the history of Chinese overseas. Chen's classification is based on China's economic and social development in relation to the West, while Zhuang's scheme is premised on China's trading relations with other nations. This line of thinking is understandable in view of the conventional perspective of viewing Chinese overseas as extensions of China beyond its boundaries. However, it also suffers from overstretching the history of the Chinese overseas to the pre-modern era and glossing over the finer distinctions in the more recent period.

Wang (2000) developed another framework to understand the history of Chinese overseas that lays less stress on homeland influence and more stress on the conditions of destination societies. Although it was not explicitly stated as a means to periodize the history of Chinese migration and settlement, it does provide a useful reference point to recast the history of Chinese overseas based on the changing aspirations of those who ventured outside of China and settled in various parts of the world. Wang's conceptual schema is based on three stories that correspond to three historical periods. In the first one, which covers much of the Chinese history until the fall of the Ming dynasty (1644), China was preoccupied with its vast territory and did not pay much attention to peripheral countries surrounding the Chinese empire. By the time China was interested to do so, many of them were under the colonial influence of western powers, and Chinese settlements were well established in these countries.

The second period saw the emergence of a way of life among Chinese overseas, the sojourners' way that became apparent in much of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Wang described the sojourners' way as one in which Chinese emigrants were seen as outcasts of China but nevertheless were expected to remain loyal subjects by maintaining a Chinese way of life and eventually returning to their homeland. However, in Asia, the Chinese migrants adopted many ways of sojourning, often accommodating to the local life by intermarrying local women or maintaining a male bachelor society bounded by religious and other social organizations. In Australasia and North America, the Chinese migrants were forced to maintain a marginal lifestyle as a result of racial discrimination and social exclusion. After 1900, however, sojourning took on a new life as Chinese overseas were no longer seen as disloyal subjects turning their backs on China, but were treated as patriots by reformers and revolutionaries of China, who sought after them for financial and political support.

The Chinese overseas were seen as hardworking, enterprising and patriotic, supporting China and aspiring to return one day. The battle over the hearts and minds of the Chinese overseas

between the Nationalist government and the Communist Party continued until well into the second half of the twentieth century. The third period, mainly after the Second World War, witnessed the changing political scene of China under the communist rule, the formation of nation states in former colonies in Southeast Asia, and the gaining of civil rights in many countries in Australasia, North America and Europe. These changes eventually opened the option of multiculturalism in many countries, under which the Chinese minority gained equal rights, became upwardly mobile, and developed various forms of identity that bore different degrees of proximity to Chinese culture, without necessarily maintaining an affinity towards the political regime of China.

The debate regarding how best to periodize the history of Chinese overseas has much to do with whether Chinese overseas were seen as a part of China or as a separate entity that developed into different settlements around the world based on local conditions and exigencies of life. Much of this debate surrounds the understanding of sojourning, i.e., seeing Chinese migrants as global subjects of China with a natural desire to return to their ancestral land one day and therefore maintaining an ephemeral migrant lifestyle in a transient foreign country. The idea of sojourning underscores another controversy surrounding the terms that have been used to describe the Chinese overseas. This controversy also reflects the contention over how much China as the homeland should be retained as a reference point in understanding the making of the Chinese overseas population.

Perhaps the best known of these terms is *huaqiao*, or Chinese sojourners. According to Zhuang (1989: 46), the term *huaqiao* became popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in China, but it first appeared in 1883 in a document written by Zheng Guanying to the high ranking Chinese official Li Hongzhang. However, in the official archives of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) prior to the twentieth century, the term *huaqiao* was rarely used. More commonly used were terms like *huamin* (Chinese people), *huaren* (Chinese) to refer to Chinese subjects settled outside of China; also used were *huagong* and *huashang* to refer to Chinese workers and Chinese merchants respectively (Zhuang 1989). By the early twentieth century, the term *huaqiao* had become an all-encompassing term for all Chinese overseas (Wang 1981: 125). By then, the term had also assumed a more positive connotation of Chinese overseas as zealous patriots and loyal supporters of China (Wang 2000).

Despite the popularity of the term *huaqiao* since the beginning of the twentieth century, its literal meaning of Chinese sojourning overseas implicitly implies a presumptuous jurisdiction of China over all ethnic Chinese outside of China based on a loose interpretation of descent. It also assumes a mentality among Chinese overseas that connects them to China and sets them apart from their adopted countries and local communities. Towards the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Qing dynasty adopted a policy to protect the Chinese overseas as subjects of China with a view to use them to consolidate the support for the imperial empire (Zhuang 2001). However, as Chinese outside of China settled in their adopted country and acquired the local citizenship, especially in the period after the Second World War, and as the People's Republic of China officially abandoned the position of using race or blood relations to define Chinese nationals in 1955[3] (Zhou *et al.* 1993: 277), the substantive implication of the term *huaqiao* to treat overseas Chinese as essentially subjects of China becomes untenable.

Since the term *huaqiao* or Chinese sojourners implies that Chinese overseas were subjects of China emigrated to foreign countries with the desire or intention to return home eventually (Siu 1953; Purcell 1965: 30), some scholars now advocate using a more neutral term "Chinese overseas" to refer to ethnic Chinese outside of China, in recognition of the fact that many Chinese immigrants and their descendants have acquired the citizenship of the adopted country where they also settle permanently and have developed many forms of identity with the adopted country

(see Wang 1991, 2000). In the official discourse of China, the term *haiwai huaren,* or overseas Chinese (often rendered as Chinese overseas), is now more often used to refer to those ethnic Chinese who have acquired the citizenship of their country of residence, while the term *huaqiao* is typically retained for those Chinese immigrants who maintain the citizenship of China.

Another debate emerged in the 1990s that tended to muddle the conceptual boundary of the term "Chinese overseas" by linking it to the economic development of China. The market reform of China in the late 1970s and the subsequent economic growth in the coastal regions of China prompted a new interest in Chinese overseas, especially in the role they played in investing in China's rapid development. Harding (1993: 664) coined the term of "new transnational Chinese economy" to refer to the connections in the prosperity of coastal regions of China, the economic expansion of Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the emergent financial influence of Chinese capitalists and firms within the international Chinese community. Other terms have surfaced in the literature to map this loosely defined economic system, as for example, Asian Chinese Common Market, Chinese Economic Community, and Greater China Economic Sphere (Harding 1993: 666). Among the many interests in what has been called "Greater China" is the role played by "overseas Chinese networks" in facilitating the growth in the so-called "transnational Chinese economy." Simply put, ethnic connections and personalized relationships among the international Chinese community are believed to be instrumental to Chinese capitalists and firms in facilitating their business ventures, and in promoting the economic growth in coastal regions of China since the market reform of the late 1970s. As well, the tendency of ethnic Chinese in different parts of the world to engage in business and commercial ventures is often attributed to their ability to preserve cultural values and cultivate ethnically based networks for business developments (Douw *et al.* 2001; Lever-Tracy *et at.* 1996). In this discussion, the notion of the Chinese diaspora is often used as a substitute for Chinese overseas with a much relaxed and sometimes imprecise boundary.

In a book entitled *The Chinese Diaspora and Mainland China*, Lever-Tracy, Ip and Tracy (1996) made the clearest case in suggesting that a distinct type of capitalism premised on trust and particularistic networks or *guanxi* has long developed in the Chinese diaspora, but it was in combination with the reform and new opportunities in China that a synergy was produced that drove the economic prosperity in China and surrounding regions. Lever-Tracy, Ip and Tracy were careful in making a conceptual distinction between the Chinese diaspora and mainland China, but they were less meticulous when they included in their analysis investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan to mainland China and the role *guanxi* played in these ventures as aspects of Chinese diaspora capitalism. It was Redding (1993: 2) in his discussion of the spirit of Chinese capitalism who explicitly grouped Hong Kong and Taiwan as parts of the overseas Chinese community on the grounds that they were originally from China and continued to think of themselves as Chinese. Thus, in trying to demonstrate the prevalence and interconnectedness of Chinese entrepreneurship in the Chinese diaspora, some authors have incorrectly included Hong Kong and Taiwan in the discussion and have muddled the conceptual boundary of overseas Chinese.

The foregoing discussion makes clear that neither nationality nor sojourning mentality should be considered in demarcating the boundary of Chinese overseas, although historically these were contentious questions. It should be noted that it is also incorrect to refer to Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau as overseas Chinese or parts of the Chinese diaspora, notwithstanding the fact that marked political, economic and ideological differences exist between these areas and mainland China. Indeed, China has officially adopted the term and the policy of "one China, two systems" to recognize the differences between Hong Kong and mainland China, while upholding the principle of national sovereignty.

In this chapter, the population of Chinese overseas is conceptualized to include those ethnic Chinese who have settled outside of mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau either in their generation or in their ancestral past but claim or trace an origin from China. It includes first generation Chinese immigrants who may retain the nationality of China but have settled in another country, as well as descendants of Chinese immigrants, who may have fully assimilated into the adopted country of their migrant ancestors.

Data on the population of Chinese overseas

Poston and Yu (1990, 1992) have provided an authoritative account of the changes in the Chinese overseas population in the decade after the Second World War up to the late 1980s. The authors mainly used official data from Taiwan, including *The China Handbook, the Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China,* and *The Yearbook of the Overseas Chinese Economy* (Poston and Yu 1990: 483). In addition, the authors supplemented the Taiwan data with census data from selected countries and other sources where census data were available. Poston and Yu (1990) considered the Taiwan data most valuable to date on the grounds that they were systematic and comparable over time.

Others have provided population estimates of the Chinese overseas population at various times for different countries based on multiple sources (Suryadinata 1997a; Zhou *et al.* 1993). However, these estimates tend to be cross-sectional and limited at one point in time. By and large, these other estimates do not different much from those analyzed by Poston and Yu (1990, 1992).

There are several advantages in using the data source that Poston and Yu had analyzed up to the 1980s. The Taiwan data have been collected and updated yearly by the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission since the 1950s. For countries where ethnic origin can be identified from censuses and where census data are readily available, such as the USA, Canada, and Australia, the Commission uses the ethnic Chinese population data obtained from census materials of these countries. For countries where such information is less forthcoming, the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission relies on statistics provided by Taiwan agencies and offices stationed around the world, taking into account local estimates and population figures provided by the United Nations (Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission 2008: 10).

Despite the important work of Poston and Yu (1990, 1992) and Poston *et al.* (1994), their analysis requires two qualifications. First, in the original analysis, Poston and Yu (1990) included population figures from Hong Kong and Macau in estimating the population of overseas Chinese. This is probably due to the fact that Hong Kong and Macau were included in the Taiwan overseas Chinese data prior to 1997 and 1999 respectively before the jurisdiction of two places was officially returned to China. The inclusion of Hong Kong and Macau in the population of overseas China is conceptually ambiguous. As a result, the inclusion of Hong Kong and Macau overestimated the overseas Chinese population, in the magnitude of 22% for 1960, 1970, and 1980, and 19% for 1990. Second, the analysis of Poston and Yu (1990, 1992) ended in 1990, the year the latest data were available at the time of their publication. Over twenty years have passed since then, and there have been important changes in the distribution of the population of Chinese overseas.

For consistency and completeness, this chapter uses data on Chinese overseas as provided by the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, Taiwan. Most of the data used for 1955 to 2009 are publicly available. In addition, the first author was able to obtain microdata files on the number of Chinese in each country outside of China for 1996 to 2001 from the Commission. In all the statistics used in this paper, the number of Chinese overseas has been adjusted to include only ethnic Chinese outside of mainland China and Taiwan, and not including Hong Kong and Macau.

Population of Chinese overseas

In 2009, the Chinese overseas population was 39.5 million (Table 1.1), distributed in about 130 countries and five regions of the world. Asia, not including China, was home to the largest number of Chinese overseas, some 29.7 million people, or 75% of the global Chinese overseas population. The second largest concentration was in America, which accounted for 7.3 million of the Chinese overseas population, or 18.5%.

Demographic data between 1955 and 2009 indicate that the population of Chinese overseas had gone through many changes. First, in the 54 year period, the population of overseas Chinese has expanded 3.4 times, from 11 million in 1955 to 39 million in 2009 (Table 1.1). The increase has been steady, although some periods witnessed a faster growth rate than others. In the first period, from 1955 to 1960, the population declined slightly from 11.5 million to 11.3 million. The drop probably had to do with the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the subsequent difficulty to emigrate from China. It also was related to the independence movements in Southeast Asia and the emergence of the Cold War between the East and the West, both of which discouraged Chinese immigration. In the 20 year period between 1960 and 1980, the Chinese overseas population grew steadily, from 11.3 million to 19.4 million, or 1.7 times. After 1980, the Chinese overseas population continued to expand, from 19.4 million in 1980 to 25.3 million in 1990, and then to 39.5 million in 2009. Thus, in the 29 year period between 1980 and 2009, the Chinese overseas population almost doubled.

It is difficult to estimate how the future of Chinese overseas population will change, as the total number and its world distribution are affected by demographic and social forces. However, if the same rate of population growth in each region between 2000 and 2009 can be maintained, then the future of the Chinese overseas population can be estimated to be 46 million in 2020, 52 million in 2030, and 59 million in 2040.

In the period between 1955 and 2009, the distribution of the Chinese overseas population by regions has shifted, with some regions accounting for a larger proportion, and some, a smaller one. Table 1.2 shows that prior to 1980, over 90% of the Chinese overseas population were located

Table 1.1 Actual and projected Chinese overseas population by region, 1955–2040

	Number					
Year	*Asia*	*America*	*Europe*	*Oceania*	*Africa*	*Total*
Actual						
1955	11,074,000	266,000	14,000	69,000	33,000	11,456,000
1960	10,904,000	301,000	14,000	74,000	40,000	11,333,000
1970	14,147,000	711,000	112,000	69,000	59,000	15,098,000
1980	17,100,000	1,558,000	525,000	105,000	75,000	19,363,000
1990	21,588,000	2,663,000	589,000	356,000	99,000	25,295,000
2000	27,363,000	5,959,000	955,000	631,000	137,000	35,045,000
2009	29,747,000	7,287,000	1,259,000	932,000	238,000	39,463,000
Projected						
2020	*33,561,919*	*9,744,454*	*1,876,684*	*1,637,137*	*528,489*	*45,626,036*
2030	*36,826,230*	*12,185,439*	*2,551,228*	*2,525,179*	*976,209*	*52,060,227*
2040	*40,408,036*	*15,237,891*	*3,468,225*	*3,894,927*	*1,803,223*	*59,401,767*

Source: Figures for 1955–2009, selected years, are based on statistics from the 2009 *Statistical Yearbook of the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission*, Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, Taiwan, 2010. Figures prior to 2000 have been adjusted by subtracting the population of Hong Kong and Macau from Asia and the total. The population of Hong Kong and the population of Macau were not reported after 1997 and 1999 respectively in the original data.

Table 1.2 Percentage distribution of actual and projected Chinese overseas population by region, 1955–2040

	Percent					
Year	*Asia*	*America*	*Europe*	*Oceania*	*Africa*	*Total*
Actual						
1955	96.7	2.3	0.1	0.6	0.3	100.0
1960	96.2	2.7	0.1	0.7	0.4	100.0
1970	93.7	4.7	0.7	0.5	0.4	100.0
1980	88.3	8.0	2.7	0.5	0.4	100.0
1990	85.3	10.5	2.3	1.4	0.4	100.0
2000	78.1	17.0	2.7	1.8	0.4	100.0
2009	75.4	18.5	3.2	2.4	0.6	100.0
Projected						
2020	73.6	21.4	4.1	3.6	1.2	100.0
2030	70.7	23.4	4.9	4.9	1.9	100.0
2040	68.0	25.7	5.8	6.6	3.0	100.0

Source: Calculated from Table 1.1.

in Asia, with the Americas accounting for no more than 5% of the total population, and Europe, Oceania and Africa collectively making up less than 2%. However, after 1980, there has been a steady decline in Asia's proportional share of the Chinese overseas population, from 88% in 1980 to 85% in 1990 and then to 75% in 2009. In contrast, the percentage share in the Americas has increased substantially, from 8% in 1980 to 17% in 2000 and 19% in 2009. Europe and Oceania too have assumed a rising importance in accounting for a relatively larger share of the Chinese overseas population. By 2009, Europe accounted for 3.2% and Oceania, 2.4%. If the rate of annual increase between 2000 and 2009 stays the same for the future, then by 2020, the Americas would account for over 21% of the Chinese overseas population, and Asia, 74%. By 2040, the proportional share of the Chinese overseas population in Asia would be further reduced to 68%, and the share in the Americas would increase to about 26%. By 2040 too, Oceania and Europe would account for 6.6% and 5.8% of the total Chinese overseas population respectively.

The proportional shift in the Chinese overseas population in the decades after the Second World War has to do with differential rates of growth in regions. For most of the decades in the latter half of the twentieth century, the average annual percentage increase in Asia was between 1–2%[4] (Table 1.3). For the Americas, the growth was slowed between 1955 and 1960, around 2.5% annually. But between 1960 and 2000, the average annual increase for each decade was between 6–9% every year. Partly because of the small baseline number of Chinese in Europe in the 1950s, the yearly enlargement in the decades 1960–70 and 1970–80 was spectacular in Europe, around 23% and 17% respectively. For the 54 year period between 1955 and 2009, the annual average growth was about 1.8% in Asia, 6.3% in the Americas, 8.7% for Europe, 4.9% for Oceania, and 3.7 for Africa. In all, the global ethnic Chinese population outside of China grew by 2.3% annually between 1955 and 2009.

Although the Chinese overseas population is distributed in some 130 countries outside of China, 23 countries with the largest concentration in fact account for about 96% of the total Chinese overseas population, with the remaining 107 countries sharing the rest of the 4%.[5] In 2009, Indonesia was home to some 7.8 million Chinese overseas, accounting for almost 20% of the global Chinese overseas population. Thailand came second with 7.2 million ethnic Chinese, and

Table 1.3 Average annual percentage growth of Chinese overseas population, 1955–2009

Period	*Asia*	*America*	*Europe*	*Oceania*	*Africa*	*Total*
1955–1960	–0.3	2.5	0.0	1.4	3.9	–0.2
1960–1970	2.6	9.0	23.1	–0.7	4.0	2.9
1970–1980	1.9	8.2	16.7	4.3	2.4	2.5
1980–1990	2.4	5.5	1.2	13.0	2.8	2.7
1990–2000	2.4	8.4	5.0	5.9	3.3	3.3
2000–2009	0.9	2.3	3.1	4.4	6.3	1.3
1955–2009	1.8	6.3	8.7	4.9	3.7	2.3
1960–2009	2.1	6.7	9.6	5.3	3.7	2.6
1970–2009	1.9	6.1	6.4	6.9	3.6	2.5

Source: Calculated from Table 1.1.

Malaysia with 6.5 million (Table 1.4). Thus, the three countries with the largest concentration of ethnic Chinese – Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia – accounted for about 55% of the total Chinese overseas population in 2009. However, the proportional share of these countries has slipped slightly in the 12 year period between 1997 and 2009, from 58% to 55%. Two other countries in Asia also had a sizable ethnic Chinese population: 2.8 million in Singapore and 1.2 million in the Philippines. In 2009, the five countries in Asia, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines, accounted for 65% of the total Chinese overseas population, or 86% of all the ethnic Chinese in Asia outside of China.

In the Americas, the USA had the largest ethnic Chinese population of 4.2 million in 2009. When the ethnic Chinese population of 1.3 million in Canada is added, the two countries accounted for 14% of the total Chinese overseas population or 76% of all the ethnic Chinese in the Americas. In the Oceania region, Australia accounted for 1.9% of the total Chinese overseas population, and New Zealand, 0.4%. But the number of ethnic Chinese in Australia and New Zealand made up 95% of the ethnic Chinese in the Oceania region. In contrast, England, France, Holland and Italy accounted for 68% of the ethnic Chinese in Europe, although globally, the ethnic Chinese in these four countries made up only about 2% of the total Chinese overseas population.

Undoubtedly, between 1997 and 2009, highly industrialized countries like the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and England have increased their proportional share of the total Chinese overseas population, from 13% in 1997 to 17% in 2009. This increase is in contrast to the proportional decline in countries like Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia.

Explaining the shift[6]

It is clear that although Asia is still home to about three-quarters of the Chinese overseas, there has been a gradual shift from Asia to North America and to a lesser extent to Oceania and Europe in the past decades. Several reasons probably account for this graduate shift that started after 1960. These factors have to do with differences in the historical formation and political development in the two regions.

Chinese emigration to Southeast Asia was originally prompted by China's imperial aggrandizement and trade relations with regions outside of China (Fitzgerald 1972; Kuhn 2008; Reid 1998). However, the migration of Chinese to North American, Australia and European countries in the latter half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was largely triggered by industrialization of the West and the subsequent demand for Oriental laborers during times of labor

Table 1.4 Population of Chinese overseas in top 23 countries, 1997, 2009

Countries	*1997*			*2009*		
	N	*%*	*Rank*	*N*	*%*	*Rank*
Indonesia	7,310,000	22.0	1	7,834,000	19.9	1
Thailand	6,358,000	19.1	2	7,178,000	18.2	2
Malaysia	5,445,100	16.4	3	6,479,000	16.4	3
USA	2,597,000	7.8	4	4,178,000	10.6	4
Singapore	2,311,300	7.0	5	2,756,000	7.0	5
Canada	1,001,000	3.0	8	1,332,000	3.4	6
Philippines	1,030,000	3.1	7	1,190,000	3.0	7
Vietnam	1,145,850	3.4	6	1,136,000	2.9	8
Burma	959,100	2.9	10	1,090,000	2.8	9
Peru	540,150	1.6	11	987,000	2.5	10
Australia	372,000	1.1	12	734,000	1.9	11
Japan	234,264	0.7	15	681,000	1.7	12
Russia	1,000,283	3.0	9	495,000	1.3	13
Cambodia	300,000	0.9	13	350,000	0.9	14
England	250,000	0.8	14	335,000	0.8	15
France	225,000	0.7	16	233,000	0.6	16
Brazil	127,700	0.4	19	244,000	0.6	17
Laos	160,000	0.5	18	197,000	0.5	18
India	167,777	0.5	17	155,000	0.4	19
New Zealand	111,308	0.3	21	149,000	0.4	20
Italy	60,600	0.2	22	170,000	0.4	21
Holland	127,500	0.4	20	113,000	0.3	22
South Africa	31,000	0.1	23	109,000	0.3	23
Total (23 countries)	31,804,332	95.69		37,903,000	96.05	
Total (all countries)	33,238,000	100.00		39,463,000	100.00	

Source: Figures for 1997 are based on electronic data provided by Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, Taiwan; and for 2009, 2009 *Statistical Yearbook of the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission*, Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, Taiwan, 2010.

shortage (Benton and Pieke 1998; Li 1998; Pan 1998). There are many notable differences between the Chinese communities in highly industrialized nations in North America and those in Southeast Asia. Demographically, the ethnic Chinese make up a small numeric minority in North America, about 3% in Canada, and 1% in the USA. However, in Southeast Asia, the proportion of ethnic Chinese in their country of residence tends to vary widely, ranging from the special case of Singapore in which the Chinese made up about 70% of its population, to a diverse nation such as Malaysia where the 6.5 million ethnic Chinese constitute about a quarter of its population, and to populous countries like Indonesia where the 7.8 million or so ethnic Chinese account for only 3% of the country's population. The Chinese communities in North America and Southeast Asia differ not just in absolute number and relative concentration. There are also major differences in the way the host society has incorporated the ethnic Chinese in the historical and contemporary contexts.

In many multiracial societies of Southeast Asia, racial features were accentuated by a history of colonization or neo-colonialism such that distinctions between races were the bases of class formation and social control. Even in the post-colonial period after the Second World War, such racial distinctions remain socially significant. In advanced industrialized societies like the USA, Canada, Australia and England, "race" was used historically to justify economic exploitation and inequality in the early stages of industrial development but later became a celebratory feature

in the age of equality and multiculturalism. Suryadinata (1997b: 3) has referred to the first type of societies as "indigenous nations," in that they rely upon "the native ethnic groups as their frame of reference," as opposed to "immigrant nations" of the second type which use "the model of the immigrant groups" as a reference point.

The distinction between these two modes of incorporation has little to do with primordial differences of race, and more to do with its social construction. Thus, in colonial and post-colonial societies of Southeast Asia, the ethnic Chinese became a mediating element which advanced the interests of the colonizing or ruling class, and in doing so, occupied a privileged and distinguishable racial position *vis-à-vis* the indigenous population (Mackie 1988; Suryadinata 1981, 1986, 1997a, 1997b). The ethnic Chinese communities in such multiracial societies often have the image of an outside group which has over-claimed their economic and political entitlement by taking advantage of their middleman position during colonial times, and by maintaining their secured financial and entrepreneurial position in post-colonial era. However, in poly-ethnic societies of North America that historically were dominated by European settlers, the Chinese in the nineteenth century became the laboring class and their superficial racial differences were used as convenient grounds for social marginalization and economic exploitation. The Chinese communities in North America and, to a large extent Europe and Australia, share a similar history, one that began with receiving societies seeking Oriental labor to relieve labor shortages during the industrial expansion of the nineteenth century, and one that was subsequently marred by an emergent ideology of anti-Orientialism. These poly-ethnic societies adopted a similar ideological stance toward the Chinese in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The Chinese were seen as culturally undesirable and racially inferior but were useful in fulfilling labor needs of industrialization (Ward 1978; Anderson 1991; Clegg 1994; Li 1998). In a sense, the Chinese were marginal in both types of society, but the way the marginal "space" was constructed depended on how the Chinese were racialized in each setting.

In the period after the Second World War, the ethnic Chinese in many countries in Southeast Asia continued to be viewed with suspicion by the indigenous population and local government. As former colonies became independent and nationalism mounted, those ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia interested to maintain a rigorous Chinese identity were often suspected as being disloyal to the local government or sympathetic to communist elements (Wang 2000: 89). For example, in Indonesia, for much of the 32 year presidency of Suharto (1967–98), the Chinese were confined in many aspects of life. The Indonesian government essentially followed a policy to limit the political and social participation of Chinese and contain their economic expansion. There was a conscious effort to advance the rights and control of the indigenous people, or *pribumis*, and to discourage the maintenance of the Chinese language, education, and publications among the Chinese under the policy of indonesianization (Heidhues 1998: 166–8; Suryadinata 1997b). Even today, there remains a mistrust of the Chinese by the *pribumis*, who see the Chinese as outsiders who, having profited from the colonial era, now maintained their economic advantage over the indigenous people. In short, the image of the Chinese is of a racial minority that is opportunistic and privileged, and whose loyalty to Indonesia is questionable. In Malaysia in the period after the Second World War, there were strong demands on the ethnic Chinese to demonstrate their loyalty to Malaysian society and to assimilate linguistically and politically (Suryadinata 1997b; Wang 2000). Other countries in Asia, like the Philippines during the Marcos era (1965–86) and Thailand, pursued an assimilation approach toward the ethnic Chinese by downplaying ethnic Chinese cultural features and stressing assimilation into the indigenous population (Suryadinata 1997b).

In contrast, in the period after the Second World War, liberal democracy was strengthened in poly-ethnic immigrant societies like the USA, Canada, and Australia with the entrenchment of

civil rights and a growing social acceptance of values of equality and multiculturalism. At the same time, many advanced industrialized countries were facing labor shortages in professional and technical jobs as their economy became more information based. Thus the rising skilled labor demand, coupled with demographic shifts in declining fertility and population aging, compelled countries like Canada, Australia, England and the USA to revamp their immigration policies after the 1960s (Li 2003). As a result, Chinese immigration to these countries was increasing in the latter part of the twentieth century. The Chinese communities in Canada, the USA, Australia and Europe were revived with the abolition of immigration restrictions and the arrival of fresh immigrants with a more diverse educational and occupational background. The population expansion of these Chinese communities and the changing composition of the new arrivals gradually alter the social status and occupational position of the Chinese in these societies.

Conclusion

Despite substantial research on Chinese overseas, there have been few attempts to analyze the Chinese overseas population. This chapter makes use of 54 years of demographic data to discuss the changes in the Chinese overseas population.

Several attempts to periodize the history of Chinese overseas have used China as a point of reference to frame the history in terms of China's trading relations with other nations or China's social and economic development. In so doing, overseas Chinese were defined in relations to China. Wang (2000) departs from others in framing the historical understanding of Chinese overseas on the changing aspirations of those who ventured outside of China and settled in various parts of the world. In this formulation, Chinese overseas are delineated on their survival methods and adaptive capacity, rather than their political allegiance or ties to China.

Another debate has to do with terms used to describe Chinese overseas. This debate also reflects the tensions underlying whether China should be used as point of reference to study Chinese overseas. The best known of these terms is *huaqiao*, or Chinese sojourners. Historically, the term implies Chinese overseas were subjects of China who, despite moving away from China, aspired to returning home eventually. The term also implies a presumptuous claim of China as having a jurisdiction over all ethnic Chinese over the world. In the first half of the twentieth century, *huaqiao* assumed a more patriotic connotation and overseas Chinese were seen as enterprising patriots of China. However in the second half of the twentieth century, as more Chinese settled permanently and acquired citizenship in countries outside of China, the notion of Chinese overseas as subjects of China sojourning overseas became untenable.

The third issue concerns whether the Chinese in Hong Kong and Macau should be considered as overseas Chinese. Authors who have done so often argue that these cities have been politically and ideologically different from Mainland China, and Chinese there have been instrumental in investing in Mainland China to promote its prosperity. In this chapter, Chinese overseas are defined as those who have settled in countries outside of Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, either in their generation or in the ancestral past, but claim or trace their origin to China.

In 2009, about 39 million ethnic Chinese resided in about 130 countries outside of mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. There are several noted demographic features regarding this population. First, the Chinese overseas population has increased steadily since the middle of the twentieth century, from 11 million in 1955 to 19 million in 1980, and to 35 million in 2000. However, the growth has been uneven in different regions, with Asia experiencing the slowest average annual growth rate since 1955, and America and Europe, the fastest. Second, the differential growth rates result in a shift in the distribution of the Chinese overseas population.

Asia, which was home to over 96% of the population of the Chinese overseas in the 1950s, now accounts for about 75%. In contrast, the Chinese in America that made up about 2% of the Chinese overseas population in 1955, have now grown to 19%. Third, if the present rates of growth stay the same, then by 2040, Asia will account for 68% of the Chinese overseas population, and America, 26%. Fourth, 23 countries account for about 96% of the total Chinese overseas population, but the proportional weight of ethnic Chinese in some populous countries in Asia has declined while the weight in some highly industrialized countries has increased.

Certain historical factors and contemporary forces probably explain the relative decline in some areas and the increase in others. The difference is essentially between multiracial societies of Asia and the more nascent poly-ethnic societies of advanced capitalist countries of the West. In the former case, the Chinese served mainly as a middleman minority in the historical period of colonialism or neo-colonialism, mediating between the ruling class and the indigenous population; in the latter case, the Chinese were recruited under different conditions for early industrialization and post-industrial development. In the period after the Second World War, the Chinese in many parts of Southeast Asia were subjected to national policies that demanded their loyalty to the local government and required them to abandon cultural ties and political attachments to China. Rising nationalism and emerging claims of indigenous rights in many former colonies of Southeast Asia also tend to marginalize the ethnic Chinese. In contrast, in advanced industrial countries of the West, the period after the Second World War saw the entrenchment of civil rights and recognition of values of equality and multiculturalism. These changes, together with the demand for skilled labor, resulted in countries like the USA, Canada, Australia, England and other European countries revamping the immigration laws to facilitate new immigrants of Chinese origin entering these countries. Consequently, there was a surge of Chinese immigration to these countries toward the latter part of the twentieth century.

If the present annual rate of growth continues, the Chinese overseas population is expected to reach almost 52 million by 2030 with about 71% still residing in Asia, and 59 million by 2040 with about 68% in Asia. However, the Americas (mainly the USA and Canada), Europe and Oceania (mainly Australia and New Zealand) will account for a large share of the global Chinese overseas population, in the magnitude of about 33% in 2030, and 38% in 2040.

Notes

1 See Li and Li (2011) for an analysis of the changes in the Chinese overseas population in selective years.

2 The Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) tended to be inward looking and, for the most part, discouraged overseas trade and travels (Wang 2000). Ironically, despite the imperial edict as early as 1370 and various measures to dissuade non-official traveling outside of China, it was under the Ming dynasty that the court sent Zheng He and his fleets as emissary to seven great voyages to the Indian Ocean and beyond between 1405 and 1433 (Zheng and Zheng 1983). The expeditions led by Zheng He were grandiose, the largest one involving 37,000 men, 62 ships as long as 517 feet (Fitzgerald 1972: 89). Zheng He and his convoy traveled to Southeast Asia, India and the east coast of Africa, and left many enduring effects of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia (Fitzgerald 1972; Zheng and Zheng 1983). The imperial edict that forbade leaving the empire without permission was lifted in 1567 and the number of private merchants going to southeast Asia was estimated to have increased dramatically to over 100,000 (Zhuang 2001: 63).

3 In 1955, Zhou Enlai, the then Premier of the People's Republic of China, announced in the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, a resolution of the citizenship question of overseas Chinese, by which overseas Chinese holding the nationality of China and that of another country must choose one citizenship. As a result of this policy, China has abandoned the position of using race or blood relations to define Chinese nationals and rejected dual citizenship of those who wish to claim the nationality of China and that of another country (Zhou et. al. 1993: 277).

4 The formula for calculating the annual percentage of population increase between a beginning period and an ending period is as follows:

$$(r \times 100) = [(P_t / P_0)^{1/y} - 1] \times 100$$

where P_0 = population at the beginning of the period; P_t = population at the end of the period; y = number of years in the period; r = average annual rate of growth; and $(r \times 100)$ = average annual percent growth.

5 Based on the microdata files for 1996 and 2001, the number of countries reported by the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission varies from 125 to 130. In 2001, the number of countries listed with an entry of overseas Chinese is 130.

6 This section is largely based on Li and Li (2011).

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Part II

Mainland China and Taiwan's policies on the Chinese overseas

2

China's policies on Chinese overseas

Past and present

Zhuang Guotu

Policies of imperial China toward Chinese overseas

Until the late Qing period (1840s to 1911), the Chinese governments' policies toward Chinese overseas were basically an aspect of their policies toward overseas trade. From the Qin to the Yuan dynasties (221 BC to 1368 AD), the Chinese governments had normally not interfered with private overseas trade. Some Chinese maritime merchants and sailors even settled down abroad. Because the number was very limited, they had been largely neglected by the Chinese governments. Based on China's advanced handicraft industry and shipbuilding, higher navigation technology and abundant commodities for export, the Chinese merchants who replaced the Muslim merchants that were active between East Asia and the Indian Ocean, played a leading role in the East Asia maritime trade from the thirteenth century onwards. When the Chinese merchants spread all over the trading ports in East Asia, they established their trade bases, resulting in the emergence of permanent Chinese settlements. Toward the end of the fourteenth century, several large Chinese communities were formed in Java, Sumatra and other ports in Southeast Asia, each of which had several thousands of Chinese people (Zhuang 2001: 53–5).

The Ming period (1368–1644 AD) is particularly significant due to the highly divergent and often contradictory policies that the Ming government applied at different times toward its own subjects' overseas trade, while the court harbored high expectations of obtaining large profits from the private trade. Before 1567 the Ming Court forbade its own subjects from engaging in private overseas trading, "not even allowing a wooden plank to drift to sea" (Zhang 1974: 5405), with the exception of the period 1405–33 when the court sent seven large fleets abroad to promote tributary relations between China and the overseas polities. Though the imperial maritime ban was very strict, a large number of Chinese private merchants and seafaring people remained active in the seas in East Asia to engage in the illegal trade. Their maritime commercial network stretched from Japan and Taiwan all over Southeast Asia, and a large number of them settled down in their overseas trade bases. When the official force tried in vain to suppress the private overseas activities, the court had to face the reality that the more strictly the prohibitions were enforced the more the rebels increased. In 1567 the court was compelled to lift the maritime prohibition, and afterwards, several hundred Chinese ocean-going vessels carrying tens of thousands of merchants went abroad every year.

The European expansion into the Far East since the late sixteenth century gave a new impetus to the development of the Chinese overseas business network and Chinese overseas settlements. On the one hand the Europeans brought East Asia into the global trade, and the products of East Asia gradually showed their importance in the world market. The overseas Chinese business network in East Asia was combined into the global trade network dominated by the Europeans after they engaged in business with the Chinese merchants in East Asia. This enabled the latter who controlled Chinese commodities to have the opportunity to export their commodities beyond East Asia, and thus increased their trade capacity. On the other hand, the process of colonization in Southeast Asia stimulated Chinese overseas emigration to Southeast Asia on a big scale. When the Europeans – whether the Dutch in Indonesia, the British in the Malay Peninsula, the Spanish in the Philippines, or the French in Indo-China – competitively established their trade ports and exploited their colonies, they all tried to recruit Chinese laborers and welcomed Chinese business people. The Chinese merchants and laborers were absolutely necessary to the Europeans colonies in Southeast Asia. The Chinese merchants supplied the commodities, such as tea, porcelain, silk and so on, which were in high demand in the Europe market. The European merchants, on the other hand, brought daily goods to the colonies. The Chinese were engaged in municipal works, planting, mining, handcraft production and transport construction, much needed in the colonial development of Southeast Asia. By the middle of the seventeenth century more than 100,000 Chinese had already settled down in Southeast Asia and Taiwan, and most of them were merchants and vendors (Zhuang 2001: 161). Almost all of them concentrated in the ports which had long been part of the Chinese trade routes, such as Dutch Batavia, Spanish Manila, Portuguese Malacca, Dutch Taiwan, Nagasaki and some other ports in Southeast Asia. All these Chinese settlements were located within the range of the Chinese overseas business network and they formed the pillars of this network.

After the Manchu established the Qing dynasty in 1644, the Manchu Court formulated strict laws and regulations on maritime trade, and the overseas migration was eventually totally forbidden. The imperial Qing view of overseas Chinese as rebels and subversives hatching conspiracies abroad is not surprising. In challenging the Qing conquest, Koxinga's resistance drew on naval and financial resources outside China. Even after Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong) was defeated, the court remained uneasy, fearing that the remnants of his forces taking sanctuary in Southeast Asia might plot against the dynasty. A wish to counter such challenges lay behind the series of imperial edicts, issued between 1656 and 1712, which made overseas travel and residence a capital crime punishable by beheading. Chinese sojourners overseas were thus criminals by definition. The legal sanctions against them had never been stricter or more comprehensive. Local officials, though opened to the heaviest penalties themselves if they did not enforce the decrees assiduously, were often tempted to resort to extortion and arbitrary proceedings against the vulnerable returnees.

From 1717 onwards, the court not only issued a series of decrees to prohibit its subjects leaving the country, it also did not allow those who exceeded the specified time abroad to return to China. The Qing Court considered the large number of Chinese abroad as an "image problem"; they were seen as deserters, traitors, rebels and conspirators. By leaving home, they left their filial duties unfulfilled: their parents unattended, their forebears' graves not swept, and ancestral sacrifices not offered. Whereas working the land has been a paramount Chinese virtue since the earliest times, the overseas Chinese sought profit from trade. As the Emperor put it in a decree in 1727, "I believe the majority of those who go overseas are undesirable elements. If they are allowed to go as they wish without any time limit, they will become more undesirable, and will encourage more people to follow suit." Among many cases of punished violators against overseas migration laws, that of Yang Ying and Chen Wei were representative. Yang

and Chen were tea dealers in Batavia and over-stayed there. In 1733 the two of them returned secretly to Amoy from Batavia and they were detained by the Qing local government and were charged with illegal emigration. Even the local officers knew that the two of them were simply businessmen, they were punished by having to donate their property and having their residence monitored.

The attitude of the court toward the Dutch massacre of the Chinese in Batavia reflected the Qing's policies of overseas Chinese. In 1740 the Dutch colonists murdered several thousand Chinese in Batavia. When the news was reported to China, the court considered these murdered Chinese as abandoned people and did not even make any protest against the Dutch.

Alhough the court enforced the stringent laws against Chinese emigration, the people in southeast coastal China had sought their livelihood overseas for centuries, and there was no way to stop them going abroad. Actually the thousands of kilometers of coastline and border could not be controlled by the few patrols of the Qing government, and smuggling abroad was a common phenomenon. Moreover, widespread corruption of officials allowed the overseas emigrants to go abroad. The whole of the eighteenth century witnessed the continuing wave of emigration from southeast coastal China to Southeast Asia and Taiwan.

Alongside the expansion of the Chinese overseas trade network from the coastal areas into the hinterland in Southeast Asia and Taiwan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Chinese merchants developed their business activities from commodity circulation to commodity production. The Chinese emigrants also moved from the coastal areas to the hinterland in Southeast Asia to be engaged in planting, mining and handcraft production. The expansion of Chinese overseas business network from the coastal areas to the hinterland in Southeast Asia and Taiwan also opened the way for the Chinese immigrants to move into new ventures, and offered them more ways for livelihood than just activities related to trade. This encouraged more Chinese to migrate. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century some 1.5 million Chinese settled down in Southeast Asia and more than 2 million Chinese resided in Taiwan (Zhuang 2001: 174). Hundreds of Chinese settlements spread over Southeast Asia, and the majority of the overseas Chinese population were not traders and peddlers, but planters, miners and handcraft workers, though the Chinese were still dominant in the trade sector (Zhuang 1992). In Taiwan, the Chinese immigrants established themselves as the majority of the inhabitants in Taiwan Island.

China's defeat in the Opium Wars brought the foreign world within its maritime gates. Among other things, that colonial world wanted cheap labor. This it gained through the coolie trade, through which large numbers of Chinese were shipped between 1845 and 1874. The abuses which characterized this trade eventually forced the local Chinese officials to pay attention. In 1860, under pressure from Britain and France, China agreed to the right of its subjects to work and live abroad. A clause to that effect was included in the Beijing Conventions it signed with Britain and France, and soon afterwards, with the USA, Spain, Holland, Peru and others.

If, as traders and rebels, the Chinese overseas aroused distrust in China, they provoked sympathy and dismay as downtrodden coolies. Traveling abroad, Chinese diplomats noted the hardship and discrimination suffered by China's subjects overseas. When the news was brought home, it caused quite a change in the prevailing official attitudes. It took an official like Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), who was Governor-general in Tianjin but who acted as China's de facto foreign minister, to improve the wretched lot of the overseas coolies. As part of a new stage of foreign-policy activism over which Li presided, investigation commissions were sent to Cuba in 1873 and to Peru the following year to report on the conditions of life and work of the Chinese laborers there.

The findings were horrifying enough to radically change the official Chinese stance on the overseas Chinese. The disclosures of the commission's reports left no doubt that the abduction

and forcible transportation of Chinese coolies across the seas were prologues to hideous atrocities perpetrated in the destination country. The revelations came at a time when a Peruvian plenipotentiary was negotiating a treaty with Li Hongzhang for augmenting the supply of Chinese coolie labor to Peru. Such abuses, Li made clear to the Peruvians, could not be countenanced, nor would he agree to the treaty without some reassurance of justice for the victims. To be sympathetic to and even protective of the Chinese abroad was a new departure for a government whose stance had been for so long to denigrate, dismiss and punish them.

The right of the Chinese to emigrate, to visit or return to their homeland at will was formally recognized in 1893, with the lifting of the old ban on emigration. The prime movers in the abolition were Xue Fucheng, the Chinese Ambassador to England, and Huang Zunxian, the Chinese Consul-general to the Strait Settlements (Malacca, Penang and Singapore). These men saw the gains to be had in harnessing the economic strengths of the overseas Chinese to the cause of China's modernization. Earlier, in 1877, the first Chinese consulate had been established in Singapore, with Hu Xuanze, better known as Hoo Ah Kay, as Consul. By the time of its demise, the Qing had established 46 consulates, a great part of whose concern was to recruit overseas Chinese merchants' support for China's economic development; among other things, these consulates promoted Chinese education and the setting up of Chambers of Commerce in the overseas communities.

Widely publicizing the change of policy in local Chinese newspapers in Singapore, Huang Zunxian offered visas to those who wished to return to China, visas which obliged Chinese officials to protect the returnees. Yet the returnees could not always be sure that the new rules would be effectively and coherently applied at the local level by officials at the ports in Guangdong or Fujian. There remained an overhang of prejudice from the days when overseas residence was tantamount to desertion.

The Merchants Protection Bureau, a new body proposed by the Governor of Fujian and duly created there and in Guangdong with the blessing of the court, was to see to it that returned overseas Chinese were registered and looked after. But it did not live up to its name, and many overseas Chinese merchants still found themselves prey to local harassment and extortion. Indeed, the local gentry who ran the bureaus were themselves corrupt and predatory. All in all, an overseas Chinese merchant contemplating business investments in his hometown would have little reason to believe that either he or his money were safe. The Ministry of Commerce tried to intervene, but the tricky central–local balance of power made this another case of uncooperative local government thwarting central authority.

Chinese imperial administrators were grappling with what China under Deng Xiaoping a century later would call "modernization." Modernization implied industrialization. And it was here (again anticipating the China of the 1980s) that the overseas Chinese came into play: they were a source and conduit of much needed capital and entrepreneurial skills. The Qing Court was aggressive in its bid to attract overseas Chinese capitalists. For the latter, association with the imperial bureaucracy conferred mandarin status of the kind denied them in their overseas commercial setting. Their eagerness for the traditional Chinese indices of prestige showed itself in their purchase of Qing official titles and honorary ranks.

Modernization also implied a degree of westernization. Here again, overseas Chinese could make an impression, as a source and conduit of "Western learning." Li Hongzhang, the leading modernizer of the day, brought into his entourage of experts a number of overseas Chinese, Yung Wing (Rong Hong) and Wu Tingfang being two of the best known. These were men with experience of the West. Ever since then, overseas Chinese have been viewed as assets to China.

China's interest in *huaqiao* (Chinese sojourners abroad) found legal expression in the Nationality Law, China's first, promulgated by the Qing government in 1909. This was based on the

principle of *jus sanguinis*: any person born of a Chinese father or mother (if the father were unkonwn) was a Chinese citizen regardless of birthplace.

Meanwhile, as the dynasty began to crack, reformists and revolutionaries, followers of Kang Youwei and Sun Yat-sen respectively, cultivated supporters among the overseas Chinese, many of whose children were inculcated with nationalistic sentiments at the overseas schools where the two camps had influence. Liu Wu-chi (see Pan 2006: 78, 191) reports in his book on the half-Japanese writer Su Manshu that at the Chinese school the latter attended in Yokohama, slogans like this were chanted regularly:

> Our national humiliation has not been avenged,
> And the people's life is still full of hardships,
> Do not forget it every time you take your meals.
> Oh, young men, exert yourself diligently!

Policies of the Republic of China toward the Chinese overseas

Interest in *huaqiao* became still stronger under the Republican government ushered in by Sun Yat-sen's 1911 revolution. This was in keeping not only with Sun's thinking on *huaqiao* but also with the fact that the new ruling party, the Kuomintang, had been helped to power by ardent overseas Chinese. Under the new laws, the *huaqiao* could send six representatives to the newly elected Parliament. The Kuomintang's loss of power to Yuan Shikai and his successors, whose military force was much stronger than that of Sun and his supporters before 1927, did not diminish the government's interest in *qiaowu*, "Overseas Chinese affairs." In addition to passing laws and regulations relating to overseas Chinese labor, repatriation, investment and education, Yuan Shikai's regime established a machinery for overseeing such affairs. This took form locally, as the Jinan Bureau in Fujian (Jinan is an allusion to "Nanyang"), and then at the level of the central government.

The first coherent policy toward the overseas Chinese was laid down by the Nationalist government, which a newly triumphant Kuomintang inaugurated in Nanjing in 1927. That year the government established an Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau in Shanghai. In 1929 the government adopted the Nationality Law first enacted by the Qing in 1909; this law has remained in force in Taiwan. In 1932 the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission became what it continued to be in Taiwan, a ministry under the Executive Yuan with nationwide responsibilities. Its counterpart in the Kuomintang party was the so called "No. 3 Section," an organ, renamed the Overseas Work Committee in 1972, whose work is often hard to tell apart from that of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission. At the local government level, eight *qiaowu* bureaus or departments were set up in either emigrant areas or at ports of entry or exit regularly used by the *huaqiao*. In 1931–48, the Nationalist government promulgated scores of laws and regulations dealing with overseas Chinese education, investment, migration, and overseas Chinese voluntary associations, and diplomatic representatives in the management of *huaqiao* educational affairs.

The importance which the government attached to the whole *huaqiao* policy area was reflected not only in the fact the various laws and regulations left no stone unturned but in the panoply of machinery set up to administer them. What gave an added stamp of legality to the right of the overseas Chinese was the inclusion of articles providing for their protection and political participation in the country's draft constitution. The overall thrust of the policies was the "care" of the "transplants." Uppermost on the government's agenda by 1937 was education, a matter covered by the largest number (at least 16) of regulations governing *huaqiao*. At that time, there

were more than 2,000 overseas Chinese schools to serve as vehicles for strengthening the emigrant's cultural, sentimental and even patriotic ties to China.

Another major preoccupation was to work with overseas community associations to enhance the sway of the Kuomintang, branches of which were established in many places of overseas Chinese settlement until, on the eve of the outbreak of China's war with Japan, they were to be found across all the diasporas. The community associations and overseas Chinese recruits to the party did fall very much under the Kuomintang government's influence. That influence explains the strength of *huaqiao*'s reaction to Japan's invasion of China and the enthusiasm with which they contributed to the war effort and the "national salvation movement." After the war ended, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party carried their battle into the overseas Chinese arena, where each vied for supremacy in the schools and community organizations and among *huaqiao* in general. That rivalry continues today despite the end of the Cold War.

Policies of Communist China toward the Chinese overseas

The period immediately after the Communist triumph in China was a time of stocktaking for those in charge of overseas Chinese matters in Taiwan. Protection of overseas Chinese remained a concern; proof of this was the responsibility Taiwan took for evacuating overseas Chinese from war-torn Korea in 1950 and for relocating North Vietnamese Chinese to South Vietnam in 1954 and 1955. Education continued to be a major preoccupation, one index of which is the fact that in 1951–60 more than 14,000 overseas Chinese students enrolled in institutions of higher learning in Taiwan. However, what had assumed overarching importance was the anti-Communism work among what the Kuomintang saw as its overseas constituencies.

On the mainland, the Communist Party, while not exactly starting from scratch, certainly had less of a *qiaowu* tradition than the Kuomintang. In 1949–54 its policies were basically modeled on those of its predecessor, regarding Chinese residents abroad as citizens of China by descent, including them (in the 1954 Constitution) among groups eligible to send representatives to the National People's Congress (without, however, specifying the number of deputies), and stipulating that publications and education among overseas Chinese should emphasize allegiance to the Chinese state and nation. Similarly, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission that was set up was based on the Kuomintang prototype.

However, at the first Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955 the Communist government, represented by Premier Zhou Enlai, showed willingness to renounce claims on those overseas Chinese who wished to opt for the local nationality. This was a gesture of goodwill toward the newly independent Asian countries, where overseas Chinese communities were feared as sources of subversion and a fifth column. It would be best, China suggested, if overseas Chinese were to comply with the laws and customs of their adopted countries. The Kuomintang government in Taiwan denounced this as a sell-out. But to a Beijing bent on gaining the widest diplomatic recognition, continued claim to jurisdiction over Chinese of foreign residence could prove a foreign policy impediment. China, it seems, would sacrifice the interests of the overseas Chinese should these conflict with higher national priorities.

From the signing in 1955 of the Sino–Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty (recognizing the right of overseas Chinese to choose the nationality they preferred), there began a process which the scholar Stephen Fitzgerald (1972: 135) has termed "decolonization." This did not mean an entirely "hands-off" stance, only that a measure of restraint would be exercised. A "special relationship," similar to what Britain and France had forged with their former colonies would prevail.

In China *qiaowu* comprises two aspects: external and internal, the one relating to Chinese resident abroad and the other to "domestic overseas Chinese." The latter consists of returnees,

the dependants of overseas Chinese, and overseas Chinese students studying in China. The majority of them were recipients of remittances from kin abroad. Remittances constituted one of the two chief concerns (the other being nationality) of the overseas Chinese policy of the Chinese Communist Party in the early years of its rule. Initially singled out for preferential treatment as part of the Communist Party's unification work, overseas Chinese in China (the returnees) were to suffer increasing discrimination as China's preoccupation with go-it-alone development climaxed in the autarky of the Cultural Revolution. Once lauded, their overseas connections became a political liability to them during the mid-1960 and early 1970s, when they were seen as links to foreign conspiracies. Therefore the mass organization representing their interests, the Association of Returned Overseas Chinese, was disbanded.[1]

From 1978 to the present day, the so-called "new era" of the Chinese and the Chinese government, the Chinese government's policy toward overseas Chinese has shown a sharp change from before. This policy was designed to follow Deng Xiaoping's policy of reform and opening-up to the outside world in work relating to overseas Chinese affairs. Like new policies in other fields in China, the policy toward overseas Chinese had become more practical and realistic in response to changes in the overseas Chinese world over the last 20 years. Two remarkable changes in the overseas Chinese during the last 30 years attracted the attention of the Chinese government from 1978 onwards. One is the overseas Chinese wealth, and the other is the new Chinese emigrants (*xin yimin*, which has now become a special concept in China and refers to those who have emigrated from China since the 1970s).

The period of the 1960s to 1980s had witnessed the rapid economic growth of the Chinese beyond the Mainland, and the East Asian economic miracle since the 1980s can also be seen to a great extent to be a global Chinese economic miracle. After the rapid economic development of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore in the 1960–80s, the Chinese enterprises in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines also showed rapid growth. The World Bank estimates that the combined output of the overseas Chinese was about US$400 billion in 1991 and rose to US$600 billion by 1996.[2] Some estimates even overstate the overseas Chinese domination of the economies of Southeast Asia.[3] These exaggerations about the overseas Chinese capital strengthen the impression of "rich overseas Chinese" to the world.

The great scale of the new Chinese emigrants since the 1980s also came to the attention of the Chinese leadership as they turned their sights to the overseas Chinese. It was estimated that there were some 2.5 million Chinese in the early 1990s who emigrated from Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and most of them settled down in the developed countries.[4] In contrast to the overseas Chinese emigrants before the 1950s, the new Chinese emigrants have some notable features. There are two main categories of Chinese emigrants from the mainland. The first comprises the poorly educated, which includes those going abroad on the excuse of family unifications and most of the illegal Chinese emigrants. The other category comprises former students or scholars studying in the developed countries and their families. This second contingent is the best educated Chinese from the mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The new Chinese emigrants are much better educated, richer, and successful than the older Chinese generation, and are considered as the potential high-tech sources for China.

When "economic development" was confirmed as the "central work" of the Party and government, overriding any other work, the next problem was how to develop the economy, or in other words, how to seek funds to start the economic engine. This became a great difficulty not only for the central government but also for local governments. Very soon, both the central and local governments came to pay attention to the overseas Chinese. And, it did not take long for the Chinese governments to recognize the change and economic growth of the overseas Chinese, as soon as they focused their eyes on their overseas compatriots.

At the beginning of 1978 China's State Council for Overseas Chinese Affairs (CSCOCA) was reestablished in the central government, and the Association of Returned Overseas Chinese was also revived in the same year. The heads of CSCOCA had come from a family with impeccable revolutionary credentials: first He Xiangning, the wife of Liao Zhongkai, one of Sun Yat-sen's comrades-in-arms; then her son Liao Chengzhi and then, after his death, his son Liao Hui. Soon afterwards, the sub-offices of CSCOCA were established in almost every province (with the exception of Tibet). In the National People's Congress and People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), special committees to deal with overseas Chinese affairs were also organized in the 1980s. The increase in official offices involving the overseas Chinese affairs meant that the Chinese governments, from the central to the local level, now paid attention to the overseas Chinese, which had never been the case before. In particular, the local governments in the coastal areas of south China, where most overseas Chinese come from, have tried in every way to promote relations with their overseas compatriots.

The work for overseas Chinese affairs and its office, CSCOCA, greatly stressed the economic effects. In consideration of the fact that the overseas Chinese held such large financial resources and a strong commercial network, how to use overseas Chinese for China's modernization became a national strategy.

In 1980 four Special Economic Zones approved by the central government were established; three are in Guangdong and one in Fujian. Deng Xiaoping clearly explained why and where to set up these Special Economic Zones:

> The selected locations of these four Special Economic Zones is based on geographical reasons: Shenzhen is close to Hong Kong; Zhuhai is close to Macao; Shantou is the hometown of Chaozhou people, many of whom live in Southeast Asia; and Xiamen is chosen because there are many south Fujianese merchants in Southeast Asia.
>
> *(Deng 1993: 366)*

Deng Xiaoping even frankly recognized that the purpose of Xiamen Special Economic Zone is to target the overseas Fujianese capital:

> I was told that there are more than ten biggest businessmen in the world and among them five are Chinese, among them three are Fujianese. Now Xiamen is much less developed than Guangdong, and when Xiamen Island as a whole became Special Economic Zone, it will attract the overseas Chinese funds and further the foreigner's investment. Therefore, it will bring along the neighbor areas of Xiamen and furthermore, push forward Fujian's economic development.
>
> *(State Council of Overseas Chinese Affairs 1989: 39)*

The measures of the Special Economic Zones have been successful. In 1979–87, 39.1% of the total US$5.22 billion of overseas Chinese capital in China was invested in these four Special Economic Zones with most investment coming from Hong Kong and Southeast Asia (Zhuang 2001: 381).

Liao Hui, Director of the CSCOCA, stressed at a national meeting of the directors of CSCOCA offices from the provinces: "Now that we are in a new historical era of China's modernization process, economic cooperation between China and the overseas Chinese has already started and extended wider and deeper. We should take this opportunity and try to do more and say less in consideration of this sensitive issue." As to how to manipulate the concrete work, Liao added: "To attract overseas Chinese investment, including that from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, should be one of the most important tasks for all the offices of CSCOCA; the overseas Chinese

investment should be favorably treated in tax and import; there should be some bases established for economic and technical cooperation between China and the overseas Chinese."[5] Hu Yaobang, the former Party General Secretary, further pointed out in 1986, "The overseas Chinese dominate a capital of some US$200 billion, and if the CSCOCA and its local offices can attract one-tenth of that, it will be very useful to China."[6] From the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s Deng Xiaoping stressed more than ten times the importance of Overseas Chinese cooperation for China's economic development (Deng 1997). In 1993 Deng Xiaoping further expressed his higher appreciation of overseas Chinese and considered them as the unique condition of China's development. He said:

> There have been rare opportunities for China to go into a great development. China is different from the other countries because China has several tens of millions overseas compatriots who can offer a unique opportunity to China's development and they have made great contributions to China.
>
> (Renmin Ribao *[People Daily], 23 January 1993)*

Based on such policies, the central government and local governments formulated special rules to offer preferential treatment to overseas Chinese capital investment in the Mainland China than the normal foreign direct investment (FDI) before 1995. Besides the favorable policies formulated by the central government, the local governments at different levels of province, city and town, even offered more favorable conditions to the overseas Chinese investment in tax, land rent, import duties, special protection on some economic sectors, residence, and so on (State Council of Overseas Chinese Affairs 1999: 163, 519, 606, 650–53, 676–78). Through the official channels, the government office directly organized activities in China and sent delegations abroad to induce overseas Chinese capital. In 1993–6 the offices of CSCOCA received some 1.5 million overseas Chinese guests, mainly for business purposes. Sometimes such activities, especially the official delegations going abroad, became so rampant after the 1990s that the central government had to issue a prohibition on them several times.

In response to the Chinese government's good graces the overseas Chinese capital took the lead in investing in China when other foreign capitals still hesitated and waited. In 1979–89 55% of FDI into Mainland China came from Hong Kong and the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Since the beginning of the 1990s overseas Chinese capital has flowed much faster into Mainland China. The economic sanctions imposed by western countries on China after the Tiananmen Square Event in 1989 reduced investment into China, giving overseas Chinese an opportunity to expand their investment into the Mainland. In 1992, 80% of FDI in China came from overseas Chinese capital. According to Mainland China's statistics the total FDI into the Mainland amounted to US$501.47 billion between 1979 and 2003, and more than 60% of FDI came from the Chinese beyond the Mainland, including Hong Kong and Taiwan. In 2008 this quota even rose to 65%.

Deng Xiaoping's attitude toward the overseas Chinese has been followed by his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Moreover, both of them also saw the rapid growing numbers of overseas Chinese talents, as many well-educated new Chinese emigrants resided in developed countries. In 1993 President Jiang Zemin said:

> The great number of Chinese overseas have not only abundant capital and a strong commercial network, but also they are a high-tech talent pool, who are expected to make a contribution to China's modernization.
>
> (Renmin Ribao *[People's Daily] 27 February 1993)*

In pace with the improvement of China's relations with neighboring countries, Chinese central government's leaders are beginning to express openly their appreciation of overseas Chinese, who are even expected to serve China's international relations and the national unity as President Hu Jintao frankly declared in 2004:

> There are several tens of millions overseas compatriots living in different regions in the world and about 30 million of their relatives in China, and all of them provide an important strength for China's modernization, national unity and the revival of the Chinese people. The CCP has always given great attention to the work on them.
>
> *(Anon 2004)*

This author's new survey reveals that about 45 million overseas Chinese were distributed over more than 180 countries up to 2008, and among them about 10 million are new Chinese emigrants. Some 65% of new Chinese emigrants are concentrated in developed countries and many of them are well-educated (Zhuang 2010). In pace with the rapidly growing number of overseas Chinese and even faster growth of their economic and high-tech strength, the Chinese government will necessarily pay more attention to the role of Chinese overseas in the process of China's modernization.

Notes

1 The Association of Returned Overseas Chinese was formed in 1956, and Tan Kah Kee was the first chairman of this organization.
2 These numbers include those of Hong Kong and Taiwan, cited in Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996: 25).
3 *The Economist*, 1996, March, p.4.
4 For a general overview of the new Chinese emigrants, see Zhuang (1997).
5 Liao Hui's speech of the national meeting of the directors of the CSCOCA at the procincial level, 1984.
6 Quoted from the speech by Ye Fei, Vice-President of the National People's Congress, at the National Conference of Work for the Overseas Chinese Affairs, 1986.

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3

The evolution of Taiwan's policies toward the political participation of citizens abroad in homeland governance

Pei-te Lien and Dean P. Chen

The year 2011 is celebrated by the government in Taiwan as entering the one-hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China (ROC). The Republic was founded by Dr Sun Yat-sen and his followers after overthrowing a corrupt Qing (Manchu) dynasty rendered impotent by decades of domestic strife and foreign aggression. To facilitate the revolutionary efforts, Dr Sun organized a Xing Zhong Hui (Revive China Society) in Honolulu in 1894. This organization later joined forces with other revolutionary groups to form a Tong Meng Hui (Revolutionary Alliance) in Tokyo in 1905. The Alliance became the basis of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT hereafter) when it was established in 1912 by Dr Sun in Beijing to contest the first national elections. The KMT, after being defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, retreated to Taiwan, where it remained the dominant party until 2000, and regained control of the presidency in 2008. Because of this convoluted history originating from overseas, and to put the Taiwan perspective in the proper context, this chapter will attempt to capture a century of political development in ROC (Taiwan) and its changing policy toward constituents abroad, with a special focus on their rights to participate in homeland politics.

We use the term "constituents abroad" to highlight the subordinate and entangled nature of the transnational or trans-territorial relationship between emigrants and their homeland government in Asia. More conventionally called Overseas Chinese or Chinese overseas (*haiwai huaren*), the term refers to persons of ethnic Chinese descent residing abroad or in areas outside of mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong/Macau (the "three Chinas"). It may refer to all ethnic Chinese in diaspora regardless of nationality. A more restrictive term *huaqiao* is usually reserved for nationals or citizens of Chinese descent living abroad. It is often used together with *huaren*, which means persons of Chinese descent in diaspora, to refer to all the Chinese overseas. The management of affairs dealing with nationals abroad is called *qiaowu*. Owing to ROC's nationality law explained later in this chapter, *qiaowu* for Taiwan may include affairs that deal with all ethnic Chinese/Taiwanese abroad regardless of whether they have adopted a new citizenship in the host country or not.

Migrants from Taiwan who settled outside of the "three Chinas" are part of the Chinese diaspora, for most can trace their ancestral origins to somewhere in mainland China, especially the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian (Williams 2003; Brown 2004). In 2009, two-thirds of Taiwanese abroad were found to reside in the USA. Although nearly all Taiwanese (except for the indigenous people) are Chinese by ethnicity, an increasing number of Taiwanese migrants, especially those who have a strong sense of Taiwanese identity, prefer to be called overseas Taiwanese (or Taiwanese overseas). Rejecting being lumped together with *huaqiao*, these Taiwan identifiers prefer a separate identity called *taiqiao*. This new term also serves to distinguish themselves from *laoqiao* or old migrants from Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Fujian who may have settled down in overseas communities for generations and some have ancestors who contributed to Dr. Sun's revolutionary causes at the turn of the twentieth century. The emergence of different identities among US Chinese is both the cause and consequence of homeland government policy regarding citizens abroad.

The terms of *tongbao*, "compatriots," or *qiaomin* are often used by the homeland government in official documents to refer to loyal nationals or citizens abroad. Trans-territorial loyalty has been a historic norm assumed by the Chinese government of nationals abroad, especially at a time when these overseas constituents were not permitted to become naturalized or participate in the politics of their new country. That the homeland government can make a claim on the political identity and orientation of its citizens abroad is an emblem of the extraterritorial rule inherited from a feudal, colonial, or an authoritarian past. Because of this history and premise, it is curious that the democratic government in Taiwan recently opted for the more restrictive "compatriot" in renaming its chief agency that manages *qiaowu*. The ministry-level office is now called Overseas Compatriots Affairs Commission instead of Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission. Although its English acronym OCAC remains the same and the Chinese name is still *qiaowu*, the boundaries of constituency abroad have been redefined. A main purpose of this chapter is to account for this identity change in *qiaowu* policy as ROC (Taiwan) marches into the second century.

To understand the transformation of Taiwan's policy priority from serving the overseas Chinese to compatriots only, we focus on studying the changing notions of citizenship and political rights regarding ROC nationals living permanently abroad who migrated either from Taiwan after 1945 or from Chinese mainland before 1950. We consider first the guiding ideology and legal framework of ROC's policies toward citizens abroad. We then trace changes in the degree of involvement of overseas citizens in homeland governance and laws regulating their political participation in light of the changing political context and associated legal and identity changes in the homeland, especially the rise of Taiwan-centered identity and consciousness that came with the democratic change in Taiwan. We conclude by commenting on the implications of identity change for the future of Taiwan's *qiaowu* policy.

Before we move on, it is important to note that *qiaowu* is "a large industry, both domestic and international at once, involving a range of government ministries, educational institutions, business organizations and other non-governmental organizations" (Chen 2002: 174). It is closely linked to the political and diplomatic objectives of the homeland government. It is also structured by the particular brand of nationalism subscribed to by the leaders in charge. Although we shall restrict our attention to issues affecting the exercise of citizenship, such as the acquisition and loss of nationality, suffrage, rights to political representation, and degree of political freedom, we cannot but have to deal with many political developments and the larger political context in accounting for *qiaowu* policy change. Examples of these political milestones include: the 1911 Revolution, KMT's Northern Expedition campaigns, ROC's economic development and nation-building in the Nanjing Decade, war against Japanese aggression, KMT annexation of Taiwan

and the Martial Law era, *dangwai* (opposition outside the KMT) and movement for political liberalization, and, under the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations, democratization and Taiwanization of island politics. To help organize our thinking and understanding, Table 3.1 shows the chronologies of key political epochs and critical junctures in history, and also lists key policies and laws affecting the citizenship rights of overseas constituency and associated changes in the policy direction and organization of OCAC.

Table 3.1 A chronology of major political and policy changes regarding the political representation and participation of Overseas Citizens of the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Critical Junctures and Historical Contexts	*Policies and Laws on Overseas Chinese Citizenship Rights*	*OCAC Policies and Organization*
Pre-1949 KMT on Mainland Era		
1912: Founding of the Republic of China (ROC) 1912–16: Early Republic 1916–28: Warlord Era	1912: Propagation of the Provisional Constitution of the ROC and Organic Law, stipulating OC representation in the legislature 1913: 6 OC Senators were elected 1928: 21 OC attended the National Congress	1922: Bureau of Overseas Chinese Affairs established in Beijing 1926: OCAC was formed in Guangzhou under the Nationalist-KMT Government
1928–37: The Nationalist-KMT Nanjing Decade 1937–45: Sino-Japanese War 1945–49: Chinese Civil War, KMT took over and retreated to Taiwan 1947: ROC Constitution took effect	1929: Nationality Law established 1931: National Congress convened to draw up the Provisional Constitution of KMT Party Tutelage 1938–47: 34 OC were elected to National Affairs Council 1946: 41 OC participated in Constitutional National Assembly 1947: 22 OC were elected to the National Assembly; 8 to the Legislative Yuan; and 1 to the Control Yuan	1932: OCAC was reinstituted under the Executive Yuan 1933: Policies for OC education were propagated
KMT on Taiwan Era– 1947–87: KMT Authoritarian Rule Era		
1947: 2–28 Incident 1949–87: Taiwan under Martial Law 1971: ROC withdrew from United Nations 1978: PRC began to emphasize *Qiaowu* 1979: USA recognized PRC as sole legitimate government of China 1986: Taiwan's key opposition party DPP was formed	1948: ROC Government propagated the "Temporary Provisions" 1972–89: KMT handpicked 139 OC Legislative Yuan representatives and 24 Control Yuan representatives	1949: OCAC relocated to Taipei 1960: Policies to encourage returned OC to invest in Taiwan were propagated 1972: Overseas Chinese schools mushroomed; OC youths were encouraged to attend cultural camps in Taiwan 1984: Service-oriented notion of *Qiaowu* was introduced; Overseas Chinese Cultural Centers were founded

Table 3.1 (continued)

Critical Junctures and Historical Contexts	*Policies and Laws on Overseas Chinese Citizenship Rights*	*OCAC Policies and Organization*
KMT on Taiwan Era– 1987–96: Liberalization/Constitutional Reform Era		
1988: Taiwan-born Lee Teng-hui was sworn in to succeed President Chiang Ching-kuo 1988: Press and Assembly bans were lifted 1990: Lee was elected President by NA 1991: Abolition of Temporary Provisions 1992: "One China, two separate rules" principle announced 1995: PRC tested its missile fires near Taiwan	1990: Overseas Taiwanese dissents were pardoned and allowed to return 1991: Revisions to the Election and Recall Law—changed methods of elections and representation for OC 1991: OC representatives in Legislative Yuan and NA greatly reduced; no OC seat in Control Yuan 1992 Constitutional reform: put greater emphasis on ROC citizenship for OC representatives 1995: Election rules set for OC participation in presidential elections	Debates over abolishing OC representation as well as the OCAC itself surfaced Pragmatism was advocated as necessary virtue in *Qiaowu* diplomacy Growing influence of DPP and Taiwan-first followers in OC policy making Overseas Taiwanese joined OC as core OCAC constituency
1996 to Present: Multi-party Democracy Era in Taiwan		
1996: Lee became the first President in Taiwan by popular vote 2000: Taiwan-born Chen Shui-bian was elected the first non-KMT President 2004: DPP's Chen was re-elected by a hair-thin margin and under controversy 2005: PRC passed Anti-Session Law 2007: National Immigration Agency established 2008: Hong-Kong born Ma Ying-jeou helped KMT regain control of the presidential palace	2000: Article 20 of the Nationality Act prevents a dual citizen to hold government offices in ROC NA was suspended in 2000 and abolished in 2005 2005: Constitutional reform to cut in half the number of seats in Legislative Yuan starting in 2008; no reserved seat for OC representative 2009: Age limit was relaxed to allow easier access to national id card for children of returned overseas citizens 2012: Absentee voting would be made available to residents in Taiwan area	1999: Policies on the returned overseas citizens were promulgated 2000: first Taiwan-born OCAC Minister Chang Fu-mei was sworn in; criticized for favoring new migrants from Taiwan over old migrants from China 2002: Overseas Chinese Certification office established 2006: OCAC replaces "Chinese" with "Compatriots" in its English name 2006: PRC adopts a multi-pronged, peaceful expansion strategy in *Qiaowu* 2008: Flexibility and harmony were stressed as key in new OC policy gearing toward the overseas compatriots

Unique interdependency of China and the Chinese overseas

Fundamental to an understanding of ROC (Taiwan)'s policies regarding constituents abroad is to appreciate the close-knit and bounded nature of the relations between Chinese overseas and the homeland government as well as the legal framework and guiding ideology that help construct the relationship. Unique in world politics, ROC (Taiwan) nationals abroad enjoy special rights and protection in the Constitution of the homeland government even if they may have settled permanently and for generations outside of Taiwan. There are six articles in the current Constitution of the Republic of China effective in 1947 that deal with the political, economic, and educational rights of citizens abroad.[1] Article 26 specifies that the National Assembly shall be composed in part by delegates elected by Chinese citizens residing abroad and the number shall be prescribed by law. Article 64 states the same for members of the Legislative Yuan. Article 91 specifies that eight members of the Control Yuan shall be elected from Chinese citizens residing abroad. Additionally, under the foundational national policies section, Article 141 of the ROC Constitution published in the ROC Yearbook 2010 states that, based on the principles of equality and reciprocity, the ROC government is obligated to seek equal and fair protection of the rights and interests of citizens abroad as part of its foreign policy goals (p. 545). Similarly, Article 151 pronounces that, "[w]ith respect to Chinese citizens residing abroad, the State shall foster and protect the development of their economic enterprises" (p. 546). Finally, Article 167 stipulates that "the State shall give encouragement or subsidies to … [e]ducational enterprises which have been operated with good record by Chinese citizens residing abroad" (p. 546).

ROC citizens abroad were granted these trans-territorial rights and protection in the Constitution in part because the Chinese overseas were instrumental to the founding of the Republic through monetary donations, bloodshed, and other material and moral support. Moreover, because the Nationalist Party began virtually as an overseas Chinese party, it had every intention and purposes to want to keep the financial and political support from the Chinese diaspora, especially those of the merchant elite class (Fitzgerald 1972; Lee 1997). For over eighty years, *huaqiao* representatives handpicked by the KMT from the diaspora were involved in making key decisions concerning governmental organization, operations, and the legal framework of the Republic. Their involvement in these decisions helped secure, in return, constitutional protection and rights for nationals/citizens abroad. On the other hand, because the Chinese overseas were treated as the "rightful human capital" by their homeland government(s), a complex network of governmental institutions were set up to mobilize and control them (Kuhn 2008: 265). Thus, the close and interdependent relations between China and the Chinese overseas can be considered a mixed blessing for citizens abroad. Although Kuhn argues that the nature of nationalism for the overseas Chinese "was a congeries of attitudes and strategies" (249) and that the overseas Chinese would identify more with the homeland people and culture than its government, the homeland government has exploited the identity complex to advance its trans-territorial political goals (Wang 1995; Rawnsley 2000; Thuno 2001; Barabantseva 2005).

The Nationality Law of 1909 (1929): the principle of *jus sanguinis*

A major rationale for the far-reaching, trans-territorial direct governance of citizens abroad practiced by the governments in China is found in its nationality laws, first set in place in 1909 during the late Qing dynasty era and promulgated by the Nationalist government in 1929, that instituted the principle of *jus sanguinis* or bloodline as the only determinant for automatic possession of Chinese nationality. According to this law, China practically treated anybody who was born anywhere to a Chinese father – dead or alive – or to a Chinese mother and an unknown or

dead father a Chinese national. MacNair (1971) notes that two developments at the turn of the twentieth century accounted for the adoption of this principle that aims to preserve the cultural ties to and political identity of Chinese residing in occupied foreign lands with the homeland: the nationality of Chinese born in Dutch East Indies and the nationality of Chinese residing in foreign possessions in close proximity to China (such as treaty ports and the interior of China). They helped the Qing dynasty realize belatedly that to protect the rights and equality of overseas subjects required formal legal standing such as the establishment of a nationality law.

As Qing diplomatic officials experienced increasing contacts with their overseas compatriots in foreign nations, they also gained better knowledge and understanding about Chinese communities abroad (Tsai 1983). Specifically, the Chinese mandarins realized that the wealth and connections of many overseas Chinese could provide an invaluable source of political and economic capitals for strengthening and improving the fortune of China (Armentrout Ma 1990). The Imperial Court in Beijing also hoped to win the hearts and minds of these overseas groups so that they would not lend their allegiance to revolutionaries like Dr. Sun Yat-sen. "In the last two decades of the dynasty," observed Stephen Fitzgerald (1972), "there was a quickening of interest in the Overseas Chinese, prompted by their support for monarchist, revolutionary or constitutional factions, and also by a realization that their wealth was more than just a few 'sands they have scraped together'" (p. 6).

Comprising of 24 articles and a series of minor provisions and clauses, the law, as will be demonstrated later, has had lasting impact upon Kuomintang government's *qiaowu* after 1929. As having another country's nationality does not nullify Chinese nationality, all Chinese emigrants are essentially nationals and citizens. Thus, the principle of dual nationality is allowed. According to the 1929 Law, while an overseas national can choose to give up his or her Chinese nationality and citizenship, such voluntary renunciation would require stringent approval of the ROC Ministry of the Interior. On the other hand, if a former national were to resume his or her Chinese nationality, it could be done rather easily. The goal is to keep as many Chinese nationals as possible globally (Lee 1997: 124). Since the overseas Chinese were encouraged by the KMT government to identify with Chinese rather than local politics, wrote Stephen Fitzgerald, "this in turn fostered the growth of Overseas Chinese nationalism which has remained to trouble the countries of Southeast Asia and complicate the CCP's policies in the region" (1972: 6).

The founding of the Republic of China and overseas Chinese in the first parliamentary elections of 1913

Thus, as early as 1909, the doctrine of *jus sanguinis* fostered overseas Chinese nationalism and explained their fervent contributions to Dr Sun Yat-sen's republican revolution. Because the decadence and ineptitude of the old regime were too apparent to all, Chinese intellectuals and bourgeoisie abroad were quickly convinced that to save China from further decline and foreign aggressions the Qing dynasty must be overthrown. Sun's revolutionary power base was situated mainly in the overseas Chinese communities in Japan, the USA, and Southeast Asia. It owed its financial backing mostly to *huaqiao*. The overseas Chinese also directly contributed money and blood to the toppling of the Qing regime on 10 October 1911 through the Wuchang Uprising. If not for the staunch sacrifices made by *huaqiao* to the revolutionary cause of Sun, the creation of the ROC would not have been possible in the first place (Sheng 1990). Thus, as the Father of the new Republic, Sun frequently commented that the overseas Chinese were "the mothers of the [Republican] revolution." Moreover, as the Provisional President in 1912, Sun pledged that the political participation rights of the overseas Chinese would be guaranteed in the new government.

These included the rights to vote, recall, veto, run for offices, and to participate in civil service examinations (Lee 1997: 147).

When the ROC's Provisional Constitution and Organic Law were promulgated in March 1912, a bicameral parliament was established, comprising the Senate in the upper house and the House of Representatives in the lower chamber (Sheng 1990: 19–20). The first national elections were to be held in the spring of 1913. Nonetheless, despite the general gratitude toward the Chinese overseas and their efforts in the Republic's inception, there were intensive debates over whether they should be involved directly in the governance and politics of ROC. The proponents argued that overseas Chinese political engagement could strengthen Chinese nationalist unity abroad and promote greater expertise and investment in domestic modernization and economic developments. Opponents, however, stressed the technical difficulties in conducting and monitoring overseas campaigns and elections. Furthermore, since many overseas Chinese hold foreign nationalities, their participations in ROC politics would inevitably generate international opprobrium and conflicts with foreign governments. Finally, given overseas Chinese exemption from taxation and military conscription in ROC, skeptics stressed that it would be unfair to allow their representations if they were not required to fulfil these citizen duties (Lee 1997: 150–2).

As a result of theses heated polemics and exchanges, a political compromise was struck in the end to mollify both camps. Though the political participation rights of the overseas Chinese were ensured, there were restrictions. In particular, overseas compatriots could run for parliamentary elections on 10 February 1913, but only in the Senate upper house. The reason was that the lower house (House of Representatives), elected based on population proportionality (as in most Western liberal democracies), has more substantial representative power than the more elitist upper chamber (Lee 1997: 155). Of the 274 Senators, six seats were reserved for the overseas Chinese. They would be elected from Overseas Chinese Electoral College, whose electors were prominent leaders in overseas Chinese organizations and associations in various foreign countries (Zhong 1991a). The six Senators were all KMT members. This marked the beginning of overseas Chinese participation in the governing of homeland political affairs.

The KMT Party Tutelage and overseas Chinese participation in the 1931 National Congress

Immediately following the birth of the Chinese Republic on 1 January 1912, China was plunged into new rounds of internal chaos and conflicts – this time, between Yuan Shi-kai's Northern militarists and Sun's Southern republicans. The political break between Yuan and Sun in July 1917 has been recounted thoroughly elsewhere (see Lee 1970). It is sufficient to note that the clash erupted out of Yuan's ambition to restore the monarchy (with himself as the new emperor) and his expelling the KMT republicans, including Sun Yat-sen, from the Beijing government (also known as the Beiyan Administration). Notwithstanding his cunning political maneuvers and political assassination schemes, targeting revolutionary leaders, Yuan's Beiyan Administration was, between 1912 and 1928, recognized internationally as the legal government of the ROC. It was in 1922 that the first Bureau of Overseas Chinese Affairs was established in Beijing. This was the first of nine other regional *qiaowu* offices to come. Meanwhile, Sun and his revolutionary forces retreated to the South and set up a Nationalist government in Guangzhou (of the Guangdong province) to continue their struggle against the Northern warlords. At the urge of the returned overseas Chinese, the first Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) was set up in 1926 under the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the KMT there. In 1932, again in response to suggestions from the Chinese overseas, the OCAC was reinstituted under the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist government in Nanking.

Given the overseas Chinese historical affinity to Sun Yat-sen's KMT since the revolutionary era, it is no surprise that *huaqiao* espoused firmer support behind the southern government. Yet, the Beijing government also understood the importance of overseas Chinese contributions to China's nation building and construction projects; therefore, the Yuan Administration and the provisional National Assembly both affirmed *huaqiao*'s political rights to participate in Chinese politics (Lee 1997). In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek's KMT forces unified China and set up the National government of ROC in Nanjing. As the revolutionary phase was completed, the KMT authority, following Sun Yat-sen's teaching, declared that the next stage of political tutelage would ensue. The Kuomintang Party, under the highest authority of the CEC, would exercise sovereignty on behalf of the people and, at the same time, train and educate them in preparation for eventual democratic self-government and constitutional rule (Tien 1972; Eastman *et al.* 1991).

In early 1928, the CEC called for the election of the National Congress (NC), and 26 of the 520 seats (5%) were slated for overseas Chinese representatives to be elected from 21 overseas districts (Zhong 1991a: 66). Nevertheless, because overseas elections were either prohibited in some countries like Malaysia and Thailand or were technically infeasible, only 18 were elected and three were specially appointed (Lee 1997: 167). All in all, 21 overseas Chinese representatives attended the NC convened on 5 May 1931. It officially propagated the Provisional Constitution of the KMT Party Tutelage on 1 June 1931. Though the NC election was only for the purpose of institutionalizing the KMT one-party rule, it showed that overseas Chinese political participation was valued by KMT leaders.

Wartime Congress, 1938–47: overseas representatives in the National Affairs Council

After Japan invaded China proper in July 1937, the National government postponed the Constitutional National Assembly (originally scheduled in May 1937) indefinitely, pending war progress and development. However, to continue the functions of wartime government, policymaking, and implementation, as well as to unite the whole nation in confronting the Japanese aggressions, the National government proclaimed the creation of a Wartime Congress, also known as the National Affairs Council (NAC) in April 1938 (Zhong 1991b; Lee 1997; Myers 2001). Since the objective was to gather all ideas, resources, and policy initiatives from all areas and all occupational sectors, representatives from the Chinese overseas could not be excluded from this special congress.

The process of selecting members to the NAC was strictly controlled by the central KMT authority, and overseas delegates were chosen and reviewed by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC), established in 1932 under the Executive Yuan and which remains the same today. The qualifications of the overseas candidate were evaluated based on his or her social, educational, and professional experience and reputation in the overseas communities (Lee 1997: 179). Then, the OCAC would recommend their list of candidates from the diaspora to the KMT's Central Executive Committee, which would make the final choice of selection. Five to eight overseas Chinese members would participate in the 200-member NAC Congress, which, between 1938 and 1947, convened four times (Zhong 1991a, 1991b; Lee 1997). The first and second NAC Congresses had six overseas members each. The third and fourth Congresses increased overseas delegates to eight as the total members were also increased to 240 (290 in the fourth Congress). In the end, a total of 34 overseas Chinese members served in those four NAC Congresses. In addition to discussing and enacting national wartime policies, the NAC Congresses also focused on overseas Chinese affairs such as promoting and protecting overseas Chinese investment, education, and job training in both China and other countries (Lee 1997: 179).

The ROC Constitution and overseas Chinese participation in parliamentary elections in 1947

In the immediate aftermath of Japan's defeat in August 1945, the National government was preparing to resume the Constitutional National Assembly that had been suspended in 1937. To select overseas delegates to the Constitutional National Assembly, 23 overseas electoral districts were drawn, of which 41 representatives would be selected either through indirect overseas elections from qualified local overseas Chinese associations or, when such methods were impossible to carry out, through "handpicking" by the OCAC (Sheng 1990; Lee 1997: 171–3). The Constitutional National Assembly convened on 15 November 1946 to draft the ROC Constitution, which was adopted on 25 December 1946 and promulgated on 1 January 1947.

Under the framework of the 1947 ROC Constitution, Chinese overseas had the right to political representation in the National Assembly,[2] the Legislative Yuan,[3] and the Control Yuan[4] (the parliamentary bodies). In the first National Assembly of 1947, 65 of the 3,045 seats (2.1%) were set aside for the overseas delegates from 41 overseas districts. For Legislative Yuan elections, 15 overseas districts were allotted and from which 19 overseas candidates (2.5%) could be elected out of 773 seats. There were eight overseas districts apportioned for the Control Yuan elections which allocated the same number of spots (or 3.9%) for overseas Chinese candidates out of 223 seats. Unfortunately, the actual electoral process and outcome were less promising than anticipated. In the National Assembly elections, only 17 overseas districts had successfully voted, electing only 22 overseas Chinese members. Only seven out of 15 overseas districts held elections for the Legislative Yuan, resulting in eight overseas Chinese legislators. As for the Control Yuan election, only one district completed election and, therefore, one Control Yuan member was elected from abroad (Sheng 1990; Zhong 1991b; Lee 1997: 176). In addition to the technical and transportation problems for political participation from abroad, many foreign governments held hostile attitudes toward the open and direct electoral campaigns by the overseas Chinese in homeland elections, accusing the ROC government of intruding on their national sovereignty and violating their jurisdictions. Dual nationality also was not accepted everywhere, preventing many overseas Chinese from exercising their political rights as ROC citizens.

Furthermore, although the ROC Constitution recognized and protected the rights for citizens abroad to access political representation in three national parliamentary bodies in 1947, one should not overrate the weight of the Chinese overseas in participating in homeland governance. Despite their long and sustained involvement in homeland politics, the number of overseas representatives was only a fraction of any legislative body and they seemed to enjoy the best representation in the parliamentary body that had the weakest power. Thus, even if few questioned the wisdom of awarding overseas Chinese with seats in the National Assembly, more raised doubts about the inclusion of overseas Chinese in the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. In fact, until after protests from the overseas Chinese delegates in the 1946 Constitutional National Assembly, there was no mention of seats for the overseas delegates in the original draft of the ROC Constitution (Lee 1997: 174). Given this checkered history, it was possible to anticipate the de facto removal of overseas representation in the parliamentary bodies of the Legislative and the Control Yuan and the abolition of the National Assembly in the constitutional reforms of the 1990s and 2000s as Taiwan constructed and consolidated its fledgling democracy.

Taiwan under siege, 1947–89

Taiwan was incorporated into the Chinese empire in as early as the Tang dynasty (618–907), but significant immigration of the Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong Provinces did not occur

until the seventeenth century or during the early Qing dynasty (1644–1911). Taiwan was ceded by the Qing government to Japan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. The ROC assumed control of Taiwan at the end of the Second World War when, according to the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the Japanese troops in Taiwan surrendered to KMT representatives on 25 October 1945. Whilst under Japanese rule (1895–1945), Taiwan was transformed into a modern state with improved literacy, health care, agricultural productions, and an economic infrastructure emphasizing transportation and communication (Williams 2003). The colonial government also made a significant and largely successful effort to assimilate Taiwanese locals into Japanese royalists. In their sporadic but sustained protests to resist Japanese colonization, a unique Taiwanese consciousness among the locals was born (Wu 2001; Brown 2004).

As the conflicts between the KMT and the CCP escalated in the postwar years, and China's national and economic conditions drastically deteriorated as a result, the KMT-led government practically treated the island as a war relief center and stripped the island of foods, industrial goods, and other wealth (Williams 2003). In addition, doubting the identity and loyalty of the former Japanese subjects, the Nationalists adopted a policy of forced assimilation to make the Taiwanese Chinese. Tension between the Taiwanese and the Nationalists erupted in the 2–28 Incident, which was triggered by the beating of a Taiwanese cigarette peddler suspected of selling smuggled cigarettes and the death of a bystander who protested the beating on 28 February 1947. An estimated 8,000 to 20,000 people were killed as a result of the subsequent March massacre launched by the KMT forces to cramp out all traces of real or potential opposition to its rule (Kerr 1965; Mendel 1970).

To stem Communist infiltration and political subversion in Taiwan, and amidst mounting setbacks of the Nationalist army in its war against Communist rebels, the Nationalist government proclaimed on 10 May 1948 the "Provisional Amendments for the Period of Mobilization of the Suppression of Communist Rebellion" (also known as the Temporary Provisions). Months after its physical relocation to Taiwan in early 1949, the Nationalist government declared a state of Martial Law in Taiwan. The Temporary Provisions strengthened the emergency powers delegated to the President in times of national emergency, as outlined in Articles 39 and 43 of the ROC Constitution, and essentially gave the ROC President an unlimited authority in times of national crisis or emergency. Together with the declaration of Martial Law, these executive orders effectively stopped all political activities and free elections in both mainland China and Taiwan. They further legitimized KMT's political repression campaigns, also known as the "White Terror," on the island (Kerr 1965; Mendel 1970; Tien 1989; Rigger 1999). Between 1945 and 1952, approximately one million Nationalist soldiers and civilian Chinese mainlanders migrated to Taiwan. Although they constituted only about 13% of Taiwan's population, they were able to maintain themselves in a position of power over the native Taiwanese through tight control of the political system, police, military, media, and the educational system. A large-scale "Sinification" program to reeducate and rehabilitate the Taiwanese, predicating on Sun Yet-Sen's idea of global Chinese nationalism and the Mandarin language and culture, was introduced and strictly enforced (Lynch 2006).

Because of the Nationalists' stated goal to regain control of mainland China (until 1991 when the Temporary Provisions were abolished), the KMT government skillfully managed the island's economy through selective privatization, massive industrialization, and urbanization to achieve the "economic miracle" within a relatively short period of time (Tien 1989). Between 1949 and 1989, the KMT government, to maintain the claim that it still had legitimate representation of all of China, froze the government's institutional framework and political structures, making only minor or incremental adjustments to reflect the political reality on Taiwan and offshore islands. Under the Temporary Provisions and the Martial Law, the ROC President, for national

security and interest considerations, could authorize additional members to be elected or appointed to the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan.

Between the years of 1972 and 1989, the KMT-controlled government decided to expand its power base by increasing the number of legislators in the Legislative Yuan and delegates in the Control Yuan through three elections. The party set such selection rules that it practically handpicked all the additional members from overseas. The number of overseas seats doubled in the 18-year period to 29, while a similar rate of increase was found among overseas seats reserved in the Control Yuan (from 5 to 10). In the six Legislative Yuan elections (1972, 1975, 1980, 1983, 1986, and 1989), a total of 139 legislators were appointed from overseas. In the three Control Yuan elections (1972, 1980, and 1986), 24 overseas Chinese members were selected (Yang 1992). It is interesting to note that qualifications of overseas candidates were assessed according to their contributions to Taiwan/ROC and to their respective overseas communities. Exemplary members were expected to exhibit high virtues, education backgrounds, professional achievements, and, more importantly, anti-communist sentiments (Sheng 1990; Zhong 1991b). Only 11% of the overseas legislators and none of the overseas Control Yuan members were of Taiwanese descent (Yang 1992).

Taiwan's transition to liberalization and democratization through Taiwanization

In the 1970s and 1980s, the KMT was forced to examine its agenda for global or pan-Chinese nationalism amidst a rapidly deteriorating international stance beginning with the withdrawal of the ROC representation from the United Nations in 1971, the visit by President Nixon to the People's Republic of China in 1972, and the USA replacing ROC with PRC as the sole legitimate Chinese regime in 1979. Meanwhile, growing domestic agitations in Taiwan with the one-party, autocratic State and the flourishing overseas movements for Taiwan independence challenged the ruling elites to adjust their relationship with native Taiwanese citizens (Lynch 2006). Increasingly, a significant portion of the Taiwanese intellectuals began to question ROC's sovereign claim and political legitimacy over Taiwan, including the assertion that Taiwan was a legal part of China (Bush 2004).

The search for new bases of legitimacy and national consensus led the KMT to open up the organs of government to rising numbers of native Taiwanese and to non-KMT views on governing. Opposition from outside the (KMT) party or *Dangwai* movement, harshly suppressed in the 1950s and 1960s, gained momentum and acceptance by the mid-1970s, as activists carried out demonstrations and protests to demand the KMT government implement full constitutional democracy, abrogate the Martial Law, and grant the Taiwanese people greater access to the ROC government apparatus (Tien 1989; Lynch 2006). The Chungli and the Kaohsiung (Mei Li Diao) Incidents of 1978 and 1979 were the first large-scale anti-government demonstrations since February 1947 (Rigger 1999).

Beginning with the presidency of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1978, Taiwan began the transition from hard-authoritarianism to soft authoritarianism through the loosening of KMT political preponderance to allow more political participation and through the sharing of political power with a broader segment of the Taiwan-born population (Dickson 1998; Tien 1989). The successive liberal policies of Taiwanization not only fostered the establishment of Taiwan's first genuine opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986, but it also facilitated the lifting of Martial Law in 1987 (Rigger 1999). During the presidency of Lee-Teng-Hui, the first Taiwan-born person to lead the ROC, progress made in democratization, Taiwanization, and further KMT party reforms, such as direct party primary elections, were expedited and institutionalized.

After Lee was elected by the National Assembly as the first Taiwan-born ROC president, he issued a special amnesty that pardoned and permitted the return of prominent overseas Taiwanese dissents.

Downward turn in overseas representation: the 1991 parliamentary elections and beyond

As political liberalization gained momentum, President Lee sought to push through a series of political reforms, including the ending of the Temporary Provisions in 1991, which effectively ended the "White Terror" era, revising ROC's Election and Recall Law, and amending the ROC Constitution on the political representation of overseas Chinese. In the 1991 revisions to the ROC Election and Recall Law, all legislators and National Assembly members would be directly elected from the people in Taiwan. Overseas representation would be allocated based on the proportional representation (PR) system, in which each political party in Taiwan would nominate a list of its own overseas candidates, who would, then, be appointed as legislators in proportion to the votes received by each party in Taiwan's national elections (Chen 2002). In terms of overseas representation, greater emphasis was put on the possession of ROC citizenship than the traditional bloodline for qualification as overseas representatives. And dual nationality no longer was acceptable to hold certain high public offices in Taiwan.

The second national parliamentary election was held in 1991 and all the senior delegates elected back in 1947 were finally forced to let go of their seats. In the Second National Assembly, 20 of the 327 total delegates (6.2%) were elected from overseas. In the Second Control Yuan, two of the 52 members (or 3.9%) were elected from abroad. In the Second Legislative Yuan of 1991, six of the 161 members (3.7%) were legislators from overseas. Although the raw numbers were down from 1947, the percentage of overseas delegates actually rose after the 1991 election. Nonetheless, after Taiwan instituted the direct election of the president and vice president by popular vote in 1996, the National Assembly was suspended in 2000 and officially abolished in 2005. As another casualty of Taiwan's democratization, Article 91 that ensures the overseas representation in the Control Yuan was declared defunct in the constitutional amendment of the 1990s and none of the 29 current members is designated to represent citizens abroad. In 1998, despite an increase in the number of overseas legislators by two, they still represented a mere 3.6% of 225 members. Because of a major overhaul in the Seventh Legislative Yuan in 2008 that cut down the total seats by half to 113, there is no longer any reserved seat in the ROC parliamentarian bodies for overseas citizens. Currently, overseas citizens *may* receive representation in the Legislative Yuan only and the overseas candidates need to compete with candidates running to represent the national constituency in the Taiwan area.

Consolidation of Taiwanization under Lee and Chen

Symbolically, in 1995 Lee became the first head of the state to openly apologize for the KMT atrocities in the 2–28 Incident. The Legislative Yuan then passed the 28 February Incident Disposition and Compensation Act, which paves the way for the establishment of the 28 February Memorial Foundation and the designation of that date as a national commemoration day. After Lee became the first president elected by popular vote in 1996, he began to advocate for various Taiwan-first policies to differentiate the island from Mainland China. In July 1999, he openly suggested, during an interview with the German press, that Taiwan and China are essentially "two states" (Ross 2000). By the end of his presidency in 2000, native Taiwanese would hold the most predominant positions, including the presidency, vice-presidency, and the premiership (Dickson and Chao 2002).

Government-led Taiwanization efforts were further magnified during Chen Shui-bian's administration from 2000 to 2008, as the DPP President ushered in an era of a more radical de-Sinification project, aiming to expunge the legacies of the KMT rule and its pan-Chineseness indoctrinations (Lynch 2006). The DPP Administration also sought to remind the Taiwanese of KMT's brutality in the 2–28 Incident. They wanted to portray the Chinese mainlanders as "butchers" aiming to stifle liberal democracy and self-determination in Taiwan. For instance, President Chen managed to change names of many government organizations and state-owned enterprises from "China" to "Taiwan." As noted earlier, in the example of the agency to manage affairs dealing with nationals abroad (OCAC), the word "Chinese" as in overseas Chinese was replaced by "Compatriots" in 2006. Failed initiatives to close down the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, and to change Taiwan's country name (from ROC to ROT), national flag, and anthem were suggested by the more extreme DPP politicians and independence activists (Taylor 2009). The Taiwanization initiatives taken up by Presidents Lee and Chen, in short, may be understood as interchangeable with processes for democratization and de-Sinification. To remove the influence of Chinese nationalism, a founding principle of the Republic of China, is considered by DPP supporters as imperative to sustain the democratic progress in Taiwan which, in turn, may be instrumental in the founding of a new Taiwan state. In this sense, only compatriots are welcomed.

Guarded encouragement of democratic participation from abroad

Although the democratized Taiwan disfavored overseas Chinese representatives, the rights of its citizens abroad to return and vote in ROC elections were affirmed in Articles 2 and 10 of the constitutional amendments, which were made prior to the holding of the first direct election of the president and vice president in Taiwan. Also, although the *jus sanguinis* principle remains intact in the present day, the ROC nationality law has been amended in 2000 to remove gender bias against women by permitting citizenship to be passed on from either father or mother of ROC nationality to a child born anywhere. Thus, as before, a person born abroad to father or mother of ROC nationality may apply for a ROC passport even if she or he may not have lived or set foot in the Taiwan area.

To help preserve the integrity of the electoral process in Taiwan, not all nationals, especially those residing permanently abroad, may receive the same rights to vote or work as local citizens in Taiwan. Key to accessing most citizenship benefits such as suffrage, labor rights, and national health insurance in Taiwan is the possession of a national identification card, which is only issued to persons aged 14 and older with household registration in the Taiwan area. Taiwan's Huji or the household registration system, inherited from a system adopted by the Japanese Empire when it ruled Taiwan, officially records the personally identifying information such as name, parents, spouse, place and date of birth, and current residence. It identifies a person as a resident of Taiwan, but it no longer serves to limit a resident's movement in Taiwan as it did under the Martial Law and Temporary Provisions era.

ROC nationals without household registration in Taiwan, such as the returned overseas Taiwanese (referred to as "nationals without registered permanent residence" in statute), may obtain a national identity card only if they live in Taiwan for a minimum period of time. According to Article 9 of Taiwan's Immigration Act of 2003, children born abroad to Taiwanese nationals and who have obtained household registration before 12 years of age automatically become eligible for a national identity card when they turn 14. In 2009 the age restriction was relaxed from before 12 years old to before 20 years old. For those unregistered nationals who are 20 years old or above, they are currently required to have continuously stayed in Taiwan for more than one year, or 270 days a year for two consecutive years, or 183 days a year for five

consecutive years, in order to qualify for permanent residency and household registration. While the application procedure is shorter, by three years, than the procedure required for naturalization application, the procedure for foreign-born nationals to obtain a national identity card is still rather cumbersome. As the government is gearing up once again to attract overseas investments, the Minister of the Council of Economic Planning and Development recently suggested that the age limit should be completely removed to welcome the return of foreign-born children of returned Taiwanese overseas and help them acquire household registration certificates and national ID cards (Yu 2011).

As Taiwan became a multi-party democracy with open competition and direct election of the presidency and vice presidency, interest from overseas in voting in Taiwan's elections also rose, especially when the stake was considered high. To ensure the KMT could win back the presidency lost by a hair-thin margin to the DPP in 2004, as many as 50,000 pro-KMT supporters returned to vote in Taiwan's 2008 election (Kent 2008). Because of the lack of absentee voting, Taiwanese abroad are required to physically return to Taiwan to vote. Yet, not all adult ROC citizens abroad who are willing to return to vote can vote. According to election laws amended in 2003, in order to cast vote in presidential elections, a ROC citizen residing in a foreign country will need to become eligible to vote by satisfying the age limit (of 20 years or older) and having maintained a valid household registration in Taiwan for no less than six consecutive months before election day. Citizens living abroad without a current household registration in Taiwan but who have been living or once lived in Taiwan for no less than six consecutive months can apply to become registered voters by mailing in the request to the agency of household registration at the location where the migrant last lived no less than 40 days before the election. An overseas citizen may maintain a valid household registration status by returning to Taiwan at least once in 24 months.

To make progress in the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan and to better live up to the promise of equal protection of the political participation rights of overseas citizens in Article 10 of the Additional Articles of the ROC Constitution, Taiwan's Ministry of the Interior recently announced its intention to permit some form of absentee voting, beginning with allowing voters within the Taiwan area who cannot make it back to their hometown to cast their votes at designated polling stations nearby where they work. This announcement immediately triggered a protest organized by a coalition of several pro-independence groups (Loa 2010b). Because of concerns over the meddling by China as well as public anxiety for speedy election results, an official at Taiwan's Central Election Commission commented that there will be no overseas absentee balloting in the foreseeable future (Loa 2010a). This announcement disappointed many Taiwanese abroad who would like to vote in elections in Taiwan but cannot make it back in person due to a variety of reasons. Because of the hypersensitivity surrounding the topic, complicated by political identity and cross-strait issues, it is very unclear whether at all and when those Taiwanese abroad qualified to vote in Taiwan will enjoy casting their ballots from abroad.

Taiwanization in *qiaowu*: a course of no return

Because *qiaowu* was considered an expedient tool for the KMT government to advance its one-China dream of unification, proposals to significantly reduce the number of overseas Chinese representatives in the parliamentary bodies and to abolish the OCAC as an institution surfaced soon after the KMT authoritarian rule ended. Corresponding to major shifts toward Taiwanization in the larger environment under the Lee and Chen administrations (1988–2008), Taiwan's *qiaowu* policy and the ethnic identity of decision-makers associated with the OCAC have also been transformed. Commenting on the developments of Taiwan's *qiaowu* during the 1990s, Chen

(2002) observed four broad trends: 1 the strengthening of services and assistance, particularly in economic and educational affairs, to the overseas communities; 2 the alignment of diplomacy and foreign policy interests with *qiaowu* interests; 3 the centering of Taiwanese emigrants as core constituents; 4 the abandoning of overseas Chinese representation. We observed the continuation of these trends into 2010. Today, overseas representation is near extinct in the national legislature and, although the OCAC still stands as an institution, its leadership organization and service scope and goal (and even its English name) have changed.

Under the White Terror era, emigrants from Taiwan were negligible among legislators from abroad. Of the 139 overseas legislators appointed between 1972 and 1989, half found their ancestral home in Guangdong, 19 had their ancestral home in Fujian, only 17 were Taiwanese emigrants and six among them were appointed in 1989 (Yang 1992). Since 1991, representatives from overseas have all been Taiwan-born emigrants who have followed Taiwan's political scene closely. A similar trend of Taiwanization occurred among OCAC Commissioners, whose job is to serve as a bridge between the homeland government and the overseas communities and to attend the annual Overseas Chinese Affairs Convention in Taipei to provide advice on *qiaowu* policies. Before 1988, Commissioners were largely Cantonese-speaking *huaqiao*, who identified with the KMT's political claim of ROC being the sole legitimate government of China. During the Lee era, an increasingly higher number of Commissioners were *taiqiao*. In 1992, 80 of the 163 Commissioners (49%) were still of Guangdong origin. By 2001, 97 of the 177 Commissioners (55%) were of Taiwan origin (Chen 2002: 183–4).

Over the years, although *qiaowu* has played an increasingly major role in seeking and making an international space for Taiwan through informal channels such as the mobilization of Taiwanese abroad in lobbying legislators of their adopted homeland, and despite the significant efforts by OCAC officials to provide a more efficient and focused service to its constituency abroad, the content and nature of the OCAC constituency has changed. *Taiqiao* have replaced *Huaqiao* as the core constituents. The significant increase in the number of emigrants from Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s may explain in part this shift. A more important reason is the changing political identity among policy-makers in Taiwan, with a growing number of them being DPP supporters and Taiwan-first followers. After Dr. Chang Fu-mei became the first Taiwan-born Minister of OCAC following the election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000, she was criticized for openly making a distinction between the old migrants from Guangdong/Fujian and the new migrants from Taiwan and for favoring the latter in OCAC service. Nonetheless, the reality of competition from the very resourceful PRC *qiaowu* would constitute another major reason for Taiwan to change. Since, compared to the PRC, the ROC (Taiwan) is no longer a dominant or even a comparable provider of service to overseas Chinese communities, a change of focus is the only route to take for Taiwan in its wish to avert a direct and possibly futile confrontation with PRC. This spirit of pragmatism in *qiaowu* policy has prevailed in recent years and been carried over to the Ma Administration (2008–), when flexibility and harmony were stressed as key by the new administration in its policy on handling affairs of nationals/citizens abroad.

Notes

1 Article 3 of the ROC Constitution stipulates that "[p]ersons possessing the nationality of the Republic of China shall be citizens of the Republic of China" (*ROC Yearbook* 2010: 536). Although nationals and citizens do not currently enjoy the same rights in Taiwan, we use the two terms interchangeably when the context is about the ROC itself.

2 As designed in 1946, the National Assembly was to serve as a constitution convention and an electoral college to elect the president and vice president. It also had the function of amending the constitution and impeaching the president and the vice president.

3 The Legislative Yuan, one of the five branches of the national government in the Republic of China, is the highest law-making body in the State.
4 The Control Yuan, another one of the five branches of the national government in the Republic of China, is the highest watchdog body of the State to exercise the powers of impeachment, censure, and audit.

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4

China's African policy and the Chinese immigrants in Africa

Li Anshan

There are three major periods in China–Africa relations since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. During 1950–78, China's African strategy focused primarily on winning allies in Africa by breaking the blockade imposed by the West and later the Soviet Union. China's aid to Africa during this period mainly consisted of supporting anti-colonial movements, the struggle against hegemony and economic construction in Africa. From 1978 to 1995, the strategy toward Africa emphasized two features, coordinating China's Africa strategy with China's reform and opening-up, as well as competing with Taiwan to win over African countries. Since 1995, China's policies toward Africa have been characterized by new strategic decisions. From an emphasis on ideology to neutralization in diplomacy, from economic support to exchanges in various fields, and from merely financial aid to emphasizing mutual benefits, China's policy toward Africa has been focusing on establishing a new-type of strategic partnership that features mutual political trust, mutual benefits of economic interest, and mutual cultural learning. The policy has been more vigorous through summit diplomacy and standardized mechanism (Li 2007).

Since the reform and opening-up, China has been developing rapidly, and has strengthened cooperative relations with Africa. The release of *China's African Policy* (2000) symbolizes the gradual formulation of China's policy toward Africa in the twenty-first century. The contemporary immigration of the Chinese to Africa is closely related to China's development strategy and foreign policy. This chapter will deal with four aspects, namely, historiography of Chinese immigrants in Africa, an historical overview of Chinese immigration in Africa, the new Chinese migrants in Africa, and China's policy concerning its immigrants in Africa.

Historiography of Chinese immigrants in Africa

The China–Africa relation has a long history, yet the Chinese began their migration to Africa only in modern times. There has been relatively little academic study on the Chinese in Africa (Li 2000: 15–20). The study so far generally covers four areas, namely the history of the Chinese in Africa or in individual African countries (Labin 1965; Ly-Tio-Fane 1985; Wong-Hee-Kam 1996; Harris 1994a; Yap and Leong Man 1998; Li 2000); the community life of Chinese immigrants (Human 1984; Park 2008); Chinese indentured labor (Song Xi 1974; Richardson 1982; Harris 1990, 1994a; Li 2011); and government policies (Slawecki 1971; Harris 1994b; Harris

and Pieke 1998; Harris and Ryan 1998; Ma Mung 2008). Regarding China's policy toward the Chinese in Africa, there are rather few works.

South African academia has contributed a great deal to the study of Chinese immigrants in Africa. Linda Human did a pioneering study on Chinese community life in South Africa from a sociological perspective (Human 1984). Melanie Yap and Dianna Leong Man are both descendants of Chinese immigrants and they have served for the Chinese community in South Africa for many years. They wrote their book on the history of Chinese in South Africa by taking advantage of their experience in serving for the Chinese Association of South Africa and Transvaal Chinese Association. Their book is a very solid work on the subject (Yap and Leong Man 1998).

Karen Harris has worked on the history of the Chinese in South Africa for more than two decades. She started with her comparative study of the labor union of gold mines in South Africa and Australia, and gradually expanded her research to other aspects of the history of the Chinese in South Africa (Harris 1990, 1994a, 1994b; Harris and Pieke 1998; Harris and Ryan 1998). Yoon Jung Park is another scholar who began her study on the Chinese community from her graduate years. Her work is concentrated on the identity issue of the South African Chinese (Park 2008).

As for the study of China's policy, few works touch on this subject. Yen Ching-hwang did an excellent work on Qing dynasty's policy toward the overseas Chinese. Regarding the Chinese government's policy toward the Chinese immigrants in South Africa, he concludes that the Chinese diplomats showed "a strong determination and a keen concern" (Yen Ching-hwang 1985: 347) toward the protection of the Chinese in the course of their negotiation with as well as protest against the British government. It seems the conclusion is made on the basis of the official data. In fact, the letters between the diplomats in Africa and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflected only one side of the story.[1]

Philip Snow wrote a comprehensive history of the China–Africa relation. In *Star Raft*, he illustrates the history of indentured labor in South Africa. However, in regard to China's policy toward the Chinese there, his viewpoint is questionable. He argues that the main concern of Liu Yulin (also known as Liu Ngai and Lew Yuk Lin in South Africa), the Qing dynasty Consul-General to South Africa, was to "help the Europeans keep order" (Snow 1988: 49). This is a lop-sided argument. It is right to conclude that the Consul-General did not serve the Chinese community whole-heartedly, since the corrupt and weak Qing government was at its end. Yet Liu Yulin did at least three things for the benefit of the Chinese community in South Africa during his service. He reported the situation of the ill-treated Chinese indentured laborers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China and asked the South African side for their transportation fees to return to China. Liu Yulin also talked to the Transvaal authority about a pension for the deceased Chinese workers. In addition, he negotiated with the Transvaal government over the discrimination laws against the Chinese community (Li 2000: 206–10).

Ma Mung (2008) recently did a study on the relation between the Chinese new immigrants and China's policy toward Africa. He categorizes three types of Chinese migration in Africa, namely, a temporary labor migration flow linked to public construction of infrastructure projects, an entrepreneurial migration flow of merchants, and a proletarian transit migration flow of people who are waiting in Africa to find an opportunity to go to work in western countries. In his view, China's foreign policy consists of three elements; to secure access to natural resources of oil, minerals, etc., to widen the export market, and to strengthen China's diplomatic support for different international organizations.

Chinese overseas in Africa: an historical overview

There is a long history of contact between China and Africa (cf. Ai 1989; Shen 1990; Li 2000: 43–81). The Chinese immigration to Africa also has a rather long history starting from the Qing dynasty

(Levathes 1996: 200–1; Li 2000: 82–125). The emigration of Chinese overseas to Africa experienced several peaks. The first was during the last years of the Qing dynasty, and this was due to three reasons. First, during the late Qing, especially the nineteenth century, it became increasingly harder for the peasants to survive and they were compelled to leave home and go abroad to find their way out. Labor was needed for the construction of infrastructural facilities of European colonies in Africa, especially the construction of railways and highways. In addition, the discovery of gold mines led to a great demand of labor after the Anglo-Boer War, and immigration to Africa became a way for Chinese to lead a life. Thus, places like French colonial Congo, German colonial Tanganyika, Portuguese colonial Mozambique, and French colonial Madagascar, all once had Chinese laborers, either in building roads or railways, or in the mining industry. There were approximately 142,000 Chinese indentured laborers in Africa during the period of 1700–1910 (Li 2000: 124, Table 2.6). Second, some anti-Qing advocates left their homes to escape pursuit by the Qing government; some like Yang Quyun, Sun Yatsen's close friend and one of the revolutionary pioneers, came to South Africa to organize the Xing Zhong Hui (Society for the Revival of China) in 1897 (Li 2000: 217–27). Third, a treaty signed by China with Great Britain, agreeing to provide Chinese laborers for gold mines in South Africa, resulted in approximately 64,000 laborers coming to South Africa. A few of them stayed on, while some other Chinese who came together with the laborers also stayed in South Africa to start a new life (Song 1974; Richardson 1982).[2]

After the Second World War, the Chinese immigrants who came to Africa earlier had already settled down, and began to help their incoming relatives establish businesses together. Besides, some people left China due to the fear of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) before the new government was set up. Some went abroad just for postwar development opportunities and most of them went to the USA or Europe. Since most parts of Africa were colonized by the western powers, only a small number of Chinese immigrated to Africa during this period, mostly to Mauritius and Madagascar.

The second immigration peak occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. The immigrants were mostly from Taiwan and Hong Kong, and they were different from the previous immigrants. Although the government had not lifted the ban of traveling in Taiwan, there had been numerous international interactions already. A few Chinese students from Taiwan with expertise in modern technology, especially agriculture and engineering, came to Africa to start their business after they finished their study overseas. Also, some Taiwanese Aid Team members decided to settle down in African countries after they had completed their aid task. Since these immigrants were from the fast developing Taiwan, and they had experiences of living or studying in developed countries and had expertise in different areas, they invested in various fields, including department stores, retail, wholesale, import and export, garment, agriculture and fruit planting. Various industries appeared in different African countries, such as those dealing with flour, textile, garments, leather, plastics, chemical products, etc. Moreover, some of the factories were started by the immigrants with their own technology, money and even machinery. One article in Chinese described what happened in Madagascar in the 1960s.

> Once arriving in Madagascar, it seems that you arrived at your own country, no feeling that you are in Africa. Since you can see various shop brands with Chinese characters here and there on the street. When we do shopping in those shops, we feel cordial and warm. The overseas Chinese here are mostly in commercial business, such as import and export, daily goods, photo shops, or wine factory and tobacco factory. All these show that the overseas Chinese have a solid economic foundation. The main reason for them to have such important status in economy is that they are both industrial and thrifty, and they are running the business by painstaking efforts.
>
> *(Zheng 1966)*[3]

This wave of immigration continued until the 1980s. In 1977, the UN passed 418 Resolution, which issued a sanction to South Africa. Owing to the fact that the sanction was partially on oil and arms, the economy was not really affected. Yet from the end of the 1970s, especially during the mid-1980s, the South African government started new suppression of the liberation movement, and thus triggered a new wave of international anti-apartheid sentiment and protest. The economy of South Africa suffered a great deal owing to the new sanction (Xia 1996: 200–5). New immigrants from Taiwan, mainland China, Hong Kong or Southeast Asia arrived in South Africa and started their new businesses. This coincided with the opening-up of China and the opening-up of Taiwan's tourism. China's reform provided a good opportunity for the Chinese overseas to immigrate to Africa. Since the overseas policy permitted the relatives of overseas Chinese to go abroad to inherit their property, some of them went to Africa (especially to South Africa, Madagascar, and Mauritius) to run businesses managed by the older generation.

In the mid-1990s, more Chinese entered Africa. With the implementation of the "two resources and two markets" strategy, Chinese enterprises started investment in Africa. At the same time, most African countries had a more favorable immigration policy, encouraging Chinese immigrants to Africa. Some Chinese immigrants went to Europe, but found it difficult to settle down there, and they re-immigrated to Africa. For example, the Qingtianese usually chose Europe as their target-place for immigration. Since the 1990s, they had found it difficult to settle down there, and they started to go to Africa. In 1995, there were 231 Qingtian Chinese in Africa, while at the end of 1996, the figure had reached 1,231, an increase of 400%. In addition, the target countries in Africa also increased from six to nine (Zhang 1998).[4] The Chinese overseas also strengthened the relations with their home villages (towns). They returned home to visit, saw relatives, gave donations, engaged in philanthropic activities and invested.

Chinese new immigrants in Africa and their characteristics

In China, those Chinese overseas who went abroad after the opening-up and reform are called "new immigrants." The new immigrants occupy a majority of Chinese overseas in Africa. In *A History of Chinese Overseas in Africa*, it was predicted that the number of Chinese overseas in Africa would increase significantly in the twenty-first century. The argument was based on four considerations. First, the development of the Chinese economy needs new markets, which would speed up the investment of Chinese enterprises in Africa as well as Chinese immigration. Second, Africa has a long history of contact with the West, but little success in its development. With its expectation for development, Africa would be willing to learn China's experiences of development, and therefore provide a huge potential to cooperate with China. Moreover, the continent has rich natural resources which would benefit both sides. Third, the East-Asian developmental experiences can offer an example to Africa, which also witnesses the achievements of Chinese overseas in the process. What is more, the old generation of Chinese overseas in Africa had built up a solid base and the Chinese immigrants in the 1970s and 1980s also set up a good example for the new immigrants. Finally, emigration policies in the African countries are generally different from those of the West, being flexible and even favorable, and they welcome Chinese immigrants (Li 2006: 513–14). From the current development, the above prediction seems well tested.

The estimation for the number of Chinese overseas in Africa varies.[5] *Jeune Afrique*, a French magazine, estimates the number at 500,000. A German weekly's statistics is about 750,000. Some scholars hold that the number of Chinese-Africans has reached 800,000. Based on the data of individual African countries, there is a great increase of Chinese immigrants in Africa. The number of Chinese in Nigeria was about 5,100 in 1996, and 60,000 in 2006.[6] In Ghana,

the population of the Chinese community was about 700 in 1996, currently it is about 4,000. In Zambia, the number of Chinese overseas augmented from 3,000 to 30,000 in ten years (Lyman 2006: 132). The Chinese community in South Africa has grown rapidly in recent years, and its population is currently estimated at 250,000.[7] If the number of current Chinese immigrants to Africa is put together with the first generation of Chinese immigrants, my estimation of the Chinese community in Africa is about 500,000.

Some characteristics of the new Chinese immigrants to Africa are mainly manifested as follows. Unlike the old generation who mostly originated from coastal regions in China, the new immigrants are from various provinces. Their profession or occupations vary a great deal: students, entrepreneurs, merchants, peasants, workers, tourists, etc. They soon dominated some sectors of the host countries' economy, such as wholesale, retail, and restaurant, etc. The population grows rapidly.

In terms of their purpose of emigration to Africa, it varies significantly. As in other emigration countries, the Chinese overseas in Africa would choose either to settle there permanently, or naturalize themselves, or just be immigrants there. Regarding their original province, some of them are from Taiwan, some from Hong Kong or Southeast Asia, but most of them are from the Chinese mainland. Compared with past generations of Chinese immigrants, who mainly came from the Chinese coastal provinces such as Guangdong and Fujian, the new Chinese immigrants to Africa are from almost all parts of China, such as Zhejiang, Jiangshu, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Shanghai, Beijing and the Northeast region of China. Regarding Chinese immigrants to Africa in recent years, some of them invest directly in Africa based on their sense of commercial opportunity in the continent. Some came to Africa for a visit, attracted by the continent's richness, they decide to settle down. Some students choose to stay after obtaining their degree in African universities (especially in South Africa) and some others just consider Africa as their springboard to emigrate to other countries.

In the 1980–90s, Chinese new immigrants came to Africa to invest or inherit their family property. With success in business, they became entrepreneurs and leaders of the Chinese community in Africa, such as Sherry Chen (Chen Qianhui), Eugenia Chang, Chris Wang, Shiaan-Bin Huang, Wang Jianxu, Li Xinzhu, Hu Jieguo, etc. Take Sherry Chen for example. In 1981, she came to South Africa from Taiwan. At first working as an English secretary in a company, she eventually owned seven companies of real estate, farm product, import-export trade after years' of struggle. In 1994, she joined New National Party, one of the major parties in South Africa. She realized that many Chinese people would come to do business or settle down in South Africa with the development of China–African relations. Although the Chinese overseas have made contributions to South Africa's economy, they are generally excluded from the mainstream. If there were no Chinese immigrants getting involved in politics in South Africa, there would be no one to uphold their interests.

Thus Sherry Chen decided to become a spokesperson of the Chinese overseas in South Africa. Starting from an ordinary party member, with her perseverance and hard efforts, she gradually proved herself and was accepted by others. She once said, "I try my best to do everything. If I didn't do it well, people would not just say Sherry Chen is not good, they would say the Chinese are not capable." As a business woman, Chen enthusiastically explains South Africa's policies and laws to Chinese investors. As a prominent member of the Chinese community, she has tried to promote relations between South Africa and China. In 1995, she led a dance troop to attend the Qingdao Beer Festival and greatly promoted the cultural exchange of both sides. As a representative of the Chinese community, she considers it her obligation to speak for the local Chinese immigrants. When she became city councillor of Johannesburg, she advocated that the Chinese overseas could light fireworks as their traditional custom to celebrate the

Chinese New Year. Through by-election, Chen was elected to the National Council of Province in 2004, and became the first Chinese overseas in South Africa's National Assembly.[8]

Sherry Chen is representative of successful Chinese overseas originating from Taiwan; He Liehui is an example from the mainland China. Majoring in Law, He graduated from Shanghai Maritime University. His father, a Chinese businessman in Botswana, is one of the first generation of private entrepreneurs after China's reform and opening-up. In 1998, He Liehui went to Botswana on a business trip. He found that there were a lot commercial opportunities in Africa. With his father's advice, He Liehui decided to start business in Africa. After he failed to get his visa to Botswana at the time, he went to Ghana instead. Although both Botswana and Ghana are African countries, the economic development is quite different. The per capita GDP of Botswana is about 5,000 US dollars while that of Ghana is only about 100 US dollars. He Liehui's successful Touchroad Company started from Ghana. He later went to Nigeria, and succeeded again. He was awarded the title of chieftain there. For promoting Sino-African economic trade, He Liehui spent about 1000,000 RMB to hold the first Touchroad China–Africa invest forum in Shanghai in March 2008. The forum attracted many African government delegations and enterprises, and had very positive impacts. After the forum, he accompanied the African delegations to visit the eighteenth East China Fair in Shanghai. He Liehui founded Touchroad International Comany in 2002 and hoped that the Touchroad Group would become one of the top 500 enterprises in the world in twenty years. Currently, he is actively planning to make Touchroad a listed company in five years, thus transforming Touchroad to a public enterprise from a family business.[9]

Few Chinese overseas are as lucky as Sherry Chen and He Liehui. Most of them are still struggling for their business success in Africa. For example, in 2008 I met a young man from Jiangxi Province in a marketplace, who has done business for four years in Botswana. He rented a room at the marketplace as his booth. Now his wife has joined him and they are doing quite well in their business. There are also more than ten Chinese restaurants in Botswana, one of which is Xinyue Restaurant and it is running well. Xinyue Restaurant specializes in Shaanxi flavor. Its Chinese dishes are delicious, such as tofu, steamed cold noodles, handmade noodles, etc. Liu Long and Yang Hongqing, both young and from Shaanxi Province, serve as the restaurant's chefs. Their salary is about 6–7,000 Pula per month (1 US dollar equals about 8 Pula). Qiao Liang, the restaurant's boss, is a local Chinese celebrity, who on the one hand does his business, on the other hand helps to organize the Chinese overseas in Botswana.

Among the Chinese overseas in Africa, some choose to stay after they have finished their aid project there. As mentioned before, some members of Taiwan Agriculture Aid Team thought that it was promising to develop a career in Africa, thus they settled down there after they had completed their service. The same thing happened to some members of the Chinese medical team. After completing their term, they chose to stay and ran their own clinics of Chinese medicine. One could see these Chinese doctors in Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, etc. Some Chinese construction workers also decided to stay in Africa after they completed their construction project as they thought there were lots of commercial opportunities there (Hsu 2007, 2008).

The Chinese in Africa have increased rapidly in recent years. However, the immigrants are various, including all kinds of people, businessmen, students, laborers, small dealers, peasants, etc. Although most of the Chinese are law-abiding, some are not familiar with, or are unaware of local laws. Some of the Chinese disregard local laws and morality. They sell poor quality goods, violate regulations and evade tax. This has provoked local people in one way or another. Cheap Chinese commodities and Chinese businessmen have brought pressure on the local market and textile industry, thus causing contradiction and conflict. Although African consumers are generally satisfied with the cheap Chinese goods, the textile industries and local businessmen are

not happy with Chinese goods and businessmen. For example, in Dakar, Senegal, two separate demonstrations were held in 2005, one being supportive of Chinese goods and businessmen, the other opposing them.[10]

China's policy toward Chinese immigrants in Africa

The current growth of the Chinese community in Africa is closely related to the Chinese policy toward Africa. China's African policy has a different focus at different times, but its continuity is obvious, and which is characterized by four features. First, China in its international strategy takes African countries ignored by other great powers as important allies. Second, China sees the African continent as a whole, which is different from the traditional diplomatic strategy based on a country-to-country model. Third, China considers African countries as equal strategic partners disregarding whether they are small or big, strong or weak. Fourth, China seeks a mutual benefit and win-win strategy when developing its cooperation with Africa. Briefly, the essence of China's policy toward Africa is to establish a strategic partnership with the continent to realize China's strategic goal on the one hand, and to promote development in Africa on the other.

China's strategy toward Africa has had a great impact on the international order, which has been dominated by the Western powers for a long time, but is gradually being eroded by other rising powers. For example, the China–Africa Summit in 2006 manifested China's political power. China's economic power is represented by being the second largest trade partner with Africa, with trade volume in 2008 being more than 100 billion US dollars. With China's support, African countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe turned a deaf ear to western powers' warning. Despite Great Britain's admonition, Nigeria is still very keen to cooperate with China. With China's entry into the market, the French companies could no longer monopolize the African franc zone. Even the newly established US African Command cannot find a base in the continent. Abdoulaye Wade, the former Senegalese President, in his January 2008 article published in the *Financial Times* called upon the West to learn from China as far as African affairs were concerned.

Based on the survey of the development of Chinese overseas in Africa, we can argue that China's policy toward Chinese overseas is highly correlative with its development strategy. In the early period of China's reform and opening-up, the Chinese government encouraged the offspring of the overseas Chinese to go abroad to inherit their parents' patrimonies. Since the mid-1990s, certain Chinese large-scale enterprises have begun investing in Africa, and this is largely related to China's strategic decision of making use of "two resources and two markets." The Chinese government also plays a guiding role in China's investment in Africa. As China–African relations deepen, protecting the Chinese overseas now becomes one of the main tasks of Chinese embassies and consulates in Africa.

After the Cultural Revolution, China changed its view on the current situation of international politics, as well as the relationship between economy and diplomacy. China realized that the theme of international relations was no longer "war and revolution," but "peace and development." In relation to this transformation, the idea of "economy serving diplomacy" changed to that of "diplomacy serving economy." Under this strategic decision, the Chinese government began to encourage vigorously the descendants of the Chinese overseas to go abroad to inherit their families' property. Some successful overseas Chinese entrepreneurs did go to Africa under such circumstances.

For example, Hu Jieguo's father is a Chinese overseas in Nigeria. Hu himself was formerly an educated youth in Shanghai, then recommended as a university student during the Cultural Revolution. In 1976, he was encouraged to migrate to Nigeria. Hu first went to Nigeria and then to Canada to learn hotel management. He obtained his first job in a hotel in Canada; then

he invested in many industries, such as restaurant business, engineering, forestry, machinery, etc. In the mid-1990s, he invested 8 million US dollars to build Jingmen Grand Hotel in Lagos, the former Nigerian capital. The hotel became the local symbolic building because of its fine decoration and exquisite craftwork. The restaurant there is famous. Since its opening, it has hosted many high officials and celebrities from China and other countries. Many high-ranking Nigerian officials often hold their banquets and parties there. Hu enjoys a high reputation in the country, and in 2001 he was awarded the title of chief by Nigerian traditional leaders. Hu has offered assistance to Chinese institutions and companies and helped China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation to win the bidding of a railway construction project in Nigeria. When China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) began to enter into the Nigerian market, Hu helped with his recommendation to make contact with the Nigerian Minister of Petroleum. When a staff member of the Chinese Embassy in Nigeria was hijacked by kidnappers, Hu led the police to successfully rescue the victims on the spot. He also undertook the project of renovation of the Chinese Embassy in Nigeria. He became one of the leading Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa, holding many posts such as the deputy director of China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, the vice president of Nigeria–China Friendship Association, the honorary president of Sino-Nigeria Federation of Industry & Commerce and special consultant to the Nigerian President (Li 2006: 470–74).

From the beginning of the 1990s, Chinese companies started to increase their investment in Africa. Under this circumstance the number of Chinese in Africa increased rapidly. Chinese construction workers prevailed in Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Republic of Seychelles, etc. Although most Chinese companies normally hire local laborers, some Chinese construction workers are employed in certain circumstances.[11] The reasons for the employment of Chinese laborers are as follows. First, it is due to the urgent time constraint of the construction projects, since the Chinese workers are able to work beyond the working hours stipulated by the local labor law. Second, the Chinese laborers are more manageable, staying together, and sharing similar language, culture and customs. Third, they are more skillful than local workers and most of them have the experience of doing construction work. All these make the Chinese companies inclined to use Chinese employees. Usually after a few years of their experience as construction workers in a Chinese company in Africa, some Chinese workers feel that the local condition in Africa is good enough and the host countries are open to foreigners, therefore they are willing to come back to Africa after their return to China.

The Chinese government provides timely assistance to the Chinese to settle down or invest in Africa. With the growing engagement of China in Africa, some ministries of Chinese central government also play an important role in guiding the Chinese firms to invest in the continent, generally in three ways. First, they offer all kinds of commodity information to encourage the investment of Chinese enterprises and businessmen in Africa. The Chinese government once set up more than ten China–African trade centers to promote the sale of Chinese products in Africa, which, however, were not successful. With the acceleration of the Chinese reform process, more and more Chinese firms started to invest in Africa. In guiding the Chinese companies and business people to operate factories in Africa, the Chinese ministries publicize lots of information on their websites to show the products needed in the African markets. For example, the Ministry of Commerce, with the help of the business service of Chinese embassies in Africa, actively gathers and publicizes in a timely fashion all kinds of information related to the economy and market in African countries.

For instance, Comoros has a very favorable policy toward foreign investment. Except for certain regulations on the import and production of pork and alcohol products, Comoros law sets no limits on the economic and commercial activities of foreign firms and individuals. On 31

August 2007 the Comoros Parliament passed the new investment law regulating investment in such sectors as agriculture, fishery, husbandry, fish breeding and poultry raising, tourism, information technology, all of which would be exempted from taxation and the term of tax exemption would be extended from 5 years to 10 years. The Comoros government also provides some preferential policies and encouraging measures for enterprises with investment in industries which need to buy land. The government has also set up an investment promotion bureau, which helps foreign firms and individuals to invest, and provides them with consultancies and other services in the country. The business service of the Chinese Embassy to Comoros quickly noticed this information and suggested that Chinese companies take advantage of the Comoros' preferential policy to engage in the development of its agriculture, fishery, farming industry, tourism, mineral resources, offshore oil, volcanic and terrestrial heat, solar energy, and the privatization process of its state-owned enterprises.[12]

The Chinese government also provides the Chinese with related African countries' laws and regulations, to facilitate Chinese immigrants to emigrate to or invest in Africa. Related laws and regulations of African countries are listed on the website of the Ministry of Commerce of PRC, or its annual book. After collecting the articles of laws on commerce, taxation, environmental protection, the Chinese embassies and consulates in Africa send them back to the Ministry of Commerce. The best example is indicated in a recent case. After the issue of bad quality of Chinese milk products was exposed, Chinese embassies and consulates urged the Chinese authorities to strengthen the supervision of the export of milk products, and to release in a timely manner the information on the reaction and feedback from related countries.

The business service of the Chinese Embassy in Côte d'Ivoire once released the information on the response of the Côte d'Ivoire media to the commercial activities of foreign companies. The media of Côte d'Ivoire are relatively tolerant toward the commercial activities of foreign enterprises in their country. There are few negative reports and they are mainly about trade disputes. In 2008, there were two negative reports on Chinese products. One was about the Chinese shoe products, the other was about Chinese milk products. In March, the Shoes Merchant Association of Côte d'Ivoire held a strike against the dumping of Chinese cheap shoe products, which was reported by the local media and caused negative impacts. After the communication and negotiation between the Chinese Embassy and the Federation of Industry and Commerce of Côte d'Ivoire, this issue was resolved smoothly. The press of Côte d'Ivoire also publicly corrected its former misleading reports. In September and October, due to the scandal of Sanlu milk powder in China, the Ministry of Livestock Husbandry and Water Resources of Côte d'Ivoire sealed up parts of the milk powder imported from China and sent samples to the European Union for testing. The result of the test was positive and satisfactory, and the press of Côte d'Ivoire reported this issue objectively.[13]

The Chinese government has started to strengthen its management of the social responsibility of Chinese companies in Africa. In August 2008, China's Ministry of Commerce and other related ministries held a conference on strengthening corporate social responsibility (CSR) of Chinese state-owned enterprises in Africa. The conference pointed out clearly that, in the long run, if Chinese companies wanted to invest in Africa, they must pay more attention to their CSR. Some 67 participants openly published a declaration on strengthening their CSR in Africa.[14]

Moreover, the protection of the Chinese overseas in Africa has become one of the main missions of Chinese diplomacy. With the growing population of Chinese in Africa, there appeared, in recent years, some abuse of violence against the Chinese community in certain African countries, such as South Africa, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sudan, and others. In response to the serious safety concern faced by Chinese immigrants in South Africa, Luo Tianguang, the former director-general of the Department of Consular Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, in

September 2004 was dispatched to Johannesburg to negotiate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Police of South Africa on the issue of the security of Chinese citizens and Chinese overseas in South Africa. Later, the Chinese government signed with its South African counterpart a series of agreements on police cooperation. In 2005, the Chinese government dispatched a liaison official for police affairs to its embassy in South Africa.[15]

Conclusion

Three conclusions can be drawn from the above study. First, the history of Chinese overseas in Africa shows that their emigration is highly correlative with China's domestic affairs. Second, since the reform and opening-up, the new trend of Chinese emigration to Africa and its development are closely related to China's African policy. Third, the issue of Chinese overseas will become more important in China's diplomacy in Africa, since they can, at the same time, become a tool in China's economic growth, political influence and cultural expansion.

With the growth of China's economic strength, the Chinese government has realized its weakness in cultural influence. Ma Mung's (2008) analysis of the three elements of China's policy toward Africa is correct, yet there is another important factor regarding China's African policy: to increase Chinese cultural influence. Chinese immigrants in Africa include various kinds of people: the old emigrants who have been settled there for several decades and take Africa as their home, the new immigrants who come to find their fortune, the educated young men and women who serve as technicians of state companies, and the uneducated peasants who were dispatched to Africa as construction workers. They all have one thing in common, linkage with China and Chinese culture. With a growing number of Chinese immigrants, the international influence of Chinese culture would defintely increase. This might be another significant factor embodied in China's policy toward the Chinese overseas.

Notes

1 Yen's view is just the opposite of Philip Snow's, which goes to another extreme (Yen 1985: 335–47).
2 For the different calculation of the figure of the Chinese indentured laborers in South Africa, see Li (2000: 108–16).
3 As for the Taiwanese in Africa, see also Wang (1969) and Tang (n.d.).
4 Qingtian is a county of Zhejiang Province in east China and it has a long tradition of international migration.
5 My estimate of Chinese overseas in 1996 is 136,000; see Li (2000: 568–9, Figure 6 (5).
6 The statistics were given by the Nigerian consul in Hong Kong at the "China–Africa Links Workshop" held in Hong Kong, 11–12 November, 2006.
7 "Chinese are new immigrants in South Africa," *Asian Week*, 4 February, 2008.
8 Li (2006: 355–6, 368–71); "Sherry Chen, member of Parliament," http://www.whoswhosa.co.za/sherry-chen-4077.
9 "He Liuhui, an African Chief with yellow skin" http://biz.xinmin.cn/chanjing/2008/10/24/1402080_2.html.
10 Sources: correspondence between the author and D.Z. Osborn, an American scholar.The author also had the chance to discuss the manifestations with Adama Gaye, a Senegalese journalist at an international conference "China in Africa: Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Considerations," 31 May to 2 June 2007, at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
11 For a more detailed account see Centre for Chinese Studies (n.d.)
12 See "Comoros government encourages foreign firms and individuals to engage the economic and commercial activities," http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gbhj/hjdt/200811/970214_1.html.
13 On 22 October 2008, *Le Journal International* of Côte d'Ivoire published the whole text of the public response of the business service of Chinese Embassy to the reports of the media of Côte d'Ivoire on the issue of Sanlu milk powder. See "There is no problem for Chinese milk powder," http://www.foods1.com/content/626380.

14 "Proposal by 67 enterprises to build sense of responsibility and create harmonious win-win economic relations between China and Africa," http://xyf.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/cksm/200709/20070905111119.html.
15 "Chinese police official dispatched to protect the Chinese overseas in South Africa," in Li (2006: 478–81).

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Part III

Migration

Past and present

5

Chinese coolie emigration, 1845–74

Yen Ching-hwang

Background and causes for coolie emigration

The interaction between international and domestic forces brought forth Chinese coolie emigration in the mid-nineteenth century. The anti-slavery movement began in the second half of the eighteenth century, and ended in the prohibition of slave trade in the first part of the nineteenth century. The termination of this lucrative trade gave rise to the demand of other types of slaves – Chinese coolies. The Treaty of Ghent of December 1814 obliged Britain and the United States of America to ban the inhuman African slave trade. With rigorous enforcement of the ban, the notorious slave trade that hitherto supplied the main source of cheap labor for European colonists in the new world came to an end. It is in this context that the Chinese coolies provided an alternative source of cheap labor.

The demand for Chinese cheap labor coincided with the opening up of China by the West following the infamous Opium Wars of 1842 and 1856. Under the treaties of Nanjing (Nanking) and Tianjin (Tientsin), the tattering Qing dynasty was forced to open five treaty ports (Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningpo and Shanghai) for trade, where Western nationals enjoyed special legal protection. Armed with the spirit of free trade and extra-territoriality rights, the Western merchants were able to acquire the needed labor for the new world.

The story of Chinese coolie emigration would not have been told in full if we had not critically examined the domestic forces at work in China, the supply side of the picture. The negative forces of a massive agrarian economy consisted of overpopulation, natural calamities, and the impact of the opium trade. Ironically, overpopulation was mainly the result of a long period of peace and stability over a century under the reigns of Kang Xi, Yong Zheng and Qian Long emperors. An estimated population of the empire in 1700 at 150 million rose to 313 million in 1794, and by 1850, the estimated population had risen to 450 million. The twin evils of overpopulation and inflation combined to rock the agrarian economy. The overpopulation undermined the land–population ratio, which declined from 3.86 *mou* (1 *mou* = 0.0667 hectares) per person in 1753 to 1.86 *mou* in 1833. It was suggested that 4 *mou* per person was needed to sustain the minimum living standard during the period (Yen 1985: 33). The overpopulation also distorted the balance in the demand and supply of food, especially rice. The price of rice began to climb as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century in the later part of Kang Xi emperor's reign,

and it continued to increase throughout the century under the rules of both Emperor Yong Zheng and Emperor Qian Long. This became a serious problem at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and worsened in the middle and the second half of the nineteenth century (Yen 1985: 34).

The natural calamities, principally flood and drought, added to the miseries of the teeming Chinese population. There were droughts in 92 years and floods in 190 years during the entire 267 years of the Qing dynasty (Ho 1959: 229). Some of these calamities devastated several provinces and affected millions of people. The worst drought in modern Chinese history that occurred in 1877–8 struck four northern provinces and one eastern coastal province, and an estimated five to six million people were affected (Ho 1959: 231). Many of them starved to death, and many more were driven out of their home provinces and moved south in search of food. The frequency and intensity of natural calamities created a tendency to look to overseas emigration as solution to their problems. This was especially so in the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, where contacts with Southeast Asia and other parts of the world had already been established.

The impact of the opium trade deepened the agrarian crisis, especially in the south. Britain's resort to introduce opium into China to reverse the outflow of silver bullion saw the rapid increase of opium smuggled into China. An estimated 4,555 chests of opium brought into China increased to 40,000 chests in 1838, an increase of nine times in mere 38 years (Chang 1964). The illicit nature of the opium trade drained off Chinese silver, and seriously upset the internal Chinese fiscal system. The outflow of silver taels as result of illicit opium trade aggravated the financial problems of Chinese peasants, who had to pay tax and rent in silver taels, but received their income in the devalued copper currency. This impact was more serious in the southern provinces where opium had flooded the market.

Social and political forces also had their toll on the vast agrarian population. Several major rebellions arose in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Among the best known were the White Lotus Insurrection in central and western China in 1796; the Nien Rebellion (*nianjun qiyi*) in the Huai river region, southern part of Hobei province and western part of Shandong in the middle of the nineteenth century; and of course the famous Taiping Rebellion that swept through more than 13 provinces in central and south China in the period between 1851 and 1864. The profound impact of these disasters on the agrarian population included disruption of economic activities, destruction of farms and the driving out of many rural populations to coastal cities and towns. The combination of these domestic factors created a destitute rural situation: a concentration of population in coastal cities and towns, an oversupply of cheap labor, and a strong desire for overseas emigration.

The rise of the coolie trade

The opening of the five treaty ports in coastal China was the victory of Western free traders led by the British. Armed with the free trade ideology and excited at the prospect of opening up a vast market for trade in the Far East, they saw a great potential in profitable immigrant trade (coolie trade) that would fill the gap of labor shortage in the new world. A notorious exploitative system known as the coolie agency system was established at the treaty ports. Under this system, Western free traders set up their agencies at the ports, and they were engaged either by the would-be employers or speculators in the new world to supply the needed laborers. They charged lucrative commissions on the number of coolies supplied, and they set up coolie houses known as "barracoon" at the ports, to collect coolies. Their operation, though illegal, was under the protection of extra-territoriality for foreigners. In the three decades from 1850s to 1870s, 44 major coolie agencies in the treaty ports, Hong Kong and Singapore were identified, and most

of them were owned by British nationals, while the rest were controlled by the French, Spanish, Dutch, German, American and Portuguese.

Surprisingly there were also six Chinese owned coolie agencies (Wang 1978: 355–60). These agencies acted primarily on behalf of the employers in the new world, principally West Indies, British Guiana, Cuba and Peru, and some for employers in Australia, Singapore and Sumatra. In the process of acquiring needed coolies, Western coolie traders were handicapped by linguistic barriers and their inability to travel freely in interior China. To make the system work, they forged a close link with local Chinese crimps popularly known as "coolie brokers" or in Chinese circles as *ketou* (*kheh-tau*). The origin of these "*ketous*" was shrouded in mystery, but evidence suggests that they came into existence long before the opening up of China in the 1840s. Two types of Chinese coolie brokers can be discerned: principal coolie brokers and subordinate coolie brokers. The former were employed directly by foreign coolie traders, while the latter were under the control of the former.

The illegal nature of the coolie trade tended to attract undesirable elements of lower socio-economic background. Being less educated and less influenced by Confucian morality, they were more prepared to deal with foreign coolie traders and had no moral scruple in pursuing their material gains to the utmost. Many of them were members of secret societies operating in the ports. However, they had some linguistic ability with foreign contacts. The principal brokers in the early stage of the trade were either the overseas Chinese of the Straits Settlements, or the Cantonese of Hong Kong and coastal Guangdong areas. Loo Kwang-hung and Loo Chang-piao, two natives of Canton (Guangzhou), together with Wang Wei-chang, Lin Kin-toan, Lew Shih-new, Le Tsai and Lin Hwan, were some of the principal brokers employed by Tait & Co., and Syme, Muir & Co., the two main coolie agencies in Amoy (Yen 1985: 39). The size of the principal coolie brokers in Amoy from 1849 to 1852 was small but they were a well-integrated group. The precise relationship among them is difficult to ascertain, as they could be relatives, friends, sworn-brothers or fellow villagers. Loo Kwang-hung and Loo Chang-piao were said to be either brothers or uncle and nephew in relationship. Whatever their actual relationship, this shows that the traditional Chinese bonds, such as kinship, common geographical origins and brotherhood, had played a role in cementing the principal coolie brokers together.

The success of acquiring coolies rested less with the principal brokers than with the subordinate brokers. The latter were a larger group in numbers. In Amoy from 1849 to 1852, they numbered several hundreds. The strength of this group lay not just in its numbers, but also in its important role in the coolie trade system. It served as the most important link between the prospective coolies and the coolie suppliers, and the system could not have functioned successfully without its service. Similar to the principal brokers, the subordinate brokers were drawn from members of lower classes who cherished the desire of getting rich quick, and who had few moral constraints. They were directly involved in recruiting the coolies: taking orders from principal brokers, spreading news about emigration and terms of contracts, and escorting prospective coolies from rural villages to sea ports. What distinguished the subordinate brokers from the principal brokers was perhaps their lack of ability in speaking a foreign language that led to useful foreign contacts, and their relatively lesser influence in the underworld.

In recruiting coolies, the subordinate brokers had three trump cards. First, most of them were locals speaking a local dialect, and were familiar with the local conditions. They were the first-line contacts with prospective coolies: monopolizing the news and information about emigration, and acting as the interpreters of contents and terms of emigration. Second, with the financial support of the principal brokers and the foreign coolie agencies, they were able to satisfy the immediate material needs of prospective coolie emigrants: food, clothes and lodgings were great attractions to roaming paupers in rural villages. One contemporary observer in the early 1850s

stated that "One great temptation they (the subordinate brokers) held out is that they at once offer to supply plenty of food and lodgings for the day to everyone willing to be mustered, whether he be eventually accepted or not … " (Yen 1985: 40–1) Third, due to their numbers, the subordinate brokers wielded considerable influence in the underworld. Though they ranked lower than the principal brokers in the hierarchy of secret societies, their sheer numbers accounted for their power. This also gave them bargaining power over the commission received from the principal brokers.

The port that emerged as the first center of coolie trade was Amoy (Xiamen), one of the five treaty ports opened after the Opium War in 1842. The choice of Amoy as the first coolie trade center was deliberate. Located on the ancient trade route between the Eastern and Western worlds, Amoy had replaced the port of Quanzhou to become an important entrepot on the southeast coast of China. It had an excellent harbor unsurpassed by any other ports in the region, with a flourishing junk trade with Southeast Asia and Japan. Apart from these considerations, Amoy was not the seat of a provincial government, and the mandarins there were less powerful than their counterparts in Guangzhou and Fuzhou, the provincial capitals of Guangdong and Fujian respectively. Furthermore, the British had a good commercial base there, and they were on good terms with the local mandarins, and any favors given by the mandarins would facilitate this illicit operation.

The first shipment of coolies from Amoy to foreign lands was made in 1845, in French vessels to the French islands of Bourbon. In 1847, a Spanish company sent 800 coolies from Amoy to Cuba. In the period between 1847 and March 1853, an estimated 8,281 coolies were exported from this center (Campbell 1970: 94; Yen 1985: 42). The success of this early coolie business was due principally to the efforts of several coolie agencies, of which five out of six were owned by British nationals. Two notorious British coolie agencies in Amoy were Syme, Muir & Co. and Tait & Co., and both of them provided coolies for the British colonies of West Indies. All these agencies knew that their operations were illegal, but they had little regard for Chinese law. They did not even bother to cover their illegal activities. Syme, Muir & Co. had erected a shed as coolie barracoon in front of its company building to receive the deceived or kidnapped coolies. The barracoon was described by Mr. Harvey, British special investigator into the Amoy Riot in 1852, as "disgusting and obnoxious," and its existence was "a disgrace to the British name and character in Amoy" (Yen 1985: 43). Tait & Co., on the other hand, had engaged a vessel, the *Emigrant*, as a depot for receiving the coolies.

One remarkable fact about these early European coolie traders was their possession of official influence. James Tait, the proprietor of Tait & Co., probably the most powerful coolie trader of the time, became the Spanish Consul at Amoy in 1846, and he was made the Vice-Consul of the Netherlands in 1851, and the Portuguese Consul in 1852. These positions of foreign consuls or vice-consuls carried influence in Chinese official circles, and could be utilized to facilitate the illegal operations. In the early days of foreign contacts, the mandarins in Amoy had little or no experience in dealing with the foreigners, and they were confused by this merchant–consulship system. Under the merchant–consulship system, any British subjects who wished to become honorary or paid consuls for other European countries, needed to seek permission from the British government. The fact that James Tait, the notorious coolie merchant, could become the consul of Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal with the permission of the British government indicates British tacit approval of the coolie trade. However, the involvement of Britain in the rise of this first coolie trade center was ambiguous. Britain was caught in the dilemma between morality and economic reality. On the one hand, it still affirmed human dignity in the post slave trade era; on the other hand, it was pressed by economic needs of the new treaty ports and the demand of labor in its West Indies colonies – British Guiana, Trinidad and Jamaica – where the impact of

the emancipation of African slaves was profound. The newly established treaty port system in China had to depend on foreign trade to survive, and a ban on coolie trade would have crippled Amoy's foreign trade. The economic necessity of the West Indies was no less pressing. The emancipation of African slaves devastated the West Indies plantation economy with serious shortage of labor. The West Indies planters organized themselves into a powerful pressure group lobbying for free hands to import coolie laborers. They eventually won the day to acquire official approval for recruiting Chinese coolies.

British tacit approval of the coolie trade helped encourage the growth of the trade in Amoy, but the flourishing of the trade was mainly determined by market forces. The demand for coolie laborers was enormous in the new world. Apart from the British West Indies, the Spanish colony of Cuba and the state of Peru were also keen importers of the coolies. Their economies were greatly affected by the discontinuation of African slave labor. In Cuba, for instance, the supply of the slave laborers to the sugar plantation was reduced by 25% in the period between 1841 and 1846. The ban on the import of slave laborers by the Spanish colonial government on the island in January 1845 dealt a severe blow to the Cuban economy. The sugar planters who had hitherto relied on African slaves to produce the sugar for the world market had to find an alternative source of labor. The demand for coolie labor was no less urgent in Peru. The Peruvian independence in 1825 stimulated economic development, and also brought freedom to 17,000 Negro slaves. The result of these events was a serious shortage of labor. In early 1840s, the growing demand for guano (bird manure) stimulated the development of the fertilizer industry in Peru. As guano export became more important in the national economy, an alternative source to Negro slaves had to be found. In November 1849, the Peruvian Congress passed a new immigration law to allow introduction of Chinese coolie laborers into Peru.

At the same time, another strong competitor for Chinese cheap labor – the British colony of New South Wales in Australia – also entered the coolie market under different types of pressure. The transportation of convicts from England to New South Wales ended in May 1840, but the sustained economic growth of the colony depended on a continuous supply of cheap labor. The decrease in convict labor greatly affected wool production and threatened the prosperity of the colony. The Australian capitalists turned their attention to Asiatic laborers in China or India. Through the arrangement with a British coolie agency, Tait & Co., the first consignment of 120 coolies were exported from Amoy, and they arrived in Sydney on 2 October 1848. In the period between 1848 and 1852, an estimated 2,666 coolies were shipped there (Wang 1978: 265). In addition to the West Indies, Cuba, Peru and Australia, the French colony of islands of Bourbon, and the Spanish colony of Batangas in the Philippines were also keen to import coolie laborers. The result of this keen competition was the flourishing of the coolie trade in Amoy.

The flourishing of coolie trade in Amoy was short-lived, and it came to an abrupt end in November 1852, but it was replaced by Macao, a Portuguese colony on the southeast coast of China. The decline of the coolie trade was mainly caused by strong public reaction against the abuses in the trade. However, this anti-coolie trade feeling was built up gradually over a number of years. As early as 1847, only two years after Amoy became the center of the trade, an overseas Chinese by the name of Lee Shun Fah, who worked as a broker for a British coolie agency, was seized by local villagers. They held him responsible for the death of some coolies kept in the emigrant ship, *Sophie Frazier*. As Lee was a British subject, he was released after the British consul in Amoy intervened. The incident caused unrest in the community, but was suppressed by the local Chinese mandarins. Public resentment against coolie trade intensified after 1849 as more and more coolies were exported from Amoy, resulting from mounting excess of criminal activities of coolie brokers who resorted to decoying and kidnapping to acquire the needed numbers. However, a balance of power was maintained up to 1852 due to the delicate triangular relationship

between the general public in Amoy, the local mandarins, and the foreigners. The public were restrained by the mandarins who feared foreigners, but the actions of foreigners were constrained to some extent by public feeling. However, when this equilibrium was unbalanced, a crisis developed.

The riot in November 1852 was caused by the excessive action of the foreigners in procuring coolies and in pressuring the mandarins to succumb to their authorities. What triggered off the riot was the action taken by Mr. Syme, a notorious British coolie trader, who went to rescue a Chinese coolie broker from the local police station. The said coolie broker named Lin Hwan was beaten up by the public while he was engaged in decoying coolies, and he was detained in the local police station. On hearing of his broker being detained by the Chinese authorities, Syme rushed to the police station to have Lin released, and placed Lin under his own custody. He obviously overstepped his authority. Even under the operation of extraterritoriality, foreign consuls were empowered only to try their nationals in accordance with their respective laws, but not to demand the release of any suspected Chinese criminals detained by the Chinese authorities. Syme was not the British consul, nor was he a British official; he was only a successful coolie trader with wide contacts among foreign diplomatic circles. His wealth and influence led him to defy Chinese law. His action had serious implications – it discredited the Chinese authorities in the eyes of their subjects, and it encouraged the general public to take the law into their own hands. Before the incident, the general public who were increasingly infuriated by the criminal activities of the coolie brokers still had some faith in their government's ability to mete out justice and to deal with foreigners, but Syme's action shattered such faith.

Thus, Syme's intervention triggered off the riot. It was on 21 November 1852 when Syme and his clerk made the second visit to the police station that they were assaulted by an angry crowd, although they had a narrow escape. Soon the crowd grew larger with the sympathy of some soldiers, emboldening them to vent their anger on foreigners. Mr. Mackay, a clerk in the coolie agency of Tait & Co. was beaten up, and two innocent foreign onlookers were also injured. In the following two days, anti-foreign feeling heightened and tension mounted. Angry relatives and friends of the decoyed coolies gathered, and a number of vagrants and hooligans from neighboring areas took advantage to loot. The riots climaxed on Wednesday (24 November) when a large crowd congregated in front of the agency building of Syme demanding the surrender of the Chinese broker Lin Hwan. Upon refusal, the outraged crowd began to attack the premises, but they were repulsed by the fire of the British marines, HM's steamer sloop *Salamander*. About ten to twelve Chinese were killed or wounded (Yen 1985: 50). Although peace and stability were restored after the riot, the British still maintained troops on the island of Koolungsoo (Gulangyu), opposite the Amoy harbor, as part of the protection of safety and properties of British nationals. This foreign military presence on the island, however, only deepened anti-foreign feeling. The riot had two immediate impacts. First, it raised local residents' awareness of abuses of the coolie trade, and the hostility was not just directed at Chinese coolie brokers, but also at foreign coolie traders. Second, the riot sent warning signals to foreigners who conducted business in Amoy, that the safety of their lives and properties were no longer guaranteed. The result was the eclipse of Amoy as the coolie trade center.

After the 1852 riot, many foreign coolie traders shifted their operations from Amoy to Swatow (Shantou), Hong Kong and then Macao. James Tait, the principal coolie suppliers in Amoy moved his coolie receiving ship, *The Emigrant*, to Namoa, an island off the port of Swatow. He also constructed other barracoons at Swatow to process coolies. At that time, Swatow was not a treaty port, and foreigners had no treaty rights to conduct their business. However, their presence was tolerated by the local mandarins. The absence of foreign consuls provided freer hands to coolie traders to conduct their business, for they could bribe the local mandarins and

get what they wanted. James Tait was reported to have obtained approval for recruiting coolies from local mandarins, and paid them one silver tael per head. For a short period of about three years from 1853 to 1855, Swatow was used as a temporary coolie trade center. The coolie traders were searching for a more permanent center that could stabilize their lucrative operation. Swatow was soon proved to be vulnerable as a coolie trade center. Its port facility was not as good as that of Amoy; there was no foreign consul's protection, and the mandarin's favor did not last long. As in Amoy, any excess in recruiting coolies might also provoke a riot. At the end of 1855, signs of unrest emerged due to the increasing abuses in the system. The captain of an American coolie ship had to be rescued by a party of his countrymen from an agitated crowd who accused him of kidnapping and carrying away their relatives. The latent anti-coolie and anti-foreign sentiment threatened the growth of coolie trade in this port, and it had to be abandoned for a more permanent base.

The port that emerged after Amoy and Swatow as the coolie trade center in the period between 1856 and 1874 was Macao, a Portuguese colony. Situated on the right bank at the mouth of the estuary of the Pearl River, Macao consists of a small peninsula and two small islands. Its geographical proximity to Canton and Hong Kong ensured the flow of trade and the movement of people. The Portuguese established a trading station in 1557 during the later days of the crumbling Ming dynasty, paying a token rental to China until 1849 when it was declared a Portuguese possession, although the declaration was not confirmed until 1887 in a treaty with the Qing government. Its ambiguous political status provided excellent cover for illegal activities like coolie trade. On the one hand, it enjoyed all the facilities that China could provide, and on the other hand, it did not have any treaty obligations to be fulfilled. In addition, Macao's own attributes such as an existing international trade network and a powerful underworld also contributed to its rise. Like Amoy, Macao for centuries had extensive trade with Southeast Asian ports like Singapore, Batavia, Penang and Malacca, as well as ports in India such as Calcutta and Bombay. The existence of a powerful underworld that controlled drug traffic, slave transactions, prostitution and other vices also facilitated the operation of the coolie trade.

Another important factor for the rise of Macao as the notorious coolie trade center was the attitude of the Portuguese government. Unlike the British government, it had little or no moral scruples for allowing the immoral trade to flourish, and it treated the trade purely as business accruing enormous profits. Although the Portuguese were the first Europeans to arrive in Asia and had established several outposts in South, Southeast and East Asia, their control over Asian trade was weakened by the Dutch and British who seized Portuguese colonies and drove them out of some parts of Asia. The British, though late-comers to the scene, captured more colonies in Southeast Asia, and succeeded in opening up the vast China market for trade. British preeminent status in East and Southeast Asia consolidated its advantageous position in the Asian trade. The Portuguese, having lost their trading advantage in Asia, tried to regain part of their lost position. It was in this competitive situation that the Portuguese government prepared to grab the opportunity to develop Macao as the permanent center for coolie trade.

Since its rise in 1856 as the new center for coolie trade, Macao grew rapidly over a period of 18 years until the suppression of the coolie trade in 1874. This growth was reflected in the number of coolie barracoons established in the colony and the number of coolies it had exported. In 1856, five coolie barracoons were reported to have existed, but the number of barracoons increased phenomenally to 300 in 1872, two years before the suppression of the trade. The number of coolies shipped out from Macao also increased steadily: 15,000 to 20,000 coolies were estimated to have been shipped from the port each year, although the figure fluctuated slightly. It exported about 13,675 in 1865, 22,901 in 1866, 15,579 in 1867, but the number declined slightly to about 12,000 each year from 1868 to 1872 (Wang 1978: 138).

Abuses in the system of coolie trade and the suffering of coolie emigrants

Abuses in the system of coolie trade were an inevitable part of the historical process. The labor shortage in the new world, the high profitability of the trade, and the rapacious character of the coolie recruiters, combined to ensure the flourishing of the trade. Abuses were found in different stages of the trade: from procuring coolies to transporting and receiving them. As the demand was high and the competition was keen, European coolie agents were highly paid for the quotas filled. To meet the quotas, the agents offered Chinese coolie brokers a high price for each coolie recruited. In Amoy around 1852, for instance, the Chinese brokers were paid at the rate of $3 per coolie, an amount that was more than a month's pay for an honest laborer. Under the stimulus of high reward, the brokers resorted to all sorts of method, including decoy and kidnapping. Gambling and traps were frequently used in decoying, but the most common method was deceiving. The prospective coolies were attracted by economic opportunities overseas and were told by the brokers that they could earn high wages and that work conditions were excellent. Some were even deluded with fancy stories that eight foreign years specified in the contract were equivalent to only four Chinese years. For those who had no intention of emigrating overseas, they were deceived by brokers who promised them jobs in the coastal ports. Then, when they arrived at the port, they were sold to the coolie barracoons guarded by hooligans, and later shipped out to foreign lands against their will (Yen 1985: 57–8).

The whole system of recruitment was under constant pressure for time. Coolie ships arriving at the port for loading were usually subject to a heavy demurrage, and coolies were immediately wanted at any cost. The European coolie agents were under contract to supply the number needed within a certain time, the quotas for the "human cargo" and time schedule were quickly passed to the principal Chinese brokers who in turn pressed the subordinate brokers to take immediate action. Failure to deliver the cargo within a fixed time would face a heavy financial penalty. This pressure partly led to the kidnapping that was usually conducted by three to five crimps in secluded places like small villages, quiet streets and creeks along the sea coast. In 1859 and 1860 when the coolie trade was flourishing in the Canton area, the crimps were active in kidnapping along the Pearl River, and it was claimed that Canton city was alive with kidnappers. A reign of terror prevailed along the coast: no place was safe, whether in the fields or along the river. There were reports that fishing boats were captured, the men kidnapped and carried away by the crimps.

After the prospective coolies were procured, they were kept in land or floating receiving depots, which were popularly known as "barracoons." The barracoons were usually secluded and guarded. Once the prospective coolies were thrown into the barracoons, they immediately lost their freedom and were completely cut off from the outside world. The barracoons thus functioned as factories to process "human cargo" ready for export. The most objectionable aspect of the abuse in the barracoons was the dehumanization of the human beings. It deprived basic human needs and brutally lowered human dignity. Basic human needs such as food, clothes and lodging were inadequate. The facilities in the barracoons were generally very bad. They were poorly ventilated and the floors were damp. Only mats were spread on the floors for the coolies to sleep on in an extremely crowded condition. One report described the conditions of a barracoon in Amoy in 1852 like this: "The coolies were penned up in numbers from 10 to 12 in a wooden shed, like a slave barracoon, nearly naked, very filthy, and room only sufficient to lie; the space 120 by 24 feet with a bamboo floor near the roof; the number in all about 500" (Yen 1985: 59).

In the course of processing, the coolies were treated exactly like African slaves, they were stripped half-naked, and had to be stamped or numbered ready for export. Dr John Bowring, the Acting Governor of Hong Kong in 1852 had witnessed such ugly scenes in a barracoon in

Amoy. He stated, "hundreds of them (the coolies) were gathered together in the barracoon, stripped naked, and stamped or painted with letters C (California), P (Peru) or S (Sandwich island) on their breasts, according to the destinations for which they were intended" (Yen 1985: 60). Apart from depriving basic human needs and lowering human dignity, the coolies were also subject to brutality such as beating, kicking, whipping and other forms of torture. Those coolies who were suspected of having tried to escape, of expressing their unwillingness to go abroad when questioned by the foreign inspectors, or of refusing to sign the contracts, were often beaten, chastised and confined to privies.

Similar abuses of coolies were found on the voyage. They were crowded together with little space for movement. Usually coolie ships were overloaded, each coolie was allocated a small space to live and sleep, and they were in fact treated like livestock. Overcrowding was described by an eye-witness as follows:

> The ship … was of 1,300 tons burden, and her hold was fitted up with bunks for 800 Chinese (this ship was obviously overloaded, working on two-ton per coolie ratio, it should have only carried 650 instead of 800). There were two tiers of platforms, one above the other, running entirely around the vessel, and upon them were numbered in Chinese and Arabic; the space allotted to each man, which was something less than two feet in width and five in length. There was also a double tier of the same running down the center of the ship, leaving a narrow passage on each side between the bunks.
>
> *(Yen 1985: 60)*

Overcrowding was a major problem on the ship, but other problems were bad ventilation, frustration, tension and sickness. Although most of the coolies came from two southern Chinese provinces, Guangdong and Fujian, they did not speak a common language. Communication problems led to misunderstanding and distrust. As most of them had undergone the process of dehumanization in the barracoons, tension and frustration had been gradually built up. The tension was aggravated when they were confined in an overcrowded ship on a long voyage. Sometimes the tension burst into fights, scuffles and murder. Another major problem on board a coolie ship was the insufficient supply of fresh water and food. As most of the coolie ships were overcrowded and the Pacific voyage took more than a hundred days, a shortage of supply of fresh water and food was inevitable. Strict rationing was enforced by the captains of the ships, as a result of which many coolies suffered from extreme thirst and hunger. Some of them who could not endure the suffering jumped into the sea to commit suicide.

The most notorious abuse aboard coolie ships was the cruel treatment of the coolies. The Cuba Commission Report in 1874, a result of an international investigation of the abuses of Chinese coolies in Cuba, provided substantial evidence of such abuses. The petition of Li Zhaochun and 165 other Cuban coolies stated:

> When quitting Macao, we proceeded to sea, we were confined in the hold below; some were even shut up in bamboo cages, or chained to iron posts, and a few were indiscriminately selected and flogged as a means of intimidating all others; whilst we cannot estimate the deaths that, in all, took place from sickness, blows, hunger, thirst, or from suicide by leaping into the sea.
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> *(Cuba Commission 1970: 12)*

Other petitioners also testified to other forms of cruelty and their consequences, such as "One man jumped overboard because he was constantly beaten by the master and the interpreter";

"those who asked for water were beaten and many died of thirst"; "I was chained to the bottom of the hold," and "On board a sailor wounded me with a knife and the scar is still visible" (Cuba Commission 1970: 14). Flogging was the most common punishment that many of the coolies received on the voyage. Those who made complaints, disobeyed orders, or stole food or water were flogged publicly on deck as punishment and as a warning to others. The combination of overcrowding, inadequate health care, insufficient supply of water and food, and other cruelties accounted for high mortality of the coolies. The busiest coolie trade route from Macao to Callao (a Peruvian seaport) bore such indelible records. In 1850, of 740 coolies who embarked on two ships for Callao, 247 died on the voyage, representing a mortality rate of 33%. On the coolie ship *Empresa* which carried 323 coolies from Amoy to Callao in November 1852, 77 of them died at sea, representing close to 24% of the total. On 20 December 1868, a French ship *Enrique IV* arrived at Callao, 142 of the 458 coolies on board died at sea, representing a 31% mortality rate. In 1872, a number of Peruvian ships arrived at Callao with "coolie cargoes"; the death toll varied from 12% to 26% (Stewart 1970: 67).

However, the ugliest aspect of the abuses in coolie emigration was the cruel treatment of coolies in foreign lands. After the coolie ships arrived at destination ports, coolies were passed into the hands of dealers. There is strong evidence to suggest that a few powerful companies and individual dealers monopolized this end of the coolie trade. In Peru, for instance, only six companies and individuals controlled the trade from Macao to Callao. The dealers were men of substantial wealth, status and influence in society. Some of them were landowners, manufacturers, plantation and mine owners. They were involved in the coolie trade partly to meet their own need for cheap labor, and partly for making profit out of the trade. Due to their close connection with local plantation and mine-owning classes, they could easily dispose of their "human cargoes." But when the local market was over-supplied, public sale of coolies was conducted. The sale of coolies was similar to the sale of African slaves, and followed a similar procedure. An advertisement of the sale appeared in local newspapers; coolies were then lined up on deck or on a platform together with their possessions and contract papers waiting to be purchased. The prospective buyers ran up and down to check each man's strength and physical condition, and started bargaining for the best price (Stewart 1970: 80–1).

The open sale system was most popular in Cuba where numerous coolies underwent this most humiliating experience before they reached their masters. A vivid picture of the horrible experience of the Chinese coolies in Cuba can be reconstructed from the evidence given to the Cuba Commission. On landing at Havana, the capital city of Cuba, coolies were escorted to barracoons by guards on horseback with whips in their hands, they were treated like herds of cattle, and their movements were closely watched. They then proceeded to quarantine stations for medical check-ups, and their queues or long plait of hair were cut off and they were sent to the coolie market to be disposed of. The act of cutting off the coolies' queues was probably not intended to humiliate the coolies, but for cleanliness. However, this act was taken by the coolies as one of the most humiliating acts that foreigners could have done to a Chinese, for most Chinese under the Manchu rule regarded their hair as being given to them by their parents, and to be an inseparable part of their bodies. The queue that distinguished Chinese from foreigners was taken as a symbol of national pride and an expression of loyalty to the Qing dynasty. When the coolies were placed in the market for public sale, they were classified into first, second and third grades in accordance with their strength and physical condition. When the prospective buyers made the selection, the coolies were forced to remove their clothes for inspection. This again landed another blow to their pride and a further degradation of their bodies (Cuba Commission 1970: 18).

After being sold, the coolies were quickly brought to farms, plantation estates, factories or mines to face their real masters. Except for a few lucky ones, the majority of coolies were ruthlessly

exploited, badly treated and cruelly punished. They worked for very long hours, at least 12 hours a day: a number of them worked for 18 to 20 hours a day. Many coolies who testified to the Cuba Commission stated that they worked from three or four in the morning till midnight. Except for a three-day holiday during the Chinese New Year period, they worked practically seven days a week and 30 days a month. The toil of the day and night caused constant fatigue and low spirit, and their physical condition deteriorated. The coolies were generally paid much less than what was stipulated in the contract, and their wages were paid not in hard cash but in paper money which was often eroded by inflation. With this meager income, they could not have saved enough money to pay their passage back to China, not to mention accumulate wealth. Apart from this direct economic exploitation, other forms of extraction were also employed by the masters. One of these was the monopoly of sale of sundry goods which most coolies needed. Usually grocery shops were set up near their quarters by the masters who compelled the coolies to purchase goods from the shops. Prices were generally higher, and those who attempted to buy goods elsewhere were punished.

In plantation estates and mines, the coolies had never been properly accommodated and fed. They were crowded together in enclosed wooden quarters, and in sheds which were dim, filthy and badly ventilated. These quarters were lockable, and the coolies were confined at night. In Peruvian plantations, the coolie quarters were known as the "galpon," which was a large shed, sometimes a walled enclosure containing a number of buildings. Its construction was never very substantial, and was usually capable of being locked at night. The coolies were locked up at eight or nine o'clock in the galpons without water or basic sanitary arrangements. A rationing system was adopted for distributing food to the coolies. They were given minimum requirements to keep them alive. Since rice was the main staple for Chinese, it became the main item of ration for the coolies. Sometimes a small quantity of meat and fish was issued on Sunday. In some cases, the coolies were further squeezed by providing them with cheaper food such as maize, bananas, sugar cane, sweet potatoes and other local products. The quantity of their ration was sometimes reduced to save cost and the quality of meat was bad. In Peruvian guano mines, the treatment of the coolies was no better. In 1870, the coolies employed on the Guano Islands had the daily task of carrying 100 wheelbarrows of guano; should they fail to meet the quotas, their task had to be completed on Sunday. They were badly fed and clothed, and as a consequence a quarter of them fell sick, but they were not admitted to the hospital while they retained enough strength to stand. Those who were unable to stand were compelled to work on their knees picking the small stones out of the guano, and when their hands became sore from the constant use of the wheelbarrow, it was strapped upon their shoulders, and in that way they were compelled to fulfill their daily task.

The most outrageous treatment of the coolies was raw cruelty that ranged from confinement, chained feet, flogging, cutting fingers, ears and limbs. The coolie masters resorted to all sorts of cruelty as they saw fit regardless of the existing laws that prohibited employers taking disciplinary penalties against the coolies. Evidences produced in the Cuba Commission Report show that on all the plantation estates in Cuba, the owners had established prisons, and the administrators and overseers constantly used hounds, knives, bludgeons and whips to keep the coolies under strict control. Flogging was the most common form of punishment. When coolies were slow at work, or physically incapable of doing certain jobs, or showed signs of any disobedience, or even failed to understand the instructions of the administrators, they were flogged. On some occasions, severe floggings ended in death (Cuba Commission 1970: 25–30). Although some coolies were not flogged to death, they ended their lives by committing suicide because they could no longer take the torture of flogging. The testimonies collected by the Cuba Commission had clearly shown that besides those who were flogged to death on the spot and those who

died from the effects of wounds, a countless number destroyed themselves by cutting their own throats, by hanging, drowning, poisoning and casting themselves under wheels or into sugar caldrons. The desire to kill themselves and the high suicide rate reflected the extreme misery of the coolies' lives. As some coolies put it, "our existence is so miserable that the hours seem as days, and the days as years."

The retrieval of the coolies' miseries was remote if not impossible. First, the coolies were handicapped by language barriers so that they were unable to lodge any complaints against the administrators and masters to the proper authorities. Second, there were no Chinese diplomatic representatives in the cities or nearby cities where the Chinese coolies concentrated. The absence of Chinese consuls or consul-generals in Cuba and Peru where Chinese coolies were worst treated closed an important channel of redemption for coolies. Third, the connivance between the officers and coolie masters made the complaints against cruelties difficult if not impossible. Last but not least, the unwillingness and inability, due to political and economic considerations, of the coolie importing countries or colonies to protect the coolies was largely to be blamed for the coolies' misfortunes.

The end and the impact of coolie emigration.

Ironically, the interaction between the domestic and international forces that brought forth the coolie trade in 1840s also contributed to its end in 1874. The suppression of the coolie trade in Macao in 1874 represented a culmination of anti-coolie feelings built up over the years in China and abroad. Domestically, the awareness of Chinese provincial mandarins of the excessive abuse in coolie trade and its profound social impact prompted them to petition the court for action. On the international scene, the increasing negative publicity of the cruel treatment of the coolies in foreign lands appealed to the Western conscience for human dignity, and gave rise to a campaign against the coolie trade similar to the campaign against the slave trade before it.

After the 1860s when the demand for Chinese coolies reached its peak, the criminal activities of the coolie kidnappers intensified in coastal regions of Guangdong and Fujian, the two provinces that provided most of the coolies exported. In December 1866, the Governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi Jui Lin together with the Governor of Guangdong Jiang Yili presented a combined memorial to the court by stating that

> In Guangdong recently the cases of enticing people to go abroad have been occurring more and more often. It has reached the point that groups devise means to entice even women and children. As soon as they board the foreign steamship, they are taken to Hong Kong, Macao and other places, where they are resold to various islands some several thousand *li* (1 *li* = quarter of a mile) away, and is impossible to follow and find them.
>
> *(Chouban yiwu shimo, Tongzhi chao 1972: vol. 45, 54a–56b)*

The enticement method was not new, but what was new was the enticement of women and children to go abroad. Presumably some works in plantation estates and mines could be undertaken by them, or perhaps some women could be sold overseas as prostitutes. Whatever the motives, the act represented a desperate move on the part of the crimps.

In response to this new wave of kidnappings, Governor-general Jui Lin and Governor Jiang Yi-li memorialized the throne for greater power to deal with these criminals, for the kidnappers to be treated as larcenists and executions to be carried out without the authorization of the Board of Punishment. The leaders of the kidnappers should be summarily decapitated and the followers strangled. The court approved the stern measures but the result seemed to have little

effect. The fact that in the following year (1867) 15,579 coolies were shipped out from Macao attested to its failure. This failure also demonstrated that any effective control over the coolie supply could not have been successful without the co-operation of Western powers, including the non-treaty nations.

However, at about this time, an international anti-coolie trade storm emerged as a result of a series of incidents of extreme cruelty against the coolies in the new world in the period between 1868 and 1872. The 1868 incident that occurred in Peru was connected with the branding of 48 Chinese coolies. A Peruvian plantation owner in Callao, fearing that the coolies might escape, marked them with a hot iron as if they were slaves. It received wide publicity in both local and international newspapers. It began to create anti-coolie trade feeling among some Western diplomats. The anti-coolie trade feeling was heightened by several accidents and mutinies of coolie ships between 1870 and 1872. On 4 May 1870, a coolie ship *Don Juan* flying a Peruvian flag left Macao with 665 coolies on board. Only two days later, the vessel caught fire and 500 coolies were burned alive or suffocated on the lower deck where they were confined behind iron barriers. Some of the survivors were rescued and turned up in Hong Kong, and they received wide publicity. This tragedy was followed in the same year by a mutiny of a French coolie ship *Nouvelle Penelope*. Carrying 310 coolies on board, the ship left Macao for Peru on 1 October, but the coolies rose in revolt three days later. The captain and several crew members were killed, and the ship was forced to return to Bay Tien-pah, 180 miles south of Macao. In 1872, another two major mutinies occurred on the coolies vessels of the *Fatchoy* and the *Maria Luz*; the latter was the most publicized incident in international media.

The *Maria Luz* was a Peruvian registered ship under the command of Captain Richardo Herrera, a former Peruvian naval lieutenant. The ship left Macao on 28 May 1872 with 225 coolies on board. After about two weeks' voyage, it was forced by bad weather to sail into the Japanese port of Yokohama on 10 July. During its anchorage, a coolie jumped into the sea and swam to a nearby British ship, the *Iron Duke*. After being rescued, the coolie told his ordeal and the story of ill-treatment of the coolies on board, and begged for protection. In view of its seriousness, the captain of the *Iron Duke* turned him to the British chargé-d'affaires, R. G. Watson, who immediately turned him over to the Japanese authorities. Captain Herrera then went to claim the escapee with his promise of not to inflict any punishment on him. The coolie was thus handed over to him and taken on board the *Maria Luz*. Breaking the promise, Herrera flogged the coolie and some others who had attempted to escape. Their cries greatly disturbed those on board the *Iron Duke*. On learning of this new cruelty, Watson pressed the Japanese government to intervene. At the same time, some other coolies managed to escape to the *Iron Duke*. In view of this new development, Japanese authorities held an enquiry into allegations of the ill-treatment of the passengers. On 22 August, all Chinese coolies on board of *Maria Luz* were brought to trial, and many of them declared they were the victims of decoying and kidnapping, accusations which captain Herrera did not deny. The captain also admitted that he had cut off the queues of three coolies. Based on the evidence, the court found the captain guilty of ill-treating and restraining the passengers. Under the Japanese law, the captain was liable to no fewer than a hundred lashes or a hundred days of detention. But taking into consideration of the special circumstances and other matters which worked in the captain's favor, the court decided to pardon him and allowed him to leave with his ship. The coolies were to be turned over to the Chinese authorities (Stewart 1970: 155–6).

It was an unprecedented act for a coolie ship captain to be put on trial and found guilty. Indeed, the trial indirectly found that the coolie trade as a system was guilty of inhuman activities. Never before had the "illegality" of the trade been so firmly established. Equally important was the impact of the trial on international opinion. During the course of the trial, details of the

excessive abuse in the system, the plight of the victims, and the judgment of the Japanese court were published around the world. The *Maria Luz* affair thus had profound international repercussions. First, it reached a much wider audience than any other coolie trade scandals, and more and more people were aware of the evil of the system. Second, it confirmed the alleged abuses in the transportation of the coolies to foreign lands. Third, the trial put the spotlight on both Peru and Portugal on the world stage. Peru was criticized for its lack of appropriate legislations to protect the imported coolies, while Portugal was criticized for allowing its colony at Macao to be developed as the center for such illegal activities. International pressure was mounted on both governments to take stern actions.

The international favorable climate for the suppression of the coolie trade was matched by the efforts of the Qing government. The suppression of the Taiping Rebellion in 1864 invigorated the crumbling Qing dynasty, and under the banner of "Tong Zhi Restoration" (Tongzhi Zhongxing, 1862–74), the dynasty undertook a series of reforms known as "Self-Strengthening Movement." Not only it regained its military strength but also its pride. The scandals of the coolie trade greatly affected its international image. In addition, the publication of the Cuba Commission report in 1872 made the Chinese high-ranking officials more aware of the plight of Chinese coolies in foreign lands, such as in Cuba and Peru. The dynasty was more ready than before to tackle this issue. The mandarin who was to carry out the wishes of the central government was none other than Jui Lin, the Governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi. He had been involved in suppressing coolie kidnappers in Guangdong in 1866–7, although he did not score tangible result. His action in 1872–3 appeared to be much more effective. His new strategy was the combination of attacking the coolie brokers and cutting off the supply of coolies to Macao.

In July 1872, Jui Lin repeatedly instructed his subordinates to apprehend and severely punish those who were involved in coolie trade. In September, he reinforced the rounding-up campaign against coolie brokers. Those who were found guilty of kidnapping of coolies were to be executed on the spot, and those who were found guilty of decoying coolies were to be exiled to a border region 4,000 *li* away. At the same time, he also used river patrols to frustrate the coolie supply line. He ordered two warships with Chinese commanders to carry out the task, and the daily steamers between Canton and Macao were under strict inspection. Jui Lin's new measure forced the coolie merchants in Macao to organize sorties to obtain supply in the remote southwest region of Guangdong province where the control was relatively relaxed. In March 1873, acting on a report of suspicious activities of nine foreign ships, he took action to detain two ships with ten crew, a Portuguese coolie merchant named Antonio Lapiola, together with eight kidnapped coolies on board. All of them were taken into custody. In the following month, 20 suspicious ships sailed into the region in an attempt to recruit coolies, but their action was frustrated by Jui Lin again. Three ships with 19 crew, three Portuguese merchants and 60 kidnapped coolies were detained.

Jui Lin's new strategy bore good results. The rounding-up campaign checked the activities of the Chinese coolie brokers, and this gain was consolidated by the attack on the supply line which had practically dried up the supply for the coolie barracoons in Macao. As one American diplomat at that time reported to his government:

> The severe measures adopted by the authorities at Canton to prevent coolies of all kinds going to Macao, in order to stop as much as possible the delivery of those who may have been engaged by contract to go abroad, and the summary execution of all crimps and kidnappers who have been caught, have, I hear, made the business so dangerous and losing that most of the barracoons are empty.
>
> *(US State Department 1874: 206)*

This description was probably the true reflection of the desperate situation of the Macao barracoons as a result of the stern action taken by the Guangdong government.

The Qing government's stern action in dealing with Macao's coolie trade received a boost in August 1873 when the British government approved the measures of the Hong Kong government to expel coolie ships. Under the new legislation, Hong Kong was strictly prohibited to be used as a port of call for any coolie ships. On 23 August 1873, a day after receiving home government's approval, Governor Kennedy ordered five coolie ships to leave Hong Kong immediately, and another two were ordered to depart within five and seven days respectively. These coolie ships, in an attempt to refit and obtain provisions, moved to the docks at Whampoa, Canton, that were controlled mostly by Hong Kong residents. However, Jui Lin moved quickly to expel them. He ordered them to leave Whampoa and the adjacent waters and announced that no coolie ship would in the future be allowed to call at the port. The expulsion of the coolie ships from Whampoa and the neighboring areas dealt another blow to the coolie trade in Macao.

Under mounting international pressure and the cutting off of the source of supply of coolies to Macao, the Portuguese government was forced to capitulate. Governor Januario proclaimed on 27 December 1873 the abolition of the coolie trade in Macao, to take effect three months after that date. Thus, after 30 years in existence, the notorious and inhuman coolie trade came to an end on 27 March 1874.

Conclusion

The impact of the coolie emigration can be assessed at at least three different levels. First, in the 30 years of its existence, the trade in coolie emigrants contributed significantly to the economic growth of some colonies and states in the new world, especially in the Spanish colony of Cuba and the state of Peru in South America. They filled the void of cheap labor left by the African slaves. The economic development of these colonies or countries would have been slowed down had the Chinese coolie labor not been available. Second, the suppression of the coolie trade in 1874 restored the basic human dignity of manual laborers. Like African slaves before them, the Chinese coolies were deprived of their basic human rights and dignity, and they were ruthlessly exploited and treated like cattle. The recovery of their basic human rights was an important step ahead in the fight for equality and rights of the international labor movement. Third, the abuses of the coolie trade and the suffering of the coolie emigrants aroused the sympathy and concern for their well-being among Qing high-ranking officials such as Li Hongzhang. This had indirectly led to the push for China's consular expansion overseas and the protection of overseas Chinese. The establishment of the first Chinese consul in Singapore in 1877, and then the consular expansion in Japan, the USA, Hawaii and Cuba in the period between 1878 and 1883 could be explained as in part the result of the impact of the termination of the coolie emigration.

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6

Integration and exclusion

The Chinese in multiracial Latin America and the Caribbean

Evelyn Hu-DeHart

Introduction

Almost from inception, the Chinese in Spanish America have experienced a curious paradox, a set of contradictions that can be captured in any number of paired oppositions: integration and exclusion, acceptance and rejection, admiration and contempt, gratitude and resentment, love and hate. How the Chinese might have, however inadvertently, provoked such ambivalence among their hosts, and, in turn, how they responded to their hosts' wild mood swings, is the subject of this chapter. By posing these questions about the history of the Chinese in that part of the Americas known as Latin America and the Caribbean, we expect to provide some new insights about Latin American society and culture, and, more importantly for this volume, enhance our understanding of the Chinese diaspora beyond the much more familiar territories of Anglo North America (the USA and Canada) and Southeast Asia.

To think about the Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean is to think comparatively about the global Chinese diaspora, from at least the late Ming to the twentieth century. During these centuries, Europe established imperial projects in Asia and America; beginning with the Portuguese and Spaniards, followed quickly by the Dutch, British, French, with smaller nations such as the Danes and Swedes in the mix as well. (By the end of the eighteenth century, Europeans in Asia would be joined by the newly independent and aggressive merchants of the USA.) In all these European empires, Chinese migrants – merchants, artisans and laborers – played key and critical roles.

How to organize massive material and write a synthetic history of this global phenomenon that involves players from all parts of the world is a challenge, but several basic patterns can be discerned. Emerging first historically were the European trading outposts in Asia where the imperialists came to trade with Great China during the Ming dynasty and continuing on into the Qing, transactions that depended on Chinese traders as intermediaries and Chinese communities as commodities and service providers. In these outpost colonies during the era of mercantile capitalism, European numbers were never very large and consisted primarily of colonial administrators, big merchants, some professionals, and military personnel. Meanwhile, they came to

depend on local Chinese to provide services of all kinds, from civil service type jobs to lowly jobs such as cooking and cleaning, and all sorts of manufacturing and artisan productions for daily living. Prime examples of this kind of settlement were Macau established by the Portuguese and Manila by the Spaniards, both in the mid-sixteenth century, Batavia (now Jakarta) by the Dutch soon after (in the early seventeenth century), and much later (mid-nineteenth century), the Straits Colonies in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong by the British.

If not by policy then certainly by practice, Europeans also elevated the Chinese above the local and indigenous peoples, according them roles that came with higher social status, economic power and political authority, making them, in the indigenous imagination, accomplices and collaborators of empire and, in turn, planting the seeds of violent postcolonial anti-Chinese outbursts. At the same time, colonial policies and practices acknowledged that miscegenation took place over time, and openly named the mixed race populations that ensued, such as Manila's *mestizo*, Macau's *macaense*, Hong Kong's Eurasian, as well as the *peranakan* of Indonesia and the *baba-nyonya* of Malaysia, all of which also became infused with a strong Chinese flavor.

Overlapping territorially in some cases but not always coterminous with earlier trading colonies was another prototype European colony in Asia, those which focused on extractive industries or mining, and commercial agriculture or plantations. The Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago and the British in the Straits both derived enormous wealth from these enterprises, which were for the most part worked and managed by Chinese licensees and subcontractors, who supplied the laborers as well as tools and technical know-how.

Where plantation really flourished was in the Americas, from the US South through the Caribbean islands and on to Portuguese Brazil. Producing primarily sugar using the labor of millions of African slaves over the course of almost four centuries, new world plantation's desperate last stand grasping at alternative labor to replenish or replace black slaves led some owners to turn to Chinese contract laborers. In the mid to late nineteenth century, formally indentured Chinese laborers were distributed throughout the British and French Caribbean, and were especially prominent in the Spanish Caribbean colony of Cuba as well as the newly independent South American country of Peru.[1]

Commonly known by the pejorative "coolie," which was first applied to those with formal contracts, free Chinese migrant laborers were recruited to other parts of the Americas, notably the Western frontier of the USA, which was also the borderland between the USA and Mexico. There they serviced mining regions, helped build the transcontinental railroad linking the Wild West to the settled Eastern seaboard of the USA, and were instrumental in clearing virgin land for commercial agriculture in foodstuff as well as cash crops on both sides of the international border. Thus, similar to some of the mining and plantation zones of European colonies in Asia, Chinese in the Americas also became a prominent presence on frontiers and in borderlands.

The USA produced the third type of society which received significant Chinese immigrants and featured prominently in the Chinese diaspora. When the original 13 British colonies declared their independence in the late eighteenth century and struck out on their own expansion westward, they also envisioned a nation built by "free white immigrants," as clearly stipulated by the 1790 Naturalization Law. Thus, during the long nineteenth century, as the USA embarked on its systematic expansion to the Western frontier and the borderlands with Mexico, and later out to the Pacific islands as well, the founding fathers envisioned that European immigrants would populate the land and define the nation's identity. Similar to Canada, later Australia and New Zealand, these were societies built initially by Anglo settlers who were imbued with a strong sense of race or "whiteness." In these Anglo white settler societies, although European immigrants of suspect racial virtue such as Catholics and Jews, Eastern and Southern Europeans, were ultimately accepted into the nation as political subjects, a racial bar was erected that scrupulously

excluded non-whites from social and political integration, including their own indigenous peoples. Racial ideologies of white supremacy were codified into law, with the Chinese and other Asians consistently defined as non-white and hence beyond the pale of national acceptance as equal social subjects even as their indispensable labor was tolerated and even coveted. In nations built by European immigrants, the Chinese (and other Asians) would never constitute more than a few percentage points of the entire population, although their presence in distinct sectors of the developing economies would vary in size and significance.

The Spanish also established settler societies in Latin America and the Caribbean, but notions of race comes with a Latin twist in this context, distinct from the Anglo perspective. Although whiteness was the clear ideal in the racial hierarchy that was quickly established in colonial Latin America, it also recognized 14 or more categories of *castas* or racially mixed social groups that resulted from the close encounters among Europeans, indigenous peoples and Africans (Mörner 1967). An Asian admixture was hinted at in some of these *castas*, as their presence in Spanish America was well known by the seventeenth century as discussed below. By the time of their independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, most Latin American countries were recognized to be racially mixed, a reality and national identity that would be further consolidated in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century in most Latin American republics. For example, Mexico publicly declared itself a mestizo nation (grandiosely self-named "*la raza cósmica*") after its momentous revolution of the early twentieth century (Vasconcelos 2001). Meanwhile, the Anglo nations have clung on to white supremacy to the present day; the best they could muster is to acknowledge the multi-racial makeup of contemporary society while dismantling formal laws and policies that had upheld white supremacy until well into the twentieth century.

Within this global context of the Chinese diaspora over time and space, Chinese experiences in Spanish America reflect all three major prototypes described above: the early mercantile outpost in Asia, the plantation economy in the Caribbean, and a modified settler society on the borderlands with the USA where race mixture rather than white supremacy defines national identity. In the examples selected for discussion here to illustrate each pattern or type, the theme of inclusion and exclusion is played out in distinct, different and complex ways, with the emphasis on the relational.

Spanish Manila: America's first Chinatown

The Chinese presence in Spanish America dates back to 1560, when Spaniards from Mexico in the Americas (then called New Spain) colonized *Las Filipinas*, the archipelago off the south China coast, and made Manila their headquarters for trade with Ming China. By then, of course, all Europeans had heard of the prodigious wealth of Great China from early travelers such as Marco Polo and the Jesuits. Chinese traders from Xiamen, Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou in Fujian had regularly sailed in their privately owned *chuan* (dubbed "junk" by Europeans) around the big island of Luzon and its surrounding archipelago on their way to Southeast Asia and other archipelagos, a well-traveled trade route known as the *dongyang zhenlu,* or eastern passage. These Minnan – southern Fujian – port cities were better known to Europeans as Amoy, Zaitun and Chincheo.

Immediately attracted by the big galleon ships from Mexico laden with silver – propitious timing because the Chinese economy was transitioning from paper currency to silver – the Minnan junk merchants quickly became the indispensable middlemen in this exchange. This first trans-Pacific shipping line was connected via Mexico to the trans-Atlantic trade of Spain, making the Manila Galleon trade the first truly global commercial system. For 250 years without fail, from 1565 to 1820, at least one, and up to three, galleons successfully made the trans-Pacific crossing.

Under the Spaniards, Manila quickly became a cosmopolitan city, at the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian Ocean maritime commercial worlds that stretched from New Spain in America to Ormuz on the Persian Gulf at the other end of the Indian Ocean, linking the fine products of the Orient – Japan, India and especially "Great China" – to the European markets controlled by Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch merchants and their respective governments. (The Minnan traders essentially followed the trade routes of Admiral Zheng He and his "treasure fleet" for Ming Emperor Yongle until the emperor inexplicably called off further voyages at the height of his maritime power in 1433.)

Jesuit Father Colín's fulsome description of the luxury trade in 1663, one century after its inauguration, captured all the lavish details and clearly displayed his personal awe at the sheer variety and sumptuousness of the items:

> Manila is the equal of any other emporium of our monarchy, for it is the center to which flow the riches of the Orient and the Occident, the silver of Peru and New Spain; the pearls and precious stones of India; the diamonds of Narsinga and Goa; the rubies, sapphires and topazes, and the cinnamon of Ceylon; the pepper of Sumatra and the Javas; the cloves, nutmegs and other spices of the Moluccas and Banda; the fine Persian silks and wool carpets from Ormuz and Malabar; rich hangings and bed coverings of Bengal; fine camphor of Borneo; balsam and ivory of Abada and Cambodia, and from Great China, silks of all kinds, raw and woven in velvets and figured damasks, taffetas and other cloths of every texture, design and colors, linens and cotton fabrics, gilt-decorated articles, embroideries and porcelains, and other riches and curiosities of great value and esteem.
>
> *(quoted in Schurz 1939: 50)*

Conceived as an extension of New Spain, Manila can be imagined as part of the evolving Americas, and the Chinese community that quickly sprang up outside the Spanish city walls, early dubbed the Parián,[2] should rightfully take its place as America's first Chinatown. The Chinese population in Manila swelled from a handful (about 150 at moment of first contact) to some 20–30,000 by 1603. Only ten years after first settlement, in 1574, the Spanish Governor noted the continuous flow of Chinese, early dubbed *sangley*,[3] to "supply us with many articles, such as sugar, wheat and barley flour, nuts, raisins, pears and oranges, silks, wine, porcelain and iron, and other small things which we lacked in the land before their arrival" (Guerrero 1966: 21). In other words, from the beginning, the Minnan traders realized that, in addition to the trans-Pacific luxury trade, Spaniards in Manila needed ready supplies of food and myriad other necessities of every day life, as well as provisioning the outbound galleons with their large crews. Not surprisingly, trade with the sangley grew steadily and rapidly, consolidating Spanish dependency on the Chinese for almost everything to do with surviving and thriving in Las Filipinas. So noted Governor Niño de Tavora in 1628: "There is no Spaniard, secular or religious, who obtains his food, clothing, or shoes, except through the Chinese" (Dubs 1942: 387).

One of Niño de Tavora's predecessors, Governor Antonio de Morga, spells out with exact details the nature of Spanish dependency on Chinese consumer goods. In his report to the Emperor at the end of the sixteenth century, he notes that the Chinese bring to Manila:

> metal basins, copper kettles and other copper and cast-iron pots; quantities of all sorts of nails, sheet-iron, tin and saltpeter and gunpowder. … wheat flour … preserves made of orange, peach, pear; nutmeg and ginger, and other fruits of China; salt port and other salt meats; live fowls of good breed and many fine capons; quantities of fresh fruits and oranges of all kinds, excellent chestnuts, walnuts and chicueyes (both green and dried, a delicious fruit);

> quantities of fine threads of all kinds, needles and knick-knacks; little boxes and writing bases; beds, tables, chairs and gilded benches, painted in many figures and patterns. … domesticated buffaloes; geese that resemble swans, horses, some mules and asses; even caged birds, some of which talk while others sing, and they make them play innumerable tricks. The Chinese furnish numberless other gew-gaws and ornaments of little value and worth, which are esteemed among the Spaniards.
>
> *(Guerrero 1966: 23–4)*

It is this additional role that led to the integration of the Chinese into Spanish colonial life of Manila. As Edgar Wickberg, noted historian of the Philippines observes, the provisioning of the "Spanish settlements with needed goods and services was an open field for Chinese enterprises" (Wickberg 2000: 4). Because so many of the enterprises consisted of providing daily services, most were located on site in Manila, specifically in the Parián or Chinatown set aside for them outside the city walls. A silk market, however, was erected "within the city," with over 200 stores which probably employed about 2,000 Chinese. Also located inside the city walls was the neighborhood named Tondo, set aside for those Chinese who converted to Catholicism. In addition, Chinese fishermen and truck-gardeners lived "roundabout," according to Dominican missionaries who kept track of them (Santamaria 1966: 89–90).

Another significant development in the Parián was noted by Bishop Fray Domingo in 1590 (Domingo 1903; all following quotations appear in this work). In describing the many kinds of goods and "curious things" brought to Manila from China, he added: "These articles have already begun to be manufactured here, as quickly and with better finish than in China; and this is due to the intercourse between Chinese and Spaniards, which has enabled the former to perfect themselves in things which they were not wont to produce in China." In other words, Chinese artisans had begun to set up shop in the Manila Parián itself, where they manufactured consumer goods according to Spanish specifications, needs and taste. "In this Parián are to be found workmen of all trades and handicrafts of a nation, and many of them in each occupation. They make much prettier articles than are made in España, and sometimes so cheap that I am ashamed to mention it." The consequence of the influx of Chinese artisans was predictable: "The handicrafts pursued by Spaniards have all dried out, because people buy their clothes and shoes from the sangleys, who are very good craftsmen in Spanish fashion, and make everything at a very low cost."

The *sangley* also produced marvelous work in gold and silver. "They are so skilful and clear that, as soon as they see any object made by a Spanish workman, they reproduce it with exactness." Father Domingo and others especially marveled at the skilled Chinese artisans' ability to duplicate religious figures from images provided them, such as marble statues of the Child Jesus, and even improving upon the original with their use of new materials, such as ivory. "The churches are beginning to be furnished with the images which the s*angleys* make, and which we greatly lacked before; and considering the ability displayed by these people in reproducing the images which come from España, I believe that soon we shall not even miss those made in Flanders," so concluded an admiring bishop.

Fray Domingo tells the amusing story of a Mexican master book-binder whose Chinese assistant surreptitiously learned the trade so well that he could produce a perfectly bound book at less cost that the Spanish master was driven back home. Speaking of the clever s*angley*, "his work is so good that there is no need of the Spanish tradesman." *Sangley* artisans also produced chairs, bridles and stirrups in "so good a quality and so cheaply that some merchants wish to load a cargo of these articles for Mexico."

The Chinese who settled in Manila also produced a wide variety of foodstuff, including "good vegetables of the kinds that grow in España and Mexico." Furthermore, "they keep the

market here as well supplied as that of Madrid and Salamanca," Spain's two major cities. In the Parián were found doctors and apothecaries, and "many eating houses where the sangleys and the natives take their meals, and I have been told that these are frequented even by Spaniards." (Thus we have the origin of the ubiquitous Chinese restaurants so prominently featured in the Chinese diaspora, noted for catering to all clients, Chinese or otherwise.)

Even Chinese bakers cornered the market, for "they make good bread and sell it at low costs," using wheat flour imported from China. Fray Domingo notes that these Chinese bakers are "so accommodating that when one has no money to pay for the bread, they give him credit and mark it on a tally," a generous practice which enabled many a penniless Spanish soldier "to get food this way all through the year." In short, Chinese bakers, rather than the colonial administration, actually provided the safety net "for the poor of this city, for had they not found this refuge they would suffer want."

Further entrenching themselves into the social fabric of Spanish life were skilled Chinese masons, who had learned to make European style bricks and roof tiles, in order to build "fine houses of hewn stone at a low cost and in so short a time that in one year a man has been able to complete a house, all ready for habitation." From constructing stone houses, the Chinese learned to repair and build Spanish galleons in the shipyard of Cavite in Manila Bay, using a strong local wood called *madera de taca* whose resistance was found to be very appropriate for a "trip of such distance and danger." Sails using local raw materials were produced by Chinese artisans in nearby Iloco, and metals brought from China, Japan and Macao by the Portuguese "were worked by Chinese blacksmiths," at first supervised by Spanish and Mexican masters. So strong were the ships built in Cavite that they were famously labeled "Castillian fort on sea" (Almazán 1971: 15).

By penetrating every aspect of Spanish life in Manila, the ubiquitous and industrious Chinese built a close daily relationship with Spanish colonial administrators and residents, from governors and bishops to penurious soldiers. However, what appeared to have been a mutually beneficial and interdependent relationship between Spaniards and Minnan Chinese in Manila also sowed the seeds of discord and distrust that led to incidences of extreme violence. Even as some Spaniards praised the Chinese for their skilled labor, commercial spirit, and overall alacrity in meeting every Spanish need and demand, these same Spaniards also sought to control and discipline Chinese entrepreneurship with a series of improvised taxes, tariffs and licensing fees that the Chinese viewed as onerous, arbitrary and unfair. For example, for those who wished to reside permanently in Manila, a residency permit of eight pesos per annum was assessed. The missionaries also imposed a contribution of several pesos for a community fund. Chinese junk merchants especially resented an indirect tax of 10% of the total value of their goods, in addition to the 6% tariff imposed on merchandise from China, compared with only 3% for goods from all other sources (Guerrero 1966: 31–2).

In 1603, with their numbers in Manila as high as 30,000,[4] the Chinese staged a protest against the heavy and arbitrary taxes and fees imposed on them. In response, the Spaniards unleashed the full force of their military might on the Chinese. The reported massacre of 25,000 Chinese practically decimated the Parián. Those who had escaped death were deported back to China. Manila came to a standstill.

Before long, Spaniards beckoned Chinese to return, which they did promptly and repopulated the Parián, resuming life and work as before, provisioning the galleons with luxury goods as well as food, supplying Spanish residents with food, clothing, shoes and all other necessities of everyday life. Just as the Chinese re-entrenched themselves into the Spanish American colony, protests against heavy taxes and fees in 1639 and again in 1662 provided Spaniards with ready excuses to rain reprisals on the Chinese with a heavy, violent hand, each time followed by

destruction and desertion of the Parián. After a brief respite, traders, artisans and laborers from Minnan, (augmented by immigrants from Guangdong later in the century), would return to the site of their violent confrontation with Spaniards, enabling a revived and rebuilt Parián to rise from the ashes of violence to grow and thrive until the next state campaign to cut them down again (Alfonso 1966: 3).

Admiration tinged with fear of the Chinese could be discerned in all those Spaniards who lived, worked and observed the *sangleys* close at hand. While prompted to pronounce them "a great danger to the Spanish population in the city," (Domingo 1903) they also knew they could not conduct trade with China nor survive in Manila without the Chinese. There was simply no way out for the Spaniards, who could not rid themselves permanently of the Chinese community when the Chinese constituted the backbone of the Spanish mercantile colonial enterprise in Manila. Spanish fear and trust would always be trumped by their total dependence on the Chinese, hence their haste to recall the Chinese to Manila shortly after each periodic violent episode that culminated in expulsion, setting the stage for the interplay between integration and rejection that characterized relationships in the first American Chinatown. Putting it another way, it was precisely the close and intimate daily interaction between Chinese and Spaniards in every facet of local life and the global economic exchange, made possible by the very intense degree of Chinese involvement in the Spanish colonial project in Manila, that provoked equally intense Spanish fear of this high degree of penetration into their lives and material interests. Their response was to slow down the momentum of the Chinese by literally shutting them down periodically.[5]

From Chinese coolie to *Chino Cubano*

By the middle of the nineteenth century, Cuba had become the world's leading sugar producer; slave uprising and political turmoil in the rest of the Caribbean had severely weakened her British and French competitors. While significantly mechanized, sugar was still very much a labor-intensive enterprise. The Cuban planter class, epitomized by men such as Julián Zulueta, who was land owner (*hacendado*), slave owner (*esclavista*) and slave trader (*negrero*) all in one, reigned supreme, their business interests driving much of the island's policies while it remained under Spanish colonial control. Zulueta would soon add another to his long list of unofficial titles: *chinero*, or Chinese coolie trader.

In the mid-1840s, due to the British embargo on the slave trade and pressures to abolish slavery as a labor system all across the Americas, Cuban planters experienced a critical shortage of labor while the demand for sugar rose unabated. Inspired by the British example of importing large numbers of East Indian contract laborers from their colony in India as well as their own familiarity with Chinese workers in their own Philippines colony, the Spaniards too turned to Asia for supplementary labor.

Thus was initiated the human trafficking called *la trata amarilla* (the yellow trade) which brought almost 125,000 almost all male Chinese workers under eight year contracts to Cuba between 1847 and 1875. Officially labeled euphemistically "*colonos asiáticos*" or Asian migrants, but commonly known as "*culíes*" or coolies, most were Cantonese speakers recruited from Guangdong, although a small number were natives of Fujian and other provinces, including among them a good sampling of Hakkas, who had just emerged from a series of bloody wars with *punti* or local Cantonese over land rights. After resistance by the Qing authorities to continue the trade on Chinese soil, the Spaniards moved their coolie operations to the more pliant Portuguese colony of Macao in 1853.

As the African slave trade wound down, ending with the last shipments in 1865 and 1866 of just 145 and 1,443 slaves, the size of coolie imports rose correspondingly, reaching the high

marks of 12,391 and 14,263 in 1866 and 1867, to immediately make up for the sharp drop in new slaves. The most intense periods were the last nine years of this 27-year trade, from 1865 to the last shipment in 1874, when 65,500 coolies representing over 50% of the total trade, entered Cuba. During this time, sugar production climbed steadily, reaching a historic high of 768,672 metric tons in 1874. Clearly then, Chinese workers compensated for the loss of fresh African slaves, delaying the economic crisis that would have surely set in with the end of the slave trade. Without Chinese labor, Cuba could not have continued to produce aggressively to supply a robust world market for sugar.

When the Cuban planters turned in desperation to Chinese coolies to meet their insatiable demand for labor, it is not clear at all if they gave serious thought to the social consequences of introducing a third racial element and a new labor system to Cuba's plantation and slave society. Perhaps they thought they could simply slot the Chinese into the existing system of slavery, while socially locating them somewhere on the familiar black–white racial hierarchy. In this way, they hoped not to disrupt the carefully calibrated and rigidly constructed social system that was divided into slave and free, with its corresponding and reinforcing racialist dichotomy of black and white.

Translated into practice, this meant that, on the plantations where 80% of the Chinese had been consigned, they worked alongside African slaves and were treated much the same on a daily basis. Upon arrival in Havana, they were confined in barracoons, while their contracts were auctioned in lots of ten on the slave market of Havana. Those who ran away were branded as "*chino cimarrón*," employing the same terminology, *cimarrón*, for runaway slaves. With no apology, plantation owners and managers basically extended the *esclavista* mentality well honed over centuries of slavery to cover the newly imported coolies. Original contract stipulations that spelled out terms for their personal freedom after fulfilling the eight-year term were replaced by new regulations in 1860 that forced coolies to re-contract indefinitely, a policy widely denounced by the Chinese as a crude ploy to maintain them in agricultural labor against their will. Without exception, Cuban historians who have closely examined the coolie system all conclude that it was barely disguised to extend slavery (Jiménez Pastrana 1983; Pérez de la Riva 1978).

Regarding what racial identity to assign the Chinese, Cuban planters and authorities were also pragmatic, although they encountered some ambivalence. In daily practice, Chinese were usually lumped with black slaves. But on other occasions, they were included among whites, as on certain local censuses which did not recognize fine distinctions between the conventional divisions of white and slave. More complex censuses sometimes included a category for *colonos asiáticos*. Complicating the matter was the fact that neither the contracts nor the many regulations governing the coolie system stipulated a racial identity for the coolies, although it could be inferred that as long as they were defined legally as free men, their immigration to Cuba as voluntary, they could be considered white; after all, they were recruited and managed by the immigration agency named the *Comisión de Población Blanca* (White Settlement), which was originally set up to attract white European immigrants. Most intriguing were the few documented cases in which a Chinese coolie married a white woman; on these occasions his baptism and marriage were invariably recorded by the local priest in the white, not black, registries (Hu-DeHart 1998).

However, just as surely as the Cuban planters and authorities wrestled with these issues, the Chinese were always acutely aware of their plight and insisted to whomever would listen that they were neither black nor slaves. In 1864, a local official appealed to an administrative judge for guidance on "whether or not it is permitted to transfer *asiáticos* to *personas de color*" [blacks or mulattos], because an *asiático* resisted being owned by *la negra Antonia*, who had bought his contract from a white man. The judge ruled that, given the Chinese man's resistance, "because he considers himself superior by race to the black person who owns him," it was best to return

him to his original white master. In a most telling moment, he reasoned that it was not "convenient" to allow *gente de color* to enjoy the same superiority as white masters over *colonos asiáticos* (Hu-DeHart 1998: 82).

Chinese coolies responded to the harshness of slavery much the same way slaves did: they rebelled individually and collectively, they committed suicide by overdosing on opium, they torched buildings and crops, they engaged in various forms of sabotage, and frequently they ran away. They seemed fully aware of laws enacted for their welfare and protection, and were consequently very bitter that local authorities repeatedly failed to observe and enforce them. During their indenture, hundreds filed complaints about the "baneful laws and evil deeds of Spain" (Cuban Commission Report 1993;[6] Hu-DeHart 2005).

If Cuban planters and Spanish colonial administrators did not anticipate it at first, the Chinese by action, behavior and words certainly contributed to discrediting slavery both as a legal system and as a racial system. By insisting on their humanity as free men, even though they were treated equally harshly or worse than slaves, and as a non-white population which refused to be subjugated racially by whites, they offered alternative visions to those still enslaved for life. Toward the end of the indenture period, it finally dawned on plantation owners and colonial authorities that the highly visible presence of a free but non-white racial group in or near the plantations posed a danger to social stability. So great, in fact, was this concern that the planters suspended the economically rational practice of hiring *caudrillas* or work crews that Chinese labor contractors organized from the ranks of free Chinese or runaway coolies, because their presence among slaves "demoralized the workers" (Hu-DeHart 1998: 83).

If Chinese coolies rejected integration into Cuban plantation society as a dehumanizing and unjust system, their concluding chapter in this history of resistance led them toward acceptance into postcolonial and post-slavery Cuban society more profoundly than could be anticipated or imagined while they were under contract. During the protracted struggle for Cuban independence from Spain, which coincided in time with the intense last phase of Chinese indenture, many coolies made the critical decision to transcend their differences with blacks and slaves, put aside their antipathy toward each other, and minimize all other sources of conflict, in order to join in the struggle toward a common goal, united in the understanding that independence would lead to their personal freedom. Chinos *mambises* or freedom fighters provided rank and file members of revolutionary armies, while a significant number rose to positions of leadership, such as José Tolón, José Bu Tack (胡德), José Fong, Andrés Cao. José Bu Tack so distinguished himself in valor and leadership that he qualified as candidate for the first presidency of an independent Cuba (Hu-DeHart 1998: 84; Triano and Eng Herrera 2009: 1–26).

Viewed as national heroes by Cubans ever since, the Chinese place in Cuban history has been secured by this tribute inscribed on a monument to the Chinese Freedom Fighters in Havana shortly after independence and attributed to fellow patriot Gonzalo de Quesada: "*No hubo un Chino Cubano desertor; no hubo un Chino Cubano traidor.*" There was no Chinese Cuban deserter, no Chinese Cuban traitor. Echoing this same sentiment decades later, renowned Cuban writer Severo Sarduy, who claimed descent from a Chinese coolie shipped from Macao, proclaimed: "Three cultures, at least, have been superimposed to constitute the Cuban–Spanish, African, and Chinese" (Sarduy 1994: 154). The birth of the *Chino Cubano* came with the birth of the nation.

Perhaps nowhere in the Americas have the Chinese made a greater impact on culture and society than the Chinese of Cuba. In explaining why she chose to novelize the Chinese Cuban experience in her acclaimed work *Monkey Hunting* (a take-off on the classic Chinese fiction *Xiyouji* or *Journey to the West*), Cuban American writer Cristina García refers to Chinese-Cuban subculture as a "huge part of the island that most people are not even aware of outside of Cuba." But in Cuba, she asserts, "they take it for granted" (*Atlantic Unbound* 2003).

In addition to Sarduy, two other cultural luminaries of twentieth century Cuba claim Chinese descent: the poet Regino Pedroso and the painter Wilfredo Lam.[7] It is not surprising that their Chinese heritage was only partial and in some cases, quite remote, for they were the Cuban-born progeny of some distant Chinese relative's dalliance with local Cuban women. Nor is it a coincidence that both Pedroso and Lam hail from Cuban's premier sugar plantation zone, where the bulk of the nineteenth-century coolies labored, while Sarduy claimed a remote ancestor from Macau, where coolies were dispatched. Together, they present powerful representations of the unique social phenomenon that has been termed *chinocubano* (Baltar Rodriguez 1990 and 1997: 105).

Regino Pedroso, born in Matanzas province (heart of the sugar plantation zone) in 1896 whose formal education ended at age 13, worked in the sugar fields before moving to Havana where he made a living as an artisan and mechanic and began writing poetry about the working class. As a leading practitioner of *la poesía social cubana*, he traveled to China and wrote passionate poems about his ancestral homeland, producing a collection tantalizingly titled *El ciruelo de Yuan Pei Fu. Poemas chinos* (The Plum Tree of Yuan Pei Fu. Chinese Poems) in 1955, and wrote his last poem in 1964 entitled "China, recuerdo … " (I remember China) (Pedroso 1975).

Not much is known of his Chinese family, but he was clearly imbued with his Chinese heritage and sought his Chineseness. This is how Nicolás Guillén, one of Cuba's most celebrated poets, describes Pedroso in his own poetic language that should be savored in the original Spanish:

> El chino. No es un chino de chinerías, externo; no es un chino pasado por California, un chino de chop-suei y sopa de nidos (en lata) de golondrinas o aletas (en lata) de Tiburón. Trátase de un chino profundo, mas aún, insondable. Un chino filósofo que ve lo que le rodea con su paciencia y su abanico (negro tal vez) y acota cada suceso con un marginal sonriente, hijo de una experiencia que viene desde la dinastía Ming, tan amada por el poeta.
>
> *(Pedroso 1975: 7)*

The essence of this evocative portrait of Pedroso is that he is not a superficial Chino, but an authentic and profound one. Along with his postmodern sensitivity and his social activist poetry, Guillén asserts, Pedroso's work is one of the "most serious, most solid—unique—of American poetics." And he concludes expansively, "Here, one can see it flow like a wide and slow river whose waters pass through Asia and Africa before arriving in Cuba." Echoing Sarduy, Guillén could well have intended for this description of his fellow poet Pedroso to apply to all of Cuba.

The best known Chino Cubano is unquestionably the world renowned modernist painter Wilfredo Lam, whose representations of *afrocubanidad* captures the soul of Cuba, and whose prolific art has been exhibited worldwide to critical acclaim and popular appreciation. As the embodiment of a multiracial Cuba, his works are permanently exhibited in a museum dedicated just to him in downtown Havana, keeping his name and his art vividly alive for Cubans and international tourists alike (Noceda 1990). Visitors to this museum from the USA and Europe may already have seen his large paintings hanging in New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art or in any number of great museums in Europe.

Born in 1902 in the town of Sagua La Grande, Las Villas province, one of the four major sugar zones, Wilfredo's birth coincided with the birth of the Cuban nation. Along with his six sisters and one brother, he grew up with both parents and knew his elderly father well, having spent considerable time with him as a child in the local Chinatown where the family led a comfortable life. His father was a literate Chinese immigrant named Lam Yam (locally known as Enrique Lam) who could read and write Chinese. Later in life, Wilfredo remembered his father as "*muy culto intelectualmente y sus paisanos le tenían mucho respecto*" (well educated and much

respected by his compatriots). Baptized Catholic at age five, his godfather was the part Chinese shopkeeper Guillermo Glenn. Glenn's mother, daughter of a Chinese father and a mulatta mother, was Wilfredo's godmother. A Chinese uncle owned a restaurant, where Wilfredo learned to eat Chinese food. In other words, Wilfredo's childhood was filled with Chinese and mixed-Chinese Cubans, and he even learned a few Chinese words from his father. When friends of his father returned from China, they often brought him and his siblings Chinese presents. After giving up a *bodega* (corner grocery store) business, Lam Yam made his living making wicker furniture. Wilfredo's mother was a mulatta named Ana Serafina Castilla, described as quite dark-skinned and very proper in comportment. Because his father retained his Chinese citizenship, according to Cuban law Wilfredo was Chinese until he gained Cuban citizenship at age 21 (Núñez Jiménez 1982: 41–53).

Despite hanging out with his Chinese father and his friends in his early youth, the person who had the most profound and lasting impact on Wilfredo's work was his maternal aunt, Mantonica Wilson. A *lucumí* priestess or *santera*, she served as his spiritual guide and infused young Wilfredo with the Afro-Cuban cultural practices and religious beliefs so central to Cuban popular culture and in turn to Wilfredo's formation as a Cuban artist (Herzberg 1992). In Europe, he met Picasso and the other great Modernists of that generation. Clearly influenced by surrealism and cubism, he developed his own identifiable style.

Dozens of books have been written about Wilfredo Lam, in English, Spanish, French, and Italian, all exploring his peripatetic life and prodigious artistic production. All his critics and biographers note his "*mestizaje*" (race-mixture) and that he was the "offspring of Chinese, white, and black" (Núñez Jiménez 1982: 14). Never hiding his Chinese heritage, indeed proud to wear his part-Chinese identity by keeping his father's Chinese surname rather than switching to his mother's more readily marked Cuban surname, Wilfredo did not betray any obvious Chinese influence in his art. Some see the Chinese in his painting methods and style, such as some brush strokes, others in the underlying philosophy of his art. Wilfredo has the last word on being Chinese in Cuba: "I have quite a lot of Chinese blood in my veins, but I have never felt Chinese." He always insisted that he was Cuban (Núñez Jiménez 1982: 56). That the son of a Chinese immigrant can be given the role of representing Cuban culture to the world may be the greatest tribute to his Chinese heritage. Chinos Cubanos, in turn, can claim Wilfredo Lam as one of their greatest cultural resources in Cuba.

From the most abject beginnings as coolies who worked alongside slaves on sugar plantations – a condition which the coolies deplored and resisted – Chinese in Cuba managed to penetrate Cuban culture and society to a degree not surpassed elsewhere in Latin America. That so many fought and led the wars for independence certainly elevated their status to *mambi*, or freedom fighter. Another explanation for this degree of social integration can be found in a familiar assertion by leading Cuban cultural figures that white, African and Chinese blood course through their veins, a poetic way to highlight widespread miscegenation or race mixture in the making of Cuba's postcolonial national identity.

Strategic transnationalism: the Chinese on Mexico's northern *frontera*

The borderlands between the USA and Mexico was delineated in the mid-nineteenth century when two frontiers (*frontera* in Spanish) collided and re-drew the border (also *frontera* in Spanish) between the two nations as it stands today. In the process, Mexico lost almost half of its national territory to an aggressive, expansionist USA in the throes of its self-proclaimed, pre-ordained or "manifest destiny" to the western frontier, which was also a triumphalist expression of white supremacy in the name of a superior Western Civilization.

As Liberals in Mexico wrested power from Conservatives to lead a defeated and deflated Mexico into the modern world, the new leaders also had to grudgingly acknowledge, if not wholly accept, the looming dominance and insatiable appetite of the "colossus to the north." Thus they acceded to demands for access to their land, natural resources, and cheap labor; they allowed the construction of rail connections to the other side of the border; they pacified the Apache, Yaqui and other trouble-making indigenous peoples in order the stabilize the countryside for foreign investment in mines and commercial agriculture; and they opened up the country to immigrants, ideally Catholics from Europe who would whiten, thus improve, the weak native stock through miscegenation.

From the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the first decade of the twentieth, Mexico was ruled by an iron-fisted, pro-development dictator named Porfirio Díaz. His ascendance to power in 1876 predated by only a few years the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in the USA in 1882, which had the effect of directing Chinese immigrants to Mexico's northern border. At the same time, American and European investors poured massive capital into this borderlands region to develop mining (mostly copper) and commercial agriculture (mostly cotton), as well as building up a modern infrastructure in transportation and communication.

European immigrants largely found northern Mexico an unattractive destination for quite obvious reasons – the lack of available land for homesteading, marauding Indians, an uneducated, unskilled local population – leaving the space wide open for willing immigrants such as the Japanese, Lebanese and other Middle Easterners, and especially the Chinese, who were shut out of the USA after decades of steady migration to California and other points West since the middle of the nineteenth century. On this emerging borderlands, they quickly filled the niches in a range of small manufacturing, commercial and service activities that arose alongside industrialization, proletarianization and urbanization. Chinese exclusion in the USA notwithstanding, immigrant businesses and families in Mexico took on trans-border characteristics by negotiating the space in between, over and above the two sovereign entities, calling upon co-ethnic networks in California and New York to comparative advantage.

When the old dictator was deposed by revolutionaries in 1911, an estimated 35,000 Chinese had entered Mexico. Only about half had settled in Mexico, the rest having found their way illegally to the USA, returned to China, or transshipped elsewhere in the Americas. While the Mexican Revolution (1910–20) seriously disrupted Mexican society, the uprooted millions from villages and towns either joining up with the armies of various revolutionary factions or crossing the border to the USA to work and avoid the violence, Chinese shopkeepers actually prospered during these turbulent times by remaining neutral politically while doing business provisioning mining and railroad towns as well as revolutionary armies. During these years, their numbers actually grew, especially in the border state of Sonora, whose landscape of mines and recalcitrant Indians mirrored that of the "Wild West" Arizona territory on the other side of the international border.

How the Chinese made themselves into effectively the petite bourgeoisie of these frontier borderlands is a story I have recounted and documented in detail (Hu-DeHart 1980, 2004). It began even before the formal enactment of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, but with anti-Chinese agitation already well underway and becoming increasingly violent in the US West, California Chinese businessmen began branching out across the border to Mexico. Beginning as early as 1873, shoe and clothing factories appeared in the Sonoran port city of Guaymas and the capital of Hermosillo, followed by well-stocked stores that functioned both wholesale and retail; they sold directly to customers while also setting up penniless co-ethnics with goods on credit so they could work as itinerant peddlers or set up small shops in remote mining towns.

One such firm was Quan, Gun, Lung y Compañía; established in 1894; it imported from China and Japan, as well as distributed domestic products through Mexico, such as beer, coffee, cigars.

It had a "well mounted factory" to manufacture shoes, and traded directly with New York, Chicago, San Francisco, St Louis, and Hamburg, Germany. Within Mexico, its commercial sphere extended beyond Sonora to adjacent states on or near the border. In a burst of self promotion, General Manager Guillermo Leytón (who cleverly hispanized his name) noted in a full-page commercial publication advertisement, that he was "an excellent Chinese who enjoys general popularity in the locality," and was "particularly well loved by the working people, because he willingly and readily helps them out, especially when a poor harvest or some other cause raises the prices of basic necessities, at which time [he makes] only a little profit or perhaps none at all, [selling] them these articles of primary needs at prices they could afford, thereby averting the specter of hunger" (García y Alva 1905–7: no pagination). In other words, Leytón projected and embraced an image of a fully integrated and civic-minded *leading member* of local society.

Other Chinese circumvented Chinese exclusion in the USA by crossing the border as Mexicans, none more adept in this deployment of strategic transnationalism than Lee Sing. We first meet up with Lee in Tucson, Arizona, in 1879 (before exclusion), where he operated a successful small business dealing in beef jerky, beans and whiskey, then expanded into shoe-making in the border town of Nogales. After engagement to a Mexican woman, he liquidated his assets in Arizona and moved across the border of Sonora, where he became a Mexican citizen. Meanwhile, he maintained a stake in his brother's business back in Tucson. In 1893 (after exclusion), on a routine trip to Tucson, Lee was detained at the border and questioned about his status as a merchant, whereupon Lee called upon Mexican and American friends and business partners to vouch for his Mexican citizenship, his 11-year residency in Sonora, his Mexican wife and three Mexican children, not to mention his considerable annual income of 8-10,000 pesos as proprietor of a lucrative general store. From then on, Lee was able to cross the border without further difficulty. Lee Sing was not unique, in that other Chinese merchants owned and operated businesses on both sides while maintaining families and residences on one or the other, or both (Delgado 2004).

A key reason for the steady and widespread growth of Chinese businesses on the borderlands was the close relationship that developed between US entrepreneurs and Chinese immigrants. For example, Fong Sing of Saltillo owned a restaurant within the confines of the Mazapil Copper Company. In fact, Fong owned only half of the restaurant, the American company controlling the rest of the inventory, so that the upstart Chinese businessman and the wealthy American company, whose workers the restaurant served, formed a partnership (Hu-DeHart 1980: 284–5).

This case illustrates the symbiotic relationship that developed between Chinese small businesses and American company towns. Railroad and mining towns were quintessential company towns, where the foreign owners/employers set up stores to recapture wages paid to workers. In the borderlands, Americans developed a modified version of the company town; instead of operating the small businesses themselves, they allowed Chinese immigrants to take care of the daily minimum needs of their Mexican workers, such as canteens and boarding houses, butchers and groceries, laundry, tailoring and shoe repair.

No Mexican town attracted proportionately more Chinese immigrants than Cananea, Sonora, home of the American-owned Greene Consolidate Copper Mining Co. In 1903, 800 of the 3,000 Chinese reported in the state census lived in Cananea; or viewed in another way, those 800 Chinese were a good percentage of the total number of 4,000 who lived and worked in the mining town that year. Many of them, like Fong Lewis, worked as domestics for the families of American managers. Others, like Fong Sing above, operated eating houses in partnership with the mining company. Most of them owned small fruit and vegetable stands, laundries, clothing and shoe stores (where work shoes were manufactured and repaired). In a detailed 1925 census,

410 Chinese individuals were counted in Cananea, making it the largest Chinese community in the state. Of them, 204 were grocery store owners; 22 had chicken farms; 21 were cooks; 23 operated hand laundries; 17 were shoemakers; 11 were tailors; 7 owned factories, and only 56 were day laborers. Collectively, the Chinese business investment totaled 172,233 pesos, which was puny, of course, when compared to the millions of US dollars invested, but many times the paltry 42,200 pesos worth of Mexican capital (Hu-DeHart 2004: 64–7).

Each on their own, but certainly when perceived to be operating in tandem as in the case of Cananea, the consequences could be dire, especially for the vulnerable Chinese. With such a large concentration of foreigners – wealthy, privileged, powerful Americans surrounded by the alien but thriving Orientals – it is no wonder that anti-foreign feelings ran deep in this mining town. Before the revolution, Mexican workers directed their hostility primarily toward the American owners and managers, staging a number of strikes. But during the most violent phase of the revolution (1910–15), they also turned on the Chinese with a vengeance, a sort of guilt by association given their perceived proximity to the American owners and managers. An estimated 100 Chinese men were killed in sporadic violence during this period, although this number was actually smaller than the casualty of US citizens (Cumberland 1960).

Anti-foreign demonstrations often degenerated into anti-Chinese mob actions. One such incident took place on 14 February 1914. Following an "open letter" in which two Mexican labor leaders accused company leaders of thievery, a band of Mexican women, wives of workers, gathered to make speeches against all foreigners. The group grew into an angry mob of almost 500 men and women, who then marched to a Chinese laundry, ransacked the premises and beat up the three Chinese owner-workers trapped inside. The police arrived late and did nothing, provably because there were only eight of them; finally, 30 mounted soldiers managed to disperse the angry mob. The gravity of this incident prompted the US State Department to order US consul Frederick Simpich to investigate the situation, to protect Chinese under attack, and make provisions to evacuate them in the event of a real threat to the copper company's "meat packing building … an extensive steel and concrete structure." Upon receiving a long list of grievances and abuses from the Chinese – such as seizure of property and excess taxes imposed by revolutionary factions – Simpich urged them to stay open for business rather than close down. He also noted that, should the American company cease operations – as managers threatened to do if Mexican unions issued more demands – the situation in Cananea would become "most perilous." In his report, Simpich offered this final observation:

> The feeling against all foreigners and against the Chinese in particular is very strong; the continued depreciation of money, and the subsequent rise in the cost of food … and the mistaken idea of the ignorant miners and American capitalists and Chinese merchants are in some way very responsible for this condition, is driving the people to increasing unrest.
>
> *(Hu-DeHart 1980: 286)*

What happened in Cananea in 1914 eerily echoed a much more devastating anti-Chinese attack a few years earlier, in the prosperous city of Torreón in the northeastern border state of Coahuila, which was also the home state of Francisco Madero, a large landowner who was mobilizing the nation against dictator Díaz. On 13 May 1911, Maderisita forces entered Torreón upon the withdrawal of the federal army, and unleashed their revolutionary fury against the highly visible but defenseless Chinese community. By the afternoon of 15 May, 303 Chinese men lay dead in the bloodied streets. The massacre appeared prompted in part by a fiery speech delivered by a Mexican bricklayer on 5 May, in which he railed against the Chinese for taking jobs away from Mexicans, especially Mexican women, and argued for restricting further

Chinese immigration. In fact, the Chinese appeared once again to be caught in the larger web of a more generalized xenophobia built on resentment against US and foreign control of local development.

A borderlands city like Torreón was exactly the kind of urban environment that attracted Chinese immigrants in the late nineteenth century. It was the meeting place of two new railroad lines that linked Mexico's mining and agricultural products to the US market, including cotton grown in the fertile Laguna Valley irrigated by the Nazas River. Chinese and many other foreign entrepreneurs – Germans, French, British, Italians, Spaniards, North Americans and Middle Easterners – arrived to invest sweat and capital in mines and foundries, department stores and banks, hotels and electric street cars. The Chinese had a variety of businesses, none so prominent as the large urban vegetable gardens that employed upwards of 100 men. This meant that the Chinese owned large tracts of urban real estate, their workers prominently at work during the day.[8] None other than the Chinese reformer Kang Youwei encouraged fellow entrepreneurs in well-established Chinese communities of Vancouver and San Francisco to invest in Torreón. He himself even visited the Mexican city twice in 1906 and 1907, where he established a chapter of the Zhonguo Weixin Hui, the American version of his reform movement (Lo 1967).

This impressive flurry of foreign enterprises unnerved Mexican businessmen, who formed in 1907 a chamber of commerce to consolidate their interests vis-à-vis the foreigners. As they lamented in the local newspaper aptly named *El Nuevo Mundo* (The New World):

> We cannot compete against the foreigners in commercial ventures. The sad and lamentable fact is that the prostration of our national commerce has created a situation in which Mexicans are replaced by foreign individuals and companies, which monopolize our commerce and behave in the manner of conquerors in a conquered land.
>
> *(Craib 1996: 15)*

Although this lament did not single out the Chinese in sounding the alarm against foreign control of the developing local economy, nevertheless the Chinese took the brunt of violent xenophobia in May 1911. The revolutionary army, abetted by an angry mob of unemployed workers, began by killing the unarmed garden workers whose presence greeted them as they entered the city (Hu-DeHart 2009; Jacques 1974; Puig 1992).

A single moment's bloodbath was matched two decades later by an even more drastic reaction to the deep Chinese entrenchment in the Mexican borderlands. If Torreón was the expression of an angry, uncontrolled mob, then the outright expulsion of Chinese from the state of Sonora was the culmination of a series of organized anti-Chinese campaigns. The first campaign surfaced in 1916, led by school teacher José María Arana. The movement attempted to join the resentment of middle-class small businessmen (*Junta Comercial de Hombres de Negocio)* to the frustration of "salaried workers" (*Unión Fraternal de Obreros Asalariados*) around a proto-fascist theme of "*Pro-Patria"* ("For the Fatherland") and "*En Defensa de la Raza*." In Arana's rabble-rousing rhetoric:

> Improvement of the race is the supreme ideal of all civilized nations, so that if the Chinese are corrupting our race, we ought to restrict them. The Chinese produce on the towns the same effect that the locust does on the crops: they destroy them. The Mexican that defends the Chinese with detriment to the national good is a traitor to the country.
>
> *(Hu-DeHart 1980: 294)*

Despite his prodigious energy and resourcefulness – adapting California's yellow peril image of locusts for example – Arana's campaign lost traction by 1920 because he failed to garner

political support from the state's top political leaders, who were in turn closely tied to the national government. Sonoran governor Cesario Soriano was outspoken in his condemnation of Arana's inflammatory rhetoric and scandalous tactics. He publicly denounced the shrill and vulgar language of Arana's leaflets, charging that it amounted to an emotional exploitation of untutored lower-class Mexicans. Furthermore, as President Alvaro Obregón, Soriano's fellow Sonoran, worked on the world stage for US and world recognition of his new Revolutionary government, the governor regarded Arana's "diatribes, insults and parochialisms" as an international embarrassment, its harassment a violation of "most favored nation" treaty agreements with China.

It is important to note that, while Arana and his followers raged, Chinese immigration to Mexico continued to surge as Chinese businesses in Mexico proliferated and flourished. In 1920, a Chinese community leader of Sonora reported to US consul Bartley Yost that "Chinese business has recently increased one hundred percent," prompting Yost to report to the State Department that "the trade in groceries, dry goods and general merchandise in Sonora is largely controlled by Chinese" (Hu-DeHart 1980: 296).

Ten years later, on the eve of the world depression, the local and national political climate was ripe for an all out anti-Chinese campaign. Leading this successful new movement in 1929 to 1932 was José Angel Espinoza, state representative of Cananea, journalist and publisher of the tabloid *El Nacionalista* and author of two tomes of anti-Chinese propaganda that borrowed even more heavily from the racialist and white supremacist rhetoric and tropes invented in California in the nineteenth century (Espinoza 1931, 1932; Hu-DeHart 1982). Joining them were other local newspapers – *El Intruso*, *La Gaceta de Cananea* among them – and together they formed a relentless chorus whipping up anti-Chinese hysteria about the Chinese menace to a receptive audience of working and middle-class Mexicans confronted with the world economic crisis. This time, Espinoza also was able to gain the support of national and state political leaders, mayors and other local officials, united in enforcing anti-Chinese ordinances concerning health and sanitation codes, job and work rules, residential restrictions, and Chinese–Mexican marriages. Those Chinese unable or unwilling to comply with these onerous laws or pay the hefty fines were subjected to expulsion, which began to happen in 1930 until most of the 3,000 or more Chinese men and their families abandoned Sonora, fleeing to other states or back to China, some with Mexican wives and children in tow (Camacho 2006).

Espinoza, however, was too smart a politician to believe that expelling the Chinese would solve Mexico's economic problems during the Depression. He, himself, in fact reported the sharp decline in state tax receipts when Chinese shuttered their businesses en masse. He actually had another motive for whipping up antagonism against the Chinese and all foreigners. As a political ally and protégé of President Plutarco Elías Calles, and, also like Calles a one-time teacher and small businessman, Espinoza came from the petit bourgeois middle class that often expressed resentment at foreign competition, couching its xenophobia in the form of a "vigorous nationalism" (Carr 1972–73). What these Sonoran revolutionaries had in mind was a plan to exploit the simmering resentment against perceived Chinese and foreign control of the local economy to build a more cohesive Mexican nationalism around a new political party that Calles founded in 1929 named the *Partido Nacional Revolutionario*. Acting as a lever to consolidate and institutionalize revolutionary power in a new party, an anti-Chinese and anti-foreign campaign could build party membership, solidarity and identity. Toward that end, the party provided office space for the anti-Chinese campaign and even helped organize the *Comité Directivo de la Campaña Nacionalista Antichina*. Concludes Mexican historian José Jorge Gómez Izquierdo, "Anti-Chinese animus functions like a lever within the nationalist project to develop cohesion among Mexicans" (Gómez Izquierdo 1991: 131).

In hindsight, one can see that strategic transnationalism on the US–Mexico borderlands enabled the Chinese to find a space in North America where they could live, work and prosper,

forming families and communities, even as they were excluded from the USA. But transnationalism also worked against them in critical moments. Their sometimes close association with US enterprises in Mexico made them vulnerable to Mexican fears of foreign control of their lives and resources, to the extent that they were singled out and targeted as representative of all foreign interests. This appeared to have been the case in the Torreón massacre of 1911. Even more profoundly, transnationalism was a two-way street and anyone on the border could avail themselves of transnational resources. Thus, a ready-made anti-Chinese rhetoric manufactured in the context of US white supremacy leaked across the border to fuel Mexico's own xenophobic nationalism, infecting it specifically with an oft performed anti-Chinese playbook.

Notes

1 The British recruited nearly one million Indian contract laborers to their Caribbean colonies after they abolished slavery in the early nineteenth century. See Look Lai's definitive study on Indian and Chinese indentured servitude to the Caribbean (Look Lai 1993).
2 Although this word appeared very early in Spanish documents to designate the Chinese residential and business community outside the walled Spanish city of Manila, its origin was never made clear; the Chinese word "pa-lam," does not give sufficient clue to any Chinese origin, but appears to be a mere phonetic rendering of the Spanish name.
3 The origin of "*sangley*" is not clear, although it appeared very early in Spanish documents. Many scholars believe it comes from the Minnan word for "doing business" (*singli*). However, Teresita Ang See, a noted scholar of Chinese in the Philippines who is based in Manila, thinks it more likely comes from the phrase "come frequently," as was the custom of the Minnan junk traders.
4 Precise numbers for the Chinese population in the Parián and in Manila for this period are hard to come by and confirm, with scholars providing various estimates. In 1603, for example, the estimates ran from 20,000 to 30,000, while for Spaniards the number varied from 1–2,000. The Chinese count was complicated by the fact that not all who resided in Manila had purchased the required residency permit, and there was no good way to measure the illegal residents. Díaz-Trechuelo (2001: 85) estimated for 1632 a legal residential population of 16,000, augmented by another 5,000 illegals, for a total of just over 20,000. Laws to limit the resident Chinese to no more than 6,000 at any one time were never effectively enforced, partly because the Chinese simply ignored the limit when necessary, and partly because Spaniards in Manila also found the limit inconvenient for their needs (Bernal 1966: 47).
5 Needing further research and discussion in this essay is the question of interpersonal relationships between Spaniards and Chinese in Manila, especially between Spanish men in a predominately male white society and Chinese women in Manila, whose numbers probably surpassed that of Spanish women.
6 This is a very important source for the study of the Chinese diaspora in the Americas, as it is one of the very few primary documents produced by the Qing Government of China about its subjects overseas. In 1876, led by Commissioner Chen Lanpin and aided by a British and a French employee of the Chinese Customs Service, the Commission visited Cuba and recorded in writing (by a Chinese scribe) interviews conducted with hundreds of Chinese men, mostly still under original contract or re-contracted, but also a few who were free. The Qing Government then released a detailed summary of the testimonies in English and French, but not in Chinese. In her recently published book entitled *The Coolie Speaks*, Lisa Yun (2008) has located the original Chinese interview transcripts and closely analyzed them.
7 In this chapter, we have space to offer only a few choice examples, by way of a "teaser." For a much fuller and richly detailed discussion of how the Chinese is imagined and portrayed in Cuban literature and culture, see López-Calvo (2008).
8 The Chinese themselves acknowledged the visibility of the urban gardeners by giving Torreón the nickname *caiyuan* which means vegetable garden.

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7

Mountains of Gold

Canada, North America, and the Cantonese Pacific

Henry Yu

Overview

From the mid-nineteenth century for over a century, Chinese migrations across the Pacific might be best understood as a singular historical process – the "Cantonese Pacific." This is not to say that trans-Pacific Chinese migrants during that period all expressed some form of self-identity as "Cantonese." However, regardless of the various dialects they spoke, and the fractured local and regional networks they created out of their individual and family patterns of migration, these hundreds of thousands of trans-Pacific migrants created a single migration system with nodes centered upon Hong Kong, San Francisco, Victoria/Vancouver, and Sydney, Australia, as well as other ports such as Honolulu, Seattle, Yokohama, and Manzanillo, Mexico. Over multiple generations a unique, recurring, and persistent geographic imaginary developed around a mythic "Gold Mountain" that was extraordinarily powerful in directing these migrant aspirations for spatial and social mobility.

The single most important factor for the creation and endurance of this coherent process of trans-Pacific migration was the dominance of Hong Kong as the main through-port for almost all trans-Pacific migrants from southern China during that period. As Elizabeth Sinn (2010 and forthcoming) has shown in her research, Hong Kong was the nodal port through which trans-Pacific Chinese migration processes connected. San Francisco, Victoria, Vancouver, Sydney, Honolulu, Seattle, and smaller ports in the British Caribbean and Latin America were the secondary nodes by which a vast geographic pattern of circular migrations extended all across North America, Australia, New Zealand, Latin America, and the Caribbean. All of these nodes connected local rural sites in the hinterlands of British and US territories and colonies all around the Pacific into a circulatory migration network that linked them with small villages in eight specific counties in Guangdong province.

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, this group of coastal counties near the British port of Hong Kong became the nexus of trans-Pacific migrations to North America. Numbering several hundred rural villages all together, these counties dominated the flows of migrants from China to the west coast of North America for over a century. Not until the 1970s did the trans-Pacific

migration of ethnic Chinese significantly expand beyond the networks created by these early migrants and their descendents. Speaking various rural village and county dialects that were in practice mutually unintelligible, these migrants organized around family, village, and local dialect networks, creating long distance routes that extended around the Pacific region. These routes were marked by multiple journeys in multiple directions, with young men leaving villages to pursue opportunities identified by earlier migrants, often paying for their initial journeys through loans and credit supplied by family and extended networks of relatives among earlier generations of successful migrants. Between the 1850s and the 1930s, a relatively stable system of life cycle migration endured, with men migrating long distances and creating families both in their villages of origin and in various sites around North America.

Exclusionary anti-Chinese legislation in Canada in 1923, and the effects of the Great Depression and the war in the Pacific, combined to cut off the trans-Pacific migration of Chinese in both directions, with small flows picking up again only after the end of the Second World War.[1] It was only after racially exclusionary immigration policies were removed in the USA in 1965 and Canada in 1967 that mass migration of Chinese to North America resumed. Initially, this resumption was shaped by familial connections to earlier migrants, but by the end of the 1970s, trans-Pacific migrations of ethnic Chinese to North America had become increasingly diverse in origin, often linked to earlier generations of ethnic Chinese migrations (from both Guangdong and Fujian provinces) to Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and the Caribbean and Latin America. Over a century of the dominance of the "Cantonese Pacific" became increasingly muted as the numerical dominance of earlier migrants speaking a handful of Cantonese dialects was increasingly subsumed by new migrations. However, the enduring legacy of the Cantonese Pacific remained.

Since the 1970s, migrations of ethnic Chinese to Canada and the USA have grown to become one of the dominant sources of new migrants to North America. This essay concentrates on the singular migration process that formed the "Cantonese Pacific" in the century after 1850, with a shift in focus to the new Chinese migrations to Canada in the last decades of the twentieth century. Increasingly, recent migrants have come from provincial origins all around China, as well as from long established ethnic Chinese communities around the globe. The numbers have dwarfed the Cantonese migrations of the previous century, and they have transformed the urban populations of two of Canada's largest cities – Toronto and Vancouver – as well as those of Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York in the USA.

The origins of the Cantonese Pacific

Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, migrants speaking various dialects of Cantonese, Hokkien, Teochiu, Hakka, Hainanese, and other localized forms of Chinese, originating mainly in the coastal regions of Guangdong and Fujian province, established seaborne migration networks in the southwest Pacific ("Nanyang," the "South Seas"). When significant numbers of migrants from China began to cross the Pacific in the 1850s, they were extensions of the existing trade and migration networks that linked the southern Chinese coast with Southeast Asia, as well as more recent migration links with other Chinese cities such as Shanghai. The ports of Amoy (Xiamen), Macao (Aomen), Hong Kong, and Singapore were the major nodes of migration from Guangdong and Fujian province into the Nanyang; however, while Chinese trans-Pacific migration networks were extensions of the existing networks between southern China and Southeast Asia, they only extended the Cantonese-speaking network through Hong Kong. There were virtually no Hokkien-speaking migrants who crossed the Pacific, a surprising absence since migrations of Hokkien, Cantonese, and Teochiu to Southeast Asia were proportionally split nearly evenly (along with smaller Hainanese, Hakka, and Hockchiu speaking networks). By the

late nineteenth century, almost every location in Southeast Asia that had Chinese migrants had both Hokkien and Cantonese speaking migrants, each of whom formed fairly separate linguistic and familial networks. In contrast, between 1885 and 1949, there were only nine migrants out of nearly 100,000 to Canada who traced their origins to Fujian (see Table 7.1).

The Pacific became dominated by migrants speaking various dialects of Cantonese because the nineteenth-century trans-Pacific began as a British project centered upon their newly acquired port of Hong Kong, granted to the British in 1842 as part of the settlement of conflicts with the Qing Empire over the opium trade. By anchoring trans-Pacific routes on Hong Kong and linking it with the migrants who had previously left Canton/Whampoa (Guangzhou) and the Portuguese port of Macao (Aomen) the main ports for Cantonese out-migration, the British effectively cut the trans-Pacific off to coastal ports, such as Amoy, that were the main out-migration ports for Hokkien and Teochiu speaking migrants from Fujian province. Elizabeth Sinn makes the compelling argument that the San Francisco Gold Rush in 1849 established the dominance of Hong Kong in this trans-Pacific process of migration and trade, creating at the same time the enduring importance of the myth of "Gold Mountain" as an organizing concept for the aspirations and dreams of social and geographic mobility that motivated migrants (Sinn forthcoming).

Table 7.1 County origins of Chinese registrants 1885–1949

County Origins, 1858–1949 *Total Registrants= 97124*	*Number of migrants*	*Percentage of total*
	Guangdong	
Zhongshan(Chungsan) [Xiangshan (Heungsan)]	5922	6.1
	"Four Counties" Siyi (Sze Yup)	
Taishan (Hoisan) [originally Xinning (Sunning)]	44217	45.5
Xinhui (Sunwei)	13857	14.3
Kaiping (Hoiping)	13352	13.7
Enping (Onping)	3753	3.9
Heshan (Hoksan) (town)	2579	2.7
	"Three Counties" Sanyi (Sam Yup)	
Panyu (Poon Yue)	6413	6.6
Nanhai (Nam Hoi)	479	0.5
Nanhai (Shun Tuck)	419	0.4
	Other Origin Places in Guangdong	
Zengcheng (Chang Sing)	623	0.6
Dongguan (Tong Kwan)	202	0.2
Sansui (Samsui)	54	>0.01
Fujian	9	>0.01

Note: Place names in *pinyin* have English transliterations of Cantonese dialect pronunciations in parentheses. Data compiled from the Chinese Head Tax Database created at University of British Columbia (UBC) from the Canadian General Register of Chinese Immigration, 1885–1949, by Jason Chan, Mary Chan, Judy Maxwell, Alyssa Pultz, Denise Wong, and Head Researcher Feng Zhang, under the supervision of Prof. Peter Ward and Prof. Henry Yu, with funding from the Social Science Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Hong Kong shipping lines connected the flows of goods and human bodies across the Pacific as well as around the Indian and Atlantic oceans to British colonies in the Caribbean. By the late nineteenth century, American, Japanese, and Canadian shipping lines crossed the Pacific along with those established by British ships earlier, connecting Hong Kong to ports such as Yokohama, Sydney, Honolulu, Victoria, Vancouver, Seattle, and San Francisco.

The initial connection of trans-Pacific migration flows from Hong Kong to San Francisco and Victoria in the 1850s was made between a relatively small number of villages in the "Four Counties" ("Sze Yup" in Cantonese, Siyi in Mandarin) and "Three Counties" ("Sam Yup" or Sanyi) region of Guangdong province. These seven counties – along with migrants from "Heungsan" (Xiangshan) later renamed "Chungsan" county (Zhongshan) near Macau – became the origination site for long distance circular networks of migrants for the next century. Chain migration, the process by which an initial set of migrants creates a set of social practices across space and through time that facilitates the movement of other migrants along the same path, was a pattern that reflected the family and village based intelligence networks that passed along information about the opportunities available in North America, as well as providing the practical means through loans and the arrangement of work and housing that made trans-Pacific journeys possible.

The networks were based upon kinship and shared origins in the clusters of villages from which the migrants came, and they stretched all around the Pacific and into the Caribbean and the Atlantic coast of the Americas.[2] As Madeline Hsu illustrated in her study of migrants who circulated back and forth between "Hoisan" (Taishan) county in Guangdong and the USA, these migration networks relied on good intelligence about wages, available jobs, local economies, and the value of goods that could be moved (Hsu 2000; Williams 2002).[3] Without these networks, the long-term stability over decades of the migration flows would not have existed.

Kinship and familial relations were crucial in these networks, but so was the importance of speaking shared local dialects. The organization of associations for mutual aid and support in North America were usually based upon kinship connections, either family linkages at the local level in the home village, or an extension of kinship ties in North America through imagining common ancestral ties through creating a clan association that brought together migrants from an assortment of villages who shared the same family name or the same local area. Speaking a mutually intelligible dialect was important, and there was generally a separation in networks between migrants whose spoken language and county origins varied greatly – for instance between those from Hoisan county and Heungsan county. Hoisanese and other Siyup dialects were so unique from the urban Guangzhou dialect and the speech of other counties that they literally necessitated linguistically dependent social practices and patterns.

The dominance of Siyup ("Four Counties") origins for the majority of the Cantonese in Canada and the USA should not be underestimated. In particular, migrants from Hoisan county (originally named "Sunning" county – Xinning), which accounted for 45.5% of all migrants to Canada between 1885–1949, dominated clan associations and social and business institutions. Research at UBC that analyzed over 97,142 registrations of Chinese migrants to Canada between 1885 and 1949 shows that four out of every five migrants before 1949 came from the "Four Counties" region.

Imagining "Gold Mountain"

It is a truism that before a migrant takes their first step away from home, a dream has to come in the opposite direction along the path to be taken. The aspirations that drew individual migrants out of rural villages in Guangdong were created out of the intelligence and information that

was passed back along the familial networks built along the shipping and mail routes. News about the financial success of a relative, the kinds of work that might be found, the amount of savings that could be amassed over a year in specific jobs, the relative merits of various destinations around the Pacific – all of this and more passed through word of mouth and in letters around the Pacific.

Although the term "chain migration" has been used to describe the phenomenon of individual migrants moving to the same places as previous migrants from the same family or local village, it does not capture the incredible amount of infrastructure that must exist in order for these links to be maintained. Mail services must provide communication across vast geographic distances, financial mechanisms must allow for the transfer of credit and remittances across oceans, and perhaps most obviously a means of transportation must exist at a cost that allows migrants to afford passage, often through loans from those who have already established themselves in the target destination. The decision to leave, however, occurs within the context of a set of aspirations that traveled from the destination back to the home villages along the same path as remittances and loans.

"Gold Mountain" dreaming, as Madeline Hsu argued, required the creation of a network of both kinship patterns extended across space and time, as well as a set of recurring social practices organized into enduring institutions. In a pattern that developed after the California Gold Rush in the 1850s, Hong Kong became the jumping-off point for trans-oceanic voyages, the long distance stage of journeys that had begun days and even weeks earlier in rural villages. Young men left small villages, inspired by stories of opportunity and success narrated in the village by wealthy returnees or in the voluminous letters that flowed back and forth across the Pacific. The stories generally focused on tales of success rather than failure, although cautionary tales also warned of the dangers of straying from the path to success by overindulging in gambling or prostitutes.[4]

For the Cantonese men who imagined following others to "Gold Mountain" ("Gum San"), or the women who dreamed of marrying a "Gold Mountain guest" ("Gum San Hak") returning home wealthy, the term "Gum San" neither named Canada nor the USA but was synonymous with both places. Indeed, "Gum San" was used for the Australian colonies as well. "Gum San," in other words, named a set of aspirations for a better life, creating a geographic imaginary that determined the meaning of places and journeys.

That overseas journeys were a primarily male-oriented aspiration is reflected in the male : female sex ratio of trans-Pacific migrants in the century between 1850–1950, beginning at over 25 : 1 and only falling slightly in the immediate post-Second World War years as more women were allowed as part of family reunifications and as "War Brides" after official Chinese exclusion ended in the USA in 1943 and in Canada in 1947. But even if men primarily pursued the journeys across oceans, there was a interlocked set of aspirations for women as well. Marrying an overseas "Gum San Hak" meant the possibility of a large house and continuous remittances from abroad that could pay for luxury goods and children's education. For many young women, marriage to a man who returned overseas also meant raising children in the absence of a husband and living with a mother-in-law in the husband's village.

For young men journeying to Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, aspirations were organized into an idealized life cycle: 1) leave the village as a young man, usually supported by the financial sponsorship of older generations who had already gone overseas; 2) work hard for 5–10 years as a laborer (construction, farming, logging, mining, canneries) in order to pay off the loans needed to pay for passage; 3) once the initial loans are paid off to take a trip back to the home village and marry, start a family, and then return overseas to begin sending remittances home for buying property and to create savings; 4) if possible find laboring work where it was possible to observe and learn a small business trade (laundry washer, cook or

waiter in a restaurant, grocery store stocker, produce delivery), and work with enough diligence and potential in order to be 5) recognized by an elder as responsible enough to be loaned some money to have a partial stake in a business, and 6) at this point work toward paying off this loan and acquiring a larger stake in one or more businesses, to the point of eventually becoming an elder with enough wealth to begin loaning money and investing in young men of the next generation who show potential.

Depending upon economic conditions and the aptitude (or lack of aptitude) of the individual, a young man might never get out of debt and spend a lifetime stuck in the toil of a laborer, growing ever older with an ever decreasing capacity to sell his labor. But if a man was fortunate, intelligent, and diligent, by middle age he could amass enough wealth to become an investor himself, making loans to newer migrants and increasingly benefiting from the loan re-payments of carefully chosen ambitious young men. Owning a half-stake in a laundry or restaurant, for instance, might allow a man to make an arrangement with a younger relative who had shown an aptitude for running the business. The younger man would make regular payments over an agreed schedule to slowly buy out this half-stake, allowing the more elderly man to make other investments or eventually retire home to the village or to Hong Kong.

This life cycle of upward mobility and the creation of wealth, generation after generation, had grown out of existing social practices developed by migrants from the same areas to Southeast Asia. They were transformed in the trans-Pacific world, however, by the large differential between wages made in North America versus the cost of living in home villages. The route to wealth in "Gold Mountain" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was worth taking despite much higher initial costs. The trans-Pacific passage was more expensive than passage to Southeast Asia, and after the 1882 Exclusion Act in the USA and the passage in 1885 of the Chinese Head Tax in Canada, getting to "Gold Mountain" also included the cost created by anti-Chinese legislation, either in the direct cost of fees such as the Head Tax levied only against the Chinese, or the cost of evading exclusionary measures through smuggling and purchasing false papers. The $50 Head Tax imposed in Canada, for instance, added an additional cost equivalent to roughly two years of wages as a laborer. And yet the possibility of social mobility and economic opportunity in North America was so high that despite the existence of the Head Tax, nearly 100,000 Chinese still came to Canada and the USA through Victoria and Vancouver between 1885 and 1923.

The irony of the extensive anti-Chinese legislation and the resulting bureaucratic control of Chinese migrants is that extensive government records now exist for chronicling the surveillance that took place during border crossings. Unlike other more desired migrants who generated few records, anti-Chinese discrimination produced voluminous documentation both in the USA and Canada. In Canada, the details included village origin, last place of residence, age, height, and even descriptions of scars, all meticulously kept in Registers that recorded every single border crossing (see Fig. 7.1).

After 1910, Canada recorded the destinations of Chinese migrants, allowing an unprecedented view of where the Chinese were residing. Analyzing the destinations of the migrants who came to Canada between 1910 and 1923 (accounting for roughly one third of the 97,124 total migrants who were registered between 1885 and 1949), we can see the astonishing breadth of Chinese migration throughout Canada (see Fig. 7.2). Nearly every small town across the Prairies had at least one or two Chinese residing there, often running a café. Chinese migrants also managed to reach the Atlantic coast, literally crossing the continent from sea to sea in the opposite direction of European migrants.

The data culled from the surveillance of Chinese migrants, however, only gives us a distorted glimpse of their lives. The extensive use of Chinese language materials by community historians



Figure 7.1 Sample page from General Register of Chinese Immigration, Library Archives Canada



Figure 7.2 Destinations of Chinese migrants to Canada between 1910–1923



Figure 7.3 Two contrasting periods of immigration flows to Canada: 1910–23 and 1924–49

and librarians such as Him Mark Lai and Wei Chi Poon of San Francisco has given a very different perspective on Chinese American history, and researchers in Canada have similarly found ways of using Chinese language resources to illuminate the lives of early Chinese migrants (Wickberg *et al.* 1982; Lai 1986; Ng 1999; Mar 2010; Stanley 2011). At UBC's Asian Library, Phoebe Chow and Eleanor Yuen have focused upon historical Chinese language materials in British Columbia (http://burton.library.ubc.ca/hclmbc), and the Richard C. Lee Hong Kong Library at the University of Toronto has collected material on the connections made by migrants between Hong Kong and Canada.

A much richer understanding can be found in oral histories conducted with Chinese Canadians and in reading letters written in Chinese that were sent back and forth across the Pacific. At the University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University, the "Chinese Canadian Stories" Project (http://chinesecanadian.ubc.ca) aimed to help collect and preserve the stories of Chinese Canadians, building upon several decades of pioneering community history work done in Canada, as well as gathering materials from community organizations across the nation and highlighting archival collections such as the Drs Wallace and Madeline Chung Collection (http://chung.library.ubc.ca) and the Chinese Canadian Research Collection gathered by Edgar Wickberg at UBC (http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/u_arch/ccrc.pdf). "Chinese Canadian Stories" project researcher Joanne Poon has examined Chinese language letters from the early twentieth century at the City of Vancouver Archives and at UBC Special Collections, working with community elders to help decipher the often-difficult idioms and dialect-specific terms used by early Chinese migrants to North America.[5]

Out of this research has emerged a picture of early Chinese migration to the USA and Canada that connects them within a single set of migration processes. We might be better off using a term such as "Gold Mountain" studies rather than Chinese Canadian or Chinese American studies, since the aspirations of the migrants themselves were organized around similar life cycle aspirations of social and geographic mobility. The imprint of Canadian and American nationalism upon the

migrants was keenly felt as the subjects of exclusion and discriminatory legislation, but they were also remarkably adept at evading such legislation through a myriad of means as they continued to migrate across the US–Canada border despite stringent laws. Indeed, for much of the period between the 1880s and the 1960s, the creation and persistence of clever social practices designed to fool and undermine the enforcement of anti-Chinese laws – false "paper" identities, the sale and reuse of legitimate government identity certificates, fictional birth certificates that created legal slots for immigration – all became a central characteristic of Cantonese migration to "Gold Mountain."

It is possible to describe the first century of trans-Pacific Chinese migrations to Canada and the USA as a "Cantonese Pacific," although the English term "Cantonese" is still imperfect for describing those migrants. The term "Cantonese" however, serves as a good parallel to the self-identifying term unique to natives of Guangdong that continues to be reflected in the Cantonese term for the urban enclaves that they created in North American cities – "Tong Yun Gai" (*tangrenjie,* literally "Tang People's Street"). The Cantonese who migrated overseas described themselves colloquially as "Tong Yun" ("Hong Yun" in Hoisan dialect), as "People of the Tang Dynasty," in contrast to terms such as *hanren* (Han people) commonly used in northern provinces, or terms such as *zhongguoren* or *zhonghua* which were becoming popular at the end of the nineteenth century with the rise of Chinese nationalism. When referring to the country from which they had come, they used the term "Tong San" (Tangshan) and they considered themselves "natives" ("Punti", *bendi*) of that land in the context of historical conflicts with the Hakka (Kejia) in Guangdong province (the term Hakka literally referred to the "guest people" who had migrated more recently to southern China from the north). Despite the strong identification with regional dialects and the ethnic divides between overseas migrants from different counties, Cantonese migrants to "Gold Mountain" created an imaginary that managed to envelop them all, even the Hakka, in contrast to "foreigners" or "Westerners" (Gwai-louh), and in particular against the "Northern Chinese" ("Buk Fong Yun", *beifangren*) who spoke the unintelligible Mandarin dialect.

The rupture of the Cantonese Pacific

Between the 1920s and the 1960s, Canada and the USA was a forbidding and hostile place to Cantonese migrants and their families. Those who were descended from the early trans-Pacific migrants of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century faced racism and legislated discrimination in multiple forms, including disenfranchisement and legal segregation in housing and employment. White supremacy in Canada was akin to the forms in other British settler colonies such as Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa – enshrined in law in areas as disparate as voting rights through housing titles and labor relations. Not until the Canada Citizenship Act of 1947 did Canadians of Chinese ancestry begin to acquire voting rights, and immigration laws did not formally remove racial preferences until 1967.

With the 1967 removal in Canada of racial preferences in immigration policy for European migrants, a new wave of Cantonese migrants from Hong Kong came during the 1970s. A post-1967 Canada echoed the incipient trans-Pacific Canada that was developing in British Columbia before white supremacy took hold. For instance, the proportion of British Columbia's total population that was Chinese in 1901 was roughly 10% (14,885 of 149,709). It took a full century before that proportion was reached again in 2001 (373,830 of 3,698,850). In 1881, before the imposition of the Head Tax, Chinese made up almost 20% of British Columbia's non-aboriginal population and an even greater proportion of its workforce. Chinese workers in lumber, mining, fishing, and agriculture dominated early industrial development, and well into the latter part of the twentieth century Chinese farmers in Vancouver's Lower Mainland region were an integral part of the agricultural industry, growing, distributing, and selling produce in a vertically

integrated network that connected farms on the Fraser River with grocery stores in every urban neighborhood and small town throughout British Columbia.

Chinese Canadian family-owned import/export firms moved millions of dollars of goods back and forth across the Pacific, fostering global connections that were often overlooked even though they maintained many of the trans-Pacific networks that led to the resurgence of migration from Hong Kong in the 1970s. Indeed, even though many of the new urban migrants from Hong Kong saw themselves as utterly distinct from their forebears in Canada, the new migrants of the 1970s often had familial links that created the initial connection to Canada. Indeed, the first period of the Cantonese Pacific in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century left a legacy of familial and business linkages that created the channels for the flows of migrants and capital from Hong Kong and other parts of Southeast Asia to Canada in the 1980s and 1990s. Up until nearly the end of the twentieth century, the mass migration of ethnic Chinese to Canada was still a Cantonese-dominated process. Despite significant numbers of Taiwanese and ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America migrating to Canada in the 1970s, the dominant dialects of use were still Cantonese. By the year 2000, however, ever increasing numbers of new migrants coming from other parts of the People's Republic of China began to reshape Chinese Canada.

Chinese migrants and the new Canada

In the last four decades, a wholesale shift of migration patterns from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific flows has created a new Canada. The shift has been less noticeable in the USA, but in the major urban regions of the west coast and the northeast, the increasing populations of ethnic Chinese have had a noticeable effect even if at a lesser scale than in the top three major urban regions of Canada. The changes were quiet at first, beginning with the creation of a new universal citizenship system in 1947 in Canada and the new "points system" for Canadian immigration in 1967, but by the 1980s Canada was increasingly becoming globally connected with a Pacific future rather than an Atlantic past. The reform of immigration in 1965 in the USA facilitated a similar re-opening of mass trans-Pacific migration after a century of anti-Asian discrimination in immigration legislation. However, the impact of the new Chinese migrations has had a much greater effect proportionally on Canada than the USA.

There has literally been a sea change since the initial moment of national Confederation in 1867, when an act of the Parliament of Great Britain created the Dominion of Canada out of the British North American colonies that had not been incorporated into the expanding USA. For most of its history, the mythic national imagination of Canada has been one of trans-Atlantic, white European settlement spreading westward, displacing indigenous societies already existing in North America. Settlement from Great Britain dominated most of the first century of Canadian immigration, supported by racial preferences in immigration policy as well as white supremacy in employment, housing, and voting. Over the last two decades, however, it has become increasingly clear that there is a New Canada that is tied to trans-Pacific migration.

What is the demographic reality of the new Canada? The top ten places of birth for immigrants who arrived in Canada between 2001 and 2006 included only two Europeans countries: Romania at #7 with 28,080 immigrants, and the United Kingdom – which was the dominant #1 sending nation for the first century of Canadian history – was even lower on the list at #9, sending just 25,000 new immigrants. In contrast, six of the top ten countries were in Asia, and the top four on the list – the People's Republic of China (PRC), India, the Philippines, and Pakistan, accounted for two-thirds of all new migrants to Canada in that period, with the PRC sending over 155,000, India over 129,000, the Philippines over 77,000, and Pakistan over 57,000.[6]

In 2006, 83.9% of all new immigrants to Canada came from regions outside of Europe, and the official government term "visible minority," used to designate "non-white" Canadians, no longer made sense to describe Canada's urban populations. Over 96% of Canada's "visible minorities" live in metropolitan regions. Two main groups – South Asians and self-identified ethnic Chinese – accounted for half of all visible minorities in Canada, with each accounting for roughly one-fourth of the total.

Ethnic Chinese and South Asians account for 8% of Canada's total population, but because they have settled overwhelmingly in either the metropolitan regions of Toronto or Vancouver, they have transformed those cities. Between 1980 and 2001, for instance, the largest proportion of new migrants to Canada were ethnic Chinese who came from various locations in Southeast Asia (including Hong Kong), along with migrants born in the People's Republic of China. These various ethnic Chinese migrants went overwhelmingly (87%) to the five largest cities in Canada, with 41% going to Toronto and 31% to Vancouver alone (Guo and Devoretz 2005).

Mobility, wealth, and education in the Chinese Pacific

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, and again in the last decades of the twentieth century, Canada was often one site among many for a significant portion of migrants. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the term "astronaut" arose to describe fathers who jetted back and forth across the expanse of the Pacific Ocean to visit family in Canada while continuing to work in Asia. "Parachute children" came to be used as a description for those kids who came to (or were left in) Canada to go to high school or university while parents continued to work in other parts of the world. Migrants were often strategic in thinking about when they should live in Canada and when it was more advantageous to live or work somewhere else in the world, and many saw Canada as only one site among many to live and work.

Just as a century before, locations in Canada were understood within a life process of aspirations, often as a good place to go to school or to live out retirement in comfort and leisure, but a much less ideal place to work during the prime wage-earning years at mid-life. Kenny Zhang of the Asia Pacific Foundation estimated that there were over 2.7 million Canadians living outside Canada, and findings from surveys revealed that those in the age range of 30–44 were most likely to be somewhere else, with the most popular reason by far being job/career opportunities (Zhang 2008; Ley 2010).

The presence of Canadian citizens outside of Canada, living and working for decades, became an increasingly noted phenomenon in scholarly studies and the popular media. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, it became widely known that there were 250,000 Canadian citizens living and working in Hong Kong. To put this in perspective, more Canadians lived in the city of Hong Kong than in either Saskatoon or Regina, and if the Canadians in Hong Kong were counted as a city in Canada, it would have been in the top 20 in size.

One of the most remarkable trends at the turn of the twenty-first century has been the increased targeting of immigrants who carry with them substantial financial resources. The Business Migration Program was revamped in Canada in the 1980s to specifically target investors and entrepreneurs who could commit to a certain level of investment in Canada (beginning with $250,000 at the beginning of the program and rising eventually to a minimum of $400,000 and then $800,000 in 2010 as the program became increasingly successful) or to the creation of a set number of jobs. Although mobile, wealthy migrants coming to Canada were from all over the world, a majority of those admitted to Canada under the Business Migration Program were ethnic Chinese.

The targeting of wealthy migrants was not new for Canadian immigration policy in terms of Chinese migrants – even anti-Chinese legislation such as the 1885 Chinese Head Tax and the

exclusionary 1923 Chinese Immigration Act both contained exemptions for "merchants." The novelty of this new program after the 1980s lay in the explicit description of the exact amount of financial commitment that migrants needed to make in order to be given fast track immigration status, and how aggressive provincial and federal governments in Canada were in setting up recruitment stations in Asia, in particular in Hong Kong before the 1997 reversion of political control from Britain to the People's Republic of China.

The strategic targeting of wealthy migrants was enormously successful, with ethnic Chinese from all around Southeast Asia making up the majority of those who responded to the call. In some ways, acquiring Canadian citizenship and a Canadian passport became a form of security guaranteeing high mobility, an "exit visa" out of any location (such as Hong Kong post-1997) that might prove difficult to leave with another form of citizenship. The investments made in Canada could be considered a transaction cost for the acquisition of this form of secure mobility (not unlike the Head Tax from the previous century), but access to Canada itself became a commodity because other nations such as Australia and the USA also began to pass immigration legislation targeting the same set of financially successful migrants. As the most sought after migrants began to consider an array of choices for migration, strategic comparisons between cities such as Toronto, Vancouver, San Francisco, and Sydney, Australia, were made by would-be migrants.

Educational mobility – the strategic migration of students around the Pacific region – became a noticeable trend that had particular impact on the major universities in the Vancouver and Toronto metropolitan region, as well as in the rapid growth of small private schools and colleges in those cities designed to prepare students from Asia (in particular South Korea, the PRC, and Taiwan) for entrance into Canadian universities. By 2008, for instance, the University of British Columbia had roughly 15% of its undergraduate population as foreign students paying non-resident tuition rates that were four times the amount of tuition for Canadian residents; however, it is likely that one-third of the students were born outside of Canada and had become Canadian citizens sometime before their entrance into UBC – 44% of UBC's incoming class in 2005, for instance, listed English as a second language, an approximation for the immigrant origins of either themselves or their parents. As one of Canada's most "Asian Pacific" universities in both composition and orientation, the University of British Columbia and Vancouver's other major institution Simon Fraser University are perhaps the clearest examples of how Canada's future educated elite are global in origin, with a particular weighting toward Asia. In terms of ethno-racial make-up alone, with no differentiation in terms of native-born versus immigrant origins, UBC also reflects perhaps the most significant example of how the demographic trend in Canada toward an "Asian Pacific" future are more marked among the educated and the young than for Canada's population as a whole. In 2005, 53% of the incoming class at UBC self-identified as "Asian," compared to 33.5% self identifying as "white." Students identifying themselves as "Chinese" were roughly 37% of the incoming class.[7]

Conclusion: the new Chinese Canada

Chinese Canadian communities are not homogeneous, with a great variety of linguistic and ethnic variation reflecting varied origins from around the globe. Even the term "ethnic Chinese" distorts the complicated manner in which so many migrants have come to Canada as part of global out-migrations that emanated from the same villages and counties decades and even centuries earlier, carrying to Canada a wide array of family journeys and complex histories from around the world and over many generations. "Chinese" – as a category for labeling migrants – awkwardly envelopes a spectrum of family and personal histories that cannot be reduced to simple ethno-cultural, national, or racial categorizations.

Even with the awkward and distorting effect of using the category of "Chinese" to describe the heterogeneity of migrants from China and around the globe, one pattern is clear: a large scale shift and expansion from the astoundingly persistent and localized migration system that flowed back and forth through Hong Kong between the Americas and eight small counties in coastal Guangdong province. Trans-Pacific Chinese migration has transformed what it means to be "Chinese" in Canada, ending the possibility of using an overarching "Cantonese" umbrella to bring together migrants, and eclipsing the dominance of the generations of chain migration from rural Guangdong province.

The new Chinese migrations have also transformed Canada in general over the last 40 years, extending across the nation from Victoria to Halifax. Toronto, the largest city in Canada and the financial hub of the nation's economy, has received the most Chinese migrants in absolute numbers, a telling sign that the shift has not been isolated on the west coast or Western Canada.

Toronto and Vancouver have become the urban capitals of a new "Asian Canada," and Vancouver in particular has become a city in which the term "visible minority" to describe Asians makes no sense. In 2006, four out of ten Vancouverites was an immigrant, and five out of ten were of Asian ancestry. Richmond and Burnaby, suburbs of metropolitan Vancouver, were 65% and 55% non-white, and 50% of Richmond's population is ethnic Chinese. In Vancouver, Canada's third largest city, the "visible minority" is "white." Continuing a demographic trend created by post-1967 migration patterns, the future of Canada will continue to shift toward a world derived from and oriented toward the Pacific world.

Notes

1 Because crossing by water or land from Canada had been one of the primary means of circumventing the Chinese exclusion acts in the USA that began in 1882, the cutting off of Chinese migration to Canada in 1923 had the added effect of cutting off both Canada and the USA to new migrants. The Mexican Revolution in 1917 also led to changes in the status of Chinese in Mexico that made that pathway into the USA less tenable. Chinese already in Canada could of course still be smuggled into the USA. For the cross-border smuggling, see Lee (2003), Romero (2010), and Delgado (2012). For the importance of Chinese migrants in understanding the trans-Pacific connections of Mexican ports, see Mandujano-Lopez (forthcoming) Ph.D. dissertation.

2 For examples of studies of family lineage organization in outmigration villages, see Woon (1984) and Watson (1975). For a study of how such regional migration networks could be reflected in a Hong Kong institution, see Sinn (1989).

3 I have used the English transliteration of "Hoisan" out of respect for the local dialect pronunciation of the migrants from that county. The transliteration "Toisan" reflects the pronunciation of other local Cantonese dialects.

4 For the best source of Hoisanese migrant aspirations in English, see Siu (1988).

5 See http://chinesecanadian.ubc.ca, as well as the City of Vancouver Archives, Yip Sang Collection, http://vancouver.ca/ctyclerk/archives/digitized/Yip_Sang/index.htm. For an online introduction to early Chinese Canadian history, visit http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/chinese-canadians/index-e.html.

6 2006 Census of Canada, "World: Place of birth of new immigrants to Canada, 2006," produced by the Geography Division, Statistics Canada, 2007. Also, "Immigration to Canada from the Asia Pacific, 1961–96," Population and Immigration Statistical Reports, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (original source 1996 Census). Some of these figures were also quoted earlier in Yu (2009).

7 Figures for UBC's incoming class in 2005 are care of Walter Sudmant, derived from a survey conducted of undergraduates at the end of their first year.

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8

From sojourning to settlement to transnationalism

Transformations of the Chinese immigrant community in America

Philip Q. Yang

Since the first wave of Chinese immigration beginning in 1848, more than 2.6 million Chinese immigrants (including over half a million before 1965 and more than 2.1 million since 1965) have arrived in America (see Yang 2011). Chinese immigrants and their descendants have become an integral part of America. How has the settlement orientation of Chinese immigrants in America changed over time? This is an issue that has not been systematically addressed. There is much research on the so-called "sojourner" orientation of early Chinese immigrants (e.g., Lee 1960; Barth 1964; Miller 1969; Sung 1971; Bonacich 1973; Lyman 1974; Glick 1980; Wong 1982), but some of the claims require a reexamination. There are relatively few studies that demonstrate a shifting orientation of contemporary Chinese immigrants to permanent settlement (e.g., Yang 1999; Zhao 2002). Little research has delved into the *current* settlement orientation of the Chinese immigrant community. No study has examined the settlement orientations from the beginning until now. This article seeks to fill these gaps. A study of the changing settlement orientations of Chinese immigrants will certainly have implications for how Chinese immigrants are perceived and treated.

The central argument of this study is that the Chinese immigrant community in America has experienced tremendous transformations from transient sojourning to permanent settlement and to transnational adaptation over time. Specifically, this process can be divided into three stages: sojourning, settlement, and transnationalism. The remainder of this article documents these three stages in turn.

Sojourning (1848–1943)

Were early Chinese immigrants sojourners?

Significant Chinese immigration commenced in 1848 partly as a result of the Gold Rush in California. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the subsequent acts that extended this act largely halted the immigration of Chinese laborers. Although Chinese merchants, teachers,

students, and visitors were not barred from entry after the exclusion, the numbers of Chinese arrivals dwindled to a trickle.[1]

Sojourner is a very important and influential concept in the study of early Chinese immigration to America and of Chinese Americans. The sojourner concept originated from Paul Siu's widely cited article "The Sojourner" published in *American Journal of Sociology* in 1952. Detaching the sojourner concept from the context and main theme of Siu's (1987) *The Chinese Laundryman*, researchers later developed the "sojourner hypothesis." This hypothesis assumes that early Chinese immigrants in America were sojourners who intended to make and save money and then return to their home villages for a better life. Since its emergence, the sojourner hypothesis has tremendously impacted the thinking and writings of scholars who study Chinese Americans (e.g., Lee 1960; Barth 1964; Sung 1971; Bonacich 1973; Lyman 1974; Glick 1980; Wong 1982; Zhou 1992). The "sojourner" concept is almost omnipresent in all major works on Chinese Americans published since the 1950s. For a long time, it had been largely taken for granted that early Chinese immigrants were sojourners. Starting in the 1980s, some researchers began to cast doubt upon the accuracy of the sojourner hypothesis. For instance, Raymond Lou (1982: 342–3) contended that the fact that Chinese Americans can trace their genealogy to as many as six generations in America contradicts the sojourner description. Sucheng Chan (1986: xx) called into question the claim that "all Chinese who came to America were sojourners." Nonetheless, these challenges rely on either reasoning or qualitative depiction based on a few cases. Chan is certainly correct in that not all early Chinese migrants were sojourners. However, the crucial question is whether there was a general tendency toward sojourning among early Chinese immigrants or whether the majority of early Chinese immigrants were sojourners. To address this question, we need to examine data in two sub-periods: the pre-Chinese Exclusion, and the post-Chinese Exclusion.

Was there a general orientation toward sojourning among the pre-Exclusion Chinese immigrants in America? There are no quantitative data on migration motives of the early Chinese immigrants. However, available historical records allow us to calculate the return migration rates of the pre-Exclusion Chinese immigrants. As shown in Table 8.1, during the 35 years from 1848–82, a total of 317,023 Chinese immigrated to the USA and 150,886 returned, yielding a return migration rate of about 48%. In 1853, 1855, 1864, 1866, 1867, and 1880, more Chinese departed than arrived, resulting in negative amounts of net immigration. As seen in the last column, each year beginning in 1853, a significant percentage of Chinese immigrants returned, and the highest rate reached about 139% in 1866. Keep in mind that these statistics only show those returnees who not only *intended* to return but also were *able* to do so. There were still many who desired to return but failed to do so because of financial difficulties and/or fears of losing face owing to a lack of accomplishments. The split family structure of Chinese immigrants by leaving their wives and families in the home villages also indicated the possibility of eventual return. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the *majority* of the pre-Exclusion Chinese immigrants had a sojourning orientation. However, it is erroneous to claim that all pre-Exclusion Chinese immigrants were sojourners. There were some Chinese who did not plan to return from the onset. Some were rebels against the Qing tyranny and faced punishments if returned; others slipped out of China for wrongdoing or breach of law or custom; still some became successful and built up property that made life much better in America than back home (Chen 1980: 197).

Quantitative data on return migration after the 1882 Chinese exclusion are scarce. Even the scant accessible information is defective because no distinction is made between departing immigrants and departing non-immigrants. With this limitation in mind, some clues may be found from the existing records. Available statistics reveal that return migration rates of the Chinese after the 1882 Chinese exclusion were particularly high (see Table 8.2). In 1883, for example, a total of 10,182 Chinese (including 8,031 immigrants and 2,151 non-immigrants) arrived, but

Table 8.1 Return migration rates of Chinese immigrants, the USA, 1848–82

Year	*Arrivals*	*Departures*	*Net Immigration*	*Return Migration Rate (%)**
1848	3			
1849	325			
1850	450			
1851	2,716			
1852	20,026	1,768	18,258	8.8
1853	4,270	4,421	–151	103.5
1854	16,084	2,339	13,745	14.5
1855	3,329	3,473	–144	104.3
1856	4,807	3,028	1,779	63.0
1857	5,924	1,932	3,992	32.6
1858	5,427	2,542	2,885	46.8
1859	3,175	2,450	725	77.2
1860	7,343	2,088	5,255	28.4
1861	8,433	3,594	4,840	42.6
1862	8,188	2,795	5,393	34.1
1863	6,435	2,947	3,488	45.8
1864	2,969	3,911	–1,215	131.7
1865	3,097	2,298	799	74.2
1866	2,242	3,113	–871	138.8
1867	4,794	4,999	–205	104.3
1868	11,085	4,209	6,876	38.0
1869	14,994	4,896	10,098	32.7
1870	10,869	4,232	6,637	38.9
1871	5,542	3,264	2,278	58.9
1872	9,773	4,887	4,886	50.0
1873	17,075	6,805	10,270	39.9
1874	16,085	7,710	8,375	47.9
1875	18,021	6,305	11,716	35.0
1876	22,781	8,525	14,256	37.4
1877	10,594	8,161	2,433	77.0
1878	8,992	8,186	806	91.0
1879	9,604	9,220	384	96.0
1880	5,802	7,496	–1,694	129.2
1881	11,890	8,926	2,964	75.1
1882	39,579	10,366	29,213	26.2
Total[1]	317,023	150,886	166,137	47.6

Source: Coolidge (1909: 498).
* Calculated by the author.

12,139 Chinese returned, yielding a net loss of 1,977. In the next six years, while the numbers of immigrants diminished to a trickle, departures and net losses reached very high levels. Net loss was never reversed in the ensuing years. The humiliations and terror caused by the exclusion agitation compelled many Chinese to leave sooner than they had planned and forced many to depart unwillingly (Chen 1980). The evidence suggests that the sojourning behavior of many Chinese did not change at least until the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, it indicates that the sources of Chinese sojourning must be sought not only from Chinese cultural preferences but also from the host social environment.

Table 8.2 Chinese arrivals to and departures from the USA, 1883–95

*Year***	*Arrivals*		*Departures*	
	Immigrants	*Non-immigrants*	*All Classes*	*Net loss*
1883	8,031	2,151	12,139	1,977
1884	279	3,194	14,145	10,672
1885	22	5,330	19,655	14,303
1886	40	4,809	17,591	12,742
1887	10	3,754	12,155	8,391
1888	26	2,751	12,893	10,116
1889	118	1,945	10,226	8,163
1890	1,716	154	8,056	6,186
1891	2,836	171	8,924	5,917
1892	2,728	462	6,696	3,506
1893	2,828	2,484	NA	NA
1894	4,018	941	5,966	1,007
1895	975	530	4,470	2,965

Source: Adopted from Coolidge (1909: 500).
Note: **Fiscal year ending 30 June.

Citizenship acquisition is also a good indicator of commitment to the host country since it normally occurs many years after immigration and requires the relinquishment of allegiance to the country of origin (Yang 1994). However, there were few records of Chinese naturalization prior to the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion laws in 1943, and therefore little is known about whether or not Chinese immigrants really intended to become US citizens. One thing we do know is that the Chinese were deprived of the right to US citizenship until 1943. Before 1870, only "free white persons" were entitled to US citizenship as promulgated in the Naturalization Act of 1790. Though only African Americans and Native Americans were explicitly listed in the excluded categories, the phrase was construed to exclude the Chinese from naturalization (Hing 1993). In 1870, Congress extended the privilege of naturalization to "aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent," but it deliberately denied that right to the Chinese because of their "undesirable qualities" (Hing 1993: 23). Thus, only a few Chinese actually became naturalized US citizens between 1870 and 1882 due to an unintended "error".[2] The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 explicitly denied the Chinese the right to US citizenship. Only after the abolition of the Chinese Exclusion laws in 1943 did Chinese immigrants gain the right to US citizenship.

Taken together, the available evidence points to some measure of validity of the sojourner hypothesis for the Chinese immigrants in nineteenth-century America. It is also important to recognize that sojourning orientation is not a unique penchant of early Chinese immigrants in America but a very common phenomenon among many immigrant groups (see Archdeacon 1983; Caroli 1990; Yang 2000 for further details). A more important question, however, is: *Why* did many early Chinese immigrants tend to sojourn?

Causes of sojourning

There is no consensus among scholars on the causes of sojourning among the early Chinese immigrants in America. The early literature abounds with the contention that the sojourning of early Chinese immigrants in America was mainly an outcome of their preferences. For instance, Gunther Barth (1964), whose book *Bitter Strength* stirred a storm of controversy in the 1960s

and 1970s, argued that Chinese immigrants were voluntary sojourners who had no intention to become a permanent part of American society. He went further to attribute the major cause of discrimination against, and exclusion of, the Chinese to their voluntary sojourning orientation, their wealth-draining behavior, and their clannish social organizations. To Barth, the Chinese were rejected because they were socially unassimilable and economically aggressive. Contrary to Barth's voluntary sojourner thesis, the involuntary sojourner thesis contends that it was white racism that forced the Chinese into sojourning in America. The Chinese were "unwelcome immigrants" from the onset of their presence, and anti-Chinese attitudes antedated the arrival of the Chinese by at least a generation (Miller 1969). The debate also spilled over from the USA to Canada in the early 1980s. Some Canadian scholars (e.g., Chan 1980) claimed that the sojourning behavioral pattern of early Chinese immigrants in Canada did not reflect cultural preferences, but rather was forced upon them by the hostile host environment, such as immigration restrictions and institutional racism, while others (e.g., Woon 1983) rebutted with the argument that cultural preferences were the most pivotal variable in explaining the sojourning orientation of the Chinese.

It appears to me that the two categories of explanations are not mutually exclusive, though the importance of determinants varies in different contexts of reception. In many Southeast Asian countries, cultural preferences may largely explain the sojourning orientation of Chinese there. In the USA, however, sojourning was neither solely a result of Chinese voluntariness nor merely a product of white racism; rather, it was an outcome of both voluntary choices and involuntary forces.

Several factors in historical America had helped shape and crystallize the Chinese sojourning orientation. First, traditional Chinese culture did not espouse permanent emigration and did encourage Chinese abroad to return home. A Chinese idiom "Fallen leaves return to their roots" vividly reflects that tradition. Going abroad was a means. Returning home after achieving prosperity (*yi jin huan xiang*) and bringing honors to one's ancestors (*guangzong yaozhu*) were the goal. This homeland-attachment tradition accompanied the Chinese to America, and it was sustained by the transplanted immigrant community in America.

Second, the sojourning of male family members was a strategy to bring prosperity and honor to the family in the home village. Ample evidence has demonstrated that "split household" or "family dispersal" across national borders was common in early Chinese migration to America from the Pearl River Delta region of Guangdong Province where most early Chinese immigrants hailed from (e.g., Glenn 1983; Mark and Chih 1993). Migration was a family decision and served the interests of the family (Chan 1997). Normally, men embarked on emigration to the USA. They usually got married before departure or returned to wed after their initial stay in the USA. When visiting home, most waited long enough to make sure their wives were pregnant. They regularly sent remittances back to support their families. Fettered by the feudal morality of obedience to husband, filial piety, and serving parents-in-law, wives of emigrant men remained home to take care of children, the elderly, family chores, and reproduction. This family division of labor – the male sojourned earner and the female homemaker – probably best served the economic and cultural needs of most emigrant families. This strategy served three functions: (1) it provided a higher level of livelihood and therefore better reputation for emigrant families than for non-emigrant ones; (2) it ensured the continuing inflow of remittances to parents from their emigrant sons to support them in old age (Glick 1980); and (3) it kept alive the bond between the emigrant men and their families and villages. In the place of their husbands, parents-in-law and clan chiefs closely watched and controlled women's behavior, especially their chastity. Male grown-up children followed the footsteps of their fathers, brothers, uncles, and grandfathers to the "Gold Mountain." Emigration was reproduced by these social arrangements across borders.

Third, as a result of the spatial dispersal of Chinese families, the bachelor's society in the Chinese immigrant community in America made permanent settlement impossible.[3] The extremely imbalanced sex ratios in the early Chinese community have been well documented (e.g., Glenn 1983; US Bureau of the Census 1990; Yung 1995). For instance, the sex ratio was 1,858 Chinese men for every 100 Chinese women in 1860, deteriorated to 2,679 Chinese men per 100 Chinese women in 1890, and remained highly uneven until the 1940s.[4] Some Chinese women did make their way to America, as is better documented in recent studies (Yung 1986, 1995; Tong 1994; Ling 1998; Peffer 1999). Even among these women, a large proportion of them were prostitutes in the first few decades of Chinese arrivals (Hirata 1979; Yung 1986; Tong 1994). The anti-miscegenation laws in the USA prevented Chinese men from marrying Caucasian women. The sex imbalance excluded the Chinese from a familial life, which was a fundamental condition for permanent settlement.

Finally, white racism played a critical role in this process. Because of the stereotypes of Chinese, the ignorance of Chinese culture, and the perceived Chinese competition for work with lower wages, white workers and mobs often attacked the Chinese and their property since the arrival of a significant number of Chinese immigrants in 1849. Whites drove the Chinese out of the mines, farms, woolen mills, and factories. Anti-Chinese mobs intimidated the Chinese with shouts or blows, threw stones at the Chinese walking on the street, chopped off their pigtails, looted their stores, set their houses on fire, and stabbed or shot the Chinese to death.[5] Tsai (1986: 68) counted 55 major anti-Chinese riots in the West around the time of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, and estimated that millions of dollars' worth of their property was marred or burned down. "The Chinese must go!" became the slogan of the Workingman's Party in California. All of these terrified the Chinese and swept away their sense of security. Moreover, institutional racism further alienated the Chinese and decreased their willingness to settle permanently. The manifest institutional discrimination against the Chinese included, for example, in California, the 1850 foreign miners' tax, a ban on the entry of the Chinese and Mongolians in 1858, a monthly "police tax" imposed on the Chinese in 1862, the Sidewalk Ordinance of 1870, the Queue Ordinance of 1873, the Laundry Ordinance of 1873 and 1876, and finally, at the national level, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and laws that extended this act.[6]

In short, the Chinese roots-attachment tradition, the gender division of labor in the Chinese split families, the absence of a family basis in the immigrant community, and the lack of personal and property security, equal economic opportunities and social status reinforced the Chinese sojourning mentality and led to their sojourning behavior pattern. The combination and interaction of culture, family, race, and gender underlay the Chinese sojourning. It should be emphasized that the racist environment played an important role in shaping their sojourning mentality and forced them into social isolation. Thus, sojourning and isolation became a form of Chinese adaptation to the context of reception in America.

Paul Siu has often been mistaken as an advocate of the voluntary sojourning thesis. In fact, Siu viewed both voluntary and involuntary factors as determinants of the Chinese sojourning orientation. To Siu, sojourning was partly voluntary since many Chinese immigrants had an intention to eventually return to their homeland because of economic considerations and cultural influences. More importantly, sojourning was also involuntary because it was a forced reaction to racism and unfair treatment. The sojourning of the early Chinese immigrant was not just determined by "what he does and thinks as a sojourner," but by "how the American general public reacts to his presence in the community" (Siu 1987: 8). "A full understanding of why he is a sojourner, or the cause of his sojourner's attitudes, cannot be scientifically verified unless we take up a fuller study of the 'white man' in the situation" (Siu 1987: 295). According to Siu, the newcomer gradually acquires sojourner's attitudes, and the process of the sojourner's adaptation is a process of "contact, conflict, accommodation, and isolation" (Siu 1987: 119, 295). The sojourning,

"isolation, and nonassimilation are obviously not entirely his own choice" (Siu 1987: 20). Sojourning is a result of racist rejection and a "solution to a race problem" and the isolation of the sojourner "may be considered as a form of accommodation" (Siu 1987: 295). Evidently, Paul Siu's *The Chinese Laundryman* points to involuntary factors as forces leading to Chinese sojourning and isolation, but this side of his argument has often been overlooked, especially by non-Asian scholars.

Settlement (since 1943)

The turning point in Chinese immigrant settlement

If the sojourner concept contains some validity for early Chinese immigrants, it is largely a myth for contemporary ones. The early 1940s was a turning point in the settlement orientation of Chinese immigrants as a whole as they began to undergo a transition from temporary sojourners to permanent settlers. Several factors contributed to this transition: China's status as a US ally during the Second World War improved the image of the Chinese and the conditions and treatment of Chinese immigrants. The repeal of the Chinese Exclusion laws in 1943 conferred on the Chinese the right to US citizenship. Several immigration acts, such as the War Brides Act of 1945, the Alien Fiancées and Fiancés Act of 1946, the Chinese Alien Wives of American Citizens Act of 1946, and the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, permitted the immigration of Chinese women and reunification of family members, and they substantially altered the demographic compositions of the Chinese population, especially sex ratio, and increased the chance of Chinese permanent settlement. And, especially, the Communist take-over in 1949 shattered the golden dream of many Chinese immigrants, deterred the return of stranded students, businessmen, and government officials sent by the Nationalist government, and generated a wave of refugees who could not, and did not intend to, return (Zhou 1992). In response to these dramatic changes in both the host and home countries, Chinese immigrants began to rethink their goal and accept permanent settlement as an alternative to returning to China. Many made the USA their home and acquired US citizenship. The 2006–8 American Community Survey (ACS) data show that 96.3% of the Chinese immigrants who arrived before 1965 acquired US citizenship and about 83.5% of them owned homes.

Settlement of post-1965 Chinese immigrants

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, along with the transformations in China and in the USA, led to the resumption of massive Chinese immigration. Since 1965, over 2.1 million Chinese have immigrated to the USA, and the majority of Chinese Americans today are foreign-born (Yang 2011). Unlike their nineteenth-century counterparts who mainly hailed from the Pearl River Delta region of Guangdong Province, post-1965 Chinese immigrants have diverse origins including Taiwan, Hong Kong, mainland China, and Vietnam, as well as other countries (Zhou 1992; Yin 2007). The new Chinese immigrants include a large proportion of the highly educated and professionals, as well as some from peasant and working-class backgrounds. Moreover, the settlement orientation of post-1965 Chinese immigrants has changed. While the US Citizenship and Immigration Service, formerly Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), does not keep data on exits, it is believed that few post-1965 Chinese immigrants emigrated from America. An earlier study, using the 5 Per Cent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data from the 1990 US Population Census (Yang 1999) found that the majority of post-1965 Chinese immigrants tended to settle in terms of naturalization rates and homeownership rates. The analysis has been updated using the 5 Per Cent PUMS data from the 2000 Census and the 2006–8 ACS. The results are highly consistent with the earlier findings. Because of space constraint, only the results from the 2006–8

ACS are given here. As shown in Figure 8.1, 75% of the total post-1965 Chinese immigrants who had met the five-year residence requirement had become naturalized US citizens by 2006–8. The longer they stayed, the higher the naturalization rate. About 66% of total post-1965 Chinese immigrants became homeowners (see Figure 8.2). Most remarkably, in four years after immigration approximately 38% of the Chinese immigrants who entered the USA in the period of 2005–8 became homeowners. Homeownership rate rose as the length of US residency increased.

As a primary source of data used to calculate naturalization rate, US Census or ACS data are less accurate than longitudinal data because they only measure the rate of naturalization at one point in time and because they tend to underestimate naturalization rates since the numerator – the number of naturalized population – does not include immigrants who have died or emigrated, and the denominator – the total foreign-born population – may include those who are ineligible for naturalization (e.g., foreign students, temporary workers, undocumented immigrants). Longitudinal data from the Department of Homeland Security are more accurate than the census data because only eligible immigrants are included in the calculation of naturalization rates although subsequent emigration or mortality of immigrants is still not considered. As has been shown in Yang (1999) using a longitudinal INS data set on naturalization rates for a cohort of immigrants admitted in fiscal year 1977 and traced through 1993, immigrants from mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong had much higher naturalization rates than the average rate (42%) of all immigrant groups and were more likely to naturalize than most of other immigrant groups. Of all groups, Chinese from Taiwan had the highest naturalization rate (76.7%), Chinese from Hong Kong ranked second (74.5%), and mainland Chinese ranked 16th (61%).

The 2006–8 ACS data show that Chinese immigrants were more likely to be home owners than most other immigrant groups. The homeownership rate was 75.1% for Chinese from Taiwan, 74.3% for Hong Kong Chinese, and 61% for mainland Chinese. These rates ranked among the highest groups.



Figure 8.1 Naturalization rates of post-1965 Chinese immigrants aged 18 or older



Figure 8.2 Home ownership rates of post-1965 Chinese immigrants

The data show that compared either to their predecessors in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries or to other immigrant groups, most contemporary Chinese immigrants are no longer "sojourners," but are permanent settlers. Hence, the sojourner hypothesis has lost its potency when it is applied to contemporary Chinese immigrants.

Conditions in the Chinese homelands, conditions in the USA, and new Chinese immigrants' characteristics are important factors that explain the settlement orientation of post-1965 Chinese immigrants. The lower levels of economic development and living standards in Chinese homelands than in the USA and a lack of democracy, personal freedom, and political stability in the homelands reduce Chinese immigrants' likelihood of return and encourage them to settle in the USA. Economic opportunities in the USA, increasing equal opportunities since the Civil Rights movement, and the role of the pre-existing Chinese communities in the USA in assisting job-search, housing, language training, and citizenship acquisition promote the adaptation and settlement of new Chinese immigrants. High levels of educational attainment, occupational status, income, and English proficiency among new Chinese immigrants facilitate their cultural and socioeconomic integration and settlement. The immigration of families also increases the likelihood of permanent settlement. These propositions found substantial support in a previous study (see Yang 1999 for details).

Transnationalism (since the 1970s)[7]

Defining transnationalism

"Transnationalism" is a vogue term, but its meaning varies greatly in the literature ranging from the operation of multinational corporations across national borders (economic transnationalism) to global cooperation and coordination across nations-states in governance (political transnationalism),

"multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nations-states" (Vertovec 1999: 447), and many others. I view transnationalism as the process that links people, groups, and institutions together across national borders (Yang 2011). It is a term that emphasizes the transcendence of social relations across boundaries of nations/states rather than cooperation between countries. Transnationalism has many dimensions including, but not limited to, economic, political, cultural, and environmental transnationalism. In international migration studies, our interest lies in "immigrant transnationalism." The classic definition of immigrant transnationalism provided by anthropologists Basch, Glick Schiller, and Blanc-Szanton (1994: 7) is "the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement." However, the use of this definition tends to include all border-crossing activities by all immigrants as transnationalism because immigrants have always maintained ties across national borders. This may diminish the novelty and significance of this phenomenon. In Yang (2006a) I define immigrant transnationalism as the process in which immigrants as well as their social institutions engage in regular and sustained involvement in economic, political, social, cultural, or personal practices across national borders. Differing from the classic definition, this definition stresses the regularity and sustentation of cross-border activities or practices spanning from economic to social, cultural, political, and even personal dimensions. While most immigrants engage in some kinds of transnational activities (e.g., phone calls, remittances, homeland visits) to varying degrees, not all immigrants are transnationals (Portes 2003). The most salient feature of immigrant transnationalism is the emergence of a growing class of "transnational migrants" or "transmigrants" who live their lives across international borders (Yang 2006a). With their feet in two or more countries, these transnationals are "the hybrid of sojourners *and* settlers in both home and host countries, and they constantly sojourn and settle in pursuit of maximal opportunities" (Yang 2000: 254).

The rise of Chinese immigrant transnationalism

It is my observation and contention that since the 1970s, more and more Chinese immigrants are experiencing another shift – from settlers to transnational migrants or transmigrants. They are engaged in economic, cultural, social, political, or personal activities across national borders on a regular basis, and they are living a genuine transnational life as transnationals.

There are several types of transmigrants in the Chinese immigrant community. The first main type is transnational immigrant entrepreneurs who own and run a business or engage in self-employment across national borders. A widely known category is the *taikongren* or "astronauts," (Skeldon 1994; Cheng and Yang 1996), who travel *frequently* between the host country and the home country or other countries for business. Some Chinese "astronauts" own factories of apparel, shoes, furniture, electronics, and toys in their home countries and sell finished products to the host country and elsewhere. Some have companies headquartered in the host country but with branches in the homeland. Some run import and export businesses. Others operate businesses that provide services for international travel, remittances, emigration, information on studying abroad, document translation, and banking and finance. Such international commuting is common and well documented in the literature (e.g., Cheng and Yang 1996; Wong 1998, 2006; Hu-DeHart 1999; Chan 2002; Yang 2006b). Another category is non-astronaut entrepreneurs who are stationed mostly in one country but operate businesses across borders. Available evidence suggests that "astronauts" are a minority among Chinese transnational entrepreneurs. The majority of Chinese transnational entrepreneurs live mostly in one country to run their businesses but travel a few times a year to another country while maintaining constant cross-country communication (Yang 2006b).

The second major type is transnational salaried workers who work for business companies or social institutions in both the home and host countries. One category is overseas representatives of host companies in the homeland, often in a position of great responsibility (e.g., branch CEO, manager, director). Another category is representatives of homeland companies in the host society. A third category is representatives of international organizations who work for an international organization located in the USA (e.g., the UN, IMF, World Bank) but are stationed in Asian homelands for a few years (Yang 2006b). A fourth category may be labeled "double-loaded professionals" who are employed by social institutions in both the home and host countries to teach, research, consult, train, and so on (Yang 2006b). Still another category may be called "second-career professionals" who have retired in the host country but kept their homes, institutional ties, and host country citizenship and then take on a new job in the homeland as politicians, administrators, managers, advisers, professors, etc. (Yang 2006b). A large number of Chinese transnational migrants are salary-based. Research by Wong (2006) revealed that a large majority of the Chinese transnational migrants in Silicon Valley's high-tech industry are not entrepreneurs.

Of course, the above two types do not exhaust all kinds of Chinese transnational migrants, and their transnational activities go beyond the economic domain. A third major type of Chinese transmigrant is composed of transnational political activists who donate to homeland political parties or candidates, participate in homeland electoral campaigns and rallies, vote in homeland elections, and publish in homeland newspapers, magazines, or other publications. The fourth main type of Chinese transmigrant consists of sociocultural transnational activists who are engaged in sociocultural transnational activities in hometown associations or alumni associations and in homeland charity organizations; give donations to homeland community projects; carry out disaster relief work; and participate in periodical lecture tours, workshops, performances, and religious activities. More often, many Chinese transnationals are regularly involved in personal activities such as visiting family members and relatives in the homeland, sending remittances to relatives, and caring for the elderly or children across borders. However, without a regular job these political, sociocultural, and personal transnational practices normally cannot exist alone, and they are often an extension of economic activities or necessary engagements that enable transmigrants to fully participate in, and benefit from, their economic activities.

Chinese transnational migrants do not act in isolation, and they are often part of Chinese transnational families. Several types of modern Chinese transnational families exist in the age of globalization. One is what I call "modern split families," in which an immigrant parent, normally the husband, returns to the place of origin to work on a high-paying job or a lucrative business while leaving the spouse (usually the wife) and children in the USA (Liu 2002; Yang 2006b).[8] The "astronauts" mentioned earlier are often part of this international commuter mode. A second type is "parachute-kid families," in which Chinese children normally aged 8–17 are dropped off in the USA to pursue a better education at US elementary, secondary, or language schools with a relative or caretaker while both immigrant parents return to the place of origin (Zhou 1998; Liu 2002). Homeland-based Chinese transmigrants are often associated with this mode. The "parachute kid" phenomenon was most common among families from Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s, increased exponentially among mainlander families after 1995, and is also significant among Chinese families from Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia (Zhou 1998). In contrast to "parachute-kid families," a third type is what I term "reverse parachute-kid families," in which the immigrant parents stay in the host country to concentrate on their careers or to save time and money, while sending one young child, or occasionally more, to the homeland to be cared for by grandparents of the child(ren) and to be immersed in the Chinese language and culture. The parents visit the child(ren) once or twice a year until reunification years later. Although currently little is written about this type of family in international migration studies, it

is my observation that this is a very common phenomenon in the Chinese immigrant community that merits scholarly attention.

Chinese transmigrants are also part of Chinese transnational organizations. Chinese immigrant transnational organizations include economic, political, civic, music/arts, sports, social services, educational, philanthropic, professional, alumni, family or clan, and place-of-origin associations. In particular, unlike the traditional Chinatown organizations such as *zu*, *tong*, and *huiguan*, new Chinese transnational organizations such as *tongxianghui* ("hometown associations"), *tongxuehui* ("alumni associations"), and professional associations have more open membership eligibility, greater social networks, and more diverse missions and activities (Yin 2007).[9] These transnational organizations serve as powerful and effective channels for Chinese immigrants to stay in touch with both countries of origin and destination (Yin 2007).

Forces shaping Chinese immigrant transnationalism

What conditions contribute to the rise of Chinese immigrant transnationalism? The answer to this question will have to be found from the general conditions that shape immigrant transnationalism and the specific conditions pertinent to the rise of Chinese transnationalism.

I argue that immigrant transnationalism is a product of global transformations and individual immigrants' responses to these transformations based on their rational choice for maximizing life opportunities. Several processes of globalization have underlain the making of contemporary immigrant transnationalism. The most fundamental of these processes is economic globalization. While economic globalization is not a sudden outgrowth, the process has accelerated in the past four decades. Partly as a result of "deindustrialization" in developed countries (Bluestone and Harrison 1982), the international division of labor has been sharpened. Developed countries have increasingly monopolized the world's high-tech-based, service-based, and information-based sectors that yield high profit returns, while developing countries have been left to specialize in labor-intense and low-return sectors. Coupled with the widening global division of labor, capital, as well as technology and commodities, has increasingly flown to the developing world in search of cheap labor and the ensuing profit, while labor, as well as raw materials, has increasingly moved in the opposite direction to the developed world. The once autonomous national economies of different countries have been replaced by a genuine global economy. Change in the economy of a country or a region will inevitably affect the economies of other countries or regions. The growing interconnection and interdependency of the global production, distribution, and consumption systems have created unprecedented opportunities for those who can take advantages of economic globalization and thus given rise to transnational entrepreneurs, investors, producers, and financiers.

Cultural globalization is an extension of economic globalization. Accompanying economic exchanges come the Western values or ideas of freedom, equality, democracy, human rights, and individualism; Western life and work styles; Western ways of thinking; the popularization of English; and Western fashion, food, music, and artistic preferences. The diffusion of democratic institutions can be viewed as part of cultural globalization as well. To be sure, Eastern cultures also penetrate the West. However, the current dominant trend of cultural globalization leans toward Westernization. Cultural globalization reinforces economic globalization, creating growing demands for West-invented goods (e.g., computer, CDs, cosmetics) and services (e.g., English tutoring, Western education). Cultural globalization brings out demands for services of professionals who are trained and have worked in the West to teach, administrate, consult, and preach. Immigrants who migrate from a particular country of origin are most likely to become targets of recruitment and subsequent transmigrants.

Another process is the expansion of dual citizenship. The 1930 Hague Convention on international law adopted a treaty related to the conflict of nationality laws. The basic principle was that "Everyone should have one nationality, and only one nationality, and statelessness and dual nationality should be eliminated." The Universal Declarations of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948 also reaffirmed the sole nationality principle. Starting in the 1950s, opposition to dual citizenship decreased significantly. Some countries began to accept a limited dual citizenship policy. For example, Spain signed dual citizenship agreements with a number of its former colonies in Latin America such as Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Cost Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Argentina, and Columbia. But before the 1970s, dual citizenship was not the main stream. However, since the 1970s, as a result of accelerated economic, political, cultural, and communication globalization, dual citizenship is no longer an abnormal phenomenon; rather, it has been accepted by a growing number of countries and is becoming the main stream. Many factors have contributed to this trend. More and more people are engaged in cross-national economic and trade activities; as a result of increasing international migration a growing number of people (almost 214 million as of 2009, according to the latest available UN data [UN 2009]) do not live in their countries of birth; international marriages have increasingly become common; and international adoption has also become a very common practice. Accommodating these changes, many countries have revised their citizenship policies to allow some forms of dual citizenship, including, but not limited to, Italy, Germany, Estonia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Canada, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, India, Ghana, Australia, and New Zealand. Both pressures from migrants from these countries and perceived benefits to their home countries by their governments contributed to this shift. Citizenship has increasingly become flexible and portable (Ong 1999). Dual citizenship is likely to proliferate in the near future, lashing at the notion of nationhood. Dual citizenship or loosened citizenship control provides convenience and incentives for immigrants who want to avail themselves of opportunities brought about by economic globalization and thus contributes to the formation of transmigrants.

The growing demand for fresh sources of cheap labor in advanced capitalist countries such as the USA, and the virtually unlimited supply of potential immigrants in the Third World countries, have led to significant increases in the level of immigration to developed countries, especially in the USA, Canada, and Australia. The swelling immigrant population produced by growing international migration forms the basis of a potential transnational community. A desire for further social mobility, a lower status in the ethnic/racial hierarchy in the receiving country, prejudice and discrimination encountered, together with improving transportation and communication technology discussed below, turn some of the potential transmigrants into actual ones.

The globalization processes and rising international migration are not sufficient to engender immigrant transnationalism. Advancements in transportation and communication technology are essential for the rise of contemporary immigrant transnationalism. The relative low cost of air travel and the prevalence of telephone, fax, video, computer, e-mail, cellular phone, and iPhone have greatly condensed space and time and made instant transnational communication and transaction possible.

Structural transformations must be linked to changes in individual immigrants' motivations to effect behavioral changes. Given other possible options such as moving up the socioeconomic ladder in the host country and returning to the homeland, why do immigrants choose to become transnationals? Here comes immigrants' rational choice. The answer to this question lies in the maximization of benefits and life opportunities. It must be the case that immigrants favor the transnational course over other available paths because they believe it can maximize their material benefits and/or their psychological satisfaction.

In short, it is the combination and interaction of economic, cultural, and citizenship globalization, transnational labor movement, the availability of advanced transportation and communication technology to ordinary people, and immigrants' rational choice for benefit maximization that explain the rise of immigrant transnationalism.

The foregoing general conditions that shape immigrant transnationalism are certainly applicable to the rise of Chinese immigrant transnationalism in specific forms germane to this particular group. Let us examine the specific processes and conditions in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China that have molded Chinese transnationalism.

Since the relocation of the Nationalist government from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, Taiwan has been an anti-Communist outpost of the West in Asia, and its economy has been integrated into the world capitalist system. In earlier years, the USA provided substantial economic aids and technical support to Taiwan. Taiwan depended largely on US capital and market. On the other hand, the USA utilized the cheap labor in Taiwan. The USA had military bases in Taiwan until 1953. Because of US cultural influences, a higher living standard in the USA, and political uncertainty and a lack of democracy and freedom in Taiwan, many migrated to the USA. Meanwhile, large numbers of students came to the USA, Canada, and other Western nations to study. Up to the 1970s, less than 2% of them returned, and most found employment in the host countries and became immigrants.

Due to the rapid economic development in the past four decades, the standard of living in Taiwan has risen enormously. For example, GNP per capita has increased from $154 in 1960 to $389 in 1970, $2,344 in 1980, $7,954 in 1990, $14,634 in 2000, and $16,895 in 2010. The stock market soared, and investments yielded great returns. Political changes followed economic development. In 1987, Taiwan lifted its martial law and its ban on new political party formation, which had been in place for more than three decades. The reforms on the elections of the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly, and the Control Yuan began in 1989. Its first direct presidential election started in 1996.

The changing economic and political conditions in Taiwan have attracted many Taiwan immigrants in the USA, as well as in other advanced nations, to return for resettlement or more frequently to become transmigrants, who want to enjoy the benefits and opportunities of living in both Taiwan and the USA. The permission of dual citizenship in Taiwan also stimulates Chinese transmigrants since they can almost freely participate in the political process in both countries except for running for legislator or high offices.

As a British colony, Hong Kong had been an integral part of the world capitalist system. In particular, Hong Kong has been a transfer center of global merchandise. Like Taiwan, Hong Kong also underwent rapid economic growth in the past 50 or so years. In 1997, its per capita GNP reached $25,200, only lagging that of the USA by less than $4,000. The British rule and a world trade center status have greatly exposed the Hong Kong people to Western culture. As in Taiwan, many students studied abroad and failed to return in the early decades. Emigration has continued over time and surged starting in the early 1980s owing to fears of the colony's return to the Chinese rule in 1997. Emigrants tried to go wherever they could acquire a visa, but popular destinations were the USA, Canada, and Australia. Near or after Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty, significant numbers of Hong Kong emigrants returned to the territory because of its better employment opportunities, familiar environment and cultural milieu, and preferred life styles. Many often had citizenship or permanent resident status of the USA, Canada, Australia, and/or the United Kingdom in hand, joking that "I have done my time in the immigration prison." With foreign passports or permanent resident status, they could leave any time should situations in Hong Kong turn to the unexpected. Some of these returnees and immigrants abroad turn into transmigrants who straddle two boats. High income and benefits have also

attracted quite a few early students abroad and now accomplished scholars to repatriate for important administrative, academic, or advisory posts. Many of these returnees can be called transmigrants who naturally maintain very close contacts between Hong Kong and the host country.

For a long period after the 1949 Communist take-over, mainland China had been secluded from the world capitalist economic system. It ran its self-reliant economy. Its closed-door emigration policy made emigration extremely difficult, and only a few managed to emigrate via Hong Kong. Western cultural influence was minimal.

However, since its reopening to the outside world in late 1978, China has reentered the world economy. Foreign investments in China have soared. China's trade with foreign countries has skyrocketed. Western goods as well as its cultural influences have made great inroads into the huge Chinese market. Like other newly industrialized countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, China has also opted for the "cheap labor" strategy to enter the world market. Increasingly, China has replaced Hong Kong and Taiwan as the preferred site of cheap labor. Since 1979, China has relaxed its emigration control, and the numbers of emigrants to the USA and other developed countries have risen tremendously (Yang 2011). For instance, in the early 1980s only several thousand Chinese migrated each year to the USA, the number had soared to between 30,000 and 42,000 per year by the 1990s and further to between 40,000 and 87,000 in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Since the early 1980s, tens of thousands of students have gone abroad to study, and the majority of them in the USA, Canada, and Australia did not return and acquired a foreign resident status or citizenship, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. The number of students from mainland China in the USA today ranks No. 1 among all countries (e.g., 127,628 students in 2009/2010 academic year).

The great economic transformation in China has created tremendous business and career opportunities. Some established Chinese immigrants returned to China in response to pulls from the homeland. On the other hand, the economic recession in the USA in the late 1980s and early 1990s rendered jobless many Chinese immigrants and students with an advanced degree and green card. Hence, many sought employment back home or threw themselves into the business world while keeping their green cards or US citizenship. The collapse of the Silicon Valley economy in the early 2000s also pushed many Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs to seek opportunities back home for survival and development. Some took leadership positions in China, some started companies in China, some became representatives of US companies in China, and some became brokers bridging Chinese companies and US companies. Nevertheless, many have not returned for resettlement and often left their families in the USA (Yin 2007) because of China's relatively low living standard and potential political instability, better college and graduate education opportunities for children in the USA, and the need for a backup plan for the future. They often travel back and forth. Hence, a group of transmigrants engaged in businesses and professional activities has emerged among mainland Chinese immigrants. Moreover, political dissidents and activists are also among those transmigrants who engage in activities in both China and their country of settlement.

The above analysis shows several conditions important for the rise of Chinese immigrant transnationalism. First, the integration of the economies in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China into the world capitalist system has been essential. Second, changing economic and political conditions in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China have created opportunities, infrastructures, and incentives for dual engagement in both the Chinese homelands and the country of settlement. Third, changes in the US economy pushed Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs to return home. Fourth, disparities between the Chinese homelands and the USA in living standard, political conditions, and college education opportunity have helped create new split Chinese immigrant families.

Fifth, emigration and students abroad have paved the way for the rise of the Chinese transnational community. Sixth, the permission of dual or multiple citizenships in Taiwan and Hong Kong and dual resident status ("green card system") in China facilitate transnational life. Finally, the desire of Chinese immigrants to maximize their economic, political, career, and familial gains or opportunities leads them to choose a transnational life.

Conclusion

The most important finding of this study is that the adaptation of the Chinese immigrant community in the USA can be conceptualized as a dynamic process from sojourning to settlement and to transnationalism in response to constantly changing global, homeland, and host-country conditions and to immigrant characteristics. Another key finding is that a general sojourning orientation of early Chinese immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries claimed in many earlier studies of Chinese Americans remains largely credible, but caution should be exercised in making generalizations to all early Chinese immigrants. Furthermore, both white racism and Chinese cultural tradition and immigrant family structure explained the sojourning pattern of early Chinese immigrants. A third major finding is that contemporary Chinese immigrants are no longer sojourners. In terms of citizenship acquisition and homeownership, they are largely settlers, and they are more assimilable than most immigrant groups including European immigrant groups. Finally, as a hybrid of sojourning *and* settlement in both home and host countries, transnationalism has emerged as a new mode of Chinese immigrant adaptation in the age of globalization.

Notes

1 For comprehensive discussions of the pre-Exclusion Chinese immigration to the USA and the Chinese Exclusion, see Chan (1991), Chen (1980), Mark and Chih (1993), Tsai (1986), and Yang (2011).
2 According to Chan (1991: 92), the collection of the 1873 US Revised Statutes mistakenly omitted the reference to "whites" in the naturalization section, and this error was not rectified by an amendatory act until 1875. As a result, a number of Chinese were naturalized between 31 December 1873 and 18 February 1875 because "no racial or color restriction existed with regard to citizenship."
3 There is no evidence suggesting that Chinese organizations in early Chinatowns, such as *huiguan* (district associations), *zu* (clans or family associations), and *tong* (secret societies), promoted the sojourning of Chinese immigrants. Available evidence does indicate that members of the *huiguan* wanting to return to the home country needed the *huiguan*'s clearance of their debts in order to obtain "exit permits" prior to their departure (see Chan 1991: 65; Mark and Chih 1993: 54). Of course, the deviation of any members of the Chinese community from the sojourning norm could risk them ostracism or estrangement.
4 In addition to the moral obligation imposed on Chinese women to take care of the family and the social arrangements, a few other factors impacted the sex imbalance. For labor recruiters, unattached male workers were desirable because they could better sustain harsh conditions. For Chinese immigrants, it was more costly to feed their families in the USA than to support them in the home village, and it was also unsafe for women and children given the hostility in the American West (Chan 1991: 104). Restrictive immigration laws also played an important role. Sucheng Chan (1994) showed that California passed laws in 1866 and 1870 to restrict the entry of Chinese women. Furthermore, as a result of the prevailing anti-Chinese stereotypes, the broader enforcement of the Page Law of 1875, which banned the immigration of prostitutes to the USA, also led to the de facto exclusion of Chinese women after 1875 (Peffer 1999).
5 For details, see Chan (1991: 48–51) and Tsai (1986: 67–72).
6 For details, see, for example, Chan (1991: 46–8) and Mark and Chih (1993: 33).
7 This stage overlaps with stage two because both processes of settlement and transnationalism are ongoing. A large proportion of Chinese immigrants still tend to settle, but transnationalism is also on the rise in the Chinese immigrant community.

8 It should be noted that this type of Chinese modern split families is not an exclusive US phenomenon but is very common in other Chinese diasporas. For documentation of "astronaut" families elsewhere, please see Skeldon (1994) and Waters (2001) for Canada, Pe-Pua *et al.* (1998) for Australia, and Ho (2002, 2007) for New Zealand.

9 *Tongxianghui* have been around since the beginning of diaspora, and *huiguan* are a kind of *Tongxianghui*. However, as Yin (2007) demonstrated, new *tongxianghui* are not restricted to a district or county level, and they can be and are often at the provincial level with more open membership criteria and more diverse missions.

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9

Ethnic Chinese in the European economy

Risk and the transnational ethnic enclave

Flemming Christiansen

Ethnic Chinese migrants to Europe entered into economic activities and occupations as entrepreneurs, workers, traders, investors and corporate functionaries, not to speak of people in the liberal professions, academics, artists, journalists, people who get by teaching Chinese language and cultural appreciation, and those who sell their services in the various shades of the leisure industry.[1] This chapter outlines how they have contributed to the diverse economies in European countries during periods of huge geo-political changes in the century and a half that have passed since the high tide of colonialism. They responded, I shall argue, to opportunities and predicaments arising from colonialism, the Cold War, European integration, the new world order that followed the end of the Cold War, and China's economic rise. They invariably engaged creatively and dynamically with the institutions of immigration, ethnic relations, labor, social (welfare-state), and economic regulation in individual European states.[2] These institutions not only create unequal legal entitlements for individuals, but are woven into a web of public discourse that generates a field of uncertainty, precarity, and exploitability beyond the workings of the mainstream economies. The ethnic enclaves and transnational communities of ethnic Chinese have contributed to the European economy at the cost of precarity and social risk.[3] The main contribution offered here is to understand the ethnic Chinese economy under the changing conditions of the global political economy, integrating an understanding of transnationalism, ethnic enclave economy, and precarity.

Ethnic Chinese and colonialism: flexible labor for Europe

The claim that ethnic Chinese outside China are transnational gained ground in the 1990s, reflecting an effort to link them to the processes of globalization. I have argued elsewhere that global forces change "the opportunities of all political, social and economic actors," and that "Chinatown's role as a global institution is … determined by the ways in which ethnic Chinese make their living and pursue other opportunities within the conditions for agency, rights, and human interaction that have been created by global markets and advanced technology" (Christiansen 2011: 217). The manifestations of the global are thus in my view *local*, integrated

in specific nation-state contexts, instantiated in host-nation economic, political and social frameworks, in cross-boundary ethnic construction, and in the political cooptation of ethnic Chinese overseas (Benton 2003: 347–9; 2005; 2007); the Chinese economic enclave incorporates these diverse dimensions.

During the high tide of colonialism, ethnic Chinese mainly contributed to the European economies as workers in the colonies of Britain, France and the Netherlands. The expansion of the colonies in the mid-nineteenth century, combined with the growth of industries in the European homelands, and the improvement of transport technology (steamship lines and the opening of the Suez Canal) gave rise to new global demand for colonial products and raw materials, and by implication for mobile and cheap labor. The so-called "coolie trade" (Sinn 1995a, 1995b)[4] that began in the 1840s[5] and lasted well into the twentieth century, in the words of Harley Farnsworth MacNair, continued where the slave trade had ceased: "[J]ust prior to 1850 [African slavery] gave way to Chinese slavery in the shape of contract labor."[6] The comparison is apt, for the mobilization of Chinese workers for extraction of minerals and cultivating crops in the colonies served a similar purpose. China's "overflowing population" (MacNair 1933: 210) ensured what development economists term an "unlimited supply of labor" (Lewis 1954), albeit not between "traditional agricultural" and "modern industrial" sectors, but between geographical regions, in response to the *incorporation of new zones* into the world economy. For a colony to be incorporated in the world economy its scale of operation must enable the production processes to generate capital accumulation. To achieve this, it is imperative for capitalists that they can freely acquire and dispose of machines, materials, capital and human labor.[7] The institutionalization of trade in flexible (i.e. easily hired and easily dismissed) human labor, in other words, was a core aspect of colonial growth in the 1850s to 1940s, and the Chinese provided that labor. The political institutions for this arose in the interstices of unequal treaties and China-coast "semi-colonialism." The seedy and highly lucrative business of Chinese labor export to the colonies was conducted in such ways that all authorities involved could wash their hands of the activities of the "coolie crimps," while the Chinese workers in the colonies served the interests of industry in the European colonial homelands, and offered European consumers ever-improving life-styles.

Colonialism also facilitated the arrival of Chinese workers on European shores. Shipping companies profiting from the rapid growth of world trade in the last half of the nineteenth century began to hire Chinese seamen on an unprecedented scale; they formed a cheap, reliable and flexible workforce that could be handled through intermediaries (Auerbach 2009; Benton 2003, 2007). The main ports in Europe, including Liverpool, London, and Cardiff in the late nineteenth century, Rotterdam and Amsterdam in the 1910s, as well as Hamburg in the 1920s began to form communities of Chinese sailors between hires, boarding-house masters who served them, as well as people who jumped ship in order to take up whatever jobs were available.

Although these small Chinatowns had tiny populations, they gained an immense impact in legal, political, labor militancy and cultural discourses and never ceased to exercise the media. The origin of this lay primarily in the fear among British workers that Chinese were likely to undercut their wages and act as strike breakers, thus undermining the emerging trade unions. The vehement agitation in the USA by Caucasian against Chinese workers as early as the 1860s had successfully strengthened labor activism. The Chinese Exclusion Law of 1882 had been an outcome that appealed to much broader classes in American society. By the early 1900s, the law was explicitly used to ban members of the "coolie class" from entry into the USA, while allowing in merchants and people of the social elites (McKeown 2003). As noted by Gregor Benton, the American labor activists' anti-Chinese views were aligned with those of the early communist movement of the mid-nineteenth century (Benton 2007: 4–9). The idea was that European workers may lose their jobs to what Friedrich Engels in the 1890s foresaw as the

consequence of Britain's continued imperialist endeavors in China: "the hated Chinaman" would in a "wholesale emigration such as the world has not yet seen" compete "for work with the American, Australian and European workman on the basis of the Chinese standard of life, the lowest of all" (Engels 1892). British trade unionists used the protection of jobs from the Chinese as a major rallying point, and as the votes of the working class gained in importance due to improved electoral franchise and the strengthening of the labor movement in those years, the issue assumed party political significance in elections. Specifically, the campaigns in 1908–10 by the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union and its founder, the Liberal politician Joseph Havelock Wilson, forced the British government to toughen the conditions on which ship-owners could hire Chinese seamen. Conversely, a seamen's strike in the Netherlands in 1911 was broken by shipping companies hiring Chinese instead of Dutch seamen; they hired many of the Chinese who had been pushed out of employment on British lines (Auerbach 2009: 37–50 and *passim*; Wubben 1986).

Sascha Auerbach reports how political debate and the behavior of state officials was pitted against the small communities of Chinese in Britain; how the media drew an image of the Chinese as immoral, seditious, filthy, unmannered, criminal, violent, and dishonest; how Chinatown harbored opium-smoking, gambling and crime; and how the Chinese seduced, cohabited with, and even married British women, leading to miscegenation. The courts of law and enforcement agencies developed practices to match, and laws and formal procedures often had to be bent in order to effectively exclude Chinese from their rights (Auerbach 2009). These accretions of moral judgments created an ethnic barrier in the economy between the "host populations" and the immigrant workers, limiting them to the lowest, normally unregulated, rungs of the labor market or to informal self-employment. As we shall see later, even in the current politically correct context of the twenty-first century, the use of ethnic moral contagion is employed to segregate ethnics into marginal existence, into what we today term *precarity*.

The ready availability of large quantities of Chinese labor enabled the British to hire them in times of warfare to replace the British workers who had signed up to become soldiers. While not allowing them to work ashore in the British economy, British authorities permitted the British merchant navy to hire Chinese seamen during the First World War (1914–17), thus undoing the rules imposed in 1910–11 prohibiting Chinese employment on British ships; after the war, most were deported. Also the 20,000 Chinese seamen in the merchant navy based in Liverpool during the Second World War (1939–45) were deported after the war.

The mobilization of Chinese as substitutes for European workers at time of war found its most palpable expression when the British and French governments recruited a total of 140,000 Chinese to work in the Chinese Labor Corps during the First World War (Summerskill 1982; Fawcett 2000). The Chinese workers were non-combatants, performing a vast number of duties on and behind the front, helping dig trenches, maintain the infrastructure, fill and haul sandbags, and so on. Following the war, some 3,000 Chinese workers continued to stay in France, while the rest were repatriated (Live 1998: 98). The Russian effort during the First World War also involved the recruitment of 100,000 workers and soldiers in China. After the war, thousands of Chinese fought during the Russian Revolution. By the 1920s, most Chinese had been repatriated, and it is estimated that while 100,000 Chinese lived in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s (8,000 lived in Moscow), the 1989 census only counted 11,000. In the meantime many were repatriated, some died in labor camps, while others were largely assimilated into Soviet society (Nyíri 2007: 41–5).

Russia's rise and the development of its industries in the nineteenth century involved increasingly intensive utilization of its resources east of the Urals. Chinese workers played a core role in facilitating the opening up of Siberia and the Russian Far East as lumberjacks, coalminers, gold diggers, railway construction workers, stevedores, domestics, and artisans. In addition, Chinese merchants played an important role in provisioning large parts of Russia. According to

Pál Nyíri, the presence of Chinese was very substantial: "In 1910, there were already 115,000 registered Chinese subjects in Russia, while Russian and Chinese estimates of the real population range from 150,000 to 500,000" (Nyíri 2007: 17–22). The Chinese presence in the Russian Far East had originally been governed by treaties bestowing rights of extraterritoriality on the Chinese, but also segregating them from the Russian population. Discriminative policies and practices rendered Chinese workers cheaper than their Russian counterparts, while Chinese traders and entrepreneurs experienced severe restrictions on their activities; their continued presence to a large extent relied on their ability to offer commodities at much lower prices than Russian merchants. Russia was, for strategic reasons, concerned about the reliance on Chinese migrants in such large, yet thinly populated areas, at any given time constituting 10–30 % of the population. Between 1900 and 1916, the Russian government therefore settled 287,000 Russian peasants in the Far East, adding to the 116,000 already settled between 1861 and 1900 (Nyíri 2007: 27). Chinese living in European Russia before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 numbered 100,000 and, according to Nyíri, were mainly urban laborers, although some, "located chiefly in Moscow and St Petersburg, were relatively prosperous and associated with restaurants, laundries, the tanning industry, and groceries." After the outbreak of the war, "the great majority of the Chinese businesses went bankrupt or closed down" (Nyíri 2007: 28).

The British, French and Dutch colonial projects and Russia's industrialization needed labor as a commodity that could be easily mobilized and deported as a class beyond the domestic working class. The folly of regarding human labor as a mere commodity obeying simple laws of supply and demand – perhaps most scathingly stated by Karl Polanyi (1944) in *The Great Transformation* – was certainly confirmed by the facts that shipping and warfare became the seeds of the Chinese communities in Europe, and that many of the Chinese who had supplied flexible labor to sustain the high tide of European colonialism in Southeast Asia and in Latin America, following the decline of European colonial rule after the Second World War, migrated to Europe. The presence of the Chinese in Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including in major cities west of the Urals, was larger than in main west European ports like London, Liverpool, Cardiff, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Hamburg. The prominent reason is the geographical contiguity of resource extraction and industrial development in Russia (as opposed to the clear distinction between "metropolis" and "colony" in the British, French, Dutch and German empires). Even so, the Chinese in Russia were a group apart, widely regarded as carriers of infectious diseases, unhygienic, criminal, dishonest, immoral, opium smokers, and luring Russians into corruption (Nyíri 2007: Ch. 2 *passim*). Although the discourse of Chinese workers undercutting the livelihoods of Russian workers surfaced in the early twentieth century, Nyíri claims that the effect in Russia of "yellow peril" campaigns by trade unionists was minor compared to South Africa and the USA (Nyíri 2007: 26–7).

A most interesting contribution to the political-economy landscape in western parts of Europe was that the threat of Chinese workers became an important catalyst for consolidating trade unions in Europe as European workers, media and political elites united in an effort to keep the Chinese workers out (Parker 1998: 70–4); "the lingering stink of Sinophobia among white trade unionists" (Benton 2007: 120) was matched by Sax Rohmer's pulp fiction invention of the "yellow peril incarnate in one man," Fu Manchu, who proved that "the greatest racial threat to Britain lurked within the imperial metropolis itself" (Auerbach 2009: 50).

The beginnings of a marginal economy

The number of Chinese in Europe between the two world wars was small; the largest Chinese communities counted a few thousand at their peak. In Britain, laundries became an important

sector in which the Chinese were able to develop a strong foot-hold; in the first three decades of the twentieth century, the number of Chinese laundry owners rose from none to 531 (peaking at 547 in 1921) throughout Britain, each providing work for many people (Ng 1968: 9–10). The laundry sector had all the hallmarks of an ethnic enclave economy.[8] The organization of small enterprises that could easily absorb and discharge workers, were based on low investment, relied on high turn-over, involved labor-intensive, low-skilled activities, and could pay low wages, were ideal for the Chinese immigrants. Often organized as family enterprises or partnerships and relying on co-ethnic labor, laundries were able to rapidly respond to the supply of new migrants and the demand for services. They were not significantly aligned with the rest of the labor market and could secure a profit based on low wages and long and uncomfortable working hours. The low entry-level meant that enterprising workers would aspire to set up their own laundry, creating a dynamic and highly competitive sector. Although laundries mainly served the non-Chinese population (and were generally acclaimed for their quality of service), their competitiveness was premised on their ethnic enterprise structure. The arrival of mechanized laundries and eventually the washing machines in people's homes brought an end to the Chinese laundries in the 1950s and 1960s. The services provided in fledgling Chinatowns before the Second World War, including Chinese restaurants, grocery stores, boarding houses, and gambling establishments were truly "ethnic enterprises" in the sense that their bosses, workers, customers and suppliers were Chinese.

According to the conventional accounts, itinerant traders at the lowest end of the Chinese ethnic economy in France, the Netherlands, Italy and other parts of Europe hailing from Zhejiang – mainly Wenzhou and Qingtian – sold small Chinese figurines and, when these ran out, home-made peanut cookies in the streets (Live 1998). The reminiscences of one of these traders, recorded by Wang Chunguang, however, indicates that the commodities in the 1930s were belts, socks and scarves, and that incomes at the best of times could reach 3,000 Francs (Wang 2000: 132–3). The narratives of their activities do not describe in reliable detail how they were organized and procured their supplies, but we may infer that there were co-ethnic middlemen involved; the extremely low initial investment, the constant threat of being arrested and having their commodities confiscated, as well as the uncertainty of incomes point at the most precarious form of ethnic enclave economy.

Chinese workers could get no foothold in the mainstream economy. The main exception was the presence of Chinese factory workers in Paris after the First World War; 3,000 of those who had served in the Chinese Labor Corps during the First World War found employment in factories in the metallurgical industry, mechanical construction and the aeronautics industry. They were joined by 2,000 Chinese who went to France on the work-study program between 1919 and 1921 and were promised work in factories for six months a year; the program was discontinued when it proved difficult to secure stable employment for many of the participants (Live 1998: 98–9). In other words, the fledgling Chinese economy in Europe during the inter-war years was predominantly an ethnic enclave providing a precarious existence for most Chinese immigrants.

The expansion of the Chinese ethnic enclave

When the European colonial empires disintegrated after the Second World War, many of the ethnic Chinese living in the colonies found themselves ethnically exposed in countries that asserted new-found nationalist values. As a consequence, in the period from the late 1940s until well into the 1970s ethnic Chinese migrated to France, the Netherlands and Britain from French Indochina, the former Dutch Indies, Suriname, Malaysia, and several other countries, territories,

and protectorates. They included well-educated people from privileged positions in colonial society as merchants, practitioners of liberal professions (doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, dentists, accountants), or entrepreneurs. Most were less privileged, ranging from Chinese phosphate mine workers from Nauru to farmers from Hong Kong's New Territories.[9]

Arriving as refugees in a context where other – much larger – colonial populations also came to Europe, they found no work in the mainstream labor markets. Instead they became workers in the ethnic catering sector, ethnic entrepreneurs, or practiced in the liberal professions (in as far as their training, often at universities in the metropolis, was recognized). In short, the new, larger waves of Chinese immigrants joined those from earlier decades, replenishing and expanding the ethnic enclave.[10]

After the war, the situation for ethnic Chinese changed significantly, for the former colonial powers came to terms with the need to accommodate immigrants from the former colonies and to gradually adapt their institutions and policies accordingly in terms of race relations, multiculturalism, integration and assimilation. Largely outside mainstream employment relations, they further developed their own niches. Small-scale import–export enterprises, wholesale and retail companies, leather accessory and party-ware manufacturing became important in France, as described in a travelog from the 1950s:

> The first time I went to see a compatriot of mine, Monsieur Kia Si-ling … who had a leather-work atelier in [rue Montmorency], I was at once interested. … I found that their chief products were small leather articles – belts, purses, handbags, children's shoes, etc. – and that they also worked as wholesalers to provincial dealers in these articles. There were several ateliers besides Kia's in the rue Montmorency, and many more in such adjoining roads as the rue Chapon, the rue Gravilliens, and the rue des Vertus. We must have been round to more than twenty ateliers. Some had a shop attached … The most interesting thing of all to me was that almost every one of these compatriots came from the same district of Chekiang Province along the coast of China.
>
> *(Chiang 1956: 49)*

These leather workshops emerged when the pre-war itinerant traders from Wenzhou and Qingtian (Live 1998: 104–5; Wang 2000) established their own production and distribution infrastructure for the products they had been selling in the streets, taking advantage of empty workshop premises and employing newly arriving co-natives from Zhejiang.

One Chinese from Zhejiang told the Chinese sociologist Wang Chunguang about his own experiences and observations of this period:

> The third arrondissement had been the world of the Jews, where they had their leather-goods and apparel workshops and factories. Before the 1960s there were only about 2,000 people in France who came from Wenzhou and Qingtian, but from the 1970s their numbers began to increase. The people from Wenzhou by putting in extra hours and taking lower wages gradually managed to buy the workshops from the Jews. It's only since 20 years that the Wenzhou people have so many workshops in the third arrondissement.
>
> *(Wang 2000: 136)*

Wang Chunguang's examination of the Wenzhou people in Paris reveals how they married French wives of the working class and through hard graft created the basis for investment in cheap business premises left by declining enterprises. The pattern of their economic rise to entrepreneurship and employment of co-ethnics in a more structured ethnic enclave was possible

because they gained a formal status through marriage and because they could fill the void left by another ethnic group, that gave up its workshops and markets due to increasing labor market integration of the younger generations in the economic mainstream, and the age of the entrepreneurs. It was the combination of the entrepreneurs' formalized immigration status (or citizenship) and the continued supply of non-status co-ethnic workers that allowed these enterprises to develop.[11] Developments in the wider economy, of course, gave further impetus to the economic viability of the ethnic sector, for not only did handicraft-based manufacture come under pressure from mechanization, but fashion houses and brands had an insatiable demand for their products as they broadened their market base among Europe's growing middle classes.

Later, in the 1980s and 1990s, areas in Tuscany and other parts of Italy experienced a similar development in the leather and apparel handicrafts clusters. In the 1960s and 1970s, the growth of fashion markets for leather bags and similar products had maintained a "system of tiny artisan enterprises" that occupied a substantial part of the local (Italian) population. The work was carried out in the homes by the women, and characterized by informality, competition, amicable family relations, intensive labor, the close proximity of work and home, and a shared positioning in the market; the low initial investment requirements, the use of second-hand machines, and the absence of particular skills requirements made the sector competitive at the time (Tassinari 1994: 108). The triggers for a rapid take-over of this sector by Chinese in Italy were the Italian immigration laws of 1986 and 1990. The possibility of achieving legal immigration status as "dependent worker" allowed ethnic Chinese who were naturalized in Italy to act as employers for co-ethnics, locking them into dependency because the new arrivals had no realistic access to the main labor markets. That such *dependent* employment took forms similar to those of family enterprises can hardly surprise. Chinese reforms in the 1980s and 1990s had to a large extent relied on casual off-farm employment in rural enterprises, informal sub-contracting in urban construction and other arrangements that had left workers without formalized rights. The acute sense of risk associated with such practices was often mitigated through "virtual kinship" and "fellow-villager" sentiments. Recent migrants from China to Europe had thus been primed to accept the privations and uncertainties of informal employment, including their total reliance on their boss, because such practices belonged to the habitual registers of behavior in China's reform economy.

The Chinese restaurant sector has, due to its high visibility and direct interaction with non-Chinese customers, become the epitome of the Chinese enclave economy. As European countries (mainly in the West and the North) grew more affluent and larger sections of the population entered the consumer markets, Chinese cuisine in many parts of Europe became an affordable and exotic alternative to the culinary styles that otherwise dominated the restaurant business. In Britain, France and Germany Cantonese food became popular; in the Netherlands, it was the *Chinees-Indisch* fusion food of the Dutch Indies. Chinese catering helps create the image of an ethnic economy, for the use of ethnic symbols, the strong cultural significance of food, and the visibility of Chinese restaurants create zones of otherness in the urban space. The economy of restaurants and Chinese take-aways is also typical of the ethnic enclave economy: Low entry-level investment, limited skills requirements, hiring of co-ethnics, and flexible, if not informal, employment arrangements all make Chinese restaurants competitive and adaptable to the growing and waning supply of migrant labor.

The large-scale arrivals of Chinese migrants from Hong Kong into Britain in the 1960s and 1970s facilitated a huge expansion of Chinese catering across the United Kingdom; most of the arrivals were Cantonese and Hakka-speaking people from the New Territories in Hong Kong (Ng 1968, 21–46; Watson 1975; Parker 1998). According to Gütinger, until the mid-1960s

there were around 100 Chinese restaurants in Germany, but the number soon began to expand rapidly, and by 1992, there were 3,000 Chinese restaurants (Gütinger 1998: 198). The Chinese immigration to Germany after the Second World War was limited and by the 1950s and 1960s only a few Chinese restaurants had been established, mainly in large cities. In the 1970s Chinese migrants arriving from the UK and the Netherlands took advantage of new pan-European rules and opened Chinese restaurants in North Rhine-Westphalia, setting in motion a rapid expansion of the Chinese restaurant trade in Germany.[12] Chinese migrants from Hong Kong were normally British subjects and therefore had the right to open businesses and take employment across the European Economic Communities (Gütinger 1998; Christiansen and Liang 2007).

London's Soho Chinatown provides an excellent example of how some European Chinatowns emerged strategically in conjunction with the wider entertainment industry. The Westminster City Council encouraged its rise to give new ambiance to a squalid area situated between cinemas and night clubs. Chinatowns elsewhere emerged where restaurants took advantage of low rents, and following the success of London's Chinatown, city councils encouraged their development. In Paris, the spatial distribution of the Chinese in particular inner-city areas, according to Live Yu-sion "reminiscent of Chinatowns," arose from government-driven, large-scale urban regeneration schemes that made available residential space coinciding with specific waves of Chinese immigration, e.g. the high rise buildings at Porte de Choisy, which led to high concentrations of Chinese in some parts of the city (Live 1998: 106). Chinatowns of the 2010s are thus largely based on the Chinese restaurant business, which lends an ethnic character to particular areas; even two or three restaurants nearby each other can suffice to turn a street or a small square into a "Chinatown." They tend not to be residential areas, although their workers in some cases live in the building where they work.

Although the sustained immigration of ethnic Chinese to Europe from Southeast Asia and from Hong Kong and other (former) colonies in the 1960s and 1970s was an important driver of the Chinese ethnic enclave in those years, it only began to gain momentum in the 1980s and 1990s with the influx of migrants from the Chinese Mainland. Although north-western Europe experienced considerable economic growth in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s and lacked labor, the Cold War prevented large-scale Chinese labor migration; the main sources of the so called "guest workers" arriving in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium were Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey; German industry in the 1950s also employed large numbers of German "settlers" from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) until the Berlin Wall caused this source to dry out. The Cold War labor flows from the "communist camp" to the "free world" were curtailed by the former both for ideological reasons and in order to stop the depletion of highly needed labor and skills.[13] Some Mainland Chinese refugees arrived in Europe in the 1950s to 1970s, but the majority of people who fled from the Mainland in the 1950s to 1970s went to Hong Kong, where they became the back-bone of the industrial boom. In the 1950s and 1960s they provided cheap labor and skills to the then low-tech plastics, textile and footwear industries, and in the 1970s were part of Hong Kong's technological transition. The downward pressure on incomes exerted by the Mainland immigrants in Hong Kong affected the earning opportunities of the "indigenous inhabitants" of the New Territories, pushing them into emigration to Britain in the 1960s and 1970s (Ng 1968; Watson 1975; Aijmer 1980).

The Cold War also caused Chinese from Southeast Asia to migrate to Europe; in particular the Vietnam War (1955–75) and the communist victory caused difficulties for ethnic Chinese in former French Indochina, as the communists regarded them as enemies. The overall effect of the Cold War on ethnic Chinese migration to Europe was not their inclusion in the mainstream economy as guest workers under government-sponsored schemes. To the contrary, they filled the ranks of the informal economies.

Transnationalism and the ethnic enclave

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese ethnic enclaves in Europe grew rapidly, for Chinese from the Mainland could easily get passports and travel permits. Foreign investments and collaborative programs in China took off; Chinese went abroad for business and for training; foreigners and Chinese married; ethnic Chinese sought reunion with their kinsfolk in China; Chinese students qualified for grants to study abroad – the global linkages expanded and generated channels and practices of migration. The huge difference between Chinese and European incomes and life quality as well as the ability of the Chinese ethnic enclave in Europe to absorb newcomers were crucial conditions behind the sustained migration. Commercial intermediaries have taken on the tasks of navigating the complexities of emigration and arranged packages combining loans, tickets and paperwork; local governments in the historic home areas of large-scale emigration (*qiaoxiang*) have opened offices that smooth inward investment, payments, burial in the ancestral soil, marriages between ethnic Chinese living overseas and local spouses, and maintenance of lineage connections; central and local governments and Chinese corporations have facilitated people-to-people and commercial links on an unprecedented scale, including procedures and ways of handling all aspects of migration.

Transnational interaction has become institutionalized so that knowledge, information channels and trusted practices are shared within the transnational community of Chinese migrants. This transnationalism is seamlessly linked to the large domestic migrations in China since the 1980s, for migrants balance the expectations, aspirations, distance, gains and costs in relation to their family situation no matter whether they move from the villages to large cities, to industrial clusters in coastal areas, or abroad. One widow, for example, emigrated in order to earn enough to provide for her children in China:

> All [her] relatives were illegal immigrants. Finding jobs, like the one she had in a restaurant, was easy. Her husband had died 13 years earlier, and she decided to go to Britain in order to earn enough to provide for her teenage children back home. Earnings at home would barely cover the school fees for her sons. From Britain, she had already remitted 600,000 RMB (or in excess of £40,000) to build a four-storey house in the village. At the age of 47, she regarded herself as "old" and planned to retire back in China at 52.
>
> *(Christiansen 2011: 228)*

The transnational practices articulate co-ethnic solidarity and friendship in lieu of formal contracts and regulation: Fellow-townsman relationships, virtual kinship, fledgling solidarity of those sharing similar conditions or speaking the same dialect or at least Mandarin, and a moral grid of shared purpose, altruism, sacrifice, and co-ethnic compassion give a sense of community and enable individuals to evaluate their own position in relation to the rest of society. The registers of these transnational practices are similar across the world, and Chinese migrants can move over large geographical distances within one community. In each destination, Chinese migrants have access to tried and tested transnational institutions of passage and sojourn.

Globalization has, in the 1990s and 2000s, changed the nature of the ethnic enclave, as the employment of migrants has become a generic informal economy. As investigative journalist Pai Hsiao-hung reports, Chinese middlemen now introduce illegal immigrants from China in ethnically mixed informal enterprises (Pai 2004, 2008). National labor market and welfare state institutions in Europe under the pressure of global markets are redrawing the boundaries of *precarity*. The ethnic enclave faces competition from the mainstream economy in terms of *risk avoidance* and *economies of scale* and deals with this by accepting lower incomes, longer hours and

higher risks, using informal practices, evading regulations and taxes, and providing services that are difficult to offer in large-scale operations. Firms in Europe's mainstream economy create supply chains of outsourced production. The use of suppliers in China and other parts of Asia is well-known. However, they also create markets for ethnic enclave enterprises in Europe. By relying on purchasing contracts rather than subjecting themselves to labor market regulation, they can externalize operational risk.

The ethnic enclave enterprises in France and Italy in the clothing and leather-goods sectors are examples of such arrangements; trading through intermediaries, they bear the risk of market failure and compete with each other on price and cost, remunerating their workers at levels well below the rates for the same work in the mainstream labor markets. Their informal employment practices avoid the costs of regular employment like contracts recognized by trade unions, compliance with health and safety regulations, regulations on working hours, as well as payment of social insurance premiums and taxes. The demand from mainstream chains for products and services is so large that the supply sectors cannot limit themselves to hiring workers from one ethnic group; in order to achieve scale and flexibility, they attract any workers in the "precarity circuit," including illegal immigrants, people on unemployment or social benefit, and people with poor language skills or very low education. Chinese middlemen supplying labor to the downstream supply sectors are thus only "ethnic" in terms of the origin of the workers they introduce.

The official immigration status (e.g. political asylum) and citizenship have become associated with social and labor market entitlements, providing cheap government housing and social benefits. One can in this observe how the global labor market affects European welfare states. Welfare states provide social security, predictability, education and life quality to their workers, making them both expensive and risky to employ – expensive in terms of social contributions and formal regulation, and risky because companies cannot dismiss them easily in response to fluctuations in demand. Agency work and outsourcing to flexible and informal sectors, including the ethnic enclave economies, therefore, are measures to limit risk and costs to companies. Welfare states are under countervailing pressures, for they must protect the jobs and welfare standards of their citizens, who are also their voters. At the same time they must ensure the competitiveness of their companies, which involves a downward pressure on job protection and welfare standards for part of the population, lest companies relocate production overseas. Welfare states also face demands from the international community to ensure equal rights to all residents (rather than just citizens) and to avoid racist exclusion. Therefore, an illegal yet condoned precarity circuit and unregulated employment practices serve to maintain some nationalistic protection within the global economy. This comes at a cost, for many immigrants – even when contributing to the economy – are classified as "illegal," and those who are not illegal are through political and cultural discourses, and alongside social welfare recipients and the unemployed, the targets of negative moral judgment, and by contagion classified as "illegal." The moral creation of precarity goes hand in hand with the maintenance of the ethnic enclave economy.

Mainland traders

Around 1990, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the East European states began rapid marketization, Chinese individuals with experience of individual entrepreneurship (introduced in China's planned economy in 1977) had learnt the skills and practices to enter into these new markets on a large scale. By then, Hong Kong, Taiwanese, European, Japanese, North American, and Australian companies had begun to outsource production to sweatshops in Chinese coastal areas. Chinese traders, therefore, had easy access to quality brands in clothing, shoes, consumer electronics, and so on at low prices, and were able to sell them at a good profit on the markets

in Russia, Hungary and other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. Visa waivers and low thresholds for entry facilitated the activities of "shuttle traders" (Nyíri 2007: 80–95). Originating mainly in urban areas in China, the Chinese traders were distinct from the Chinese workers who emigrated from rural areas in Zhejiang and Fujian to Western Europe. The traders capitalized on their links with Chinese state trading companies and used their credentials and turnover to secure credit from their suppliers (Nyíri 1999: 35–7). The success of Chinese trading was so great that Chinese markets emerged across Eastern Europe:

> The number of Chinese markets grew so rapidly that in a few years [in the 1990s], local entrepreneurs began setting up new markets or refurbishing old ones specifically for Chinese traders. The new "Chinese markets," such as Chetkizovo in Moscow, Europa in Bucharest, Blok 70 in Belgrade, Four Tigers in Budapest, Shanghai in Irkutsk, or the market in Ussuriisk, became important economic hubs, many with thousands of traders and tens of thousands of visitors daily … They consist of long rows of stalls or containers, usually in the open but sometimes enclosed in hangar-like halls of former factory buildings or warehouses. "Chinese markets" have also sprung up in smaller towns, reaching thirty in Hungary by 1995.
>
> *(Nyíri 2007: 83)*

By the mid-1990s markets became saturated, and non-Chinese chain stores entered the market for inexpensive clothes and consumer goods; the Chinese state curbed loans to Chinese traders; following the Asian financial crisis state trading companies withdrew their overseas assets; and customs regimes were toughened. These developments caused Chinese traders' profits to slump (Nyíri 2007, 91). Pál Nyíri notes that although many traders stopped their business, some of them upgraded their activities beyond the "Chinese markets," by becoming wholesalers to chain stores, even to international chains spanning Europe and North America, by opening their own brand chain stores, or by branching out into real estate deals and logistics services (Nyíri 2007: 93–5).

Chinese traders concentrated on the very particular opportunities in Eastern Europe, making use of the production for the global supply chains that had developed in China on the one hand, and the huge demands for inexpensive clothes and consumer goods in early-reform Russia and Eastern Europe. They expanded what had been the "second economy" under East European socialism and helped transform it into a buoyant market for consumer goods, before the global mainstream sectors had been able to respond to demand. They used their more than one decade of experiences with informality, flexibility and risk taking, making a profit based on informal economic activities, *before the formal, regulated, mainstream economies of scale were able to compete with them*. When the comparative advantage dried up, they moved their frontier into other markets still not dominated by the mainstream economy or turned themselves into competitive formalized, mainstream activities.

Mainland traders also entered into West European economies. Some individual traders with specialized professional expertise procured European specialty products on behalf of firms in China, for example construction equipment, production machinery, and Italian marble. Some discrete Chinese traders, registered in the Cayman Islands and operating in Europe, started out selling and buying on behalf of large Chinese state corporations, but branched out to generic brokering of deals where none of the partners is Chinese. Individuals have – on behalf of Mainland companies and local authorities – set up companies in Europe to represent Chinese business interests and provide services for them. The most high-powered of these traders learnt their skills as trade representatives of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the late 1980s and 1990s, commanding huge resources and striking complex international deals, building up experience and trust with core players.

Taiwan traders and investors

By contrast, Taiwanese traders in Europe arise from a totally different political-economy context. In the 1960s the Republic of China (ROC) began to put on track a policy to develop export-oriented industrialization, and Taiwan's economy began to take off. Among the main drivers were the small and medium-sized companies run by Taiwanese; when the economy underwent technological upgrading in the decade that started after Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975, the need to expand overseas became acute. Already in the 1980s, Taiwanese investors initiated indirect investments in the Chinese Mainland in order to gain access to the cheap labor resources, and since direct investments were made legal in the 1990s, Taiwanese firms have used the Mainland as their major manufacturing base, producing cheap consumer goods for the world market. They also began to deal more directly with their export markets in Europe, not only building up trade networks, but also large processing plants that could serve Europe as a whole and cut the impact of customs tariffs on their market shares. In the 1990s in particular Germany, the Netherlands and Britain became areas of substantial Taiwanese investment in pan-European distribution networks for goods imported from Taiwan, and in production and assemblage plants.

The Taiwanese traders in Europe represented a new and powerful trend in the global economy, rapidly eclipsing the old-style ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in European countries, who were embedded in ethnic enclave economies. The technological upgrading of Taiwan's economy has placed Taiwanese firms in a position as global players in the mainstream economy. This involves, of course, outsourcing of production and services to ethnic enclaves and other informal sectors, including those in Europe.

Conclusion

The ethnic Chinese have contributed considerably to the European economies in the last 150 years. That contribution must be understood in its full, transnational dimensions, for the Chinese were not just marginal. They provided the large amounts of labor that allowed the colonial European powers Britain, France, and the Netherlands, as well as the Russian empire to achieve industrial expansion in the late nineteenth century. In the period after the Second World War, they contributed cheap labor that helped along the expansion of middle-class consumer markets in fashion and in eating out. They provided inexpensive consumer goods to the fledgling post-communist markets in Russia and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and 2000s, and they have entered into a division of labor between mainstream and informal economy that represents new forms of exploitation in the global economy.

When Engels (in 1892) believed that the penetration of international capitalism in China would unhinge the Chinese economy to the degree that traditional, informal forms of working would collapse, sending destitute Chinese people across the world in competition for jobs with workers in Europe, America and Australia, he was no doubt visionary. But a century later, the *grande industrie*, now the regulated, formalized "mainstream economy," has proven to rely on informal forms of working, sweatshops, and displaced populations; in this world of downstream supply chains "ethnic enclave economies" assume a truly transnational nature. Welfare states in Europe protect the jobs and life quality of their citizens, while creating circuits of precarity that allow immigrants to contribute to their economies at knock-down rates and carrying huge burdens of social and economic risk. The "ethnic enclaves," in that sense are assets for European nation states, although their ethnic exclusivity is currently challenged by globalization. The hateful rhetoric of "being tough on illegal immigration" is belied by the welcoming actions of European mainstream companies addicted to cheap labor and services in their supply chains.

Notes

1 For overviews of Chinese in Europe, see Benton and Pieke (1998), Christiansen (2003), and Li Minghuan (2002).
2 The issue of ethnic workers' evolving role in the changing political economies of industrialized countries is of particular importance here. For a synthesis, see for example Quassoli (1999: 217–18).
3 The definition of "ethnic Chinese" will always be a moot point, as there is no simple point at which a person is "fully assimilated" into a "host society." Naturalization, marriage to non-Chinese, education and occupational career in the "mainstream economy," and even loss of Chinese language skills may be outweighed when people seek or assert their ethnic roots; the formal and practical recognition by Chinese authorities also plays a role.
4 For a comprehensive collection of sources, see Chen (1980–5). The *coolie* was, according to Breman and Daniel's perceptive etymology of the phenomenon, a true product of colonialism, the term itself pre-dating the coolie trade on the China coast. See Breman and Daniel (1992).
5 Emigration from China was formally illegal until 1893, but none the less condoned and practiced on a large scale, partly through Hong Kong and Macau, but also through many other Chinese ports, see Szonyi (2009). Szonyi's formulation is, however, at variance with Harley Farnsworth MacNair (1933: 16–17). MacNair claims that when the ratification of the 1858 Tianjin Treaty was exchanged between the British and Chinese governments in 1860, the Chinese imperial government sent out a decree that "Chinese choosing to take service in the British colonies or other parts beyond the seas, are at perfect liberty to enter into engagements with British subjects for that purpose." That being said, the Chinese imperial authorities most likely did not intend to enforce any part of the treaty (see Wang 2008: 16–18). The Burlingame Treaty (1868) between China and the USA instituted free movement of their respective citizens between the two countries. This was later revoked with the passing of the Chinese Exclusion Law of 1882.
6 See MacNair (1933: 209). MacNair, a Professor at Saint John's University in Shanghai, wrote the book in 1924 and had it prefaced by the doyen of Chinese foreign policy Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun).
7 These observations follow Immanuel Wallerstein (1989: Chapter 3).
8 The notion of an ethnic enclave was first systematically debated in the USA during the 1970s and 1980s mainly with reference to Hispanic and Black immigrants, see for example Wilson and Portes (1980), Portes and Jensen (1989), and Portes and Zhou (1996).
9 On the migration from the New Territories to Britain, see James L. Watson's (1975) detailed study on the Mans in Hong Kong and London.
10 Chinese refugees from the Mainland well into the 1950s could obtain Republic of China passports from the ROC consulate in Macau enabling entry into many European countries.
11 On details of citizenship and entitlements for immigrant entrepreneurs in France, see Dinh and Ma Mung (2008).
12 For details, see Leung (2003: 109). The claim that German authorities in the 1960s recruited 5,000 Chinese cooks from Taiwan (Kaminski 2000) is spurious.
13 Although the eastern bloc countries, including the GDR allowed some emigration, it was limited, and labor shortages were considerable in the most industrialized countries. Given the emigration of labor to the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR, for example, had to replenish its labor force from Poland, Vietnam, North Korea, Angola, Mozambique and Cuba.

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10

Chinese immigration to Australia and New Zealand

Government policies and race relations

Manying Ip

Overview: colonial social engineering and its legacy

Australia and New Zealand share numerous similarities in the way they handled and managed Chinese immigration, both in earlier centuries and in contemporary times. On the surface, there seemed to be great differences: Australia practiced the notorious White Australian Policy while New Zealand enjoyed the reputation of being tolerant and a "race relations haven." In practice, the only difference is that Australia's anti-Chinese (and anti colored-migration) legislation was open and overt, while New Zealand's anti-Chinese and anti-Asian policy was well-covered, and if not strictly "unwritten," it was largely unpublicized (Brawley 1993).

This chapter will argue that policies governing Chinese immigration to Australia and New Zealand, past and present, have been fundamentally shaped by the fact that both countries belonged to the "Anglosphere."[1] Both societies were former British colonies – and very loyal colonies for that matter. They progressed from being colonies to be dominions, and then achieved nation-state status while staying within the British Commonwealth, and to this day both countries still acknowledge Queen Elizabeth of Britain as their Head of State. They share elements of the Anglo-Celtic culture and have the same linguistic and historical heritage. Most crucially, for over a century they had the same vision of preserving their lands for the exclusive use of immigrants from the United Kingdom. That vision guided their immigration policies.

In recent years, both nations have adopted a new liberal attitude and called themselves "immigrant nations." Much has been made of the fact that their population was made up of migrants from many different places around the world. However, this has been a somewhat belated acknowledgment of reality. For the greater part of the histories of these two countries immigrants from the United Kingdom were particularly favored, and any non-white, non-Anglo-Celtic immigrants were not welcome. The histories of Australia and New Zealand are inextricably linked to British imperial expansion and the desire to create "a new Britannia." From the 1880s to well after the Second World War, immigration to Australia and New

Zealand was carefully controlled to keep out migrants of color so that racial purity could be preserved in this white haven. According to famous Australian historian James Jupp, the white immigration policy has been one of the most long-lasting and elaborately managed pieces of social engineering witnessed in history (Jupp 2007).

Since Australia and New Zealand wished to become "a new Britannia" and a "Better Britain of the South Seas" respectively, it follows that Chinese immigration was highly undesirable for both, a threat and an aberration of the order which the founding fathers wished to establish. However, neither country could bring about legislation which explicitly forbade Chinese entry based on racial terms. As British colonies, Australian and New Zealand laws needed the "royal assent" – the signature of the British monarch given on the advice of the British parliament. By the 1840s, Britain had succeeded in imposing various unequal treaties on the Manchu government which gave them the right to freely enter, travel around, to trade and to preach in China. Most of these treaties signed with China stipulated reciprocal rights. It would not be a good move to openly exclude the Chinese on explicit racial grounds. Hence it was necessary for Australia and New Zealand to introduce less open and more roundabout discriminatory laws and policies to keep the Chinese and other colored-migrants out. Somehow these "undesirable aliens" needed to be excluded by other means.

The anti-Chinese stance of both countries basically did not change until the last 20–30 years, when personal merit, instead of race or "country of origin" is used as the criteria to measure the eligibility of a potential immigrant. Such a non-racially based "color-blind" immigration policy was adopted by Australia in the 1970s, and New Zealand followed suit in the late 1980s. By the twenty-first century, it would have been hard to keep using an immigration policy based on race. Nevertheless, Britain has remained the single largest migrant source country of both Australia and New Zealand, and this pattern has not changed in spite of the many alterations of the finer points of the immigration policies over the recent decades.

It should be noted unequivocally that both Australia and New Zealand have remained essentially Anglophile to the present day, and this leaves an unfortunate legacy whereby the old prejudice would flare up in new forms, plaguing the race relations scene of both countries. In recent decades, the attitude toward the Chinese – and other non-white "ethnic groups" – has improved considerably. Now it wavers between general tolerance and vague ambivalence. In times of economic downturn or social uncertainty, however, conservative rightist politicians would make their political capital by criticizing the Chinese and colored immigration, usually claiming that they were defending true Australian and New Zealand "core values" by opposing "foreign immigrants" who would harm their traditional legacies. In Australia Pauline Hansen's "One Nation" Party gained considerable political clout in 1996 by using this template. In New Zealand, Winston Peters' "New Zealand First" played the race card so successfully that he became the king-maker in two successive general elections in 1996 and then 2005, holding the balance of power between the major parties. The writer posits that much of the racial tensions directed against the Chinese and other Asians in recent years springs from the age-old unresolved ambivalence regarding non-white immigrants.

This chapter will examine Chinese immigration to Australia and New Zealand from the mid-nineteenth century to contemporary times, tracing the changing policies as well as the corresponding internal development of their respective Chinese communities. In critically examining the past, we want to explore the social and political forces at work which prompted immigration policy changes. We also wish to elucidate the most salient features affecting race relations past and present, highlighting the role of the Chinese communities – first passive, now dynamic – in both countries.

Mid-nineteenth-century early Chinese immigrants: gold miners and itinerants

Australian view

> We know that colored and white labor cannot exist side by side; we are well aware that China can swamp us with a single year's surplus of population … [The Chinese could] transform the Northern half of our continent into a Natal with thirteen out of fourteen belonging to an inferior race …
>
> *(Pearson 1894 quoted in Griffiths 2002)*

New Zealand view

> John Chinaman, my jo, John!
> Oh, what can you be? / to stay there in Victoria.
> New Zealand is the place, John / Why don't you try the diggings here,
> John Chinaman, my jo!
> Why stay at Ballarat, John, / or worked-out Bendigo
> … You're not unmindful that / you had a queer reception,
> One day near Lambing Flat[2]
>
> *(Thatcher 1863)*

The Chinese were the first group of non-white migrants to arrive in Australia and New Zealand, and therefore bore the brunt of prejudice. They appeared in sizable numbers when gold was discovered in the colonies, following in the footsteps of their European counterparts. They were mostly natives of the southern Chinese province of Guangdong, the area that was most adversely affected by Western imperialist penetration because of the Opium Wars and the subsequent erosion of Chinese sovereignty when various treaty ports were set up along the southern Chinese coast. Several thousand Chinese young men, mostly landless impoverished peasants, flocked to the Victorian goldfields of Australia in the 1850s. About a decade earlier, their fellow villagers had already left for San Francisco and Canada for the Gold Rush there. South China was over-populated and ravaged by floods and famines, a consequence when the Qing government was repeatedly defeated by Britain and other European powers. Their young men left home reluctantly to try their luck in the "New Gold Hills," a name given to the Australasian goldfields of Ballarat, Bendigo (in Victoria), and Otago as well as Riverton (in New Zealand).

When the early Chinese migrants encountered their Scottish, Irish and English counterparts in these gold fields of Australia or New Zealand, they were not meeting as equals. From the start, the Chinese were looked upon as interlopers and intruders, while the Anglo-Celtic miners were "legitimate" workers. As the lyric of the "Lake Wakatipu Songster" (quoted at the beginning of this section) suggested, "John Chinaman" was just a figure of ridicule. He could be the victim of the lynching mobs in Lambing Flat (in Australia), so he should leave the Victorian goldfields and try his luck in New Zealand, although there would be no guarantee that the reception might be any better there.

Racial ideas of the 1850s were influenced by the assumption that a certain "tree of man" existed. Different races: Caucasian, Negroid, Mongoloid and Australoid, in that order, occupied specific places in that hierarchical ranking.[3] The "tree" was supposedly based on Darwin's *Origin of the Species* which explained evolution. The white Caucasian was believed to be highest because of their technological and scientific skills, their physical strength, and their supposedly

superior level of civilization as manifested in their successful imperialist expansion across much of the world. This racial theory conveniently justified much of the colonial conquests of Africa, the encroachment of Asia, as well as the discrimination against "Asiatics" in the new immigrant nations of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Since the Australian colonies and New Zealand were planned as reserved destinations for British nationals, any other groups were only allowed in by sufferance. The Chinese were assumed to be racially inferior, being Mongoloid, they should only be allowed into the white haven as itinerant laborers. The blueprint of the Australasian young colonies had no real place for the "yellow men." Hence they should not be allowed to settle down, and every effort was made to make sure those already there would eventually leave. For this reason they were not allowed to naturalize, nor were they entitled to pensions or health care. High barriers were put in place to prevent Chinese females from arriving, since the presence of Chinese women would mean the birth of Chinese babies and the subsequent formation of an indigenous Chinese community[4] – a most undesirable development for the young colonies.

Managing the Chinese as "undesirable migrants": 1880s onwards

Australian view

> It is not the bad qualities, but the good qualities of these alien races that make them so dangerous to us. It is their inexhaustible energy, their power of applying themselves to new tasks, their endurance and low standard of living that make them such competitors.
>
> *(Alfred Deakin quoted in Jupp 2007: 11)*

New Zealand view

> the Chinaman was an undesirable immigrant for the colony. The Chinaman, however docile, however imitative, and however industrious he might be, in so far as he knew nothing about free government, was unfitted to take any part in the government of a free country.
>
> *(William Hutchinson, MP,* New Zealand Parliamentary Debates *1880: Vol. 36, p. 91)*

For many decades, both Australia and New Zealand consistently used their immigration legislation to achieve the twin purpose of keeping the countries white and keeping colored migrants out (Price 1974). Laws and regulations were used as walls and floodgates – both imageries appeared with considerable frequency in political cartoons of the time.[5] Simultaneously, every effort was made to recruit migrants from Britain. The only difference that marked apart the two countries is that Australia was much more upfront and overt, while New Zealand was more discreet and low-key in administering its white policy.

In 1855 Victoria passed the first poll-tax legislation (10 pounds) against the Chinese. New South Wales followed soon after. Then New South Wales, Queensland and finally West Australia all introduced anti-Chinese laws to restrict Chinese entry. These were early un-coordinated efforts. In the early 1880s, special Inter-colonial Conferences were called to discuss immigration issues and to pass more effective anti-Chinese legislation. Representatives of the Australian colonies and New Zealand met in 1881, and then in 1888. They were advised by the British colonial secretary who made certain that there should be no overt reference to "race" in the legislation devised.[6] He recommended the "Natal method" used in South Africa. Prospective immigrants were required to take a literacy test, undesirables could be given tests which ensured their

failure and subsequent rejection. These early anti-Chinese laws were very effective; they led to a steady decline of the Chinese population. From 38,000 or 3.3% of the national population in 1861, the number of Chinese in Australia fell to 29,600 or below 1% in 1901 at the time of Federation, when even more stringent laws were passed (Price 1974: 277).

New Zealand similarly introduced a 10 pounds poll-tax on all Chinese immigrants, and the sum was raised to 100 pounds by 1896. The exorbitant poll-tax and the "literacy test" remained the mainstay of the legislative walls to keep the Chinese and other colored migrants out. Chinese population fell from just over 5,000 in 1881, the year of the Anti-Chinese Act, to around 2,600 by the turn of the last century.

Australia became federated in 1901, and the first substantive piece of legislation passed was the Immigration Restriction Act, a highly symbolic move (Markus 2001). Thereafter, the Commonwealth government would ensure that all Australian states adhere to the same immigration policy. The "White Australia Policy" was applied uniformly across the six former separate colonies. Thereafter, Australian politicians and public media tirelessly defended the policy on the international stage, thereby attracting much attention and alienating world opinion.

New Zealand chose a much more subdued and discreet path. In 1920 the government passed the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act and introduced a "Permit System" (Brawley 1993). It became the mainstay of New Zealand immigration policy for more than half a century but hardly attracted any attention. All non-British immigrants were required to apply for a permit to enter, but the eligibility criteria were highly opaque. No reason was ever given for unsuccessful applications. The number of permits issued was also very restrictive. Only 100 permits a year would be issued to Chinese people. From 1926, entry was limited to the wives or fiancées of New Zealand-born Chinese men. By 1935, the permit quota was further reduced to only 10 per year.

The New Zealand Prime Minister William Massey remarked that the Act of 1920 was "the result of a deep seated sentiment on the part of a huge majority of the people of this country that this Dominion shall be what is often called a 'white' New Zealand."[7] Until a policy change in 1974, the 1920 act determined who would be allowed to enter New Zealand. In effect, most of the Chinese were given temporary permits of six months to two years.

Race relations in the 1930s: Chinese as second class citizens and the fear of "miscegenation"

Australian view

Aboriginal woman reminiscing about her marriage to a Chinese man:

> We couldn't get married [in Broome] because he was classed as an alien and because I was a part Aboriginal woman. Back then they did not approve of Aboriginal women mixing too much with Asians. They even had laws against co-habitation.
>
> *(Stephenson 2007)*

New Zealand view

New Zealand district nurse on the mixing of Chinese and Maori:

> It goes against the grain to see so much mixing between these two peoples. The Chinese after all are really a coloured people, and the Maori, well, they are much like us when all is said and done.
>
> *(Beaglehole and Beaglehole 1946)*

With the walls and floodgates built and most of the Chinese kept out, the legislation pertaining to the Chinese in both countries continued to be discriminatory toward Chinese people already in the national borders. A significant percentage of these Chinese were local born. However, the local born Chinese in both countries remained very much second class citizens for decades. In both places, the "re-entry permit" system was introduced which required the Chinese to be thumb-printed whenever they left the national borders, usually to return to China for family visits. The enforcement of thumb-printing was applied on local-born Chinese as well, showing in effect that it was meant to control the movement of ethnic Chinese, regardless of their citizenship status.[8] In later decades, the governments relaxed on the thumb-printing requirement, but ethnic Chinese Australians and New Zealanders continued to be subjected to heightened border control well into the 1970s. Historically, Australians and New Zealanders had unrestricted entry rights to each other's country.[9] Reciprocal travel arrangements had long been formalized since the 1920s, enabling citizens to freely visit, live, work or remain indefinitely without having to apply for a permit or visa. However, the privilege of freedom of travel did not apply to ethnic Chinese Australians and New Zealanders, who required special permits to move across the Tasman Sea.

In Australia, though not in New Zealand, the literacy test could also be used on the Chinese already settled in the country – back-dated to those who entered five years ago. Those who failed the test could be deported. The most significant legislative barrier to the Australian and New Zealand Chinese was the fact that they were barred from naturalization and had no means of becoming legitimate citizens of their land of adoption. They were barred from citizenship in Australia since Federation and in New Zealand since 1908. Without citizenship and therefore no voting rights, the Chinese could not even hope to start lobbying government or politicians to soften their anti-Chinese legislations. On a practical level, they could only stay on temporary permits, and could not bring their wives and families from China, even if they could afford the exorbitant poll-tax.

The effect of the stringent immigration laws meant decades of broken families, with the women – and any of the children born – stranded in the home villages while the men led enforced bachelor lives in Australasia. The loneliness and lack of family anchor drove many of these early Chinese immigrants to opium smoking and gambling. The severe gender imbalance among the Chinese also led to their sexual liaisons with indigenous women. Such relationships ranged from long-term common-law marriage to cohabitation to casual transactions. Even though the numbers are never very high, the cases of Chinese liaison with indigenous women were officially frowned upon and actively discouraged (Stephenson 2007; Ip 2008). The fear was "miscegenation" when the ethnic minorities mixed and bred babies, bringing about the specter of a "pie-bald nation" instead of a lily-white superior New Britannia which all South Pacific would look up to. In both countries, the appearance of the Chinese complicated race relations. In colonial times, the Chinese were very much on the fringe of society, co-existing with the Aboriginals and the Maori, and shared similar economic status.

Both countries were founded on the military subjugation of the indigenous people and the appropriation of their lands and resources by the colonial power. New Zealand had the Treaty of Waitangi signed between the Crown and the Maori chiefs, but Australia lacked any such documents acknowledging the indigenous and legitimizing the presence of the British conquerors. Successive Australian governments did not treat the Aboriginals at all well, and the latter did not even have the right to vote until 1962.

Ironically, the Maori of New Zealand were given privileges by the Australian government when similar rights were specifically denied to Australian aboriginals. New Zealand Maori were first given the vote through Australia's Commonwealth Franchise Act of 1902. The Act specifically

limited voting enrolment to "persons of European descent," and "aboriginal natives of New Zealand." During the debates on who should be granted voting rights, Australian parliamentarian O'Malley made the notorious argument that "an aboriginal is not as intelligent as a Maori. There is no scientific evidence that he is a human being at all."[10] During the early years of the Australian federation, the efforts to entice New Zealand to join included being accommodating to the New Zealand Maori.

As history subsequently shows, New Zealand did not join the Australian Federation. Within both countries, the Chinese remained disenfranchised. As for their respective indigenous peoples, while New Zealand accorded its native Maori legislative recognition by the Treaty of Waitangi, social and economic disparity remained severe until very recent times.

In the past, when discussing race relations and Chinese immigration, the focus used to be on the host governments and the Chinese. Too often it is forgetten that the host communities, especially the indigenous First Nation peoples and their relationship with the immigrant Chinese are very important factors shaping race relations.[11]

Internal growth: Chinese as an isolated minority

> Our immigration is based firmly on the principle that we are and intend to remain a country of European development. It is inevitably discriminatory against Asians … We have done much to encourage immigration from Europe, *we do everything to discourage it from Asia.*
>
> *(New Zealand External Affairs Department 1953 memo, emphasis in original)*

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Chinese people in Australia were in a wide variety of occupations. Most of them had left the goldfields by then, and worked as small tradesmen offering their menial services to residents of the burgeoning cities of Melbourne and Sydney. They worked as cabinet makers and storekeepers in the urban centers, and continued to work as scrub cutters, tobacco growers and market gardeners in the rural areas. They also ran hand laundries and worked as cooks and domestic servants, serving European households.

By the time of Australian Federation, there were around 29,000 ethnic Chinese in Australia (Price 1974). The community had its own clan associations and supported several Chinese language newspapers. Most of these newspapers had particular political affiliations: they were either pro-reform or pro-revolution. The overseas Chinese were extremely patriotic toward China, partly because they were mostly treated badly by various host governments. They dreamed that a reinvigorated China (either through reform or revolution) would stand up for them.

The Australian and the New Zealand Chinese followed very closely the political developments in China: the efforts of the last Emperors to reform the imperial government, the attempts to push for a constitutional monarchy, and the agitation of the revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen trying to topple the Qing. Politicians from China also visited Australia to fund-raise and to garner support. Liang Qichao (1873–1929), famous reform leader, pioneer journalist and one of modern China's foremost literary figures, did a six-month tour of Australia in 1900–1 (see Levenson 1959). It was the time of the Federation, and reportedly this exposure to Australian politics made this Chinese philosopher-reformer even more interested in political reforms.

In the 1920s and 1930s, continual legislative restrictions and social hostility in Australia froze the growth of the community and led to a slow decline of the population. Very few Chinese were allowed to arrive. China was preoccupied with warlords and internal strife. The early years of the Chinese Republic saw China weakened, divided, and humiliated by successive foreign aggression. The links with China became more tenuous and weak and the Australian Chinese community remained small and isolated.

The development of the New Zealand Chinese community was very similar though on a smaller scale. For example, although New Zealand had its share of Chinese communal and political activities (Sedgwick 1984) and had branches of the Chee Kong Tong (supporting the reformers) as well as the Guomindang (supporting the revolutionaries), no one of a comparable stature to that of Liang Qichao ever visited New Zealand. Following the depletion of the goldfields, the Chinese drifted to towns and cities and started working in fruit shops, laundries and commodity stores. They also found a niche in the market gardening trade, especially from the late 1920s onwards. European settlers in New Zealand generally preferred dairy farming and rearing sheep and cattle. These were more economically rewarding and less labor intensive. The Chinese often leased land from Maori, and worked side by side with them, making a modest living (Ip 2008).

The Chinese community in New Zealand was predominantly male until after the Second World War, the gender imbalance was even more severe than that of Australia. As most Chinese men only had temporary resident status, and many could not afford the 100 pound poll tax for their wives, the longstanding practice was for them to make home visits every few years. It was also customary for Chinese men to send for their sons, brothers and nephews, instead of sending for their wives and daughters even when they could afford the poll tax. It made better economic sense to have male helpers in the gardens or shops.

The Second World War marked an important turning point for the Chinese in both Australia and New Zealand. With the invading Japanese armies overrunning the home villages around the Pearl River Delta in South China, the wives and children of the long-term Australasian settlers became refugees and were granted temporary asylum. After 1939 wives and children of Chinese men in New Zealand were allowed temporary entry as refugees from war-torn China. Rather than indicating a fundamental change of immigration policy, the apparently liberal measure of allowing the Chinese to stay in 1947 was prompted by humanitarian concern about possible casualties in the pending Chinese civil war. Those granted permanent residence included wives and children who had arrived as refugees after 1939, New Zealand-born babies of the wives, and Chinese temporary residents and students who had been in New Zealand for over five years. They came to a modest total of 1,323 Chinese.[12]

This was the low-key beginning of a significant change for the New Zealand Chinese community. Before the World War, the absence of Chinese females in a tiny group of men doomed the Chinese to be a broken stem community of bachelors. The subsequent Communist victory in China further encouraged many New Zealand Chinese to stay in New Zealand, since returning to their homeland was uncertain. From the 1950s on, a real Chinese community, consisting of settled adults and local-born children, could sink roots. Meanwhile, their counterparts across the Tasman Sea in Australia were much less fortunate, the post-war government there showed no leniency toward their colored refugees.

Post Second World War Australia: immigrants needed but not Chinese

The Second World War similarly forced Australia to modify its immigration policy, but the desire to preserve racial purity remained as strong as ever. The country worried about its sparse population, especially about its lack of people to populate the vast continent. Australia's wakeup call came with Japan's blitzes in December 1941 which started the Pacific War. The naval protection that Australia had always relied on so confidently: the mighty navies of the USA and Great Britain, together with the "impregnable naval bases" of Singapore and the forts in the Coral Sea, were suddenly crippled. Australia felt vulnerable and exposed.

When peace came in 1945, Australia became acutely aware of its isolated geographical position and its vulnerability because of its very small population, its lack of people to populate the

vast continent. It became urgent to populate Australia – by large scale immigration. The post-war Labor government was to embark on a bold immigration program, on an unprecedented scale and with a vigor that was to change the country's ethnic mix forever.

The architect of this program was Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell. He had an emotive slogan which helped to quell labor union's objection to bringing in more people, "We must populate or perish." To increase Australia's population became a bi-partisan goal. "We must double or quit," wrote Liberal Leader R. G. Casey. At war's end the opposition political parties were agreed on one point: large-scale immigration.

Post-war Prime Minister Ben Chiefly introduced a brand new department: the Department of Immigration with the avowed purpose to populate Australia as quickly as possible. The urgency was prompted by Japan's bombing of Darwin, and the fear triggered by how close the battle line moved. More importantly, there was the dawning realization that Australia needed a much bigger population base in order to maintain its peacetime industrial capability. This was a crucial turning point in Australia's population policy. Calwell decided to extend the assisted migration schemes which Australia always had used for nationals from Britain. Now Calwell decided to accept as many European settlers as possible. The assisted migration scheme was extended to the many victims of Nazism from war-torn Europe. He visited Europe and signed an agreement with the United Nations Refugee Organization to accept "Displaced Persons," up to a minimum of 12,000 per year. The resettled refugees promised they would work for Australia for two years in exchange for free passage and post arrival assistance. The agreement with the United Nations was followed by a series of bi-lateral migration agreements signed with various European countries: the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Spain, and the Scandinavian countries in the 1950s, to promote migration to Australia. Largely because of Calwell's diligent promotion, the post-war years transformed Australian society. It became markedly less British and Irish in character. The significant numbers of Italians, Germans, Greeks and Poles formed the basis of the Australian multicultural society today.

Arthur Calwell remained a staunch defender of the White Australia Policy. While he was tireless and unhesitating in advocating the necessity of rapid increase of immigration, he was equally determined to keep migrants of color out. He found Asia a threat, he never forgot the Japanese military aggression, and was always uneasy about the "Yellow Peril" posed by the teeming population of Australia's north. Calwell was responsible for deporting many Malayan, Indochinese and Chinese wartime refugees. No exception was made to those who had married Australian citizens and started families in Australia.[13] The forcible repatriation of Asian refugees who had strong immediate Australian family links made the White Australia Policy notorious in Asia. As discussed in earlier paragraphs, both Australia and New Zealand were equally restrictive toward Chinese migration before the Second World War. It was the difference in post-war policies toward Chinese refugee families that gave the White Australia Policy specifically bad-press in Asia (Brawley 1993). Although the basic immigration policies of both countries were remarkably similar and consistent, New Zealand was seen as flexible and more humanitarian by comparison, a reputation which was probably not totally deserving.

Post-war Chinese communities: upward mobility

Peace time brought general social optimism and prosperity, and the Chinese minorities in both countries were well-regarded for the war-time role as valiant allies against the Japanese aggressors. The small Chinese communities were allowed to apply for family reunions to bring core family members in. They were expected to acquire Anglo-Celtic ways and cut all links with China. Chinese schools were therefore discouraged and visas were denied to Chinese language teachers (Dunstan 1999).[14]

When the Australian and New Zealand governments gradually relaxed their immigration laws, slowly dismantling some of the most blatantly discriminatory policies against the Chinese, the internal growth of the Chinese community in both countries was given a respite and experienced remarkable upward social and economic mobility. By stint of sheer hard work and perseverance, the Chinese achieved a comfortable standard of living and a certain degree of social acceptance.

By the 1950s, the Chinese were given the right to naturalize – even if their requirements were particularly stringent, and the numbers strictly controlled.[15]

Throughout the 1960s and well into the early 1980s, "assimilation" was the keyword favored by policy makers in both Australia and New Zealand. Mainstream Australians and New Zealanders expected their Chinese minorities to be very grateful. The bestowing of citizenship had never been a natural right to those formerly labeled as "race aliens," it was a hard-earned acceptance, attained after long decades of exemplary good behavior. The Chinese were also expected to learn and live like white Australians and New Zealanders.

Many of the Chinese internalized this pervasive view of the dominant majority, and decided that they should live up to mainstream expectations: to be hard-working, undemanding, not making trouble, and law-abiding. They were so successful and so trouble-free that they became known as the "model minority" in both countries, just like their counterparts in the USA and Canada. The Chinese younger generation usually left the fruit shop trade, and entered the professions as doctors, lawyers, engineers and architects. The occupational change meant that the Chinese community as a whole took on white-collar jobs and enjoyed a middle-class lifestyle within a generation. The material affluence meant a period of stability and comfort, and the unhappy memories of the earlier exclusion era gradually faded as the Chinese were allowed a share of the New Zealand dream.[16]

As a community, the Chinese have paid a high price for mainstream acceptance. In their efforts to "fit in" and to acquire mainstream values, most of the second and third generation local-born Chinese lost their language fluency and much of their heritage knowledge and culture. In their long struggle to gain acceptance, the Chinese had to give up much of their "Chineseness," either intentionally or by default. In trying to blend in with the dominant Anglo culture, Chinese language was the first casualty.

By the 1960s many of the local born Chinese children had become successful professionals. This rise in socio-economic status, however, came at the same time as the community was rapidly losing its Chinese identity, its pride in being a distinctive group.[17] Numerically the Chinese communities in both countries were small (see Figure 10.1), the desire to fit in meant a great reluctance to be different. Chinese values and Chinese language were not considered important when assimilation was supposed to be the highest virtue. To become as "Anglo" or "British" as possible seemed to be the aim of many Chinese at the time.

In both Australia and New Zealand, the local Chinese communities continued their internal growth, largely cut off from the replenishment of any new arrivals or any influence from China. China was in the throes of a series of political movements (like the anti-rightist campaigns of the 1950s) and economic experiments (like the Great Leap Forward of the early 1960s). It remained largely cut off and was a sort of pariah state in the eyes of many Western countries. The "bamboo curtain" kept China isolated, and the majority of the overseas Chinese at the time were pro-Nationalist and suspicious of the Communists; the links with China became more tenuous than ever.

Great white walls slowly crumbled: 1970s and 1980s

In both Australia and New Zealand, significant immigration policy changes took place in the 1970s and 1980s respectively, effectively opening the countries to non-white migration, thus facilitating the entrance of the Chinese.



Figure 10.1 Number of Chinese in New Zealand and Australia

In 1972 Australians elected their first Labor government since 1948. The long established quota system based on "country of origin," with the avowed purpose of preserving "racial homogeneity" was dismantled. Al Grassby became the new Minister for Immigration, and introduced a system of "structured selection" by which migrants were to be chosen according to personal attributes and their occupational training. The selection of immigrants based on personal qualities instead of on racial or country of origin factors is a radical departure from the country's long-standing preference for European immigrants. These are essentially the same criteria as those of the present immigration policy.

In 1973, with typical optimism and considerable idealism, Grassby declared that Australia had become a "multicultural" society. He declared that all past ethnic or racial discrimination should be abolished. The same year saw the passing of the Australian Citizenship Act. It stipulated that all migrants accepted by Australia were to be accorded equal treatment. If multiculturalism was not yet quite there, the White Australia policy was for all practical purposes defunct from 1973 onwards.

In 1975, under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, the Australian government passed the *Racial Discrimination Act*, which made racially based selection criteria illegal. The Act also overrides any inconsistent States and Territory legislation. Henceforth, it became illegal for Australian citizens to be discriminated against on account of their race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin. In immigration policy and in all laws, the Chinese were put on an equal legislative footing as all other migrants to Australia.

New Zealand's gradual liberalization in the 1970s and the New Immigration Act of 1987

Around the same time, the liberal winds of change also affected New Zealand. Norman Kirk, who became prime minister in 1972, argued that New Zealand's future lay with Asia and the Pacific.

He suggested that New Zealand needed an immigration policy that ignored prospective migrants' race, color and religion. Beginning in 1974, the time-honored preference for what historian Mckinnon calls "kin-migrants" (McKinnon 1996), aka British migrants, or migrants from "traditional source countries" was abolished.

After the immigration policy review of 1974, British migrants, like all others, were required to obtain a permit before they left their homelands. The British and Irish were now theoretically placed on the same footing as the nationals of other countries when they applied to enter New Zealand. In practice, however, they could always obtain the permit pro forma.

The real significant breakthrough finally came in 1987, the year which is now widely recognized as the watershed of New Zealand immigration history. Kerry Burke became Minister of Immigration the year before, and decided that a radical approach was needed to stimulate the economy by opening the country to business migrants with international linkages to Asian markets. The opening of New Zealand to "quality migrants" was part of the Labor government's commitment to free market, and part of the general economic deregulation and radical restructuring. The 1986 White Paper, commonly referred to as the Burke Report, played down traditional migration links with Britain, it stated boldly that the main aim of immigration policy should be

> to enrich the multi-cultural social fabric of New Zealand society through the selection of new settlers principally on the strength of their potential personal contribution to the future well-being of New Zealand. … the selection of new immigrants will be based on the criteria of personal merit without discrimination on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, color, sex or marital status, religion or ethical belief.
>
> *(Burke 1986 :10–11)*

This marked a real break with New Zealand's longstanding emphasis on nationality and ethnic origin as the basis for admitting immigrants. Any person who met specified educational, business, professional, age or asset requirements was to be admitted, regardless of race or nationality. None of the architects of the policy envisaged that many middle-class Chinese and other Asians would fit the bill, and that they would migrate to New Zealand in such great numbers and at such a rapid pace that the social backlash against "the new Asians" would become a significant social issue and give much ammunition to populist politicians skillfully playing the race card.

Business migration

New Zealand introduced the Business migration scheme from the late 1980s onwards but never succeeded in attracting significant numbers of applicants. The policy also attracted much negative publicity, and government was criticized for engaging in "checkbook immigration," in effect selling New Zealand citizenship to those who could afford it. At the same time, the business migrants usually did not score much success in terms of establishing truly viable business ventures or forging international commercial linkages (Boyer 1996; Forsyte 1998; Beal 2001; Ip 2001).

Immigration policy fine-tuning, 1990s to 2000s

The Immigration Amendment Act 1991 introduced a points system. Applicants were awarded points for age, educational qualifications, employability, career and business track records, and settlement funds. A modest level of English was required. Under the points system, any applicant achieving a minimum number of points was automatically eligible for a permanent visa.

Yearly immigration targets were set and the total number coming in was adjusted by raising or lowering the number of points needed, or by tightening or easing such criteria as English language requirements. The early 1990s saw much public debate on the target number of migrants, and heated criticism of the "influx of foreigners." The main target of criticism were the "Asian immigrants," an interchangeable term for "Chinese immigrants" in both Australia and New Zealand.

The points system favored people of early to middle working age, who had appropriate qualifications, work experience and business skills, the ability to be self-supporting on arrival, or the capital to invest in a business. The economic rise of the "Asian dragons" meant that many middle-class Asians from the Pacific Rim became the main source of migrants to both Australia and New Zealand. In 2003 the general skills category was replaced by a skilled migrant category. This replaced the pass mark system with a process whereby people qualifying above a level of points entered a selection pool, from which they were invited to apply for residence. In spite of the lack of success, the encouragement for business immigration has continued. Under the business migrant category, there are investors, who were expected to contribute a minimum of NZ$1 million, and entrepreneurs, who had to prove that they had established a successful business in New Zealand.

In 2011 New Zealand's immigration regulations remained blind to race or nationality. But in the application of the policy, there was some evidence that the focus on the high level of English language requirements and the non-recognition of professional degrees and skills outside of the British system were leading to a decline in the number of immigrants from the Chinese regions.[18]

Contemporary Chinese communities in Australia and New Zealand

The arrival of new Chinese immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s has resulted in radical changes in the community. The contrast in the community's profile between the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries could not be greater. The most noticeable feature is the much higher ratio of females. The traditional predominance of Chinese males has now completely reversed. Gender parity was achieved in the 1991 census; thereafter, New Zealand has seen a predominance of females. This is a tell-tale sign of the "astronaut phenomenon," as many of the working-age men have returned to earn better money in the booming Asian economies (Pe-Pua 1996; Beal *et al.* 1999; Ho *et al.* 2001; Ip 2002).

In Australia, the first significant group of Chinese arrivals after the demise of the White Australia Policy was in fact not directly from China, but from Southeast Asia. In the early 1970s, the refugees from war-torn Vietnam and Cambodia arriving in Australia were predominantly ethnic Chinese. They formed very distinctive communities in cities like Sydney and Adelaide. The economic migrants from Hong Kong followed in the 1980s and 1990s. Haunted by the fear of the uncertain future when China would reclaim sovereignty of the British colony, large numbers of Hong Kongers became "reluctant exiles" (Skeldon 1994; Salaff and Wong 1995). The big cities on the Pacific Rim were favorite destinations: Vancouver in Canada, Sydney in Australia, and Auckland in New Zealand. (For an overview of the Chinese population in Australia after the mid-1970s see Table 10.1.)

By the late 1980s, significant numbers of international students from the People's Republic of China were studying as international students in Australia and New Zealand. Many of these arrived as short-term English language students, while a smaller number studied in tertiary institutions. The tragic turn of events of the 4 June 1989 Pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square shocked the world. Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke's tearful condemnation of the military crackdown was followed by the dramatic announcement that Australia would grant asylum

Table 10.1 Rising Chinese population in Australia since the mid-1970s (Ancestry-Chinese and China-born Chinese)

	Ancestry-Chinese	*PRC Born Chinese*
1976		19,542
1981		25,883
1986	201,165	36,595
1991		77,882
1996		111,009
2001	556,554	142,780
2006	669,890	206,589

to Chinese students worried about their return to China. Subsequently, both the Australian and New Zealand governments granted political asylum to the Chinese students already in their countries and gave them permanent resident status. When New Zealand formally accepted 600 Chinese nationals under the humanitarian category, the local newspaper reports with unusual historical insight,

> New Zealand has not always treated its Chinese community with fairness or respect. Official discrimination manifested itself in the poll-tax levied on every Chinese immigrant from 1881 to the mid 1930s and the denial of social welfare benefits until 1935. Some small atonement, then, that 600 or so Chinese who sought refuge here after the iron hand of Tian'anmen Square should be given permanent residence.[19]

In both countries, the new Chinese immigrants are a very different breed from their predecessors who arrived over a century ago as gold miners or market gardeners. Instead of being migrants from the South China home villages, the new Chinese are from highly developed urban centers and metropolises both inside and outside "China proper." Many are "re-migrants" from British Hong Kong, nationalist Taiwan, or diasporic outposts Singapore and Malaysia (Friesen and Ip 2001).

They are generally well-educated professionals, technocrats, or business people with internationally transferable skills. Many have chosen to migrate to Australia and New Zealand because they want to raise their children in a less competitive educational environment, or because they want a more leisurely lifestyle and new employment opportunities.

In contrast to the pioneers of a century ago, the new Chinese migrants are generally well-traveled, well informed and articulate, and therefore less likely to tolerate discrimination in any form. Their general desire for social recognition and integration has also made them active in philanthropy and politics. In both countries, we see the formation of effective Chinese professional associations and high-profile business groups. The communities also formed their own self-help advice centers offering support to new arrivals. Services offered include pragmatic support like English classes, basic legal advice, counseling, and life-skill courses (Ip 2003).

Successive waves of new immigrants from the early 1990s also reinvigorated many Chinese cultural traditions. The new migrants have both the cultural knowledge and the organizational skills, not to mention the time and the resources, to promote what they truly value. In both Australia and New Zealand, Chinese New Year and the Mid-Autumn Festival, for example, have become popular celebrations drawing huge attendance of Chinese and other ethnic groups. The Dragon Boat races have attracted multi-ethnic competitors, with the champion teams from Australasia eligible to compete for championship in China.

Ethnic identity: the 2006 censuses

Both countries had their most recent census in 2006 (see Figure 10.2). The synchronization of undertaking censuses in the same year is for easier comparisons and more accurate charting of the Trans-Tasman population flow for planning purposes.

According to the 2006 Australian Census, 206,591 Australians declared they were born in China Proper, excluding the SARs of Hong Kong and Macau. A further 71,803 declared they were born in the Hong Kong SAR, 2,013 in the Macau SAR and 24,368 in Taiwan. Chinese ancestry was claimed by 669,896, denoting that a big percentage of the Chinese are either local-born or have arrived from countries other than the above-named regions. In addition, Taiwanese ancestry was claimed by 5,837 persons.

In New Zealand, people were asked to indicate the ethnic group with which they identified. The numbers include those who indicated more than one group. The Chinese are the largest group within the Asian ethnicity category, and they are the third largest ethnic group within New Zealand, after Pakeha/New Zealand European and Maori, the indigenous people. In 2006, there were 147,567 Chinese living in New Zealand. Just over half (77,157 or 52.29%) born in China. The second largest group was New Zealand-born Chinese, who numbered 32,112 (21.76%). Among other overseas-born Chinese living in New Zealand, 10,638 (7.21%) were born in Taiwan; 6,705 (4.54%) were born in Hong Kong. 20,955 (14.2%) were born in other overseas countries or did not specify a birthplace. Both the Hong Kong born and Taiwan born group have decreased in number in the last two censuses.

The significant numerical decline of the Hong Kong population in both Australia and New Zealand has been noticeable since the late 1990s. This was largely the result of the restoration of confidence in Hong Kong after the 1997 Handover. While many feared the future under Communist rule, the economic prosperity of Hong Kong became a magnet drawing many of the reluctant exiles back to its fold.

A number of the Taiwanese have also returned, or moved onto a third country. The phenomenon of transmigration, the circulatory flow of highly skilled migrants became increasingly evident among the Chinese, and is set to form the newest chapter of the story of Chinese migration (Ip 2011).



Figure 10.2 Trend of rising Chinese population in New Zealand

Legislative protection against discrimination and New Zealand's poll tax apology

Meanwhile, increasing legislative protection materialized in both countries to safeguard the Chinese and other minorities against discrimination. As discussed above, the White Australia policy was for all practical purposes defunct from 1973 onwards. In 1975 the Australian government passed the Racial Discrimination Act (RDA), which made racially based selection criteria illegal. Furthermore, the Racial Hatred Act (RHA) was introduced in October 1995 and extends the coverage of the RDA to prohibit offensive behavior based on racial hatred (racial vilification).

Similarly, New Zealand introduced the Race Relations Act in 1993 which forbids discrimination on grounds of color, race, and ethnicity. Both countries set up a Human Rights Commission as human rights and equal opportunities watchdog, and the Commissioners' duties include the investigations of complaints of any infringement of the race relations legislation.

In New Zealand, a highly significant event for the Chinese community took place in 2002. At the Chinese New Year celebration on 12 February that year, Prime Minister Helen Clark made a formal apology to the New Zealand Chinese community in parliament:

> I wish to announce today that the government has decided to make a formal apology to those Chinese people who paid the poll tax and suffered other discrimination imposed by statute and to their descendants. With respect to the poll tax we recognize the considerable hardship it imposed and that the cost of it and the impact of other discriminatory immigration practices split families apart. Today we also express our sorrow and regret that such practices were once considered appropriate.

To many of New Zealand's poll-tax descendants, this apology brought closure to their humiliation and suffering. To the community as a whole, it was a formal recognition that the Chinese should be accorded a fair share of the level playing field.[20]

Bicultural New Zealand and multicultural Australia: trans-Tasman relations

> Australia has many alliances and friends around the world … but New Zealand alone is family.
> *(Julia Gillard, Australian Prime Minister, 2011)*

In terms of race relations, New Zealand is officially "bicultural" – recognizing the partnership of Maori culture and non-Maori culture; while Australia is multicultural. Ever since the 1920s, the two countries have cemented a special bond, a particularly close relationship which allowed a free flow of people in between Australia and New Zealand.

The 1973 Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement has allowed Australian and New Zealand citizens to enter each other's country to visit, live and work, without the need to apply for authority to enter the other country. In other words, the movement of Australian and New Zealand citizens between the two countries is not governed by the usual immigration policies.

Since Australia has a much bigger economy and a much greater job market, the flow of population has largely been one-way, from New Zealand to Australia. In times of slower economic growth, then many New Zealanders return home. Many more New Zealanders are living in Australia than Australians living in New Zealand. Many of these New Zealand migrants are Maori. The population size of Maori in Australia is so significant that in 2007, the co-leader of New Zealand's Maori Party, Pita Sharples, proposed the creation of an additional seat in the

New Zealand Parliament, so that Maori living in Australia might be represented. Although nothing came of this proposal, it is illustrative of the significant size of the New Zealand Maori population in Australia. The biggest South Island tribe, the Ngai Tahu, has a register of its members and descendants, and again many of their people are currently located in Australia.

New Zealanders in Australia previously had immediate access to Australian welfare benefits and were sometimes characterized as living off Australian social welfare benefits. This was a point of contention whenever the Prime Ministers of the two countries met. Nevertheless, Canberra announced regulation changes in 2001 whereby New Zealanders must wait two years before being granted welfare.

The Australian policy change was preceded by several years' of media hype and heated discussions on how "new Asian immigrants" were using New Zealand as a "revolving door." It was suggested that many Chinese (aka "new Asians") chose to use New Zealand as a stepping stone to enter Australia. Since New Zealand has a comparatively lower threshold of entry, migrants who might not qualify to enter Australia in the first place might try to gain New Zealand citizenship first, and then enter Australia with their newly gained identity. Some scholars pointed out a higher than normal percentage of "China-born" New Zealand arrivals since the mid-1990s as evidence of their fears (Rapson 1996; 1998).

While some Australians worry about New Zealand migrants (Chinese and others) becoming a welfare burden, New Zealanders worry about a continual brain drain. The loss of New Zealand's brightest, young and most employable citizens across the Tasman has been a long-term worry. Given the unequal size of the economies and the vast difference in population, these ongoing trends are unlikely to change significantly.

Similarly, neither country is going to drastically change its immigration policy toward the Chinese. In fact, it would be highly unlikely, if not downright impossible, for either Australia or New Zealand to announce any particular immigration policy aimed at any particular racial group. It would be far too discriminatory. On a practical level, the fact that China is now an economic power house in Asia, and the world's second largest economy, is going to raise the status of the ethnic Chinese. In both countries, new Chinese immigrants are now looked upon as possible bridge-builders fostering linkages with the rising Asian economies. In the age of transnationalism and globalization, the Chinese of both countries will have increasingly pivotal roles to play.

Notes

1 The *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* defines the Anglosphere as "the group of countries where English is the main native language." The *Merriam-Webster* defines it as "the countries of the world in which the English language and cultural values predominate."
2 The 1861 Lambing Flats Riot saw over 2,000 Chinese miners driven off the goldfield by European miners; a number of the Chinese died violently.
3 See Keevak (2011: 83) for a discussion of how Darwinism was used in the 1850s to justify racial ranking even though Darwin's works barely mentioned "race."
4 For the specific wariness shown toward Chinese women because they could procreate, see Ip (2002: 149–66).
5 For a study of the Australian cartoons, see Hornadge (1971). For a study of the New Zealand political cartoons, see Ip and Murphy (2005).
6 The Australian colonies were very assertive with their decision to pass legislation against Chinese entry. The British colonial office was mindful of keeping the façade of respectability and wished to avoid being overtly racist toward the Chinese. Britain was also mindful of not offending Japan, its new naval ally. The Australian colonies saw Britain as unsympathetic, and some of the unruly miners decided to take the matter into their own hands by expelling the Chinese forcibly. According to Myra Willard, the Buckland Riot and the Lambing Flat Riot of the late 1850s happened largely because of the Australian miners' frustration. See Willard (1923: 24–36).

7 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 14 September 1920, p. 905.
8 The Australian and New Zealand local-born Chinese were required to be thumb-printed and hold re-entry permits in order to exercise the right to return home. See Murphy (2003: 48–68) for an early attempt by a New Zealand Chinese family to challenge the legality of the New Zealand Government's practice of enforcing re-entry permits on local-born Chinese.
9 The mutual freedom of travel arrangement was first established in 1840, when New Zealand became a British colony.
10 Commonwealth Franchise Bill, second reading. Australian House of Representatives Hansard, 23 April 1902, House of Representatives, p. 11929.
11 See Ip (ed., 2009: 1): "While we acknowledge that the study of two particular groups of people, no matter how important they are, does not comprehensively cover all the divergent races which make up the national population, we consider that Maori and Chinese are distinctive enough, both in their own particular histories and in their mode of mutual interaction through New Zealand's evolving socio-political saga, to exemplify certain crucial aspects of intergroup dynamics."
12 For New Zealand's acceptance of Chinese war refugees as permanent residents, see Fong (1959) and Ip (1990).
13 Dunstan also refers to Calwell's notorious remark during a parliamentary debate "Two Wongs don't make a White."
14 According to Sedgewick (1984), in the 1950s the Chinese community remained in the dark about the government's repeated refusal to allow Chinese teachers to enter New Zealand. The Chinese used to send their children back to the home villages for a proper Chinese education or for some cultural exposure, but the practice stopped after 1949, when the Communist government was established. To the community, it became very important to have Chinese teachers. But the New Zealand and Australian governments looked upon Chinese schools as a barrier to assimilation, and greatly discouraged the effort. Visas were no longer issued to Chinese teachers after 1950.
15 The Chinese were required to formally renounce Chinese nationality before being considered for Australian or New Zealand citizenship. They also had to prove that they were "closer to the New Zealand way of life than to the Chinese." See Murphy (1997: 40).
16 See Ip (1996) for the form of the model minority concept.
17 For the challenges faced by the local-born Chinese, their sense of being in-between and ambivalence, see Yee (2003: 215–35).
18 In recent years, the number of immigrants from the PRC to both Australia and New Zealand remained quite high, while the numbers from Taiwan and Hong Kong dropped. In both countries, the number of successful applicants from English-speaking regions (like South Africa, India, The Philippines) has risen.
19 *New Zealand Herald,* 27 June 1994, p.1.
20 For a discussion of the significance of the Poll-Tax Apology, see Wong (2003: 258–79).

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11

The Chinese in South Africa

Five centuries, five trajectories

Karen L. Harris

Introduction

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the increasing presence of China and the Chinese on the African continent has received unprecedented media attention, followed by intense academic scrutiny and heated debate (Ampiah and Naidu 2008: 5; Taylor 2009: 1). While popular journalism portrayed the West as concerned, if not wary, about the "new imperialists" in the region (Anon. 2006: 53; Van Rensburg 2007: 128), the academic deliberation has ranged between presenting China as an exploiter on the one hand and a partner on the other (Alden 2007: 5). It has been argued that after the West's twentieth-century post-colonial tangential concern for aid for third world development in Africa, there is now a return in the twenty-first century to the nineteenth century era of an aggressive colonial scramble for natural resources and potential markets in Africa (Lee 2006: 303–4). This scramble apparently intensified when China entered the fray as a new major player. Lee argues that this scramble is not unlike its nineteenth-century predecessor as it too has "two faces" – the one of "Saving Africa" and the other of "Naked Imperialism" (2006: 303–4). The debate over China as "partner, competitor or colonizer" (Alden 2007: 5) rages on as the competition between the world powers persists.

What is however often overlooked in this recent popular Africa-scramble-hype is that the Chinese and China are not newcomers to this continent. It has been contended that China made an appearance in this region over a half dozen centuries ago as early as the 1400s with the voyages of Cheng Ho. While there is much conjecture about these earlier encounters between China and Africa (Harris 2003), the appearance of Chinese on the continent during the colonial period of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is well recorded. The Portuguese, British, French and, to a lesser extent, the Germans and Belgians, were all responsible for bringing Chinese workers to their colonial possessions in Africa. In the post-slavery period and with the apparent absence and unavailability of a willing or able workforce locally, the Chinese were regarded as a controllable solution to assist the European colonists in the development of their respective colonial possessions. This included amongst others the construction of railways, building of roads, cultivation of crops, development of plantations, fortification of harbors and excavation of mines (Snow 1988: 42–6). While the Chinese workforce accomplished much in these colonial-run sectors, it is plausible that their presence left an indelible and paradoxical mark on the popular consciousness of African societies.

From the mid-twentieth century, China entered the African stage as a potential ally of various African countries as they embarked on their struggles to obtain independence (Snow 1988: xiii–iv, 70). In particular, after supporting liberation movements China later built railways, educated the students and provided medical assistance to the newly founded independent countries. Part of this strategy was to gain influence in the region, show solidarity against the West and to outdo its ideological rival, the Soviet Union (Anon. 2006). This was followed from the late twentieth century by China's dramatically increasing direct interest in Africa for trade, resources and investment (Taylor 2006: 1). In the past decade, China has been ranked as the fifth largest country of origin of foreign investment in Africa, and while this funding provides opportunities to African states, it in turn must in the end be to China's benefit (Grimm 2011: 3).

Thus the intermittent presence of the Chinese and China in Africa over these past centuries has always been and remains ambiguous as they vacillate between positions of passive detachment and disinterest to active involvement and investment. These divergent and sometimes opposing stances are attributable to the changing historical contexts of China as a global force and the respective host country's political and economic environment. It is in the context of this shifting scenario over many centuries, both in terms of China and the recipient African countries, that this chapter turns to focus on the Chinese in South Africa as a case study. It not only considers the history of the Chinese in this part of the world within the social context of the host societies, but also situates them as a separate cultural group differentiating between the ethnic Chinese who became South African and the more recent transient or Chinese in diaspora. It will be evident that during this extended period of time in a country which has undergone major political changes and transformation, the place of the Chinese remains invidious.

Seventeenth-century small beginnings

Besides the above mentioned speculation about a possible Chinese encounter with Africa in the fifteenth century, the first tangible record of a Chinese presence in South Africa dates back to the decade after the arrival of the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) in the mid-seventeenth century. Only interested in establishing a victual station at the Cape to supply their ships travelling to the East, the initial small DEIC cohort were intent on producing supplies and obtaining goods through trade with the indigenous peoples (Ross 2008: 22–3). It soon became apparent that this was not feasible and the first Commander, having been exposed to the Chinese work ethic in the East, wrote to the DEIC officials requesting the import of "some industrious Chinese" to farm and develop the settlement (Thom 1952: 33). During the DEIC period, this never transpired, however some 350 Chinese did come to the Cape between 1652–1799, either as free individuals or convicted exiles from the Dutch possessions in the East (Armstrong 1997: 4–5).

Although the number of Chinese at the Cape settlement was small, there never being more than 50 at any one time, Armstrong (1997: 1) argues that there must indeed have been a distinctive sense of community amongst some of them. Besides their own markers of identity such as a shared language, culture, cuisine and living in relatively close proximity of one another (Armstrong 1997: 1), it can be argued that they were also galvanized together as a result of the manner in which they were "portrayed, perceived of, treated and discriminated against" (Harris 2008: 1). This possibly entrenched a cultural cohesion that at the same time contributed to their cultural visibility and compounded what was oftentimes an invidious and peculiar position within South African society (Harris 2008). It was in a sense the genesis of a pattern that would be perpetuated throughout their five-century history under the colonial, segregated and racist dispensations that dominated the country, and went even beyond these times into the post-apartheid new democratic dispensation of the twenty-first century.

Not unlike other colonial destinations, the first free Chinese who arrived at the Cape could be termed transient in that they mainly arrived as single male individuals. Although a few were to have stayed at the Cape for up to three decades (Armstrong 1997: 1, 66), generally their sojourns appear to have been of shorter durations. As a rule they do not appear to have had extended families that settled at the Cape and are not the ancestors of the ethnic Chinese South Africans. However, their relatively brief encounter with the early settlement remains significant.

Most of the free individuals – as opposed to those banished to "to earn their keep" for a set period of time (Armstrong 1997: 3, 11) – were self employed, being occupied in a range of small-scale enterprises. These included trading activities in eastern goods, fish, confectionery and fresh produce, some of which they cultivated or produced themselves. Others were known to have kept small eating houses and cook shops earning themselves the reputation of being "good cooks" and restaurateurs (Mentzel 1921: 92). That some of these individuals became reasonably wealthy is evident in their wills that revealed extensive possessions, sometimes even including slaves, as well as the fact that their economic activities were at times opposed by their contemporary European settlers. As a result of petitions from the latter against the so-called Chinese competition, numerous legal regulations with penalties and fines were introduced to curb and limit the Chinese economic activities (Harris 1995: 157–58). Thus despite their miniscule numbers, the stigma attached to so many Chinese in other overseas destinations as "unfair competition" and an "economic threat," was also to prevail in the early colonial Cape and was to persist to the present day (Harris 2010a: 213–31).

Armstrong (1997: 61) aptly describes the Chinese during this early colonial period as having been an "unassimilated appendage" literally listed separately at the bottom of the Company census lists. He points out that this "symbolized in a striking way" their status, and one might add, their position in society. However, it is also interesting to note that while they might have been relegated to a peripheral position on the outskirts of European settler society, the Chinese were also to emulate much of the activities of this dominant group. Like the Europeans, they often remained insular and distant from the indigenous peoples; they were active participants in the prevailing Cape economy, trading and offering services, and at the same time accrued wealth that included the ownership of slaves. The latter was an important indicator of wealth and status at the Cape settlement and was for the most part a prerogative of the Europeans, becoming a key determinant between classes within an increasingly stratified society. From this perspective, these early Chinese arrivals were ambivalently positioned between the marginalized edge and the prevailing core – a position that the ethnic Chinese would persistently find themselves in during the centuries ahead.

When the British occupied the Cape at the turn of the nineteenth century, the position of the Chinese within colonial society appears to have remained relatively unchanged, yet their numbers were to dwindle dramatically. Although the British East India Company (BEIC) did not exile colonial convicts to the Cape as the DEIC had, there is evidence indicating that as early as 1804 it was recommended that the most effective way to improve the Cape would be the "introduction of Chinese" (Barrow 1804: 430–1; 1806: 150). Even though they were again recognized for their work acumen, and resolutions were passed by the British authorities to introduce Chinese labor, very limited numbers were actually contracted let alone encouraged to come to the Cape (Van der Horst 1942: 118). Significantly, in the first official Cape census of 1891 in which the Chinese were specifically enumerated at a mere 215, they were again relegated to a subsection of a "race" category termed "Mixed and other" (*Statistical Register* 1891: 4). It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century, after the European penetration of the interior of southern Africa, that a new wave of non-transient free Chinese individuals arrived in southern Africa.

Late nineteenth-century arrivals

The mid-nineteenth century witnessed a dramatic increase in the size and extent of Chinese emigration globally. It involved the movement of in excess of two million people and heralded the arrival and more permanent residence of ethnic Chinese in numerous destinations, including South Africa (Pan 1991: 43). Although the number of Chinese that came to the four southern African states was relatively small, there was a marked increase in arrivals that coincided with the mineral discoveries of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886. By the end of the nineteenth century the highest concentration of Chinese in southern Africa was to be found in the gold mining region of the Witwatersrand, estimated at well over 1,000 (PRO CO 1904). These ethnic Chinese, who were the ancestors of most of the South African Chinese, originated primarily from the south China province of Guangdong and were either Cantonese or Hakka (Huang 1954: 50). Yap and Man (1996: 32–3) claim that from the outset this geographical distinction accounted for traditional ethnic animosity that was transferred to the overseas location despite the fact that they were, and continued to be, regarded by the host societies as "simply Chinese". Tan (1998: 29) endorses this in another context when he points out that "while people of Chinese descent worldwide are identified as Chinese, their subjective experiences of identification and perception are not the same."

The ethnic Chinese in South Africa set up mainly small-scale businesses as service-providers or traders, but unlike their overseas counterparts, they were prohibited by legislation from participating in the mining industry. From the inception of the state of the South African Republic (SAR) in the mid-nineteenth century – in which the Witwatersrand gold was later to be discovered – various pieces of legislation were put in place that discriminated against people who were not white, who belonged to "one of the native races of Asia" and ultimately specifically targeted the Chinese (Harris 1998a: 272). In its first constitution of 1858 the SAR had instituted a color bar according to which there would be no equality "in Church or State" between the white inhabitants and "colored" people (Kotzé 1887: 36). Moreover, according to Law 3 of 1885 (*Statute Law of the Transvaal 1839–1910*) "Coolies, Arabs and other Asiatics" were prohibited from obtaining citizenship rights or owning fixed property. A year later this legislation was altered slightly so that Asians could own land in "such streets wards and locations as the government for purposes of sanitation shall assign them to live in" (*Volksraad Resolutie* 1886). This meant that the Chinese as "Asians" could also not trade outside these locations as no distinction was made between "living" and "trading." In addition, besides every Asian having to register with a payment, an 1893 resolution stipulated that "every Chinamen was bound to provide himself with a special pass" with an annually renewable stamp of £25 (Harris 1995: 159). To further restrict their activities within the newly discovered El Dorado, Law 15 of 1898 (*Statute Law of the Transvaal 1839–1910*) stipulated that as regards the "digging for and dealing with precious metals," "no colored person" may be a license-holder or in any way be connected with the working of diggings, unless they were employed as workmen in the service of whites.

Yet despite these legislative limitations, the Chinese persisted in arriving and settling in the region (Miao 1947: 30). They were however also by no means passive recipients of these discriminatory laws as well as the anti-Asiatic sentiments that abounded among sectors of the white population (Yap and Man 1996: 78). Indicative again of a sense of community, and in the face of shared grievances, the archival record attests to a number of petitions signed by on average one-third of the community (250 to 300) from the Witatersrand region. They objected to their removal from areas where they had established viable businesses and claimed they did not want to be forced to live in locations with "other Asians" nor be classified as such. They also made a point of proclaiming themselves "law-abiding" and "loyal" supporters of the state declaring they were also prepared

to pay state taxes, but demanded that they should have the same free trade rights as those given to foreigners of all nationalities in China. These petitions were sent to both the SAR government as well as the British authorities in the Cape Colony and were sometimes accompanied with signed vindications from white SAR residents (Yap and Man 1996: 78–83; Harris 2002: 108). These were ultimately to no avail.

It was this sense of ethnic identity, combined with a shared indignation regarding the experienced injustices, that was to re-emerge in a more visible and vociferous manner after the South African War fought primarily between Boer and Brit from 1899 to 1902. In the early twentieth century the SAR was taken over by the British as the Transvaal Colony, and a third wave of Chinese would be ushered into the region, albeit of a temporary nature. This transient trajectory would have a significant and serious long-term impact on the ethnic Chinese already resident in the region.

Early twentieth-century indentured labor

After an interlude of two and a half years of war, the British colonial powers were bent on getting the Witwatersrand gold mines back into full production. One of the problems they faced was the disruption the war had caused among the labor force resulting in an apparent unskilled workforce shortage (Denoon 1967: 481; Tinker 1974: 298). Since the British Empire had a legacy of indentured labor and had already engaged Chinese emigrants in its colonies and protectorates from the early nineteenth century, including southern Africa, this was a viable option (Northrup 1995: 17, 29). Moreover, in contrast to the Chinese authority's initial lack of interest in their subjects abroad, by the mid-nineteenth century the passenger trade in Chinese labor had indeed become more regulated (Richardson 1982: 268). In 1855 the Chinese Passenger Act was instituted to monitor British ships carrying Chinese passengers and in 1860, according to the Convention of Peking, the Imperial authorities agreed to a "system of foreign contract emigration" as long as the "British Minister in Peking [notified] the Chinese government of the terms and conditions of the engagement" (Thompson 1906: 430; Campbell 1923: 129). Thus, despite heated opposition and debate both locally and abroad, by 1904 the Anglo-Chinese Labor Convention was signed in London and the Labor Importation Ordinance was promulgated in the Transvaal Colony. The former insisted on the "proper supervision and protection of such immigrants" to allay concerns of "slavery," while the latter was primarily restrictive in nature to annul white fears of "labor intrusion" (Naylor 1904: 67).

According to the various agreements and regulations set in place, the indentured Chinese for the Transvaal mines were to enter a contract of service for three years after which they were to be returned to "their country of origin" (Richardson 1982: 166). This differed significantly from the earlier southern African indenture scheme when Indians had been contracted by the British to work on the Natal Colony sugar plantations from 1860 and, after a five-year term of indenture, had the option of being re-indentured or remaining as free people in the country. The public outcry against the Indian scheme actually resulted in an undertaking that the Chinese would "not enter the Transvaal under the same conditions as the Indians had entered Natal" (Harris 2010b: 152–3). Thus it is critical to note that these indentured Chinese laborers represented a temporary expedient and could never, like the Indians, become ex-indentured and part of South African society (Harris 1998a: 113). In addition, the regulations also specified that the Chinese indentured laborers were only to be employed on the Witwatersrand as unskilled miners, they had to reside in compounds on the premises on which they were employed, were issued with a passport and had to obtain a permit to leave for periods of less than 48 hours. It was also stipulated that the Chinese laborers were not to be employed in 55 occupations, except in unskilled capacities,

could not engage in trade nor own landed property. In addition, severe penalties were set in place to address transgressions such as desertion, absenteeism or employment other than that designated in the ordinance (*Ordinances of the Transvaal* 1904). These restrictions constrained and confined the indentured Chinese to such an extent that there was little, if any, contact with the resident ethnic Chinese community.

To administer the Chinese indentured scheme in the Transvaal Colony a Foreign Labor Department was created with a Superintendent of Labor along with various officers to monitor the conditions and treatment of the laborers. In addition, a Chinese Consul-General was appointed by the Chinese Emperor to oversee the welfare of the emigrants (PRO CO 1905). Of great significance for the resident ethnic Chinese in South Africa was the fact that in 1905 the Consul-General also obtained jurisdiction over the free or resident ethnic Chinese in the South African region. As I have argued elsewhere (Harris 1996: 72–80), "this represented the only tangible connection between the free Chinese and their indentured compatriots" and in addition was also to have a very significant impact on the place of the Chinese within the remainder of the twentieth century (Harris 2007).

The Chinese indenture labor scheme had ramifications that went way beyond the mere half dozen years it was instituted. Besides the alleviation of the unskilled labor shortage on the mines and the increase in gold production – which surpassed the pre-war figures thereby reinstating the Transvaal as the world's largest single producer of gold (Richardson 1982: 180) – there were various other consequences on economic, political and social levels (Yap and Man 1996: 134–5; Harris 1998a: 137–47). The political hype about, as well as the actual treatment of the Chinese miners left much to be desired. The anti-campaigners and the media had a field day in portraying the Chinese miners as "unsavory," "murderous," "degenerate" and an "inferior other" endorsing feelings of orientalism, which along with the outrages that did occur, became integral to long-term popular consciousness (Harris 1998a: 121–33; 177–81). Of more relevance to this discussion, however, is the impact the indentured Chinese scheme had on the free ethnic Chinese communities.

The heightened attention of the introduction of the Chinese indentured laborers, and the implementation of the experiment itself, led to an increase in the "anti-Asiatic" and, more specifically, anti-Chinese sentiments. From the outset of the campaign to introduce Chinese labor, members of the free Chinese community in the Transvaal and Cape Colony appeared to have officially and pragmatically distanced themselves from their indentured compatriots. In a 1903 petition from the Chinese in the Transvaal to the British authorities it was stated that they were "neither interested nor concerned with the introduction or otherwise of Chinese labor for the mines" (PRO CO 1903); while a letter from a resident Chinese in the Cape contended that it would be "detrimental to the social interests of the Colony" and that "together with [his] brother Chinamen here [he was] against the importation of the lower class of Chinese laborers" (*South African News* 1904). Given that the Chinese laborers were confined to mine compounds and were strictly monitored, there is little record of contact between the free and the indentured Chinese, other than the commercial trading and supplying of Chinese goods and services. Moreover, there were also vast regional and consequently linguistic and other differences between the majority of the free ethnic Chinese who originated from the southern provinces and the indentured laborers who were almost entirely recruited in the northern provinces of China (Richardson 1982: 104).

In both the Cape and Transvaal colonies the free Chinese communities were to suffer the impact of the proposed mine labor scheme. In the Cape so much political mileage was made of the potential influx of Chinese laborers that it ultimately resulted in 1904 in the introduction of the Chinese Exclusion Act (*Statutes of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope* 1904). This was the first "overtly racist piece of legislation introduced during the genesis of white hegemony in

southern Africa" (Harris 2008: 9). It singled out the "whole of the Chinese race" and disallowed any new Chinese immigration into the Colony. Chinese who could prove previous residence in the Cape (or who were British subjects) had to obtain annually renewable exemption permits and had to register with the district magistrate if they relocated. This legislation remained on the statute books until 1933 (*Statutes of the Union of South Africa* 1933) and the salient features of it were also incorporated in the 1913 Immigration Act (*Statutes of the Union of South Africa* 1913) effectively terminating the free immigration of ethnic Chinese for almost three-quarters of a century (*Statutes of the Republic of South Africa* 1986). The local Cape Chinese reaction to the Act was virtually non-existent. Barring a few individual appeals against the implementation requirements – such as having to strip naked for the recording of marks of identification – the Chinese complied with the legislation. Apart from the demographically diffuse nature of the Chinese community living in towns across a 2,000 km span (*Cape of Good Hope* 1908), it can be assumed that the Chinese did not want to draw more attention to their already invidious situation and risk the enforcement of more stringent action. After the arrival of the Consul-General in late 1905 some Chinese requested his written intervention for the renewal of trading licenses, permits to visit China and the immigration of wives and children (Harris 1998a: 250).

In the Transvaal Colony the British authorities not only perpetuated the "Asiatic" legislation of the former SAR regarding separate residential areas, trading licenses and registration, but in the light of the indentured scheme, also enforced the restrictions far more rigorously than before. To further strengthen legislative efforts to curb post-war illegal immigration into the Transvaal Colony, the re-registration of all Asians was specifically required and an "Asiatic Department" was established for administration and control purposes (Brown 1989: 33–45). The Transvaal Chinese communities continued to resist this discriminatory treatment through petitions and deputations to the British authorities. They repeated claims that they were a "peaceful law-abiding and industrious folk" who were a "necessary and desirable addition to the community," but asserted that the restrictive legislation was "inconsistent and illegal" given the relations that existed between "His Britannic Majesty and the Emperor of China." In this instance they therefore laid claim to their status as members of an Empire that had treaty terms of equality with England and objected to being classified with "other Asiatics … that were not a ruling race." There was again evidence of some European support for the Chinese as petitions were sometimes accompanied by affidavits to that effect (PRO CO 1903; TAD LTG 1902–3).

In 1906–7 the anti-Asian regulations reached a new high with the promulgation of the Asiatic Amendment Act, also known as the Black Act. It required the compulsory registration of all Asian males over the age of eight with the Registrar of Asiatics, a new registration certificate with identification marks, as well as finger and thumb impressions (*Statutes of the Transvaal* 1907). It was this legislation that led to the renowned Indian *satyagraha* or passive resistance movement led by Mahatma Gandhi, but also resulted in the relatively unknown similar, but separate action by the Transvaal Chinese community led by Leung Quinn (Harris 1996: 69–95; Yap and Man 1996: 137–68). The Chinese community was steadfast in their resistance and although they endorsed and often cooperated with Gandhi's Indian resistance, they also operated on their own and, as in the past, at times even differentiated between themselves as Chinese and the "other races." At one level their objections were against putting "Chinese subjects on the same level as British subjects coming from India" and at another they argued that the requirement for fingerprints reduced them to a "level lower than that of the natives of South Africa and other colored people" (PRO CO 1907). This separate and distinct ethnic identity or "Chineseness" would continue to play a prominent role in the history of the place of the ethnic Chinese within South Africa.

The Chinese commitment to passive resistance was often commended by Gandhi and he referred to their solidarity as worthy of emulation (Gandhi 1961a: 397). On one occasion Gandhi

wrote "The Chinese have done something remarkable. They have surpassed us in unity, cleanliness, culture and generosity" (Gandhi 1961b: 162). Their resilience in not registering and being arrested by the authorities was evident in the fact that there were on occasion more Chinese in jail than Indians. Besides petitions and meetings, a Chinese deputation went to England to protest their case while Quinn was incarcerated along with Gandhi as part of the resistance campaign (Harris 1996: 69–95; Yap and Man 1996: 137–68). A temporary compromise was reached with the government and the respective leaders, but passive resistance ensued again with the Act only being finally repealed with the introduction of the 1913 Immigration Act. So ended an unprecedented but successful political episode in the history of the ethnic Chinese in southern Africa, the like of which would not occur until the twenty-first century.

With the introduction of responsible government to the Transvaal in 1907, the newly elected *Het Volk* party, along with the Liberal government in England, terminated the indentured Chinese labor scheme (Richardson 1982: 166). The remaining labor contracts were concluded and to all intents and purposes all the indentured Chinese were returned to China (Yap and Man 1996: 133). They had saved the gold mining industry, but had also inadvertently impacted negatively on the place of the free resident ethnic community.

Mid-twentieth-century political expediency

In 1910 the four states of southern Africa came together politically and economically to form the Union of South Africa. At all levels, including the social, it was a dispensation dominated by a white minority intent on maintaining superiority over the other cultural groupings within the country. Over the next few decades a range of segregationist pieces of legislation were put in place, but as the number of Chinese in the country had gradually dwindled as a result of the early twentieth-century restrictions on immigration, residence and social rights, they were no longer the object of specific acts. Legislatively speaking, the Asian question devolved into the Indian question (Harris 1998b: 279), yet the Chinese remained restricted by the regulations on the statute books pertaining to both Indians and "non-Europeans." For example, the above-mentioned Immigration Act of 1913 endorsed a "language test" and definition of a "prohibited immigrant" effectively excluding Chinese immigrants. The Chinese communities in the Union became exclusively reliant on natural increase residing in small cohesive groups in the larger cities scattered across the country.

Although by the mid-twentieth century the resident ethnic Chinese were second and third generation "South Africans," they had no constitutional rights and, along with other "non-Europeans," were basically treated as second-class citizens. This discriminatory situation was to become entrenched with the election victory of the National Party government in 1948 that instituted the policy of apartheid or "separate development." One of the key pieces of legislation to implement this policy was the Population Registration Act (*Statutes of the Union of South Africa* 1950a) according to which there were three racial classifications: "white," "native" and "colored" – the latter comprising those people who were not members of the former two. Due to widespread reaction within a year the "colored" group was subdivided into Indian, Chinese and Malay. To a certain extent the Chinese communities conceded to this as it aligned with their age-old desire not to be classified with other Asians, Indians or "non-Europeans." They had however made representations to the government regarding their possible classification as "European" or "white" by pointing out that they were accepted by the majority of the upper European classes and had one of the "highest cultures in the world." They conceded to being recognized and acknowledged as a separate group with a separate identity finally claiming in government negotiations that they were a "very race conscious group" that did not want to

belong to any other group than Chinese. Their use of their exclusive "Chineseness," or Chinese ethnicity, was expedient in this process (Harris 1999: 188–9).

However, the other cornerstone of the apartheid policy that the Chinese were not prepared to accord with was the Group Areas Act (*Statutes of the Union of South Africa* 1950b). This was the legislation that was regarded as the key measure for the realization of "one of the major objects of the policy of apartheid" – separate development and compulsory segregation (Harris 1999: 185). In simple terms it was intended to apportion each categorized group distinct residential areas and to control the acquisition and occupation thereof. It was also to prove to be the piece of apartheid legislation under which the Chinese were the most inconsistently treated, but at the same time it was their invidious position that contributed to showing up the futility and impracticality of the legislation.

The small size and scattered demographics of the community made the government's task of identifying and demarcating a group area for the Chinese a virtual impossibility. Moreover, the fact that the majority of the ethnic Chinese were dependent on trading for a livelihood was also used in their arguments that removal to a designated group would mean financial ruin. Their established businesses were dependent on the support of other racial groupings and they could not survive as a geographically separate group as their numbers were too small. They thus maintained that although they "should be a separate group, they should not [be] allocated a definite area" (SAD GGR 1952). For two decades the government authorities went to great lengths to try and determine viable areas for a Chinese group area. Numerous locations were proposed and investigated but ultimately abandoned. Eventually a single area in Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape called Kabega Park was proclaimed, but it was later de-proclaimed and the Chinese were allowed to live in areas designated for other groups as long as they acquired permission and permits.

The decision to allow the Chinese to reside where they were and not to remove them or create a separate group area meant that the "basic principle of the Act [had to be] jettisoned for the sake of a small minority group." In addition, the government claimed that the "present inter-group injustice in the field of trade [would] be continued to the detriment of every group except the Chinese" (SAD GGR 1954). In a sense this episode, whereby the Chinese were a separate group, but not awarded a separate area, made them the first ethnic group to bridge the apartheid divide (Harris 2002: 118). It has been argued that by default this gave the Chinese communities in the various urban areas an economic advantage, as they could trade in most racial zones designated for other groups (Human *et al.* 1987). At the same time, it was an episode that contributed to the comment made some decades later by the first President of the new democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela, when he stated that the South African Chinese had "helped to expose the twisted logic of apartheid" (Park 2007: 38).

Just as the apartheid government persisted in devising mechanisms to enforce its range of discriminatory policies, so too did the Chinese communities persist in quietly questioning and undermining these strategies. Restrictions that impacted on them included no franchise; no property rights; no admission to the better institutions of learning reserved for whites at both school and university level; no access to certain occupations and professions; no use of amenities reserved for white groups; no use of certain transportation and no membership of a range of professional bodies and organizations – to mention but a few. The apartheid system impacted on every dimension of their existence at both a local and national level (Accone 2007). The Chinese reaction and manner of dealing with the predicament was generally expedient. They resorted to signed petitions, local community representations and worked through the channels of the Chinese Consul-General. The latter representative gave the Chinese an official conduit to government that could not be dismissed out of hand. Yet although it meant that the Chinese were sometimes granted concessions or permission to certain considerations as the law could not accommodate

them, it was always an extremely invidious situation. They were never assured of their position, nor when officialdom – or the public at large – would subject them to the discrimination and exclusion of the apartheid regulations and legislation (Yap and Man 1996). This in itself further enhanced the cohesion of the various ethnic Chinese communities, but at the same time entrenched their isolation both within an extremely fractured South African society and from their Chinese homeland (Harris 2007).

The foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 initially had little impact on the new apartheid government's international relations. The Chinese were prohibited immigrants, and therefore there was no immigration to speak of other than the occasional admission of bona fide wives and children and temporary emigration visitors' permits. In due course, communism was also adopted by the apartheid government as another justification to enforce the exclusion of Chinese immigrants under the rubric of the *rooi gevaar* (red peril) or *geel gevaar* (yellow peril). Until the 1970s, the Republic of China in Taiwan (ROC) continued to send consular representatives to South Africa and remained an official interventionist voice for the Chinese communities within the country. The consulate also supported local Chinese cultural activities and made considerable financial contributions to a range of activities including education (Yap and Man 1996: 290, 312, 429; Harris 2007).

While emphasizing their common fight with South Africa against communism, the ROC was equally opportunistic in their efforts to upgrade their consular mission to ambassadorial level, particularly in the face of their own increasing international ostracism. Eventually, as a result of apartheid South Africa's economic isolation, the links between the two "pariah states" became stronger. By the mid-1970s the ROC was ranked as South Africa's fifth largest trading partner and in 1976 official diplomatic relations were established (Harris 1999: 198–200). It is not apparent how individual members of the community felt about this situation, other than that it was expedient to accept the ROC channel of intervention and not raise issues that would catapult them onto the government radar screen with possible discriminatory consequences. What was significant to the South African Chinese communities was that the apartheid government was forced to adjust certain sections of its discriminatory legislation so as to avoid embarrassment at state and business level with the concomitant ROC diplomatic and trade exchange visits. In the light of this, although the Chinese remained "non-white" according to the law in some instances prohibition gave way to permission and they were given access to certain white amenities. It is however important to note that the Chinese were never classified as "white" or "honorary white" by the government, who claimed that they had to maintain the status quo as they feared the reaction that might emerge among other "non-white" groups (Accone and Harris 2008: 196–8). That the Chinese continued to suffer the brunt of apartheid is clearly evident in the fact that there was a dramatic increase in the number of South African Chinese emigrating to the USA, Canada and Australasia (Harris 1998b: 285).

Another development related to the isolation of South Africa that also impacted on the local Chinese community was the flagging economies of a range of South African towns. In the 1980s, in an effort to improve this situation, various municipal regions embarked on government-sanctioned campaigns to entice wealthy new Chinese entrepreneurs from the ROC and Hong Kong to come and invest in South Africa. The local ethnic Chinese community remained tight-lipped on these developments until it became apparent that there were plans to establish exclusive zones or areas for the new Chinese migrants. Having successfully fought against the designation of Chinese group areas, the ethnic Chinese community made it apparent that they were not able to sanction or accept such developments (Harris 1999: 200–1). It was a distinct case of the ethnic South African Chinese taking a stand against the possible consequences of the arrival of the new migrants or Chinese in diaspora.

However, with the increased presence of people of Chinese descent and South Africa's strong ties with the ROC, the government was obliged to reassess the position of its third and fourth generation ethnic Chinese population resident in the country. After a broad constitutional investigation in 1980 the government proposed the founding of a 60 member council that would include nominated members of the "white, colored, Indian and Chinese population groups." Initially there was mixed reaction among the Chinese communities located across the country, but when the government went ahead without any consultation and appointed a Chinese representative to the council, the Chinese communities united in one official voice. They emphatically distanced themselves from a council that excluded the bulk of the population and also decided to form an umbrella organization, the Chinese Association of South Africa (CASA), to act as the official mouthpiece of the ethnic communities and to link the various regional organizations and associations – some of which dated back to the late 1800s and early 1900s (Yap and Man 1996: 53, 67, 86). As was the case at the turn of the twentieth century, government action had again propelled the relatively inconspicuous communities into the public domain that had in turn resulted in them standing together as a united ethnic group to protect their interests.

Turn of the millennium new migrants

As the twentieth century drew to a close and the apartheid state began to dismantle, the ethnic Chinese remained on the periphery of South African society although conditionally and tangentially connected with the dominant core. However, legislative transformation saw the repeal of discriminatory laws and the social, economic and political spaces began to open up to the previously disadvantaged members of society. While a new dawn appeared to be breaking, there were further obstacles of a different nature that the ethnic Chinese community had to face.

During the transitional phase of government, legislation regarding immigration was also relaxed allowing the entry of formerly "prohibited immigrants". In addition, regulations pertaining to municipal trading licenses were eased, opening up access to the informal business sector. The combined result was an increase of new Chinese migrants from the PRC and other South East Asian regions – or Chinese in diaspora – who were involved in street hawking. The arrival of these new migrants, as in the past, again had an indirect impact on the ethnic Chinese resident in the country. In 1992 it was estimated that there were more than 500 Chinese hawkers in the central business district of Johannesburg alone and more than half of the licenses being issued were to Chinese. At first the established businesses in these districts complained about the loss of clients and income as a result of this new development. This was followed by a vehement outcry from the representatives of the African Council of Hawkers and Informal Business (Achib) specifically against the Chinese hawkers. They accused them of "unfair competition" (Louw 1992: 6) claiming that they were "foreign invading traders" benefiting at the expense of the Africans who for years had fought apartheid to gain access to the informal trading sector. Although the Chinese traders were described as "doing business peacefully, respecting the laws of the country and following free market principles," (Chan 1992: 10) Achib persisted with their objections, tensions increased and the situation turned threatening. Again this incident thrust the Chinese as an ethnically identifiable group – both ethnic and diasporic – into the spotlight. Within weeks the number of Chinese hawkers in Johannesburg declined, probably leaving for fear of violence. The resident ethnic Chinese then stepped in to defuse the situation. In behind-the-scene negotiations with Achib, members of CASA, as well as the Chinese Business Association (CBA), offered the African hawkers direct access to Chinese manufacturers as well as funding to assist with training programs for African hawkers (Harris 1998c: 554–8). In the short-term a potentially volatile situation had been resolved, but in the long-term, anti-Sinitic feelings had been re-kindled.

Another development within the ambit of the new South African dispensation that was to impact on the insular Chinese community in the post-apartheid period was the decision taken by the African National Congress (ANC) government to switch diplomatic allegiance from the ROC to the PRC (Alden 1997: 80). After 22 years the ROC embassy became a Liaison Office and the PRC was established as the official ambassadorial representative from 1998. The South African Chinese community had only been able to maintain limited contact with the mainland due to the apartheid government's restrictions, and having relied on the ROC over the past decades as a conduit to government negotiation, they found themselves having to negotiate and deal with the complexities of the "two China" question.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the euphoria of being able to live and integrate as South African citizens was also abruptly interrupted for the ethnic Chinese. In an effort to redress the injustices of the past, the new South African government introduced two pieces of legislation regarding employment equity whereby members of society who had been discriminated against would be given, amongst other measures, access to employment opportunities in order to ensure workforce diversity. The Employment Equity Act and Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act defined "black people" as "a generic term which means Africans, Coloreds and Indians" (*Government Gazette* 1998; 2003). The Chinese presumed that as they had been defined as a sub-category of the "Colored" group in 1950, they were included in this legislation. It soon became apparent that this was not the case as they were again being discriminated against in terms of preferential shares, promotions and economic empowerment. It was a case of double racism – under the apartheid government they were not "white enough," and under the new government they were "not black enough" (Accone 1998).

After initially making unsuccessful representations to the government on the matter, the Minister of Trade and Industry responded by stating categorically that the "definition of 'black people' excluded the classification of Chinese people as black" (Whyte 2005: 14). This resulted in a protracted and full-scale legal battle that lasted eight years and ended up with CASA launching an application to the High Court against three ministerial departments: Labor; Trade and Industry; Justice and Constitutional Development. Although the High Court ruled in favor of the Chinese in 2008 declaring that they were allowed to "enjoy the full benefits of black economic empowerment," the Chinese were again in a contentious space (Harris 2010c: 158). Compounded by the hype around the influx of both legal and illegal immigrants from the PRC and the ongoing xenophobic conflict within the informal sector, the media had a field day inciting and portraying negative public reaction. The irony was that for the small 10,000 strong Chinese community this had not been about targeting the benefits of black economic empowerment, but rather about the "clearing up of the misconceptions of the historical injustices the South African Chinese faced" (Harris 2010c: 159).

Conclusion

Having lived out a separate existence for almost five centuries in the ill-defined economic and social spaces that colonial, segregationist, apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa left open to them, the ethnic Chinese and their new migrant compatriots continue to live in an invidious space. While it is conceded that South Africa is perhaps not typical of many African countries, the place of the Chinese – both ethnic and diasporic – will resonate somewhat with what has transpired here.

Generally seeking a successful middle-class livelihood, and not eager to be conspicuous, the small ethnic Chinese communities have remained insular and, as a result, have often been relegated to the periphery of the host society. In the face of indignities and injustice, they have sometimes

resorted to concerted action to ensure a place within the host society. More recently their situation has been compounded by the perceived and real threat of the Chinese in diaspora who, at both local and international level, continue to conjure up anti-Sinitic sentiments, locally, across the continent and internationally. In this context, the new migrants have often inadvertently impacted on the ethnic Chinese, often threatening to dislodge them from their precarious off-center positions. Moreover, with fissures often existing among the ethnic Chinese communities themselves, despite their shared sense of "Chineseness," the new incumbents only further compound a multifarious situation.

As regards the ethnic Chinese and the Chinese in diaspora, the words of Wang Gungwu (1991: 135) are pertinently applicable when he pointed out that, "Being Chinese in China is in itself a complex problem, but being Chinese outside China has several additional complicating features."

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12

The Chinese in Russia

Alexander G. Larin

Historical background

The history of the Chinese population in Russia dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, when several Russian–Chinese treaties demarcated the border along the Amur and Ussuri rivers, and Russia acquired the wild taiga-covered lands, populated by ethnic minorities and a modest number of Chinese people (estimated as 2–3,000) – mostly, hunters, gold diggers, ginseng hunters, and others. In the late nineteenth to early twentieth century, construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad and the fortress port of Vladivostok in the Far East attracted a massive influx of labor, mainly, the coolies from China. According to the population census of 1897, the Chinese population in Russia (including the Dungans in Central Asia) was 57,459 people, 41,112 of whom resided in the Far East and Siberia. By 1910, the number of Chinese residents in the Russian Far East, as evidenced by the local statistics, had grown to 111,466 people. By our estimates, however, the actual number was about twice that, around 200–250,000. During the First World War, about 150,000 Chinese workers were brought to Russia, and they were employed both in the Asian and European parts of the country.

During the revolution of 1917 and the Civil War, many Chinese workers were repatriated, while 30–40,000 of those who failed to return to China joined the Red Army – partly because they did not have other resources for living, and partly because they were under the influence of Russian Bolshevik propaganda. The migrant Chinese Workers' Union, serving the revolutionary cause in Russia, hoped that quite soon the revolution could be exported to China. Upon the end of the Civil War, the Chinese migrants, on a par with all other nationalities of the Soviet Union, were involved in the profound and painful social transformation – the so-called "socialist construction". In 1937–8, a sizable group of Chinese workers was repatriated, while another group was subject to massive repressions that were taking place throughout the country. The Chinese community shrank in numbers and the press media ceased to mention them. According to the census of 1989, there were only 11,335 ethnic Chinese residing in the USSR; 3,732 of these identified their first language as Chinese, and the rest – numbering 7,303 – as Russian. However, at the juncture of 1980s and 1990s, when the Soviet–Chinese relations were normalized and the Russian Federation appeared on the map as the successor to the USSR, the Chinese community started a new chapter in its history.[1]

In this chapter, I shall present the numbers and activities of Chinese migrants in the new Russia, discuss whether they can be qualified as a diaspora, and what aspects mark the activities of Chinese businessmen and workers who form the major occupational groups of Chinese coming from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to Russia.

The Chinese in Russia: numbers and activities

Following normalization of bilateral relations, the Russian–Chinese border control was liberalized, and a growing wave of Chinese merchants moved into Russia, which at that time experienced an acute deficit of mass consumer commodities. (Russians nicknamed the Chinese suppliers "shuttle traders," because they used to travel back and forth across the border to bring new goods.) Barter exchange became the major form of trade. The advent of Chinese traders was a bailout for the Russian population, exhausted by the economic crisis and shortage of staple commodities. For the traders, commercial raids into Russia offered an opportunity to make quick and big money. Professional traders, as well as workers, clerks, ex-soldiers, and literati, driven by unemployment and poverty, rushed to Russia from the northern and southern coastal provinces of China.

The local administrative and law-enforcement authorities were not prepared to receive hundreds of thousands of foreigners, and it took time to organize immigration control. Migration control regulations were tightened and a visa regime was established in 1993–4. Nevertheless, in the later years (except the period of the global financial crisis), Russia's economic growth attracted bigger numbers of visitors from the PRC and generated a higher rate of migration. This trend is illustrated in Table 12.1.

The precise data on the numbers of Chinese migrants currently residing in Russia are not available. The more or less accurate statistical recording of foreign migrants, including Chinese, was not well established in Russia, while the data of different authorities were marked by notable disparity. It was not until the start of the massive foreign migration to Russia that the authorities began to maintain the current statistics of migration (at least, the publicly available statistics). As shown in Table 12.1, in 2000–2009 the growth of migration from the PRC amounted to 182,000 persons. However, it is not known how many Chinese migrants had entered Russia before 2000. In the experts' view, the number of 200–400,000 or, at the most, 500,000 persons, would be the most realistic estimate of the current size of the Chinese population in Russia.[2] The value of this assessment is seen in the fact that it is derived from the analysis as the sum of estimated numbers of Chinese migrants in different regions of Russia. According to the local data, about 200,000 citizens of the PRC work in the Far East (Novosti Vladivostoka 2007).

The above-quoted figures include the so-called illegal migrants, those who do not have the properly processed documents (for example, updated visas) or work without a proper work permit. The illegal frontier crossers are not considered as their number is almost nil. Sometimes Russian mass media allege that millions of illegal Chinese migrants reside covertly in the forest expanses of Siberia and the Far East (Gilbo 2004). Many people believe in these allegations which are not supported by any fact, although the experts do not take them seriously.

Registration of migrant labor and issue of work permits is a responsibility of the Federal Migration Service (FMS), but a considerable number of migrants – partly because of cumbersome bureaucratic procedures – avoid registration. Nevertheless, the number of legally registered labor migrants is growing, and the growth rates of migration from the PRC rank among the highest in Russia. Chinese migrants, accounting for 15–20% of the total number of labor migrants registered in the FMS, are one of the largest migrant groups and in some years are

Table 12.1 Distribution of Chinese migrants by purpose of travel to Russia, 2000–2009 (in thousand persons)

Year	*Index*	*Purpose of travel*						
		Official	*Tourism*	*Private*	*PPR**	*Transit*	*Service staff*	*Total*
2000	Arrived	239.8	172.2	29.6	0.02	2.7	49.5	493.8
	Departed	239.5	165.5	33.5	–	1.3	50.4	490.8
	Migration growth	0.3	6.7	–3.9	0.02	1.4	–9.9	2.9
2001	Arrived	164.8	164.8	78.2	0.02	2.5	50.8	461.2
	Departed	165.4	156.8	82.4	0.01	1.3	50.9	456.2
	Migration growth	–0.6	8.0	–4.2	0.01	1.2	–0.1	4.4
2002	Arrived	126.3	267.0	262.1	0.1	4.5	65.7	725.8
	Departed	111.2	258.6	254.9	1.3	4.0	68.6	698.6
	Migration growth	15.1	8.4	7.2	–1.2	0.5	–2.9	27.2
2003	Arrived	99.7	203.3	293.0	0.02	7.0	76.8	679.6
	Departed	93.8	190.2	289.5	2.3	5.0	75.5	656.3
	Migration growth	5.9	13.1	3.5	–2.28	2.0	1.3	23.3
2004	Arrived	117.7	283.8	323.0	0.05	10.5	78.0	813.2
	Departed	113.0	275.0	310.0	0.6	8.3	76.6	783.6
	Migration growth	4.7	8.8	13.0	–0.55	2.2	1.4	29.6
2005	Arrived	146.3	204.2	352.5	0.1	7.3	88.2	798.7
	Departed	140.3	197.8	338.8	0.7	5.6	87.8	771.0
	Migration growth	6.0	6.4	13.7	–0.6	1.7	0.4	27.7
2006	Arrived	257.4	157.4	241.0	0.9	10.7	98.0	765.3
	Departed	226.2	153.3	244.0	2.4	5.5	97.5	728.8
	Migration growth	31.2	4.1	–3.0	–1.5	5.2	0.5	36.5
2007	Arrived	183.8	129.7	337.6	0.3	11.3	102.3	765.1
	Departed	177.5	128.2	338.0	2.5	26.4	101.4	750.1
	Migration growth	6.3	1.3	–0.4	–2.2	–15.1	0.9	15.0
2008	Arrived	196.9	127.2	378.0	0.7	9.9	103.1	815.5
	Departed	193.6	125.4	358.5	1.2	2.5	101.7	783.0
	Migration growth	3.3	1.8	19.5	–0.5	7.4	1.4	32.5
2009	Arrived	195.2	115.9	309.7	0.3	4.2	93.4	718.6
	Departed	204.0	114.7	319.7	–	9.8	87.7	735.7
	Migration growth	–8.8	1.2	–10.0	0.3	–5.6	5.7	–17.1

* PPR means "permanent place of residence"
Sources: Statistical Bulletins (2001… 2010)

identified as the biggest migrant group, which, for example, in 2008 numbered 281,700 persons (Trud i zaniatost 2009: 302).

The bigger part of Chinese migrant labor is concentrated in the Central Federal District (mainly, in Moscow) as well as in the south of the Far Eastern and Siberian Federal Districts. Eastward from the Urals, the share of Chinese in the total number of all foreign migrants exceeds the share of migrants from any other country, and accounts for about 50%. According to the FMS data of 2006 (Antonova and Yakovlev 2007: 44), the main sectors that attract Chinese migrants include commerce (59%), construction (17%), agriculture (7.5%), forestry (6%), and processing industries (2%). Similar proportions mark the economic specialization of Chinese labor migrants in the Far Eastern Federal District, where 62% of them are employed in commerce, 13.6% in construction, and 7.6% in agriculture (Antonova and Yakovlev 2007: 46).

Chinese migrants: a diaspora?

However uncertain the term diaspora may be, the Chinese migrant community in Russia is not a diaspora. First of all, a diaspora is formed by people residing in the host country not temporarily but for a long time. The influx of migrants to Russia from China is represented mostly (if not entirely) by temporary labor migrants – a sort of "guest workers" category. In 2006, for example, almost 800,000 Chinese arrived in Russia, and only 0.3% of those had a residence permit, and even fewer – 0.12% – a temporary residence permit. Upon arrival, another 0.03% received the residence permit, and 0.04% the temporary residence permit (Antonova and Yakovlev 2007: 44). Table 12.1 amply illustrates the fluid structure of the Chinese community: in 2000–2009, only 2,280 persons arrived from the PRC for permanent residence in Russia, while migration growth in the given category was negative (–8.8 thousand). According to the FMS data, the composition of the registered Chinese labor is "renovated" every year by about 50%.

Second, the term of diaspora usually applies to that part of the nation (ethnic community, nationality), which lives away from the country of its origin and forms a well-established ethnic group. The Chinese migrants in Russia, permanently renovating their ranks, obviously do not form such an ethnic group. Finally, diaspora is understood as an ethnic community, which retains important features of its national identity and contributes to the development of its national language, culture and mentality. Vladimir Dyatlov, a leading Russian expert in the studies of diasporas and ethnic migrants, identifies the sustained sense of ethnic and cultural unity as a major property of diasporas (Dyatlov 2004: 63). Indeed, this feature is important for groups permanently living in a different ethnic environment and therefore taking the risk eventually of losing their national identity. As for temporary migrants, they do not face the problem of national self-preservation; therefore, for them the given criteria of diaspora is irrelevant.

However, some crucially important properties of diaspora are reproduced partially (while not entirely) in the behavior of the fluid mass of Chinese migrants. Diaspora is qualitatively different from disperse emigration as it has organized forms of its functioning and development – from community through to public, national-culture and political movements. This feature of diaspora does apply to the fluid community of Chinese migrants. The roots seem to be found both in the collectivist approach of the Chinese migrants and in their basic economic needs – that is, to transport the multi-ton commercial cargoes, to store them and to sell the imported commodities would not be possible without division and clear-cut organization of labor, as well as without the organized daily life, information and cultural service of the people engaged in such operations. Therefore, we see such business structures as Chinese markets with diverse specialization of their workers, formal and informal connections, tight inner hierarchy, their special regulations and habits, plus Chinese hotels and dorms, brokerage and consulting firms, various public associations, newspapers, etc.

Moscow, the Far East and Siberia host a number of Chinese organizations, most of which were established by and for business people – such as the General Commerce Chamber of Chinese Muscovites (Mosike Zhonghua Zong Shanghui), or General Russian–Chinese Far Eastern Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Elosi Yuandong Zhong-E Gongshanghui). The less specialized organizations are represented, for example, by the Moscow Association of Chinese Migrants (Mosike Huqiao Huaren Lianhehui). The more or less active organizations include the Society for Unification of China (Lü E Huaren Zhongguo Hepin Tongyu Cujin Hui), Moscow Association of Chinese Women (Mosike Huaren Funü Lianhe Hui), etc. Some of the big cities behind the Ural Mountains may have several public organizations of Chinese migrants.

Most such associations maintain regular contacts with the Embassy, other diplomatic missions and Emigration Service of China, and to some extent indoctrinate the compatriots with political

education in line with the PRC government policy. Acting in concert with Beijing, they condemn separatists, or conduct meetings to condemn the "Falungong" sect, which is the least, if ever, popular among the Chinese residents in Russia. In 2008, Chinese public organizations were quite active in raising donations to help the victims of the earthquake in Sichuan Province, and in 2009 they were instrumental in exposing the instigators of riots in Xinjiang.

The PRC government, considering the public organizations of overseas Chinese as very important, pays serious attention to work with Chinese migrants and seeks to consolidate their ties with the motherland as well as to instill them with pride for their country and national culture. "Chinese public organizations," said Mr. Liu Guchang, the PRC Ambassador to Russia, "relentlessly work for construction of the 'harmonious society of *huaqiao*,' develop the glorious patriotic traditions, support unification of the Motherland, disseminate Chinese culture, and contribute to promotion of the Sino-Russian friendship" (Embassy of PRC in RF 2008). More specifically, dissemination of Chinese culture includes promotion of and assistance to the Confucius Institutes network in many countries including Russia.

The list of periodicals published by the Chinese in Russia contains about a dozen titles, such as *Mosike Huaren* (The Muscovite Chinese), *Long Bao* (Dragon), *Huashang Bao* (Chinese Commercial), *Lüxing Cankao* (Travel Newsletter), *Hua E Shibao* (Sino-Russian Newspaper), *Mosike Wanbao* (Moscow Evening News), and others. As evidenced by their publications, the Chinese community's life is full of events and activities – commerce and transport business, information and advertising, brokerage, daily service, and all sorts of entertainments.

Local associations for emigrants from the same province plus different clubs make their own contribution to the consolidation of the Chinese community. Business, cultural, local, group and clan ties help the Chinese in Russia to sustain a sense of their national identity. An interesting point is that migrants' associations based on the locality of origin sometimes would predetermine their economic specialization. In Buryatia, for example, as observed by those who cooperated with Chinese business, the Fujian association is engaged in timber trade, migrants from Zhengning (Hunan Province) sell jade, while those from Nantong (Jiangsu) operate in the construction business (Sharmashkeeva 2007).

The web of different structures is a factor that helps to fasten the Chinese community in Russia, provides for its continuous reproduction as well as a succession of coming and going "generations" of migrants. The second and no less important factor is seen in the relative duration of many migrants' stay in Russia and the formation of some stable "kernel." Due to their years spent in Russia, the "old-timers" would accumulate experience and relay it to the newcomers. As shown by our poll of Chinese traders in 2007, 16% of respondents had lived in Russia for three to five years, and 32% for over five years.[3]

In some publications diasporas are defined as ethnic groups which "are well-rooted and have become necessary for the hosting countries" (Leverovskaya 2003). While the Chinese migrants evidently cannot be described as "well-rooted," the criteria of "necessary" is applicable to guest workers quite well, because otherwise they would not be received in the host country. That the Chinese trade is necessary for Russia is recognized by almost all experts and confirmed by facts. For example, in April 2007 Russia banned the use of foreign labor in marketplaces. Many Chinese traders, having sold their goods with huge discounts, went back home. Quite soon, the city markets in the Far East and Siberia had nothing to offer to customers. The local population was strongly dissatisfied. Local authorities were constrained to look for and find all sorts of loopholes – for example, to replace markets by the so-called "shopping centers" and to wink at breaches of the ban. Finally, by the end of 2007, the notorious ban was actually ineffective and lifted, and thousands of Chinese traders, whether legally or illegally, reactivated their commerce operations in Russian markets.

The above discussion shows that the Chinese migrants in Russia resemble a "quasi-diaspora". However, they are often perceived as forming a diaspora because their presence in Russia has been a fact of life, and their difference from those that form a stable diaspora is neither visible from their daily life nor important.

Merchants

Business people form the largest group of the Chinese migrants. Most of them are engaged in the so-called "people's commerce" – the term applied in China to "non-official" (*feiguanfang*) mass trade, which has nothing to do with companies founded by authorities of whatever level, and is conducted by individual entrepreneurs or "people's organizations," that is, private firms. Starting in the early 1990s, the Chinese people's commerce with Russia made a remarkable progress. The initial barter trade was replaced by normal commodity trade. The "cash-and-carry" shuttle traders were replaced by a network of brokers, and then manufacturers chose to market their products themselves. Today, Chinese commodities are much better in quality and their assortment is much wider than before. The initial line of clothes, footwear and headgear is added by all sorts of home appliances including sophisticated electronic products. While trade with Russia was started by business people from the provinces of Northeast and Northern China, today the list of suppliers includes quite strong companies from southern coastal provinces. The "people's traders" started paying more attention to trademarks. As noted by the Chinese press, "in Russia almost everyone buys things made in China, but Russian customers do not even know one Chinese brand. The vendors, too, are not more knowledgeable. Before selling Chinese TV-picture tubes, they would stick Russian labels thereon" (Wang 2003).

Considering the heavy costs and risks incurred in transportation of goods across the border, some Chinese entrepreneurs began experiments with investing and manufacturing in those regions of Russia, where such experiments would make sense as the costs of equipment, labor and rent might be quite affordable. Another trend is the pooling of investors who rely on the support of local Chinese authorities. A case in point can be found in the initiative of Xinji municipal administration (Hebei Province) which invited entrepreneurs to pool efforts and set up their chamber of commerce in Moscow. The Ningbo government, too, plans to open its center for investments and commerce in Moscow (Wang 2003). So far, however, no tangible progress has been observed in realization of this trend.

The volume of haggling operations across the border in the Far East is a good indicator, which, if extrapolated, can help to calculate the total scale of the people's commerce. The province of Heilongjiang is Russia's main partner in the border trade. As noted in *Renmin Ribao*, in 2007, "in the border trade, conducted by private companies of Heilongjiang Province," the volume of export amounted to 2.92 billion USD (since the previous year grew by 17.1%), and import to 1.73 billion USD (grew by 18.6%) (*Renmin Ribao* 2008). Besides, data have been made available on the share of Chinese traders in Russian markets. As shown by the results of representative monitoring (8,639 inspections), conducted by Rospotrebnadzor (Federal Supervision over Compliance with Consumers' Rights) in 2007, the share of foreign traders in the markets of Russia varied, depending on the region, and amounted to 53.4% in Moscow, 27.12% in the Moscow Oblast, 39.1% in the Sverdlovsk Oblast, 37.9% in the Maritime Territory, and never exceeded the statistically significant threshold of 5% in the hinterland. Among all foreign traders, the PRC citizens were taking the lion's shares, such as 61% on an average in Russia, 42% in the Ural region, 83% in the Far East and 76% in the Central Federal District (Butrin 2007), and in the latter area, the share of Ukrainian citizens was only 5.1% and the share of other foreign nationals was even less.

What kind of people, and where are they from, who go to try their luck as sellers in Russian shops and markets? Do they succeed in making their dreams come true? As evidenced by our and other sociological surveys,[4] almost 100% of them are graduates of secondary schools, while university graduates form a considerable segment[5] of the Chinese migrants. The overwhelming majority of the migrants arrive in Russia from Heilongjiang,[6] tangibly less from two other North-East provinces, and even less from other provinces. Buryatia is most attractive for neighbors from Inner Mongolia. An interesting point is that people from the southern provinces are much more inclined to go to Moscow than to the Far East. Most migrants come from cities or "township" (*zhen*), but more recently they are rural residents, too.[7]

The migrants' occupations at home are very diverse, ranging from directors of government institutions to students, and even the unemployed. The biggest percentage is represented by workers. Most of them are dismissed workers, who formally are not registered as unemployed but rather put on a "waiting list for a job" (*daigong*). As it was the case in the earlier-conducted polls, now, too, the number of those who recognized themselves as unemployed is quite small (probably, this could be explained by psychological reasons). The second largest group comprises "peasant workers" (*nongmin gong*), that is, the former peasants who form the lower strata of urban workers. In the same rank one could find junior-level civil servants with their modest but reliable salaries – it turns out that for this category, too, petty-trade revenues in Russia might be quite attractive.[8] The full picture includes peasants, top managers and staff of private firms, small-scale entrepreneurs and housewives. This list of occupations does not mean that people gave up their jobs and went to Russia. Some of them migrated in search of bigger earnings, while the others, including workers, did not have any job at the time of departure from China.[9]

The most representative aspect of Chinese migrants is that one is a petty trader, who could be a self-employed entrepreneur, or a trader contracted by a firm or an employee of a company. Most such traders work under contract or verbal arrangement with a supplier firm without setting up their own enterprise. By Chinese standards, most such supplier firms fall in the category of small, or very small or medium-size businesses.[10] For the absolute majority of Chinese traders the mode of life is the same as for any guest worker who went to a foreign country to earn money. They work hard and take little if any rest, spend little on themselves and their lodging, pinch and scrape, and send a part of their earnings to their families. Quite often they save even on the staple needs, such as food, clothes and footwear, or medical service.[11] Notwithstanding their saving efforts, earnings of the bulk of Chinese migrants are rather modest and comparable to average earnings of Russians doing similar jobs. This is evidenced both by the results of our survey and data of Elizabeth Wishnick, who polled 250 migrants who returned from Russia to Heilongjiang (Wishnick 2004: 9).

Certainly, this does not mean that the incomes of all Chinese traders are the same. There have been examples of wealthy entrepreneurs who make big profits and live a luxurious life. For example, according to Chinese press publications, one container of commodities brought and sold in a Russian market could bring hundreds of thousands of US dollars of revenues. However, businesspeople of such scope are few.

Successful development of Chinese businesses is hampered by the same obstacles that frustrate their Russian counterparts and mark the generally unfavorable atmosphere for business (especially, small and medium-size business) in Russia. The list would include corruption, extortions on the part of militia, racket, high economic risks as well as heavy taxes and expensive rent. Besides, Chinese migrants find it hard to bear the cost of living in Russia which is tangibly higher than in China.[12]

Moreover, they suffer from the Russian phobia of migrants, a phenomenon that is not unusual in Russia which grew from the widespread xenophobia that appeared together with the disintegration

of the Soviet Union followed by the painful birth of the new society. Extremist groups in Russia, such as the skinheads, used to intimidate foreign migrants and even used violence. (Chinese migrants note the "three evils" in Russia: militia, skinheads and corrupt custom service.) Such extreme manifestations of unwelcome attitudes toward migrants are aggravated by another problem. Chinese migrants feel that the daily treatment they receive from the Russian population and Russian authorities are often inimical, arrogant or even repulsive. And, as people in the street manifest such attitudes more often than the authorities, there are all the reasons to say that disfavor of migrants is quite deeply rooted in the Russian society.[13] A noteworthy point is that phobia of migrants is as well recorded with regard to Russian-speaking migrants arriving from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or even from other regions of Russia.

In such circumstances, the successful performance of Chinese traders is made possible by such factors as low prices for their goods, the migrants' relentless work, low spending for their own living, and their commercial talent that is widely recognized in Russia even in the pre-revolution period. Finally, we should note again the strong self-organization of the Chinese community. As the Chinese community keeps to itself while its members are successful in commerce, the Russians have various stereotypes about them. We hear that the Chinese (as well as Chechen, Azeri, and some other) communities are unusually coherent and therefore are able to win profitable sectors (markets, local outlet chains) from their Russian competitors. Some Russians see them as a demon-like, resembling the myth-like perceptions of the Chinese diasporas in some Southeast Asian countries.

Meanwhile, although we have too scanty reliable information, the scattered but numerous data strongly suggest that relations within the Chinese community are more complex and ridden with contradictions. Close internal ties, taking shape between and within groups, in some cases help secure tight discipline, in other situations provide in-group support, while in different circumstances help the group members to relay commercial information swiftly and covertly. In this way, big transactions are made without elaborate formalities, often based on trust only. Incidentally, Russian citizens, too, may be admitted into such groups. At the same time, the nature of in-community relations does not rule out fierce rivalry among different group leaders ("*laoban*"). It is known that in some cases such *laoban* even resort to using the militia's cooperation in order to remove their rivals, and that the master–employee relations, generally rather balanced and stable, are not free from frictions or even conflicts. By all evidence, in terms of its specifics and structure the Chinese community in Russia resembles Chinese communities in some Southeast Asian countries, although in the Russian case it is structured less profoundly.

There is another important aspect in the business activities of mainland Chinese traders which is not overlooked by the local residents. Some of the latter believe that Chinese merchants push out Russian traders from the market and make their business economically unfeasible. Is there any truth to this? Or, rather, is it true to say that the Chinese, since the time they appeared in the Russian Federation, have been filling the vacant niche without damaging anybody's interests? In our view, no general answer can be given to these questions as the Russian market is filled with a variety of situations, and competition often takes place in covert forms and is difficult to study. In some locations, the market is free from any competition because supply does not exceed the demand and the prices are more or less even; in other locations, competition proceeds in normal, "healthy" forms and is beneficial for customers, while in the third series of cases commerce has been seized by monopolists. The "Shanghai" market in Irkutsk, most thoroughly described in the specialized literature, is "a strong and dangerous competitor for a part of local businesses, while the other part derives good benefits from its operation" (Dyatlov and Kuznetsov 2005: 166).

The situations may be quite fluid: with new rivals coming, competition might be aggravated, sometimes leading to clashes or mass protests of Russian entrepreneurs. For example, such events

took place in Kamchatka in early 2002, when local traders blamed the Chinese newcomers for dumping. The conflict grew to such an extent that Chinese diplomats were forced to be involved in its settlement. Fortunately enough, such acute situations occur quite rarely.

Another form of economic rivalry is connected with the sale of analogous commodities made in Russia and in China. For example, a case in point is found in the food sector of the Russian Far East, where such rivalry prevails between the local vegetable-growers and the suppliers of Chinese vegetables. The low prices of Chinese products make it unreasonable for wholesale traders to purchase and deliver vegetables even from the short-distanced Russian rural areas. As a result, the local vegetable-growers who cannot sell their crop, complain to the local administration and demand that the authorities protect the local producers. However, this difficult problem, which affects the interests of Russian producers and consumers, can hardly be resolved through simple measures or within a short time.

Nonetheless, the Russian market is certainly wide open for Chinese traders and offers them good opportunities to trade successfully.[14] As evidenced by the poll data and by some other facts, most Chinese business people feel like continuing their operations in Russia.[15] Many migrants would like to receive Russian citizenship or a residence permit for permanent residence,[16] and the more they communicate with Russians, the more attractive life in Russia is for them.[17] Interesting results were obtained by a research group from the Amur State University, which in 2000–2006 conducted a sociological survey of the population in the Far Eastern border regions of Russia and the PRC (Zabiyako 2006: 252). Chinese respondents, residing (a) in Harbin, (b) in the border city of Heihe, the residents of which permanently communicate with inhabitants of the neighboring Blagoveschensk across the border, and (c) in the territory of Russia, were asked the question: "Would you go to Russia for permanent residence?" Those who said "Yes," accounted for, (a) 17%, (b) 24% and (c) 39%, respectively. Besides, migrants feel positive about the prospect for their children to settle or to work in Russia.[18]

Workers

In contemporary Russia, use of Chinese labor started at the end of 1980s. Decentralization of Russia's foreign-economy ties promoted a new impulse, and in 1991, there were 10,000 Chinese workers employed in lumbering, construction and vegetable farming. Signed in 1992, the Russian–Chinese government-to-government Agreement on the Principles for Dispatch and Employment of Chinese Citizens (Agreement 1999: 145) states that relocation of labor must take place under contracts, signed between Russian enterprises and properly licenced companies of the PRC, while the term of such contracts may not exceed three years.

Another bilateral agreement, On Temporary Labor Activities of the RF Citizens in the PRC and the PRC Citizens in the RF, signed in 2000, determines that "Employees may not perform any payable work other than the one specified in the license. The license may not be relayed to other employers. Workers, recruited under the license, may not be out-placed to other employers" (Article 9), and that "Employees must leave the hosting state upon expiration of the effective term of the license" (Article 10) (Agreement 2007: 114). Thus the use of Chinese labor is strictly regulated.

In the course of 1990s the number of recruited workers, while subject to certain market fluctuations, nevertheless exceeded 20,000 persons annually, and in the 2000s accounted for 30,000 and more (Karlusov and Kudin 2002: 82–83: Larin V.L. 2006: 112, 115–16). By 2007, China had sent to Russia about 320,000 workers in total, and as of the 2007, there were about 31,000 Chinese workers employed in the country (*Renmin Ribao* 2008).

The impressive share of Chinese workers in the general balance of foreign labor is especially visible in the Russian Far East, which experiences reduction of population and shortage of labor

caused by the nation-wide demographic crisis and by migration of local residents to the better-off regions of Russia. For example, by the end of 2007, the number of foreign workers, who arrived from almost 30 countries in the Khabarovsk Territory, numbered 25,100 persons, or 3.4% of the total employed population. Among these guest workers, the largest group (37.3%) comprised PRC citizens, and the second largest group (32.3%) comprised migrants from the CIS countries (*Renmin Ribao* 2008). Distribution of Chinese workers by economic sectors can be illustrated by the following figures (Antonova and Yakovlev 2007: 46): in 2006, 55.7% of them were employed in construction, 24.5% in agriculture, and 19.7% in forestry. Apart from the Far East and Siberia, Chinese migrants work in some areas of European Russia.

Professional merits of Chinese workers are highly valued in Russia. In most cases they are known as being industrious, well-disciplined, not demanding in their daily life, and ready to accept lower reward for their labor. Foreign labor is even more valuable for Russia because destruction of the vocational-training system in the reform years resulted in a deficit of local professional workers. There are different ways through which the Chinese construction workers get access to the Russian market. First, they can be hired directly, for example, through recruiting firms that select construction workers, vegetable growers or loggers to work in Russia and CIS countries. The terms of work normally imply 10–12 working hours per day and 6 workdays per week.

Another way to hire Chinese builders is to make a construction contract under which they would perform all sorts of works: designing, construction, finishing, supply of equipment and materials and recruiting of workforce. This form of cooperation may be even more attractive for the customer, as together with all the merits of Chinese labor it offers relatively inexpensive prices for Chinese building materials including cement, ceramic granite, glassworks and fittings. Most often, however, cooperation in the given field would be limited by a subcontract for construction of a brick-laid or concrete case. A case in point is served by a grand joint project for construction of the iron-concrete case for the Federation Tower, one of the highest buildings in Moscow. Having analyzed thoroughly the international experience in multi-story construction, Russian customers made their selection in favor of Chinese partners.

Finally, the third option is to invite Chinese builders in their capacity as developers. The projects, entrusted to Chinese developers, include, among others, the unique complex of The Baltic Pearl in Saint-Petersburg. Placed on the 208-hectare plot, it would contain over one million square meters of housing and over 400,000 square meters of commercial facilities. (The symbolic "foundation stone" was laid in 2005.) Chinese developers work for the construction of public buildings as well as housing districts with hundreds and thousands of apartments in many cities of Russia.

A mention should be made of the mainland Chinese companies as the most important partners in the construction of the multifunctional complex – the Chinese business center of Huaming Park in Moscow (the foundation stone was laid in 2007). Chinese construction companies such as Huafu, which conducts large-scale building operations in the cities of Siberia and the Far East, gained a solid foothold in the Russian market. Huafu tends to attract Russian specialists (designers, lawyers, managers) and to pay them high salaries. Experts take note of the high-quality and quick operation as well as efficiently organized work of Chinese builders. Chinese workers usually do not take away jobs from Russians, as they perform works which do not require a high, if any, qualification, and are not well paid and therefore are not attractive for local residents.

The number of Chinese workers operating in Russian agriculture is twice less than in construction. For them, too, the Far East and Siberia are the major areas of operation. According to the Chinese statistics, in 2006, peasants from just one province of Heilongjiang (the main supplier of labor to Russia) farmed over 2.1 million *mu* (over 130,000 hectares) of land in the Far

East and Siberia, and to this end they made 35,000 person-rides to Russia (Ministry of Commerce 2006). Chinese peasants specialize in growing vegetables, cucurbits crops and soya. Part of the soya crop (in 2008 over 400,000 tonnes) is exported to China (IDK.RU 2009). At the present time Chinese peasants work both in the Asian and some European parts of Russia.

In this connection, we should note an interesting circumstance: in the 1990s the high-tech suburban farming in Russia collapsed as irrigation systems were defunct while prices of greenhouse heating and motor fuel skyrocketed. Thus the landspaces became available for manual labor of Chinese peasants, working with whatever tools were at hand, and heating greenhouses with firewood, etc. (Datsishen 2006: 135).

One cannot but admit that Russian villagers are not at all always delighted to welcome peasants from the PRC, and they greet the newcomers even less cheerfully if they are seen to settle down for a long time. Local residents do not feel happy to see strong competitors living next-door and being satisfied with the lower earnings. Besides, the local people feel concerned that the guest workers would stay on the rented land forever. Those who are dissatisfied argue that the government should attend to the development of national agriculture by means of investments, modern machines and advanced agricultural technologies rather than follow the line of least resistance and neglect the interests of domestic producers. Protest sentiments are aggravated by unemployment in rural areas. For instance, in 2006, the local population in the Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast forced the authorities to give up a plan to bring in Chinese peasants to grow vegetables and do fish-farming, and to lease the abandoned farmlands to them for 40 years.

While the ideas of decades-long land lease or land sale to foreigners are unambiguously rejected by the society, the local population welcomes Chinese migrant labor as temporary workers, although this gradually extends to other economic sectors. Today, workers from mainland China operate not only in construction and lumbering but in plant workshops as well. For instance, in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast the Navashinskiy ship-building yard invited 150 welders from the PRC to come under a one-year contract in order to replace the local workers leaving for the capital city in search of the bigger earnings. (By another version, that contract was made simply to get the cheaper labor.) A meaningful point is that with the lower hourly rate of wages the Chinese workers started to earn more than Russians, because they worked 10 hours per day and never wanted to have days-off. At home, they had suffered from unemployment (Semenova 2008).

Conclusion

For a number of historical reasons, the new state of the Russian Federation, upon its establishment in 1991, found itself in the lingering period of depopulation and deficit of labor, and thus became "a country of migrants." Among the latter, a notable position is taken over by traders and workers from the PRC, who contribute to economic activities in Russia and especially in the Russian Far East. In such circumstances, some demographers, who consider it reasonable to admit millions of migrants to Russia in the years to come, argue that the priority should be given to the Chinese in consideration of the high quality of their labor and the growing cooperation between the two neighboring powers.

In our view, however, Russia is unlikely to choose to have massive admission of huge migration flows. Certainly, it is not prepared to "integrate" this mass of migrants into loyal citizens as the USA did in past centuries. Russia's population quite evidently does not accept such a prospect and is very cautious about the settlement of migrants from other countries. The same Russians, however, clearly understand the importance of foreign labor in general and Chinese labor in particular. So, the local population is ready to welcome guest workers, provided that the foreign labor does not function as a spontaneous force of unregulated market, but rather it is strictly

organized and controlled with due regard to Russians' primary interests, while migrants must reside in Russia on a temporary basis only. By all evidence, exactly such a form of Chinese labor is prevailingly in Russia.

Obviously, Chinese labor is needed in Russia and will be needed even more as the grand joint construction projects are realized. A large group of workers from PRC has already taken part in the construction of the oil pipeline from East Siberia to the Pacific coast. Actually, the basis for further development of such a trend has been laid in the Program of Cooperation between the Neighboring Regions of Russia and China for 2009–18, signed by the Presidents of the two countries in 2009.

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Notes

1 Among the works which provide comprehensive study of the history and current status of the Chinese in Russia, see Datsishen (2008), A.G. Larin (2009), and V.L. Larin (2006).
2 The first assessment of the Chinese migrants' numbers in Russia at the level of 200–450,000 persons was made by V.G. Gelbras. See (Gelbras 2001: 39–40).
3 Our survey of 2007 encompassed 900 migrants, including 700 entrepreneurs and personnel plus 200 students. Of the 700 respondents, a half was polled in Moscow and another half in the Far Eastern cities (by equal numbers in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Blagoveschensk). Among the students, the poll inquiry forms were distributed in the same proportion. We also polled 900 Russian citizens – 450 respondents in Moscow and 150 respondents in each of the three above-named cities of the Far East. For more details on the respondents' profile and poll results, see (A.G. Larin. 2009).
4 The most representative of other polls include the sociological surveys conducted by Gelbras (2001, 2004), and in the Far East, by V.L. Larin (2005).
5 In our survey 21%.
6 In our survey 45%, including 79% to the Far East and 11% to Moscow.
7 In our survey 40%, 39% and 21% respectively.
8 In our survey, the first three positions are featured by such figures as: workers (38%), peasant workers (11%), non-management employees of state-run companies (11%).
9 As found in our poll, almost a half (40%) of them by the time of departure had been unemployed (this figure is close to the results drawn in the poll by E. Wishnick (2004: 7). About the same number of migrants went to Russia in search of a better-paid job. As for workers and "peasant workers", the share of unemployed is about 70%.
10 In our survey, 53% of migrants positioned themselves as individual entrepreneurs; 35% classified their business as "medium-size," 21% as "small," and 37% as "very small, individual".
11 In our survey, when asked about the benefits that they could not afford, the respondents mentioned: purchase of staple foods (32%), purchase of necessary clothes and footwear (20%), medical treatment (48%), and a trip to China for the Spring Holiday (51%). Almost 80% of respondents live in dormitories, while 22% rent apartments, which in most cases are overcrowded by tenants. Most of the respondents (80%) help their relatives or friends in China; others do not help – either because there is no need to do so (10%) or because they cannot afford to help others (5%); and the rest (5%) receive help from their relatives.
12 In our survey, 82% of respondents complained about extortions on the part of militia, 49% about the racket, and 45% about the corruption of different authorities. High rent payments were mentioned by 61% of the respondents, high economic risks and heavy taxes by 23% respectively, while 53% complained about the high costs of living.
13 In our survey, 28% of the respondents complained about "rather unfavorable" or "hostile" attitudes on the part of authorities, and 45% about the same attitudes on the part of the local population.

14 In our survey, 69% of the respondents stated that their decision to go to Russia proved justified, and only 10% described the trip as unsuccessful.
15 In our survey, only 6% of respondents stated their wish to give up their activities and leave Russia, and another 1% said that they would like to reduce the scope of their operations.
16 In our survey, 20% and 26% respectively.
17 In our survey, when asked about evolution of their view of Russia as a result of their stay in the country, 44% of respondents stated that it had improved, 15% that it had become worse, and 25% said that it did not change at all.
18 In our survey, 19% and 15% respectively.

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13

The Chinese in South Asia

Zhang Xing and Tansen Sen

The emergence of Chinese communities in South Asia (pre-colonial India and Ceylon/Sri Lanka) was linked to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Chinese migrations to various parts of Asia, particularly to Southeast Asia. Population pressures, domestic turmoil, and the formation of colonial commercial and labor networks that triggered the migration of the Chinese to the ports and cities in the Malay Archipelago also contributed to the emergence of Chinese settlements in Calcutta (today officially Kolkata), Bombay (today officially Mumbai), Karachi, and Colombo. The patterns of Chinese migrations to South Asia and the experiences of these Chinese communities were in many ways similar to those in Southeast Asia. Most of the early migrants, for example, originated from the southern coastal regions of China. They were largely skilled and unskilled laborers, and initially overwhelmingly males.

Like the Chinese who settled in the Malay Archipelago, those migrating to South Asia also established various cultural and social institutions, created remittance and exchange networks to their ancestral homelands, and were affected by local cultural and political ostracism. In fact, these communities in South Asia were sometimes perceived as extensions of the Chinese settlements in Southeast Asia, albeit they were much smaller and less influential than the latter. Indeed, unlike some of the Chinese settlements in the Malay Archipelago and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese communities in South Asia never had significant impact on the local regions in terms of demography, economic clout, or cultural influences. Even at its peak, the population of the Chinese in South Asia may not have exceeded 50,000. Today, only several thousand Chinese immigrants and their descendants continue to live in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.[1]

The formation of Chinese settlements in South Asia

In 1772, the British East India Company named Calcutta the capital of British India. The Indian port town had in the prior decades emerged as an important link for the British colonizers in their trade with China. Chinese goods, such as tea and silk, were transported to Britain through Calcutta and, in return, silver bullion was exported from the Indian port to China. Commercial relations between Calcutta and Canton (now Guangzhou) grew rapidly after opium was introduced by the British as one of the main Indian exports to China. Cotton and indigo were some

of the other Indian commodities the British used to pay for the demand for Chinese goods. This colonial trading network, not only between Calcutta and Canton, but also gradually, with the signing of unequal treaties, between other South Asian and Chinese ports, contributed to the formation of Chinese settlements of skilled and unskilled workers in the Indian subcontinent.

The legendary "first" Chinese settler in South Asia is said to be a tea trader called Yang Dazhao 杨大钊, nicknamed Atchew. In 1778, according to a British document, in return for the tea he offered as a gift to the reigning British Governor-General of India Warren Hastings, Atchew received a large land grant near Calcutta (Bose 1934). Atchew established a sugar mill on this land and later brought laborers from China to work for him. There is a Bengali novel called *Chinatown*, which, while a fictional tale of love between a Chinese girl and a Bengali boy written in the 1950s, offers intriguing details about Atchew's life that may have been gathered by the author from stories circulating among the Chinese in Calcutta (Dās 1958). According to one such story, before departing for India, Atchew had made acquaintance with the famous English trader named James Flint in Canton. It was because of this contact, Atchew is said to have found "patronage in the aristocratic English society in Calcutta," including from the Governor-General Warren Hastings (Zhang 2011: 87). It is not clear if this is a historical account, but according to British documents, Atchew maintained close contacts with local British officials, which would have been unlikely if he were an ordinary entrepreneur. Soon after he established the sugar mill, for example, Atchew appealed to the British officials that the Chinese living in Calcutta were luring away his workers. The Chinese responsible for this, Atchew wrote in his petition dated 1781, were those who had "deserted from the shops and remain in Calcutta without any apparent subsistence" (Bose 1934: 6). The British Supreme Board, in response, immediately published a note in a Calcutta newspaper cautioning the involved persons.

It is clear from Atchew's petition, the response from the British Supreme Board, and a few other sources that there were already some Chinese migrants living in Calcutta in the later half of the eighteenth century (Zhang 2011: 65; Oxfeld 1993: 73–4; Sinha 1978: 52). It is likely that these Chinese came to Calcutta on ships frequenting between Calcutta and Canton. Thus, it seems that there were two early settlements of the Chinese in the Indian subcontinent, one in Calcutta and the other in the area where Atchew had established his sugar mill. An eyewitness account of the Chinese in Calcutta comes in the work of the Vietnamese traveler called Ly Van Phuc (1785–1849). According to Ly, "several hundred" Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong provinces were residing in Calcutta, some of whom had built temples dedicated to Chinese deities (Salmon 1999: 383–4).

A more detailed description of the Chinese settlement in Calcutta comes from an 1857 account by the Englishman Chaloner Alabaster, who had been assigned the task of accompanying the anti-British Chinese official Ye Mingchen 叶名琛 to his exile in Calcutta. Alabaster reports that there was a "colony" of about 500 Cantonese and Hakka Chinese living in Calcutta (1858: 369–70). Engaged in shoemaking, selling opium, carpentry and other economic activities, these Chinese had built temples for Guandi and the Goddess Tianhou.

It is around this time that some Chinese also started settling in Bombay. According the census of 1871–2, the numbers of Chinese in the two Indian cities were comparable: 574 in Calcutta and 531 in Bombay. Similar to the story of Atchew, there seems to be a legendary tale of the early Chinese in Bombay. The Bombay Census Report of 1901 notes that, "There is no reasonable doubt that the Chinese were in Bombay by the close of 1838: tradition tells of 'Aho Na and Wow Sing who came hither to dispose of silks'; of 'Thow wing an artist'" (vol. 10: 116). The Chinese in Bombay mostly worked and resided around the Mazagaon dock area. They seem to have also built a Chinese temple and had a cemetery that was located on the Suklaji Street.

The expanding commercial exchanges between the Indian subcontinent and China after the Opium War in 1839–42 and the subsequent opening of the "treaty ports" in China, the development of steam ships, and the devastating rebellions within China during the second half of the nineteenth century led to the increase of Chinese migrant population in Calcutta and elsewhere in India. The 1901 census recorded 1,640 Chinese in Calcutta. There was also a marginal increase in the Chinese population in Bombay, and others entered the tea gardens of northeastern India, including places such as Assam, Kalimpong, and Darjeeling. The number of Chinese immigrants continued to grow in the first four decades of the twentieth century, especially due to civil wars and the Japanese invasion of China. By the end of the Second World War there were, according to an estimate by the British Indian intelligence service ("Chinese Activities in India: 1941–6"), at least 26,250 Chinese. This number did not include adult Chinese who had adopted Chinese nationality, Chinese children, deserters from the US and Chinese forces that were stationed in India, and seamen "dumped in by the shipping companies."

In the 1940s, some new Chinese immigrants also settled in Colombo in Sri Lanka and in Karachi in present-day Pakistan. Those living in Sri Lanka included sailors and those who re-migrated from India. The earliest mention of Chinese in Sri Lanka dates from 1816, when there were reportedly between 80 and 100 settlers. A Census of 1911, however, only counted 65 Chinese in the country (Rodrigo 1989: 231–2). In 1947, the numbers increased to 204, with 200 men and only four women (Yu 1956: 50). It is estimated that the number of Chinese settled in the country was 450 in 1955 and 499 in 1981 (Rodrigo 1989: 232). Many of these Chinese migrants seem to have arrived in Sri Lanka from India, Southeast Asia, or Hong Kong (Rodrigo 1989: 233).

In Pakistan there were already some Chinese settlers in Karachi before independence in 1947. Turmoil in Xinjiang province during the latter half of the 1940s, led to the migration of Uighurs to places such as Peshawar and Lahore. In 1949, there were around 1,000 such migrants from Xinjiang. The Han Chinese, on the other hand, numbered 1,709 in 1944 and increased to around 2,000 in 1957–8 (Dai 1958a: 90–1).

The Chinese population in South Asia declined rapidly after the India–China conflict of 1962, when almost 3,000 Chinese were deported from India. Many others decided to emigrate to North America, Europe, Australia and other countries. The Chinese still living in India is estimated to be between 4,000 and 5,000. Numbers have also shrunk in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, where there may be fewer than 500 people of Chinese origin that still reside there.

The Chinese communities in South Asia consisted mostly of Cantonese and Hakka. Additionally, there were also migrants from Hubei, Shandong, and Fujian provinces. In the mid-1950s, 80% of the Chinese in India were from Guangdong province, 9% from Hubei, and 8% from Shandong. Among the migrants from Guangdong province, 43% were Hakka from Meixian County, 30% were Cantonese from the Siyi region, and the rest were mostly from Nanshun, Dongan, Huining areas (Yu 1956: 21). These groups were mostly endogamous, had their own native-place associations, and, as discussed below, engaged in specific occupational specialties.

Economic activities of the Chinese in South Asia

The Chinese who migrated to South Asia initially were mostly skilled and unskilled laborers, some of them worked on the ships and others in the poor neighborhoods of large port cities. There were some who were brought by the British to work in the tea plantations in northeastern India. Later, professional teachers, traders, Christian missionaries and Buddhist monks also settled in South Asian cities. Over time, some of these migrants were able to find occupational niches within the South Asian societies. These niches became intrinsically linked to the four main sub-ethnic groups of the Chinese migrants. Thus, in India particularly, the Cantonese were

identified as carpenters, Hakka as shoemakers/tannery workers, Hubeinese as dentists, and those from Shandong as silk traders.

Although no similar coloration between occupational specialties and sub-ethnic groups are found in Sri Lanka, the Chinese there also engaged in "three or four avenues of business: Chinese restaurant, noodles and soy sauce making, souvenir shops and dentistry" (Rodrigo 1989: 233). In Pakistan and what later became Bangladesh, the Chinese were similarly engaged in shoemaking, dentistry, and restaurant business (Dai 1958a: 92).

The Cantonese carpenters

Carpentry was one of the main occupations of the Cantonese speakers migrating to South Asia. Most of them learned their skills in China and were employed in Calcutta and other South Asian cities by companies and private individuals to work at shipyards and railway companies. In 1930, for example, there were 178 Chinese carpenters working for the Greater Indian Peninsular (GIP) Railway Company in Bombay (Tan 1933: 153). Some were in Assam engaged in making wooden tea containers. Because the Cantonese carpenters had a reputation as hardworking, cordial, and highly skilled, they were sought after both by the local Indians and the British living in Calcutta. Initially they engaged in part-time work; but, after learning English and Indian languages, they were able to obtain subcontracts from large carpentry factories and other companies to do interior woodwork and make home and office furniture (Zhang 2011: 138–9; Liang 2007: 404).

Since Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Colombo had frequent maritime exchanges with the Far East, European shipping companies used these ports to undertake repair and maintenance work on their ships. Cantonese carpenters worked at these ports and received high remunerations, reportedly on par with American and European workers. The Cantonese carpenters continued to be employed at the docks in South Asia after the end of the colonial period. Gradually, they advanced from being part-time workers and contract laborers to factory owners. In the 1950s, for example, there were more than 300 Cantonese carpenters working on ships in the Hoogly dock in West Bengal and more than 20 Cantonese-owned carpentry factories in Calcutta (Yu 1956: 43; Zhang 2011: 142–3).

The India–China conflict of 1962 had a significant impact on the Chinese carpenters. Many of them were interned and deported from India. Those who worked on the docks were fired from their jobs for security reasons. Some of them, however, remained in India and set up small carpentry workshops. During the 1970s and 1980s, Chen Bingguang's 陳炳光 (P.K. Chen) Canton Carpentry emerged as the leading Chinese carpentry business in Calcutta. Many of the major cinemas and hotels in the city, including the Ritz and Metro cinemas, employed the Canton Carpentry (Zhang 2011: 142). Today, with continuing erosion of the Chinese population, only a few Chinese carpentries survive in the Calcutta area. Their visibility and presence in Calcutta and elsewhere in South Asia is insignificant compared to what they seem to have achieved during the first half of the twentieth century.

The Hakka shoemakers and tannery owners

The Hakka migrants in South Asia have become renowned for their shoemaking skills. However, unlike the Cantonese, the Hakka immigrants from China were not skilled in a specific profession when they reached the Indian subcontinent. There were some who migrated through Thailand and other Southeast Asian regions, where they received training in shoemaking. But a majority of the Hakka migrants acquired their talents in shoemaking business expertise in India

(Liang 2007: 405). A few of these shoemakers in Calcutta later bought tanneries in the Tangra area of Calcutta, opening up another new occupational niche for the Chinese immigrants.

Both Ellen Oxfeld (1993) and Jennifer Liang (2007) have pointed out that the Hakka migrants were able to establish these niches as shoemakers and tannery owners due to the Hindu caste system that relegated any work dealing with leather to the untouchables. Having no such religious norms or regulations, the Hakkas migrating to Calcutta found it convenient to enter the shoemaking business. Later, realizing that such Hindu notions of pure and impure also affected the tannery business, they bought tanneries that produced leather needed to manufacture shoes, bags, and other goods.

When it became clear in the early twentieth century that the situation in China would not permit them to return frequently, these Hakka shoemakers brought their families from China and started settling down in India. They opened their own retail stores on Calcutta's Bentinck Street, known to the local Chinese as the "shoe road." Rapidly, the number of such Hakka-owned shoe stores on Bentinck Street crossed the 100 threshold and triggered competition among the shoemakers.

After the start of the Second World War and the occupation of Southeast Asia by the Japanese, the number of Chinese immigrants in Calcutta and elsewhere in India increased significantly. This development led to the growth of the shoe business. The number of shoe stores owned by the Hakkas in Calcutta increased to 140. Among these were 30 large shoe stores, with branches in Bombay, which had access to necessary resources and made significant annual profits (Yu 1956: 30–1).

It was in the early twentieth century that some of the Hakka shoemakers started exploring the possibility of also engaging in the tanning of leather needed to make the shoes they sold. These Hakkas ventured into the Tangra area where the low-caste Hindus and Muslims tanned leather and supplied them to the Chinese shoemakers. Eventually, the Hakkas bought the tanneries from them and started relocating to the area with their families. By 1930, a substantial community of Hakkas had emerged in Tangra and became known as the city's second "Chinatown," after the one in central Calcutta.

In the 1940s and 1950s, the Hakka community in Tangra became affluent due to increased demand for leather worldwide. At the same time, the community became more cohesive and segregated from the non-Chinese residents of Calcutta. In recent years, however, both the Hakka shoemakers in central Calcutta and the tanners in Tangra have witnessed severe disruptions to their economic lives. The Hakka shoemakers have lost business to modern, more efficient, shoe chains, such as Bata and Khadims. In fact very few of them now hand-make the shoes themselves. Instead, Bihari and other local workers use machines to make the leather shoes the Chinese shoe stores sell. The Hakka tannery business, on the other hand, has been affected by the environmental concerns raised by non-governmental groups and legal orders from the state and federal courts. Several tanneries have either closed or shifted to a designated area authorized by the local government. Since the Hakkas in Tangra lived in their unique tannery-cum-residences (Berjeaut 1999; Bonnerjee 2010; Zhang 2011), the closure of the tanneries has not only affected their livelihood, but also their lifestyle and residential patterns.

The Hubeinese "dentists" and paper-flower makers

The Hubeinese have been well known as "teeth setters" in China for a long time. After migrating to South Asia, these Hubeinese dentists traveled from one region to another, with their families, just as they did in China. Some of the Hubeinese teeth setters seem to have first emigrated to Southeast Asia, and from there they relocated to Calcutta and other regions of India. By the end

of the Second World War there were around 300 Hubeinese-owned dentistry businesses in India. Indian customers were attracted to the Hubeinese teeth setters because of their reputed skills and low fees (Yu 1956: 34). In Calcutta itself, there were more than 80 such clinics run by people from the Tianmen area in Hubei province. These clinics catered to the local Chinese and non-Chinese customers.

Shortly after independence in 1947, the Indian government established new laws for dentists. These laws required dental clinics to either procure certification from a regular hospital specializing in dentistry or the approval from the health department. This was a major setback for the Chinese dentists in India because very few of them had proper training or standard facilities. Indeed, most did not meet the necessary standards to work as dentists. Upon vehement urging from the Chinese Consulate General in Calcutta, temporary exception was given to Hubeinese dentists by the Indian government which extended the deadline (Zhang 2011: 156).

The biggest blow to the Hubeinese dentists and their way of life came during the India–China conflict of 1962. The restrictions placed on the movement of the Chinese in India forced the roaming teeth setters to pick a place to settle down. Most of them decided to choose Calcutta, and others chose Lucknow, Jamshedpur, Gorakhpur, Vishakhapatnam, Shillong, and Imphal. Some seem to have also settled in the Saddar neighborhood of Karachi, where after the independence of Pakistan, these teeth setters made dentures and extracted decayed teeth (Rizvi 2005).

A few Hubeinese teeth setters can still be found practicing their craft in Calcutta and Karachi. In the latter city, the Hubeinese have several full-fledged clinics and perform advanced procedures such as filling and root canal. Similar to those in India, these second and third generation Hubeinese dentists are not accredited. But they still continue to attract patients because they charge half the normal fees. Those opting to receive formal training have moved to other cities of Pakistan (Rizvi 2005).[2]

Some of the Hubeinese immigrants, especially the wives of the roaming teeth setters, were also engaged in making paper flowers to supplement the family earning. They made flowers of varying designs and colors, paper balls, lanterns, and even toys. During major celebrations, such as Christmas, Hindu festivals, and Chinese New Year, they sold these paper flowers and other things in local markets (Yu 1956: 36). This occupation does not seem to have revived after the India–China conflict of 1962.

The Shandong silk traders

More than 50% of the immigrants from Shandong in South Asia originated from the Changyi 昌邑 and Weifang 濰坊 regions, 30% came from Pingdu 平度, and around 20% from Yantai 煙台. The first of these immigrants seem to have arrived through the maritime route during the Guangxu period (1875–1908), settling in Sri Lanka initially and then travelling to India. There were also others who reached India through Rangoon (today officially Yangon) in Myanmar. These immigrants engaged in selling silk products from Shandong by frequenting various markets across India. In 1920, the Shandong Sichou Tongye Gonghui (Shandong Silk Common Business Corporation, later re-named) was established because of the increase in the number of these traders in India. The organization facilitated communication and exchange of information among the Shandong silk traders. In the 1940s, the number of immigrants from Shandong province in India had increased to 1,500, most of whom (about 600) lived in Bombay and Calcutta (about 200) (Zhang 2011: 158–9).

The Shandong silk traders were mostly itinerants, traveling between Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Assam, and also the cities and towns of Sri Lanka peddling various silk products. In Calcutta and Bombay they even had their own stores selling brocade, lace and other silk products. However,

during the Second World War, the supply of silk from Shandong ceased due to disruptions along the routes connecting China and India. As a result, the Chinese silk traders were forced to start doing business in silk produced in India and Sri Lanka. Some of them switched to doing business in small-scale handicraft industry, opening grocery and snack stores, and even starting a few restaurants that offered cuisine from North China. The income from these businesses was barely enough to sustain their lives in Calcutta or other parts of India, and may have been a reason why most of them left the country.

The Shandong silk traders in India gained some prominence, especially among the Bengali-speaking people in India, due to the Bengali film *Nīl ākāśer nīce* (Under the Blue Sky). Loosely based on Mahādevī Varmā's Hindi short story *Cīnī pherīvālā* (The Chinese Peddler) (Varmā 1998), the film portrays the friendship between a Chinese silk vendor called Wang Lu and a Bengali woman called Bāsantī during the 1930s. Today, except for this film, there is no trace of the presence of the Shandong silk traders in Calcutta. Unlike the Cantonese, Hakka, and the Hubeinese immigrants, the Shandong traders seem to have not lived in India beyond one or two generations. In fact, most may have been regularly traveling between India and China, something that is also represented in the character of Wang Lu in the Bengali film.

The Chinese laundries, restaurants, and beauty parlors

Laundries (including dry-cleaning stores), restaurants and beauty parlors are the three other businesses that are generally associated with the Chinese in South Asia. These are now more ubiquitous than the Chinese businesses mentioned above. However, unlike the above-mentioned occupations, these businesses are not monopolized by any specific sub-ethnic groups of the Chinese. Before the Second World War, there seem to have been only two Chinese-owned laundry stores in India, one in Calcutta and one in Bombay (Yu 1956: 41). The Japanese occupation of China brought new Chinese immigrants to India, some of whom set up laundry stores as means to sustain themselves. Although some of these new laundry stores referred to Shanghai in their name, leading to the belief that they were run by immigrants from Shanghai, the owners came from various parts of eastern China, including Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces.

Because these laundry stores did good business initially, their numbers grew rapidly during the 1940s and 1950s. These were at least 10 such Chinese-owned laundry stores in Calcutta alone during this period. In fact, in the 1950s, when the relations between India and China flourished, the Bank of China branch in Calcutta actively gave loans to the members of the community who wanted to declare themselves citizens of the newly founded People's Republic of China (PRC). Many of those taking the loan and PRC citizenship used the money to open laundry stores. However, when the relations between the two countries deteriorated, the Chinese with PRC passports were the first to be interned and deported. This resulted in the closure of a number of Chinese-owned laundry stores across India. Still, several stores, such as the Chunking Laundry and the Shanghai Laundry in Calcutta, continued to function and are still popular today.

There is little doubt that Chinese restaurants are the most successful and popular Chinese-owned businesses in Calcutta. Already in the early twentieth century Chinese restaurants in the Bowbazar area of central Calcutta had become renowned among the European and American residents as well as among the upper class Indians (Bradley 1924; Tan 1930). During the Second World War there was an increase in the number of Chinese restaurants in South Asia. Chinese from Southeast Asia, who sought refuge in India, opened their own restaurants. As a result, the number of Chinese restaurants and teahouses in India reached 150 (Yu 1956: 37). In addition to Calcutta, several Chinese-owned restaurants also opened in Bombay, Karachi, and Assam.

While the India–China conflict had a discernible impact on the restaurant business of the Chinese, the cuisine that mixed Chinese dishes and Indian spices to suit the needs of the South Asian palate had already become an inseparable part of South Asian eating habits. Thus, many Chinese-owned restaurants have continued to operate in the major cities of South Asia. In Karachi, for example, the ABC and the Ming Court restaurants remain popular. The former restaurant was established in 1942 by T.Y. Lee, the former Consul-General of Republic of China in Karachi (Asadullah 2007). In Calcutta, on the other hand, new Chinese-owned restaurants are now located in the Tangra area, replacing not only those in Bowbazar but also the tanneries that have closed due to environmental restrictions. In fact, "Chinese-Indian" cuisine has emerged as an international brand, with restaurants such as "Tangra" and "Indian Wok" that have in recent years opened across the world, including in cities such as Singapore, New York (USA), and Toronto (Canada).

Another business in South Asia that continues to be closely associated with the Chinese is that of beauty parlors. These businesses are mostly run by Chinese women and started opening in South Asia sometime in the 1930s. Their appearance is linked to the increased migration of Chinese women to South Asia. Similar to other Chinese-owned businesses, most of these beauty parlors were located in Calcutta. Chinese-owned beauty parlors were subsequently also established in other larger cities in South Asia. Many of these businesses run by the Chinese women are located near the restaurants owned by their husbands.

The Chinese in South Asia were engaged in several other economic activities. These included running grocery stores and pharmacies, especially those that catered to the Chinese residents, garment shops, and import and export businesses. An old Chinese migrant living in

Figure 13.1 Tanneries and residences of the Hakka community in Tangra, Calcutta, India (Photograph by Zhang Xing)

Colombo produced and distributed the famous Linbaiquan safflower oil 林白全紅花油, which was exported to China (Yu 1956: 51). In Calcutta, in 1945, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, under the supervision of the Chinese Consul-General, was established in Calcutta. There were also two banks and other organizations engaged in remitting money from India to China. In Colombo, in the 1950s there were only about 10 Chinese businesses, including two restaurants, one shoe store, and two dental clinics (Yu 1956: 51).

After the India–China conflict, many of the above businesses, including the banks in Calcutta, closed. Still there are several businesses owned by the Chinese immigrants and their descendants that continue to operate in South Asia. A list of these businesses in India can be found in the *Indian-Chinese Yellow Pages* published by The Indian Chinese Association for Culture, Welfare and Development and included in their annual *Diary*. The 2003 edition of the *Diary*, for example, lists 13 beauty parlors, 6 provisions and sauces stores, 4 dentists/dental clinics, 3 doctors, 1 dry–cleaner, 5 interior decorators and furnishers, including carpenters, 2 photo

Figure 13.2 Siyi Chinese association, Bowbazar, Calcutta, India (Photograph by Zhang Xing)



Figure 13.3 The Chinese Kali temple, Tangra, Calcutta, India (Photograph by Zhang Xing)

studios, 41 restaurants, and 50 shoe stores. While these numbers are not complete, they indicate the diverse businesses that the Chinese in India are currently engaged in.

Social and cultural institutions of the Chinese in South Asia

Within decades of arriving in South Asia, the Chinese migrants established temples, native-place associations, and cemeteries. These were followed by the formation of various clubs, schools, and other social and cultural organizations. As with other institutions of the Chinese migrants, most of these were established in Calcutta due to the fact that the city had the largest number of Chinese immigrants and easy access to China. Many of the temples and institutions in Calcutta still continue to attract Chinese who live elsewhere in South Asia and those who have emigrated to North America and other foreign countries. The most important site for these "Chinese-Indians" is the tomb of Atchew in Achipur, which has emerged as an annual pilgrimage site.

Huiguans (native-place associations)

*Huiguan*s were Chinese merchant guilds that played important social, cultural, and economic roles in the lives of the people in major Chinese cities and the coastal regions especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In foreign lands, these associations provided or organized places for lodging, community gatherings and celebrations, and religious rituals and ceremonies. Some of them also operated as unofficial courtrooms where members of the overseas Chinese community settled their legal disputes. In Calcutta, for example, five such *huiguan*s were established by the Cantonese immigrants, mostly in or in the vicinity of Blackburn Lane in the



Figure 13.4 Dewali celebrations by the "returned" Chinese from South Asia, Laibin Overseas Chinese Farm, Guangxi Province, China (Courtesy of the Chinese-Indian community in Laibin)

Bowbazar neighborhood. Named after specific regions in Guangdong province, these were the Yixing (Ye Hing), Nanshun (Nam Soon), Dong'an (Toong Oon), Siyi (Sea Ip) and Huining (Wei Ning) *huiguan*s.

The Nanshun *huiguan* belonged to people who migrated from the Nanhai and Shunde areas. The Dong'an *huiguan* was established by immigrants from the Dongguan and Bao'an areas of Guangdong province, the Siyi *huiguan*, in Calcutta and Bombay, by people from the Taishan, Xinhui, Kaiping, and Enping areas, and the Huining *huiguan* by immigrants from the Sihui and Guangning regions. The Hakkas had their own *huiguan* known as Jiaying that was established by the Zhongyitang 忠义堂 and operated by migrants from Meixian.

These *huiguan*s were initially established to connect and bring together the immigrants from the above regions. They served as guesthouses, religious institutions, sponsors of schools, sites for community gatherings, etc. They were also in charge of graveyards. Wedding, funerary, and other kinds of large receptions also took place in these associations. Since these *huiguan*s also housed shrines devoted to Chinese deities, they were usually called "churches." Their importance in the social and cultural affairs of the Chinese migrants can be discerned from Table 13.1 which highlights the *huiguan*s connections to important social and cultural institutions.

The *huiguan*s and many other institutions of the Chinese living in South Asia are now run-down. The decline in the population of the Chinese living in the region seems to have had a significant effect on the financial situation of these places. For the Chinese still residing in some of the South Asian cities, the *huiguan*s, no matter what their physical condition, are places that relate to the history of the community, especially at its incipient stage. Until the late 1950s, these places had served as a meeting place for immigrants and their descendants from the same places of origin to gather and maintain their sub-ethnic identity. Most of these *huiguan*s continue to function till the present day and are places for people to gather to play mahjong (Oxfeld 1993), read newspapers, venerate Chinese deities, or attend special events.

Temples and religious practices

It is not clear when the Chinese-Indians started perceiving Atchew as their collective "ancestor" and began the practice of visiting his horseshoe-shaped tomb every Chinese lunar New Year. The tomb was reconstructed in 2004 by the Yixing *huiguan*, the oldest Cantonese guild in Calcutta, dating to 1838. The site also seems to have one of the earliest Chinese temples in South Asia that is dedicated to Bogong and Bopo (God and Goddess of the Earth). The images of the two

Table 13.1 Huiguans in Calcutta

	Name	*Year of Establishment*	*Attached Shrines*	*Sponsored Schools*	*Administered Graveyards*
1	Yixing Huiguan	1838	Guandi shrine	None	Yixing graveyard
2	Zhongyitang/ Jiaying Huiguan	1841/1907	Guandi shrine	Meiguang School	Zhongyitang graveyard
3	Siyi Huiguan	1845	Guanyin shrine	None	Siyi graveyard
4	Dongan Huiguan	1864	Guandi shrine	None	Dongan graveyard
5	Nanxun Huiguan	1894	Guandi shrine	Jianguo Primary School	Nanxun graveyard
6	Huining Huiguan	1908	Ruanliang shrine[3]	None	Huining graveyard

deities were said to have been installed by Atchew himself. The Bogong–Bopo temple at Achipur is perceived to be the protector of all Chinese settled in India, especially those in Calcutta, and may provide the visitors a sense of a shared historical past (Zhang 2009). Moreover, it also underscores both the Chinese and the Chinese-Indian identities of the community.

Another early Chinese temple in South Asia belonged to the Chinese goddess Tianhou or Mazu. In 1858, Chaloner Alabaster (1858: 383) reports of the existence of Tianhou temple in Calcutta, built, according to him, by the local Cantonese carpenters. Alabaster notes that the temple was "well-kept" and visited once a year by both the Hakka shoemakers and the Cantonese carpenters in "grand processions." The temple was renovated several times, the last of which took place in 1999. Still the largest Chinese temple in South Asia, the altar dedicated to Tianhou is located in the second floor of the temple. Flanking her on the left altar is an idol of the Bodhisattva Guanyin, and on the altar to the right are funerary tablets of the deceased people from the local Chinese community. Inside the secondary hall are the images of Chinese deities such as Huode Xingjun, Bogong Bopo 伯公伯婆, Taohua Furen, and the legendary carpenter Lu Ban. Inside and outside the two halls are various inscribed *paibian* (inscribed boards), some dating from the Xianfeng (1851–62) and Guangxu reign periods of the Qing dynasty.

Alabaster (1858: 370–72) also mentions the existence of a Chinese temple dedicated to Guandi in Calcutta. The temple was built by the Hakka shoemakers. Alabaster seems to be referring to the large Guandi temple that now stands in the premises of the Meiguang School in the Bowbazar area of Calcutta. In fact, Guandi is a popular Chinese deity among the Chinese in Calcutta. There are Guandi shrines in the Yixing *huiguan*, Siyi *huiguan*, Dong'an *huiguan*, Nanshun *huiguan*, Jiaying *huiguan*, Huining *huiguan*, and at the Peimei School in the Tangra area of Calcutta. Additionally, since one of the manifestations of Guandi is as the god of wealth (Caishen), these images are also found in the homes and businesses of the people.

Also popular among the Chinese in South Asia is the veneration of Guanyin. The most important Guanyin shrine is located in the Siyi *huiguan* in Calcutta. While Guanyin is worshiped at other Chinese places in South Asia, the Guanyin shrine in Siyi *huiguan* is considered to be the most efficacious. The shrine draws Chinese worshipers settled in different parts of India. Similar to the veneration of Caishen, images of Guanyin can also be found in the homes and businesses of the Chinese in South Asia. Other Chinese Buddhist deities and temples were also established in different parts of India, including one dedicated to uniquely Chinese Buddhist divinities known as Ruan Ziyu and Liang Cineng. The veneration of these two Chinese Buddhas originated in the Sihui region of Guangdong, from where many Cantonese carpenters had migrated to Calcutta.

The Chinese community was also instrumental in establishing Buddhist temples at sacred Buddhist sites in India. In 1921, a Zhonghua Fosi (Chinese Buddhist Temple) was established in Sarnath, the Zhonghua Dajue Si (Mahabodhi Chinese Temple) in Bodhgaya in 1923, the Huaguang Si (Huaguang Temple) in Balrampur in 1923, the Shuanglin Si (Shuanglin Temple) in Gorakhpur in 1927, and the Zhongguo Miao (China Temple) in Nalanda in 1931. In addition, a Buddhist association of Chinese Indians, known as the Chinese Buddhist Community of India, was established in Ajmer in 1932. In Calcutta, the Chinese community built a Zhonghua Fosi and the Xuanzang Si. In recent years, the Taiwanese Guoji Foguang Hui (Buddha's Light International Association) has started playing an important role within the Chinese communities, especially those in Calcutta. In addition to promoting Buddhist teachings, nuns from the Association perform funerary rituals, organize cultural and charity events, and arrange Chinese language classes (Zhang forthcoming).

Christianity and Islam are also practiced by the Chinese living in South Asia. In 1912, the Zhonghua Jidu Jiaohui (Chinese Christian Church) was established in the Dalhousie Square

section of Calcutta. Three years later, in 1915, a Chinese Catholic Church was built in the Bowbazar area of the city. And in 1934, Father De Moor of Belgium, who had lived in China for several years, successfully introduced Catholic teachings among the Calcutta Chinese community through the establishment of the Sacred Heart School. In the same way, two Chinese Christian missionaries from Shanghai called David and Mary Lamb set up the Ling Liang schools (with a branch in the Bowbazar area and the other in the Tangra area of Calcutta) to promote Protestantism. Today, there are large numbers of Christians among the Chinese community in Calcutta. The Protestants usually congregate at the Church of St. Francis Xavier and the Ling Liang Church. The Catholic Chinese frequent the Immanuel Mary Church. The Bandel Basilica, located in Bandel near Calcutta, organizes special Mass services for the Chinese.

Chinese Muslims lived in Calcutta as well as in parts of Pakistan. While many of the Chinese in Pakistan were non-Han migrants from the Xinjiang province, some Han Chinese also converted to Islam. These conversions took place through either workplace associations, such as in the tanneries of Calcutta, or through intermarriages in both Pakistan and India. In Lahore there may have been a Chinese Mosque (Chini Masjid) for the local Chinese immigrants. In Calcutta, the Chinese Muslims seem to have visited the mosques belonging to the local Muslim communities. Ali Hassan (1982: 85) argues that the Chinese Muslims in Calcutta, who according to him numbered 50 in 1970s, were more integrated to the local society than those practicing other religions. Perhaps because of this integration or most likely due to emigration to other countries, there are only a handful of Chinese Muslims in India at the present time. Even in Pakistan, with the decline in the number of ethnic Chinese, the number of Chinese Muslims has diminished and the Chini Masjid in Lahore seems to have closed several decades ago.

In addition to the above-mentioned religious beliefs and temples, the Chinese immigrants to South Asia created their own unique practices. This can be seen, for example, in the veneration of the Hindu goddess Kali at a small temple called Chinese Kali Temple in the Tangra area of Calcutta. The temple is popular among the local Chinese for fertility rituals. Also in Tangra is a large temple dedicated to a Hakka spirit medium Lady Huang Xie Shou 黄谢寿 and her disciple in Calcutta called Lady Liao Li Qiu 廖李秋, who migrated to Calcutta in the 1950s. On the second story of the temple there is an altar for Jade Emperor, the ruler of the Chinese heaven. Outside the temple there are images related to Buddhism, including Emperor Ashoka's emblem, the four-headed lion (Zhang 2009).

The schools of the Chinese in South Asia

Schools for Chinese immigrants were set up in several South Asian cities and towns. The earliest of these schools was the Meiguang School established in Calcutta in 1920. Initially called Yinjing Huaqiao Xuexiao, it was managed by the Jiaying *huiguan*. In 1933 it was formally renamed Meiguang Wanquan Xiaoxue 梅光完全小学 (Meiguang Comprehensive Primary School). The education section of the Qiaowu weiyuanhui (Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs) under the Guomindang (GMD) government in China passed a bill to formally recognize the school, and it was decided to officially call it Yindu Jiacheng Sili Meiguang Xiaoxue 印度加城私立梅光小学 (The Meiguang Private Primary School in Calcutta, India). The medium of instruction at the school was Hakka and most of the students and teachers were migrants from Meixian. In the 1940s, similar to the other Chinese schools in South Asia, Meiguang started using Mandarin as the medium of instruction. The School offered instruction up to junior middle school (*chuzhong*). It also had branches in Kalimpong and other Indian cities in North Bengal.

Meiguang along with the Peimei School 培梅学校, which was established in 1934 in the Tangra area, and the Jianguo School 建国学校, which opened in 1943, formed the three leading educational institutions for the Chinese in South Asia. All three were operated by the Hakka migrants and were closely linked to the GMD faction in South Asia. Financially supported by the Hakka tannery workers, through their organization called Dhapa Chinese Tannery Owners' Association, Peimei School at its peak in the late 1940s had about 500 students and 10 teachers. Most of the teachers at these three schools came from Meixian and the curriculum was approved by the education department of the GMD government in China (Zhang 2010).

In 1951, after the establishment of the Communist government in China, the Xinghua Middle School 兴化中学was founded in Calcutta. It offered free education to the students. Within a year, 200 students were registered at the school. The Consulate General of the PRC oversaw the Xinghua Middle School. It also established the Zhongguo Primary School 中国小学 in 1952. Within a few years, the number of students at the Zhongguo Primary School quickly surpassed 400. Some of these students seem to have transferred to the Zhongguo Primary School expressly because they did not have to pay any tuition fees.

The 1950s was the most vibrant and also the most contentious period for the Chinese schools in India. Divisions were drawn based on support for either the GMD or the Communists, an outcome of the civil war within China that eventually led to the establishment of communist rule in Mainland China and the formation of the GMD government in Taiwan in 1949. Some in the Chinese community in Calcutta supported the GMD government, and others the People's Republic of China.

One episode mentioned in the *Yindu huaqiao shihua* (Dai 1958b: 35–6) that highlights not only the conflict between these two factions, but also the Indian government's delicate position in maintaining order among the Chinese population in Calcutta, involved Li Weibin 李渭滨. A leading figure within the Calcutta Chinese community, Li Weibin had been involved in the founding of the local Chinese-language newspaper called *Yindu Ribao* and also played an important role in the establishment of the Overseas Chinese School (Huaqiao Xuexiao) and the Zhongzheng School. For over 20 years, starting from 1936, he served as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Meiguang School. In September 1954, his involvement with the celebrations commemorating the victory of Taiwan over the armies of the People's Republic of China in the Battle of Jinmen in the Taiwan Straits in October 1949 led to Li Weibin's detention by the Indian government (HZBW 1962: 120–22).

The celebration took place at the Jiaying Association on 10 October, a day also known as the "Double Ten Day," which marked the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and is recognized as the national day of Taiwan. A lavish dinner was held to celebrate the two events. Li Weibin was one of the main organizers and delivered a "rousing" speech at the celebration. Within one week there were rumors that he and two other key people involved in the celebrations would be arrested. At first, most people thought it was meant to intimidate the pro-GMD faction in the city. But, on the night of 30 October, the Calcutta police took Li Weibin into custody. The reason given was that as an Indian citizen, his speech hampered the diplomatic relations between India and the People's Republic of China. He was released in 1955 after a year-long imprisonment. The report by Dai Zi'an (Dai 1958b) portrays this event as an attempt by the Consulate General of the PRC in Calcutta to take control of the leading Chinese schools in the city. His and other Taiwanese records of the episode allege that the Consulate convinced the Indian government to arrest Li Weibin and thereby hindered the operations of the Meiguang School.

Indian intelligence records also note the political factionalism centering on the Peimei and Jianguo schools. They frequently mention the involvement of the Chinese Consulate General, and report on the violence that ensued because of the rivalries between the supporters of the

GMD and the People's Republic of China. The local pro-Communist *Zhongguo Zhoubao*, on the other hand, reported that the Chinese Consulate was playing a more constructive and "patriotic" role in unifying the community in Calcutta.

The acrimonious situation between the two factions seems to have continued until the late 1950s, when the relations between India and China deteriorated and the schools supported by the Consulate General of the People's Republic of China were forced to close. The remaining Chinese schools in Calcutta maintained their contacts with Taiwanese institutions and continued to attract local Chinese students. However, factionalism and funding problems continued to mar these remaining few, so-called GMD supported, schools in Calcutta. The recent example was the Peimei School, which was forced to close in 2010 due to rivalries among its administrators.

Three Christian schools that originally targeted the Chinese community in Calcutta remain open today. These are the Sacred Heart Catholic Chinese School and the two branches of the Grace Ling Liang School. The Sacred Heart Catholic Chinese School was founded by the Belgian missionary Father C. De Moor in 1936. After spending one year in Guangdong province, Father De Moor, who had learned to speak Mandarin, came to India and established the Catholic school exclusively for the Chinese. Although a Chinese-medium school, it emphasized English language courses and followed strict administrative guidelines. By 1955 there were 241 students; the number increased to 253 in 1957 (Dai 1958a: 61–2).

After the death of Father De Moor in 1968, who had until then served as its principal, a special committee was appointed to take charge of the school. Since then several principals and vice principals have been appointed by the committee, including Agnes Siew, a Malayan national of Chinese origin residing in Taiwan. In 1996, the Archbishop of Calcutta Henry D'Souza requested the Sisters of St Joseph of the Apparition take over the administration of the school. The Sisters accepted the invitation and appointed Sister Renee Quadros as the new principal. The new management committee established by the Sisters, like the previous committee, consisted of European missionaries, members of the Chinese community, and local Indians. Until 1999 the school offered classes up to grade six, after which grades seven and eight were added. In 2005, Sister Rosa followed as the new headmistress and served until 2010. However, the school no longer offers Chinese-medium instruction. It follows the Indian Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) system and uses English as the medium of instruction. It currently has about 400 students, with very few, if any, Chinese students, even though it is still called the Sacred Heart Catholic Chinese School.

Although the Ling Liang School in Calcutta was formally established in 1962, its origins date from 1950. Mary Lamb, one of the founders of the Ling Liang School, started what was called the Poor Children's School. With funding from local government and Chinese businesses, a new building of the school was inaugurated on 12 January 1962 and was named the Ling Liang School.

The English-medium Ling Liang School quickly emerged as the most successful Chinese educational institution in Calcutta. It had a well-crafted curriculum that followed the Indian educational system; it was selective about students and teachers, and benefited from the fact that a number of Chinese Consulate-supported schools closed during the aftermath of the India–China conflict. In fact, it grew into a full-fledged high school that offered kindergarten to grade 12 education to the students. In 1970, the school had 550 students and 34 faculty members with a budget of about Rs. 1 million (Rohrer 1986: 100). It also played an important role in converting a large number of Chinese students to Christianity. The success of the Ling Liang School in the Bowbazar area convinced the Lambs to open a branch in the Tangra area. The project to build the new school known as the Immanuel Ling Liang School, later renamed Grace Ling Liang English School, began in 1970.

The two Ling Liang schools continue to function today, drawing students and teachers from Chinese and non-Chinese communities. They offer a curriculum based on the Indian educational requirement that provides opportunity for the Chinese students to pursue higher education in Indian colleges and universities. This opportunity to pursue higher education in Indian colleges and universities was not a key goal for the drafters of the curricula at the earlier Chinese schools. Rather, the decision to establish schools exclusively for the Chinese immigrants was related to the community's attempt to preserve its cultural heritage and identity. It is evident from the curricula instituted at these schools that the Chinese in Calcutta and elsewhere in South Asia desired to some day return to their ancestral homeland. One of the early features of the Chinese schools in Calcutta was the use of regional Chinese languages as the medium of instruction. While schools such as the Meiguang and Peimei, established by immigrants from Meixian, employed Hakka as the medium of instruction, those founded by the Cantonese used their own regional language. This situation persisted until the 1940s, when Mandarin was accepted as the medium of instruction at most of the Chinese schools in Calcutta.

The teaching of Mandarin at the Chinese schools in Calcutta was part of the overall educational program that emphasized an eventual return to China. Before 1950, the textbooks on Chinese language, general knowledge, mathematics, history, geography, civics, and natural sciences used by the Meiguang, Jianguo and Peimei schools were imported from China. Teachers at the local Chinese schools compiled some other course materials in India. From 1952 – three years after the establishment of the Communist government in Mainland China – onwards, the Meiguang, Jianguo, and Peimei schools started using textbooks printed by the Xinjiapo Qingnian Shudian (Singapore Youth Bookstore).

The content of the latter textbooks included the politics, culture, and history of Southeast Asia, and thus was not fully appropriate for students in India. Nonetheless, since there were some common aspects among the people living in South and Southeast Asia, these textbooks were more relevant than the China-focused books used previously. They also did not overtly show any political affiliations. In 1955 it was decided that the three schools would use textbooks sponsored and freely distributed by the Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs in Taiwan. These books were called the "Nanqiao *ban*" (Edition for the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia) and printed by the Zhengzhong shuju (Zhengzhong Publishing House). They incorporated material about the history, geography and customs of Southeast Asia and primarily targeted the Chinese immigrants in that region. In the case of the junior middle school division of the Meiguang School, the textbooks from the former Huaqiao Middle School, which were imported from pre-1949 China, were used (Dai 1958a: 71–2).

The curriculum instituted at the Ling Liang schools was significantly different from that of the other Chinese schools in Calcutta. They not only provided an English-medium instruction, but also followed an Indian educational curriculum. Like other Indian schools, they offered kindergarten to grade-12 education and an opportunity for the graduating students to enter colleges and universities after the completion of the India-wide higher secondary examinations. Also, unlike other Chinese-medium schools, except for the Sacred Heart Catholic Chinese School, a majority of teachers at the Ling Liang Schools were (and continue to be) non-Chinese teachers. The schools continue to offer Mandarin only as an elective course. The Ling Liang Schools attracted many Calcutta Chinese especially because they were located near their neighborhoods and used English as the medium of instruction. English education not only made it easier to access higher education in Indian colleges, it also facilitated the emigration of Calcutta Chinese to Western countries. Indeed, as Ellen Oxfeld (1993: 53) points out, "families reasoned that a background in English was useful if one emigrated and even within India itself." Because of this demand, English was also introduced at the Peimei School.

In 1956 the Bajisitan Huaqiao xiaoxue (Pakistan Overseas Chinese Primary School) was established in Karachi by the local Chinese residents. It started with a Chinese Tuition Class with about 15 students. Similar to many of the Chinese schools in Calcutta, this school also became an issue of contention between the GMD and Communist supporters within the community. Eventually, the Pakistan government recognized the control of the school by the representatives of the PRC consulate in Karachi (Dai 1958a: 94–6). It is not clear when it ceased to operate. There was also a Chinese school in Colombo called Xilan Huaqiao xuexiao (Ceylon Overseas Chinese School) established in 1954, which, in addition to teaching Chinese language and culture, also offered a course in Singhalese (Dai 1958a: 112–13).

The India–China conflict of 1962, financial constraints, and internal divisions led to the decline of Chinese-medium schools in Calcutta. Chinese students started to opt for English-medium schools, such as the Ling Liang Schools, and pursued studies based on the curricula and textbooks used by other Indian schools. It had become clear at this point that the remaining Chinese in Calcutta had to either integrate or emigrate to a third country, where English and a Western education would have more utility than Chinese education. With the decline of population in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the schools there were closed in the 1960s.

Politics and the Chinese community in South Asia

Despite the small number of Chinese settlers and their descendants in South Asia, some members of the community played a prominent role in political discourse. This discourse took the form of negotiations with the British in regard to Tibet, overseeing the activities of the GMD in South Asia, and coordinating with the Republican government in China on an anti-Japanese coalition. There were, as noted above, also political rivalries within the Chinese community stemming from the Guomindang–Communist conflict in China. More prominently, the Chinese community found itself severely affected by the India–China conflict of 1962, which saw many of its members interned and deported by the Indian government. Not a single member of the Chinese community, however, has yet been able to make his/her mark in the local governmental politics in any of the South Asian states.

A person named Lu Xinqi 陆兴祺 (Lu Hsing-chi) was one of the most active and successful Chinese political operatives based in South Asia. At some time in the late nineteenth century, Lu had gone to Calcutta to study at a local Chinese school. Later he started a company called Tianyi Gongsi 天益公司 (Thinyi and Company), located in the Tirreta Bazar of Calcutta, which did business in fur imported from Tibet. By 1911, when the imperial Qing government collapsed, Lu was one of the richest Chinese businessmen in South Asia. He also had good political contacts. Lu frequently sent telegraphs to the officials in the newly established Republican government in China, recommending various ways to maintain Chinese jurisdiction over Tibet and the methods to deal with the British officials. One scholar of the Tibetan intrigue during this period has noted that Lu Xingqi

> played an extremely significant role in setting forth and giving practical shape to the Chinese position vis-à-vis Tibet. Additionally, he, more than anybody else, appears to have grasped, indeed masterminded, the minutest details of the Tibetan question and having secured Peking's ear at the highest level, strove hard to make the best of what was a fairly bad bargain.
>
> *(Mehra 1976: 50)*

Lu was appointed as the "Administrator" of Tibet by the Republican government in China, a position not recognized by either the Tibetans or the British government in India. Nonetheless,

Lu played an important role in the Shimla Conference of 1914 regarding the political and territorial status of Tibet. The Chinese representative Ivan Chen, who was advised by Lu, withdrew from the negotiations and the agreement could only be drafted between the British and the Tibetans in absence of the Chinese. Lu continued to be active in the Tibetan issue until 1916, when he returned to China to look after his ill mother.

Lu's activities in Calcutta may have been instrumental in setting up a Chinese consulate in Calcutta and the establishment of GMD offices in various cities of South Asia. According to one Indian intelligence report ("Chinese Activities in India") the first GMD office in South Asia was established in Calcutta in 1911, perhaps soon after the overthrow of the Qing government. Calcutta not only housed the headquarters of the GMD, it also had two sub-branches. A third branch was located in Bombay. In 1946, new branches opened in Darjeeling, Shillong, Jalpaiguri, and Karachi. The intelligence reports mention that the aim of the GMD office was to "unite the Chinese in this country (i.e., India) under the Kuomintang, to minister to the welfare of Chinese subjects residing in India and to provide an understanding of the Kuomintang policy amongst Indians and other sympathetic foreigners." Indeed, with regard to the last point, the GMD government in 1927 permitted Indians to join the Indian branch after paying appropriate entry fee and contribution to the Northern Punitive Expedition Fund ("The Kuomintang Association").

GMD's activities in India grew rapidly during the 1930s and early 1940s. Strong links were established between the GMD government in China and various Chinese organizations and associations in South Asia. Funding for some of these organizations, such as the San Min Chu I Youth Corp., and educational institutions came from the offices of GMD in China. A key role in linking the high GMD officials to some of these educational institutions and the leadership of Indian National Congress was played by Tan Yunshan, perhaps the most prominent Chinese-Indian, who was invited by Rabindranath Tagore as the inaugural director of Cheena Bhavan in Santiniketan. Tan contributed significantly to the development of Chinese studies in India through his connections to the GMD leadership, organizing high profile visits to India by GMD officials such as Dai Jitao, and also in the establishment of various Chinese Buddhist temples in India, including those in Bodhgaya and Sarnath.

The political activity of the Chinese in South Asia became contentious and violent in the late 1940s, when deep divisions emerged between the supporters of GMD and the Communists in China. With the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, this rivalry became more acute for the Chinese in South Asia. Almost every aspect of their public life was affected by the intense hostilities between the two sides. The impact on Chinese schools, as mentioned above, was most visible. Even cultural and social activities were split according to ideological allegiances. The government of newly independent India, leaders of whom had close contacts with the GMD leadership, chose to side with the PRC government and started curtailing the activities of the pro-GMD groups in Calcutta and elsewhere.

The fact that the Indian government took side with PRC was evident, for example, in November 1954, soon after Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru returned from his trip to China, when two Chinese residents of Calcutta, including C.S. Liu, the editor of a local Chinese newspaper sympathetic to Taiwan, were deported. A third Chinese was arrested under the Preventive Detention Act. Then, in August 1958, the Indian government cancelled a football match between India and Hong Kong, because some of the players in the Hong Kong team were allegedly "loyal" to the Nationalist government in Taiwan.

Dalai Lama's defection to India in 1959 and the subsequent border dispute between India and China gave the upper hand to the anti-Beijing Chinese organizations in India. Leaders of some of these groups wrote letters to the Indian government pledging their loyalty to India and

expressed the desires of thousands of Chinese residents to become Indian citizens. In October 1959, 8,127 Chinese in Calcutta were registered as foreign residents. Some of them held outdated passports issued by the pre-1949 GMD government in China. Others identified themselves as citizens of communist China. There were also thousands of unregistered Chinese, who were born in India but did not possess birth certificates. They were thus considered stateless.

The ambiguous status of Chinese residents in India proved to be disastrous for the community in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. The Chinese Consulate, the Bank of China, and schools funded by PRC were shut down. Security surveillance over the Chinese community in India increased. Hundreds were charged with anti-Indian activities, detained at the Deoli camp in Rajasthan, and many were subsequently repatriated to Mainland China (Leng and Cohen 1972). The Chinese population in India dwindled. Those who remained were perceived as enemies, deprived of rights to free movement, and dismissed from their jobs in private and government enterprises. The appalling treatment of Chinese residents and their isolation after the war is movingly recounted in Rafeeq Ellias's recent documentary called *The Legend of Fat Mama*.

The Sino-Indian war widened the gulf between the Chinese-Indian community and the local residents. While the Indian government placed constraints on the economic activities of the Chinese-Indians, common people, even the Tamils of Indian origin in Sri Lanka continued to look at the community with suspicion (Rodrigo 1989: 235). The Indian government and the general public failed to distinguish between the border conflict with a nation and the Chinese-Indians, most of whom were born in India. It was not until 1998 that the Indian government allowed the naturalizing of Chinese-Indians. By this time, the political and social reclusion experienced by the Chinese-Indians had forced them to migrate to countries in northern America, Europe, and Australia. Today, the largest community of Chinese-Indians thrives in Toronto, where they are trying to maintain their unique heritage and identity by establishing cultural associations, intermarrying, publicizing their distinctive cuisine, and by preserving links with relatives still living in India.

Concluding remarks

The population of Chinese in South Asia has diminished to a few thousand, with a majority still living in Calcutta. Many there have sold their tanneries, restaurants, and dry cleaning shops and migrated to Toronto or other overseas destinations. Yet it is only in Calcutta, and specifically among those living in the Tangra area, that the Chinese have continued to maintain their distinct cultural practices. Social interactions between the Chinese in Tangra and other ethnic groups in Calcutta are limited and endogamy remains prevalent among the Hakka community. Elsewhere in South Asia, the Chinese population is either migrating to the West or returning to their ancestral homeland. Marriages with non-ethnic Chinese were always more common among those settled outside Calcutta, in northeast India (Zhang 2011) and places such as Sri Lanka (Rodrigo 2001). At these places the processes of acculturation and assimilation were more pronounced, leading to the loss of ethnic and cultural identities.

The fact that almost all educational institutions established specifically for the Chinese communities have now closed makes it difficult for the Chinese, even those living in Tangra, to preserve their unique identity. But, during their 200-year history in South Asia, the Chinese have contributed to the local societies in many different ways, through their cuisine, work ethic, shoe and laundry stores, etc. These imprints on South Asian societies by the Chinese immigrants and their descendants will no doubt remain even after their distinctiveness in these places ceases to exist.

Notes

1 The history of Chinese immigration to South Asia invariably gets eclipsed by the study of the communities that settled in Calcutta, India. This is due to the fact that nowhere else in South Asia were the Chinese, their neighborhoods, social and cultural institutions, and businesses, so ubiquitous as in Calcutta. Their presence in the city can be traced back to the late eighteenth century, not long after the first Chinese migrants arrived in South Asia. Additionally, the sources for studying the Chinese in South Asia mostly come from Calcutta, which include local press and intelligence reports and writings and documents produced by the Chinese communities themselves. As a result, while this essay attempts to also cover the history of Chinese immigrants in other parts of South Asia, particularly in Sri Lanka and what later became Pakistan, the focus remains on the activities of the Chinese who settled in Calcutta.

2 In India, one of the most prominent members of the Hubeinese community is Meiyang Chang, the star of the TV program *Indian Idol*. A descendent of a Hubeinese dentist family living in Dhanbad in the eastern Indian state of Jharkhand, Meiyang Chang has recently also appeared in a Bollywood film with the English title *Badmaash Company*.

3 The Ruanliang temple, or Ruanliang Fomiao 阮梁佛廟 (Sea Voi Yune Leong Futh Church), is dedicated to Ruan Ziyu 阮子鬱 (1079–1102) and Liang Cineng 梁慈能 (1098–1116), both of whom are recognized by the people in Sihui 四會, Guangdong Province, as Buddhas. The temple was established in 1908 by local immigrants from Sihui. This temple is discussed in detail in Zhang (2009 and 2011).

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14

Negotiating transnational migration*

Marriage and changing gender roles among the Chinese diaspora

Huping Ling

Immigrant experiences in a new country could very likely result in changes in family life and marriage for immigrant women. Once in a different environment and a completely new culture, the female exodus found that the relationship between them and their husbands and children were altered. Like women in other immigrant groups, Chinese immigrant women also experienced changes in their families and marriages.

Sociological and historical research on Chinese American families and marriages

Sociologists pioneered many early studies of Chinese American families and marriages. In 1947, Rose Hum Lee in her dissertation entitled *The Growth and Decline of Chinese Communities in the Rocky Mountain Region* found that 13 Chinese families resided in Butte, Montana by 1870 and the average size of the Chinese families in Butte tended to be large, usually seven people (Lee 1978: 234–9). Lee observed that Chinese women were subjected not only to their husbands, but also to clan and family associations (1978: 241–53). Despite the patriarchal control, Lee also noted, Chinese women in Butte occasionally challenged male predominance by running away from unhappy marriages (1978: 253–4). Two decades later, another sociologist, Stanford Lyman examined the social life of Chinese immigrants in the USA and spearheaded the discussion on polygamous practice among early Chinese immigrants in his book, *Chinese Americans*. Not simply proclaiming the practice as an evidence of the inferiority of Chinese, rather, Lyman interpreted polyandry as a form of marriage among Chinese immigrants due to the shortage of women (Lyman 1974: 94).

Despite the above works, the studies of family and marriage of Chinese immigrant women have evolved slowly. Most works on Chinese communities in America have either overlooked the aspect of family life in Chinese immigrant history or treated it in very terse text, the discussions of family and marriage of Chinese immigrants only emerging sporadically and briefly. This

Figure 14.1 Merchant Moy Tong Wee (Moy Dong Yee) and wife Luk Shee. *c.*1906. (National Archives, Great Lakes Region, Chicago, Illinois)

situation continued until the publication of specialized studies on Chinese families in America in the 1980s. Evelyn Nakano Glenn's essay "Split household, small producer and dual wage earner: an analysis of Chinese-American family strategies" was one of the recent significant studies in the field (Glenn 1983). In this work, Glenn claimed that there were three distinct immigrant family types which emerged in different periods in response to particular political and economic conditions: split household (1850–1920), small producer (1920–60), and dual-wage worker (1960–80). "The existence of these distinct types," Glenn believed, "suggested that characteristics often interpreted as products of Chinese culture actually represented strategies for dealing with conditions of life in the United States" (Glenn 1983: 42).

While Glenn's work theoretically analyzes different forms of Chinese immigrant families in the USA, the following more recent studies further provide evidence for the existence of Chinese family lives in the different regions during the early Chinese immigration. Sandy Lydon's *Chinese Gold: The Chinese in the Monterey Bay Region* examined the various Chinese communities in Monterey Bay region, California. He found that as early as in the 1850s, there had been fishing families in the Monterey Bay region, contrary to the stereotypical Chinese laborers in California who generally left their families behind and worked in gold mines and railroads. As a family venture, fishing required the fisherman and his wife working jointly. While some Chinese wives went fishing with their husbands, others worked at home processing fish. Several couples even formed fishing companies, making fishing a profitable industry (Lydon 1985: 156–61).

Family lives not only existed in fishing villages, but were also found in agricultural areas. Sucheng Chan in *This Bittersweet Soil: The Chinese in California Agriculture, 1860–1910* discussed the presence of family lives among Chinese farmers in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta in 1900 and noted the age difference between married couples being a notable feature of Chinese farm families (Lydon 1985: 391–5). Chan also noticed the polyandrous practice among some Chinese miners

Figure 14.2 Merchant Chin F. Foin and wife. 1906. Chin F. Foin was arguably the first and exemplary modernized Chinese restaurateur in Chicago. (National Archives, Great Lakes Region, Chicago, Illinois)

and laborers in northern rural California in 1900 (Chan 1986: 390). Sylvia Sun Minnick's *Samfow: The San Joaquin Chinese Legacy* also discovered 17 Chinese marriages recorded between 1857 and 1880 from the San Joaquin County Marriage Records. Chinese family lives became more apparent after 1900 as 43 Chinese marriages were recorded from 1900 to 1924 (Minnick 1988: 246). Along the same line, Laura Wang in her study of the Chinese community in Vallejo, Solano County, California claimed that between 1910 and 1940 there was a family-oriented Chinese community in Vallejo (Wang 1988).

Similarly, David Beesley challenged the notion that no family existed among the early Chinese immigrant laborers in his article "From Chinese to Chinese American: Chinese women and families in a Sierra Nevada Town" (Beesley 1988: 168–79). From census and other data, Beesley gathered evidence indicating that some of the Chinese laborers in a Sierra Nevada town with regular income had wives or women with them (Beesley 1988: 168–79).

In addition to California and the mountain region, Chinese families also appeared in the Midwest. Sarah R. Mason's case study of Liang May Seen, an early Chinese immigrant woman in

Figure 14.3 Merchant Hong Sling Family. *c.*1908. Front row from left: wife Toy Shee, daughter Jennie Hong Sling, son William Hong Sling, and Hong Sling. Back row: son Harry Hong Sling. (National Archives, Great Lakes Region, Chicago, Illinois)

Minneapolis between the 1890s and 1940s, indicated that Liang May Seen played a vital role in her family's survival and prosperity economically, and assimilation into American society culturally (Mason 1995: 223–33).

In the 1990s, more specialized studies on family lives of Chinese immigrant women in America have emerged. Judy Yung's *Unbound Feet: A Social History of Chinese Women in San Francisco* examines family lives of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Chinese immigrant wives in San Francisco. Yung has observed that most immigrant women "presented a submissive image in public but ruled at home" (Yung 1995: 79). Yung further asserts that immigrant wives "as homemakers, wage earners, and culture bearers made them indispensable partners of their husbands" (Yung 1995: 77).

Along the same lines, Huping Ling's 1998 book *Surviving on the Gold Mountain: A History of Chinese American Women and Their Lives* is noted by scholars as groundbreaking and the first and "most comprehensive history of Chinese American women to date" (Review by Evelyn Nakano

Glenn). It closely examines the lives of Chinese immigrant women as wives of merchants, farmers, and laborers, as prostitutes, and as students and professionals in major gateway cities as well as in rural areas of different regions in nineteenth- and twentieth-century America (Ling 1998).

The above studies have confirmed the existence of family life among the early Chinese immigrants and greatly contributed to our knowledge of family and marriage of Chinese immigrant women in the USA. However, such questions as what characterized marriages among Chinese immigrants and the implications of the characterizations, whether women's role in Chinese immigrant families had changed and how the changes occurred still remain understudied.

Attempting to address these issues, this study claims that immigration affected Chinese immigrant women's marriages. Three types of marriages existed among the early Chinese immigrant families: the transnational split marriage – Taishanese "widow" and American concubine; traditional marriage; and American urban marriages: love union and interracial marriage. Immigration had also changed Chinese women's role in most Chinese immigrant families. Immigration freed women from the dominance of their parents-in-law and they became joint heads of the households as they left the extended families behind and came to America to join their husbands. The necessity of survival in the New World also made these women providers for their families. In performing the above roles, women also participated in decision-making in family affairs. The information included in this study has been primarily derived from archival documents, census data, oral history interviews, and secondary literature.

Marriage patterns

Historical records reveal a few distinctive marriage patterns among the early Chinese families in America. I have classified them into the following categories: first, the transnational split marriage – Taishanese "widow" and American concubine; second, traditional marriage; and third, American urban marriages: love union and interracial marriage. The earlier women were predominantly from the rural area in Taishan, Guangdong, many of whom were concubines. However, the traditional patriarchal polygamous marriage turned into a variant when transplanted to the new land, the husband did not live with multiple wives simultaneously, but left a first wife (in most cases) in China to carry out duties of filial piety, and brought a concubine to America, or married a woman in America, to carry on a family life. While a dominant pattern had been the traditional marriage, in which the Chinese male returned to China, got married and brought his bride with him when returning to America, the American urban marriage was gaining popularity, especially among the younger and American-born Chinese, who were more likely to find mates in their socioeconomic circles in America. Meanwhile, interracial marriages or unions also emerged in the last category.

Transnational split marriage: Taishanese "widow" and American concubine

The establishment of family life in America for the Chinese immigrants encountered a series of obstacles, including ideological, socioeconomical and physical restrictions in China and the alienating and oftentimes hostile environment in America (Ling 1998: 18–20, 25–39). Despite these obstacles, the Chinese immigrants devised a mechanism to negotiate their immigrant reality. I call this mechanism "Transnational split marriage: Taishanese widows and American concubines," a marital arrangement, in which the husband had to leave his wife behind due to the aforementioned obstacles, but in one of his returning trips brought a concubine with him to America to ease his immigrant life. This pattern is evident in Chicago among the earlier Chinese immigrants.

A widely spread and popular folk song among the overseas Chinese villages starts with the lyric "*dangnian agong xia nanyang, jiali apo ku duanchang*" or "A man left for Southeast Asia, his wife wept until she was broken hearted" (author's translation), depicting the plight of wives who were left behind by their emigrant husbands. The villages with substantial numbers of Chinese overseas were called "widow villages." Such folk song and sobriquets best describe the split family life a transmigrant and his family had to endure (Zhang 2008: 1–6). Numerous literary works also reflect this reality. Louis Chu's novel *Eat a Bowl of Tea* and its adaption into motion picture vividly and light-heartedly portray the life of a split immigrant family. The wife laments that her absent husband periodically sent her modern household gadgets from America while he was the one she wanted most (Chu 1979). Academics recently have also studied the issue, with Madeline Y. Hsu's *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home* as one of the best accounts (Hsu 2000).

The plight of the virtual widow of an immigrant Chinese is only part of the trans-Pacific saga. A complete analysis of the transnational split marriage can provide us with a fuller picture of the transnational stories of the Chinese immigrants and their families. It is an arrangement and a practical compromise invented by the immigrants to cope with the marital separation caused by immigration. In many cases, a concubine was arranged by parents or the first wife of an immigrant, with a specific purpose of taking care of his physical needs while abroad; at the same time, the first wife remained in the home village to fulfill the filial piety on his behalf. Through such an arrangement, a concubine and a wife jointly completed the biological, socioeconomic, and emotional duties expected of a traditional wife by society. Despite the inferior status of a concubine in family and society, concubinage was recognized as a workable alternative for girls from impoverished families and desolate situations. Many concubines were illiterate slave-maids from the same or nearby villages, who were sold into servitude at a young age by impoverished parents. A slave-maid's destination of life was dictated by her master, she could be married to a male servant, or become a concubine of the master at the master and mistress's will. The latter eventuality was considered a better alternative for many slave-maids, since as a concubine she was no longer a slave but a member of the masters, thus this was an upward social move. Concubines among the earlier merchant families in Chinatowns were often slave-maids prior to their emigration (Siu 1930s).

Concubinage was not a monopoly of Chinese culture, but a natural product of patriarchal society in traditional China and other patriarchal cultures. The origin of concubinage in China is obscure, but it certainly was related to the patriarchal nature of the society, in which only a male heir could secure a family's name passed down, keep its fortune intact, and have its social and economic status in the community unchallenged. Confucian scholars systematized the patriarchal beliefs and formalized them into cultural institutions that ruled Chinese society and individuals. According to the Confucian idea, "a man without a son was not a dutiful son." A man therefore could legitimately have a concubine or concubines if his wife failed to bear him a male heir. The institution of concubinage was further strengthened and developed during the Song dynasty, when urban development and economic prosperity reduced the significance of women's participation in economic activities, and enabled wealthy Chinese gentry-landowners and merchants to enjoy a more leisurely lifestyle (Fairbank 1973: 142). Together with other valuable possessions, concubines signified a man's social status and economic power. Many wealthy Chinese men therefore acquired concubines not only to satisfy their sexual urge, but also to display their fortune and power. In one of China's most famous twentieth-century novels, *The Family* (originally published in 1933), Ba Jin (Pa Chin) vividly portrayed a typical feudal patriarchal wealthy Chinese family, the Gao family, modeled after his own. Grandfather Gao, the patriarchal family head, and his wealthy friends all possessed concubines (Ba 1972). Although the millennium-long feudal practice of polygamy had been challenged several times in Chinese history,

during the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) and the May Fourth Movement of 1919, it was not outlawed until 1950, when the new Communist government issued the Marriage Law that legally prohibited bigamy and concubinage (see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hunyin Fa 1987).

Although concubinage had been practiced in China historically, the polygynous conditions among Chinese immigrants in the USA were more likely ramifications of immigration than Chinese cultural habits. Not only the well-to-do Chinese merchants had concubines in America, even some Chinese laborers acquired concubines. Before the repeal of Chinese exclusion laws in 1943, most Chinese immigrant men had left their families in China due to their financial inability, American immigration restrictions, and Chinese patriarchy who dictated women to stay in China to take care of children and parents-in-law, and to secure remittances from men abroad.[1] A few fortunate ones were eventually able to arrange for their families to come to America.[2] Many others managed to return to their native villages in China to see their families periodically.[3] The passage of the Scott Act in 1888, which barred the re-entry of Chinese laborers to America even if they left the country only temporarily, however, made the latter practice impossible. Unable to bring wives to America or go to China to see them, some successful Chinese laborers, such as farmers, employed laborers, service workers, and even gamblers, purchased women from brothels or married those who successfully escaped servitude, while still legally married to their first wives in China, as indicated in David Beesley's study, which discusses the polygynous practice among Chinese immigrants in Nevada (Beesley 1988: 174).

Furthermore, polygyny practiced among Chinese immigrant males during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took a different form from its twins in China: most men had first wives in China, and remarried or lived with women under the common law marriage in America without divorcing their first wives; they generally did not live with multiple women under the same roof simultaneously, as a polygynous marriage suggested. Therefore, these marriages were more bigamous than polygynous.

Moreover, the bigamous practices among Chinese immigrants in America were more for practical reasons – physical sustenance of the men and survival of Chinese immigrant communities – than for psychological reasons – display of one's wealth through possession of concubines, as was the case for many wealthy Chinese in China. An ordinary Chinese migrant needed to meet his basic physical needs (food, shelter, and sex) in order to function normally to work for his American dream. With the absence of his wife, he had to find a way, either a nuptial, a common-law co-inhabitance, or a long-term or short-term relationship with a prostitute.

Most Chinese immigrants remained lonely married "bachelors" in America. However, even for them, the role of a companion for one's physical need was practically met by a substitution of concubinage – prostitution, which has been conveniently and frequently employed as an example of the Chinatown vice. Thus, the pattern of transnational split marriage is applicable to the majority of the earlier Chinese immigrants.

The wide age gap between husband and wife was common among the Chinese immigrants. In many Chinese immigrant families, a husband was usually older than his wife. David Beesley's investigation, involving 27 married Chinese couples in a Sierra Nevada town, for example, shows the average age of the women was 22, while the average age of the men 31 (Beesley 1988: 174). Sucheng Chan's study also notes that among Chinese families in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta in the early twentieth century, some farm laborers were twice or even almost three times as old as their wives (Chan 1986: 395). The documents from the Immigration and Naturalization Services and oral history interviews also suggest the age gap between a married couple as a common feature of many Chinese immigrant families. As indicated in the three photos of the traditional Chinese families in Chicago during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, most husbands were much older than their wives.

It is easy to attribute such wide age gaps between marital partners to a patriarchal Chinese culture. Chinese culture dictated marriage was often a social and economic arrangement between the families of the bride and groom, rather than a romantic union between two individuals. A successful and financially secure man was more likely to be an older man. However, the wide age gap between husband and wife was more noticeable among Chinese immigrants than in China. Obviously, immigration to America had something to do with the age gap. American immigration policies before 1943 were mostly responsible for the age gap in Chinese couples. These policies effectively reinforced the sexual imbalance among Chinese immigrants by restricting the entry of Chinese women. The Page Law of 1875 forbade the entry of Chinese, Japanese, and "Mongolian" contract laborers, and prohibited the entry of women for the purpose of prostitution. It also imposed fines and punishment on those convicted for transporting women interstate for the purpose of prostitution. Although the Page Law applied to women of any race and nationality engaged in prostitution, it was executed with the Chinese women in mind (Peffer 1986: 28–64). The Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 effectively banned the entry of Chinese laborers and the wives of Chinese laborers who were already in the USA. As a result, from 1906 to 1924, only an average of 150 Chinese women per year were legally admitted. The Immigration Act of 26 May 1924, based on the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of *Chang Chan et al v. John D. Nagle* on 25 May 1924, excluded Chinese alien wives of American citizens of Chinese ancestry. Consequently, no Chinese women were admitted from 1924 to 1930 (Daniels 1988: 96). In 1930, an act relaxed this ban by allowing the entry of alien Chinese wives as long as the marriage was legally effective before 26 May 1924. Under this provision, about 60 Chinese women were admitted each year between 1931 and 1941 (Daniels 1988: 96–7). The records of the Immigration and Naturalization Services indicate that the majority of the Chinese women entering the USA between 1882 and 1943 were wives and daughters of Chinese merchants.[4] Consequently, American-born daughters of Chinese families were in demand as prospective brides.

The second reason for the age gap was the enforcement of anti-miscegenation laws in many states, which prevented Chinese men from marrying women outside their own ethnic group (Chan 1991a: 59–60; 1991b: 128–9, Osumi 1982: 1–37; Pascoe 2009; Sickels 1972: 64; Sung 1990: 2). Anti-miscegenation laws in the USA evolved as a reaction of white society toward possible racially mixed marriages between whites and blacks resulting from the introduction of black slaves from Africa. In 1661, Maryland passed the first anti-miscegenation law to prohibit marriages involving white females and black males. Following Maryland, 38 states in the Union passed similar legislation (*New York Times*, 13 March 1966, Sec. 4, p. 12; Harper and Skolnick 1962: 96–105; Pascoe 2009). In 1850, California lawmakers adopted a miscegenation statute to prohibit black–white marriages, which was later included in Section 60 of the new Civil Code in 1872. A drastic evolution of anti-miscegenation laws in California in 1880 also outlawed Chinese–Caucasian marriages along with black–white marriages. In the same year, California legislature introduced Section 69 of the Civil Code, which restricted the issuance of marriage licenses to unions between a white and a "Negro, Mulatto, or Mongolian" (*California Statutes*, 1880, Code Amendments, Ch. 41, Sec. 1, p. 3). Although the generic term "Mongolian" refers to Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and other ethnic groups in Asia, the law was designed to target Chinese, echoing the anti-Chinese outcry at the time on the West Coast. In 1905, to make Sections 60 and 69 consistent and to deal with the fear of the Japanese, the California legislature amended Section 60 to make marriages between whites and Mongolians "illegal and void" (*California Statutes*, 1905, Ch. 481, Sec. 2, p. 554). The above anti-miscegenation laws were enacted until 1967, when they were finally declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case *Loving vs. Virginia* (US Supreme Court 1967). Prohibited from marrying women of other racial groups, Chinese immigrant males could only look for mates

from a very limited supply, most likely American-born Chinese girls, who in terms of age could have been their daughters.

Third, the noticeable age difference between Chinese husbands and wives was also due to the financial inability of Chinese men. Many of them worked for almost their entire lifetime to save enough money for a marriage. Mrs. C, a second-generation Chinese American woman from Boston in her eighties, recalled her family history in which her parents' marriage was exemplary. "My father spent many years to save money for his marriage. So when he had enough money to support a family, he was already a middle-aged man. He went to Guangdong, China to marry my mother when she was sixteen" (Mrs. C. 1992).

The transnational split marriages often coincided with a larger family size. The three Moy brothers in Chicago all had large families, with eight or nine children each. Moy Dong Chow had nine children altogether, including three daughters and six sons. His first wife Ng Shee bore him four sons in China: Moy Fook Hung, My Fook Choon, Moy Fook Jung, and Moy Fook Ngoon. His second wife Wong Shee bore him three daughters and two sons in the USA since 1898: Moy Fung Gu (Lillie), Moy Fung Ying (Marion), Moy Fung Lin (Jumie), Moy Fook Keung (Edward), and Moy Fook Sun (William) (CCCF file 2005–1628). Moy Dong Hoy and his wife had three daughters and five sons, and Moy Dong Yee had three daughters and six sons (Tun 2007). Siu's study of the Chinese families in Chicago's Chinatown indicates a similar pattern (Siu 1930s).

The large-sized family was common among the early Chinese immigrants in other parts of the country, though it varied according to the class status of the male head of the household (Hirata 1982: 48). Many well-to-do Chinese men wanted to raise a big family to financially secure their future and emotionally alleviate their loneliness as immigrants. Mrs. C.'s family history typifies this. As the daughter of an affluent Chinese merchant in Boston, Mrs. C. recalled, "there are nine children in my family. My father knew that he was alone in this country. He did not have any relatives here. So he wanted to have many children as security in his old age" (Mrs. C. 1992). Similarly, Mrs. S.'s merchant family from San Francisco consisted of seven children, including four boys and three girls (Mrs. S. 1992). Like Chinese merchants on the mainland, Chinese farming families in Hawaii also tended to be large in size. Lily Chan, a farmer's daughter in Honolulu, wrote, "our family was a very large one, comprising of five brothers and four sisters, so my father had quite a hard job feeding and clothing us" (Chan 1926).

Traditional marriage

The transnational split marriage pattern, of course, does not encompass all early Chinese immigrant families and not all the wives of the earlier Chinese immigrants were concubines. Many wives managed to come to America to join their husbands (Ling 1998). Among the 137 families in Chicago surveyed by Paul C.P. Siu, 39 cases or 30 percent were in the category of traditional marriage, one arranged prior to or after the husband's immigration to America. Eighty percent of the traditionally married couples resided in Chinatown, and a majority of these men were restaurateurs, grocers, and lottery house keepers, merchants who were exempted from the Chinese Exclusion Acts, as illustrated in the following cases (Siu 1930s).

S. Moy came to Chicago in the 1890s and became a general store owner. During the First World War, he made good money that enabled him to send for his wife in China and built two houses in Chinatown as rental properties. Unfortunately, he was paralyzed in his mid-fifties and began to lose money in business due to his ailment and the economic depression. His wife was "sluggish" and could not take care of him or his business. Both of his houses were therefore authorized to his creditors to collect the room rent (Siu 1930s).

C.L.'s case offers a counter example to that of S. Moy in a number of ways. C.L. came to America when he was 24 around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He stayed in Portland, Oregon for a few years, but lived in Chicago for over 30 years as a general store keeper. His store was doing well and he made some money. During the 1910s, he went back to China, got married, and brought his bride to Chicago. Twenty years later, they had five children, aged 19, 18, 17, 13, and eight respectively. Except for the 18-year-old, the rest of their children were males. The oldest son was sent to China for Chinese schooling, and the two youngest also worked as news boys while attending school. During the Depression, his business was slow except on Sundays, when his cousins and relatives would come and buy something in the store. He had to supplement his income by selling lottery tickets earning about $20 a week. To supplement family income, his wife worked in a garment factory and later in a bakery (Siu 1930s).

American urban marriage: love union and interracial marriage

Love union

Along with the transnational split marriage and the traditional marriage, there were also matrimonies resulting from romances rather than parental or familial arrangements. Such unions were often found among the younger, better educated, and the second generation Chinese, and they counted for 26 percent of the total marriages investigated by Siu. The following cases exemplify marriages of love union.

Mark was a young engineer from Hawaii and found an employment in an American company. His wife was also a Hawaiian-born Chinese. The couple had resided in Chicago for six years by the early 1930s. They lived in a little apartment on 26th Street, four blocks from Chinatown. Their apartment was clean and furnished with modern furniture, rug, piano, radio, and musical instruments. Mark played tennis in summer while his wife watched him playing. They spoke English and associated mostly with the Chinese from Hawaii (Siu 1930s).

Dr D. was a young residential physician who had an office in Chinatown in the 1930s. A son of a Chinese missionary, he went to high school on the West Coast and came to Chicago for his higher education. He graduated from the Northwestern University and then Chicago Medical School. His wife was his childhood playmate and a fellow student at the Northwestern University. They got married immediately after his graduation from the medical school. They spoke Cantonese and occasionally English to each other (Siu 1930s).

Mr Ying came to America during his teen years and had been in the country for nearly 20 years in the 1930s. His wife was an American-born Chinese from Los Angeles. Ying opened a chopsuey house at the North Broadway but closed it during the Depression. Then the couple became insurance agents making a fairly good living, which afforded them an apartment near Lincoln Park on the North Side (Siu 1930s).

J. Chung's case is the most illuminating of the category.

> Mr Chung was born in China. At the age 18, he was sent out to Canton by his parents for his high school education. He was there only one year, attending a governmental high school. At the age of 20, he went across [the ocean] to Mexico. When he was in Mexico, he learned Spanish. Later, a Chinese newspaper here in Chicago was established and it was run by a group of his cousins. Mr Chung was offered a position as a business manager. The newspaper sent him over from Mexico. He finally arrived here and assumed his job. He [worked] in this place for four years and made about from $150 to $200 per month. During that period, Mr Chung was quite a prostitute and tax-dancing hall patron. He went

to dancing hall at least once a week. He had venereal [disease] for once or twice. But, [however] he is a man of will power. Despite of being a [constant] vice patron, he still [could save] a lot of money.

One year before his [return] back to China, he resigned as a business manager of the newspaper company because he had personal conflict with the [editor]. Then, [assisted] by one of his friend[s], he established a pictorial [magazine]. The office was in Downtown. Because of lack of ability and specialization, the [magazine] had a poor circulation. It was stopped from print finally; he [lost] about two thousand dollars probably.

At the same time he imported some Chinese goods from China. At first, those goods were sold only to Chinese people. But since Chung came back from China again, he ordered some goods that can sell to American business houses in whole sale.

Mr Chung is a new idea person in the immigrant community. In many ways he is different from the other conservatives. He knows many American friends and [constantly makes] contacts with them. Now, since he brought his wife from China, he lives in the Southside instead of … in Chinatown. He has lived in the YMCA for a while when he [ran] that pictorial [magazine].

Mrs Chung is a very skinny figure, small, but very sweet. She was educated in Hong Kong, a high school graduate. She speaks a little bit [of] English. She learned her English when she was in high school at Hong Kong.

They are living in three room apartment. Housing condition is fair; it furnishes with all modern equipment. They have very seldom gone down to Chinatown. Mr Chung do[es] go down there often for only business purpose.

(Siu 1930s)

The above cases indicate that the love unions were more likely to occur among American-born or Hawaiian-born second-generation Chinese or the more Americanized Chinese immigrants who came to the country at a younger age. They were mostly better-educated professionals, and their marital partners shared similar cultural and educational backgrounds with them. They lived outside Chinatown in more affluent neighborhoods and their contacts with Chinatown were limited to only business ones.

Interracial marriage

Despite anti-miscegenation laws, interracial marriage took place among Chinese in Chicago. The earliest recorded case was a union between Quing Kee and his German wife, who was referred to as Mrs Quing Kee, a hardy and "stout" woman. By 1890, the couple had been married for some years and lived in the upper stairs room of Hip Lung, a Chinese grocery store. On New Year's day in 1890, Moy Dong Chew and Moy Dong Hoy, the owners of Hip Lung and leaders of the Chinese community, led other Chinese residents to pay homage to Quing Kee and his wife, a Chinese custom to visit relatives and friends on New Year's day. Apparently, the couple were accepted as members of the community. "Complacent" for the homage, Mrs Quing Kee reciprocated the respect by offering the greeters Chinese rice-gin and sending her husband across the street to fill the "growler" with beer, as she told her husband, "I can't dring dot rice-chin. I lige beer better. Quing go ofer by Lawler's, unt get dree pints" (The *Chicago Tribune* 1890).

Significant numbers of interracial marriages occurred among the Chicago Chinese. In the 1930s, according to Siu's study, there were at least 27 such marriages, or 20 percent of the total families investigated. Twenty-six of the interracial marriages involved Chinese men and white

women, mostly Polish, and one between a Chinese man and a black woman. The white women who married to Chinese generally fell into three social backgrounds: the Polish dish-washer of Chinese restaurants, the chopsuey house taker or cashier, and the veteran prostitutes. Twelve of the interracially married couples lived in Chinatown, while 15 resided outside (Siu 1930s). This profile of interracial marriage was shared by Chinese in other Midwestern cities, such as St Louis, and Minneapolis-St Paul (Ling 2004: 26–7; Mason 1982: 163).

A few cases of interracial marriage in the 1930s are revealing in regards to social acceptance, cultural assimilation, and ethnic identity of the individuals involved in the interracial marriages. T. Chan met his future wife in a Chinese chopsuey house where she worked as a waitress. Despite the seemingly physical incompatibility – Chan was short and small, and she tall and big – they fell in love. After the marriage, they lived on the South Side for three years, when T. Chan was employed in a big company as a treasurer. He quit his job later and opened a small chopsuey shop. Unfortunately, the business was so slow that he even could not pay the rent for the shop. The landlord evicted him from the premises, and he lost thousands of dollars on the venture. When the Great Depression came, the couple had to move to Chinatown to ease the situation. Living in a small apartment on 25th Street in the Italian community and at the edge of Chinatown, T. Chan found a job as a waiter in Pagoda Inn restaurant in Chinatown. Occasionally, Mrs Chan would take their son to Pagoda Inn to see her husband and to have dinner. Some fellow workers there would tease the little boy and bribe him with change to make him speak Chinese (Siu 1930s).

H. Chan, a cook at a Chinese chopsuey house, married a Polish woman, a dish washer of the same chopsuey house. H. Chan was always kind to her and treated her well, often cooking a special dinner for her. The romance developed in the kitchen led to a marriage. In the first 20 years of their marriage, as chopsuey business was bustling in Chicago, H. Chan prospered and was able to buy a house on the South Side, and his wife quit her job and stayed home to take care of their three children, two girls and a boy. The first daughter graduated from a normal school on the South Side and worked as a book keeper in a Chinese restaurant. In her teen years, she wanted to be a nun and was in denial of her Chinese heritage, unwilling to associate with any Chinese. As she matured, she changed her entire attitude toward the Chinese. She became actively involved in the Chinese community, attending Chinese social meetings and going to dancing parties held by the Chinese student association at the University of Chicago, while her younger sister, a 17 year-old high school student, tagged along. Both girls ended up finding boyfriends among the Chinese students. When their father was at work in a Chinese restaurant where he was a manager, they would have parties with their boyfriends at home (Siu 1930s).

Mr Lam was a second generation Chinese and married a white woman. The couple came to Chicago in the 1930s and set up their tailor shop in Chinatown, although neither of them could speak Chinese. Their clients were young Chinese men who could speak English and were mostly their friends. The Lams, however, were socially isolated from the Chinese community; Mr. Lam was never invited to any social meeting in Chinatown and Mrs Lam had no Chinese women as her friends (Siu 1930s).

Dr K. graduated from the Northwestern University's medical school as the best student in his class and married a white nurse. Both were in their mid-thirties in the early 1930s, and the couple had a three-year-old daughter. Dr K. opened his office in Chinatown, practicing as a residential physician and surgeon. Although his business was the best among the three doctors in Chinatown at the time, the doctors in Chinatown generally were not doing well, as most Chinese would go to American doctors when they fell ill. In addition, Dr K. could not speak Chinese very well and this became a disadvantage for his business (Siu 1930s).

The above stories shed light on the interracial marriages in Chicago. First, the shared working experiences made interracial marriages possible, as in the cases of T. Chan and H. Chan, where the common working environment ignited the romance between a man and a woman from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Second, interracial marriages involving working class Chinese men seemed to have been favorably accepted by the Chinese community, as in the cases of T. Chan and H. Chan. Both couples had worked and resided in Chinatown. In contrast, more educated interracial couples, such as the Lams and Dr K and his nurse wife, were less connected with Chinatown community. This difference suggests how the class line crisscrossed and transcended the racial line: Chinatown was then predominantly made up of laborers and small entrepreneurs, thus interracially married working-class couples could easily fit into the community. In all cases, the Chinese men appeared as passionate husbands and responsible providers of their families.

The interracial marriages in Chicago mirror those across the country. Despite anti-miscegenation laws, a small number of interracial marriages existed among Chinese immigrants. For those Chinese men who married non-Chinese women, the intermarriage usually occurred among small entrepreneurs or laborers. The racial and ethnic background of their wives varied from region to region (Cohen 1984: 147; Loewen 1971: 75; Mason 1982; Tchen 1990: 157–92).

In the South, most Chinese men were laborers from California or Cuba recruited to the South by railroad companies or sugar plantations. They found wives among black women, and Irish or French immigrant women. The 1880 census for Louisiana indicated that among the 489 Chinese in the state, 35 were married, widowed, or divorced. Of the married Chinese men, only four had a Chinese wife. The remaining Chinese men married non-Chinese women, among whom four had married mulatto women, twelve black women, and eight white women, including six of Irish or French immigrant background (Cohen 1984: 147).

In the Midwest, interracial marriages occurred among Chinese small entrepreneurs and laborers, as those in Chicago. In Minneapolis and St Paul, there were at least six interracially married Chinese men in the early twentieth century. They were laundry and restaurant owners and cooks. The women they married were often Irish and Polish women, who worked as vegetable washers in Twin Cities restaurants (Mason 1982: 163).

In New York City, census and contemporary newspapers reveal an interracial marriage pattern of Chinese men and Irish women consistent through the last decades of the nineteenth century. *Harper's Weekly* and other magazines and newspapers frequently featured stories of "Chinamen" and "Hibernian" women, in which Irish women praised their Chinese husbands (Tchen 1990: 176–7).

Compared to Chinese men, few Chinese women of this period married men outside of their racial group, largely due to the unbalanced sex ratio among Chinese immigrants. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the sex ratio of Chinese in America was roughly 20:1. This ratio declined to 14:1 in the early twentieth century (US Census 1860–1920). The great gender disparity consequently forced Chinese men to look for partners in other ethnic groups where possible, whereas Chinese women had a large pool of mates to choose within Chinese communities, and therefore intermarriage made little sense to them as indicated in the case of Mrs S. in this section.

The rarity of interracial marriages among early Chinese women was also due to racial and cultural prejudice from white American society and cultural concerns of Chinese immigrant communities. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Chinese in America were generally perceived negatively as ignorant coolies and strike breakers, or evil and seductive prostitutes. They were barred from the mainstream labor market and excluded from mainstream social and cultural life by legal restrictions and popular practices. Meanwhile, as a discriminated small minority, Chinese immigrant society also objected to interracial marriages between Chinese women

and non-Chinese men in order to preserve their population, since Chinese generally regarded married women as members of their husbands' clan, or race in this case. This situation was exemplified in Suey Sin's story and Mrs S's family history.

Suey Sin (meaning "water lily" in Chinese) was a beautiful Chinese girl working in the film industry in Los Angeles in the 1920s. There she played minor roles in movies and met a handsome white actor. Their relationship started in the casual studio way and soon developed into a romance. However, the actor's mother and sister objected to the relation, and the actor never had the courage to stand up to his family's objection to the relationship (Gilbert 1924). In contrast to Suey Sin, Mrs S. had never dated Caucasian men because intermarriage was considered unacceptable in her community at the time. Born into a Chinese immigrant family in San Francisco in 1917, Mrs S. was an obedient daughter. Like most of her peers in Chinatown, she attended public school and Chinese language school, and learned sewing from her mother at home. She did not date until she met her future husband, Mr S., a language technician for the Office of War Information in San Francisco at the time. They got married in 1946. "Most of us," Mrs S. reminisced, "married Chinese. Intermarriage was not popular [in the Chinese community then], since you have a big Chinese population there [in San Francisco]" (Mrs S. 1992).

Women's changing role in the family

Immigration to America had changed women's role in their families. First, Chinese women became joint heads of their households, a clear promotion from their previous position in China. A traditional and predominant Chinese family was an extended family in which several generations lived together under the same roof and was ruled by the patriarchal familial authority. Once married, a Chinese woman – the daughter-in-law of her husband's family – had to serve and please every family member, especially the parents-in-law, in order to conform to the social norms of filial daughter-in-law, submissive wife, and nurturing mother.[5]

This predominant family pattern of three or more generations in one household, however, was not transplanted into America, and Chinese immigrant families in America were mostly nuclear ones. Having suffered the pain of leaving a familiar surrounding, seasickness for months, and prolonged interrogation and detention at the American immigration station on Angel Island in San Francisco Bay, Chinese immigrant women, and young wives especially, found that they were no longer subjected to the authority of their mothers-in-law and that for the first time they were female heads of their families (Ling 1998: 30–9). "It's better to be a woman in America," Helen Hong Wong of San Francisco, California said. "At least you can work here and rule the family along with your husband. In China it's considered a disgrace for a woman to work and it's the mother-in-law who rules" (Yung 1986: 44).

Chinese immigrant women also found that they had become providers for their families. Although most Chinese women had woven at home in northern China and tilled in the fields in southern China to supplement family income throughout Chinese history, Chinese immigrant women's participation in family economic activities or wage-earning work were more essential and indispensable for the survival of their families in the USA (Huang 1985: 192; 1990: 13).

In urban communities, as wives of laundrymen, restaurant owners, grocers, cooks, and laborers, the majority of married Chinese women had to work side by side with their husbands, in addition to their daily household duties. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the laundering business had been a predominant occupation of the Chinese in the USA. The Chinese laundry shop, according to Paul Chan Pang Siu's study, was not merely a place of work, but also a place for sleeping and cooking (Siu 1987: 58). For the wife of a laundryman, her life was not easier than that of her husband. Her home was in the back of the laundry,

where she slept, cooked, and tended her children. The living quarters were humid and dim in all seasons. When she was not busy with her domestic chores, she was expected to help with the laundry work. Her daily life was characterized by long hours, drudgery, and intense loneliness. The only people she saw were customers who brought in their parcels and reclaimed them when they were finished. The wives of laundrymen were easily worn out from hard work and suffered physical weariness and emotional stress (Sung 1967: 197–8).

Like laundries, restaurants were another type of the most important businesses for the Chinese in the USA. In the 1890s, Chinese restaurants emerged in many places (Liu 1981: 297). Most small Chinese restaurants were run as husband–wife businesses; the husband served as cook and dishwasher in the kitchen, while the wife worked as waitress, barmaid, and cashier in the front. Some Chinese American women even became successful proprietors despite the harsh environment. Gue Gim Wah, a pioneer Chinese woman in Prince, Nevada, helped her husband run a boarding house for Chinese miners in the area in 1930. After she accumulated enough capital and experience, she opened her own restaurant in 1942, which became a big success (Chung 1989: 45–79).

The grocery business ranked as a distant third occupation for Chinese immigrants before the 1940s. While the larger firms seemed to have pooled capital and manpower together, with each member having well-defined responsibilities and receiving a regular salary between $45 to $75, many smaller Chinese stores were run as family businesses with unpaid family members meeting the demand of labor needed for keeping the stores.[6] As wives of grocers, the women worked along with their husbands, packing, stocking, and selling goods. As indicated in Connie Young Yu's family history, Chin Shee, Yu's great-grandmother, arrived in San Francisco in 1867 to join her husband, a successful merchant of a Chinese dry-food store. She lived in the rear of the store where she bore six children. She not only took care of her children, but also helped her husband's business. All the hard work and responsibilities, Yu has noted, made her face appear "careworn" in her middle-age (Yu 1989: 37).

Apart from the laundry, restaurant, and grocery businesses, the garment business proved to be a vital profession for early Chinese immigrant women. The garment profession started as family sewing. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, married Chinese immigrant women sewed or mended clothes for Chinese bachelors at home to supplement their family income. The immigration documents from the Office of the Collector of Customs at San Francisco Port revealed that sewing was a common occupation for Chinese women of this period. Low How See, one of the earliest Chinese women in San Francisco, worked as a seamstress. "I worked in my room," she told the immigration official when she was called to the office of the Collector of Customs as witness for the entry of a Chinese woman on 26 March 1896. "My friend who knows me well brings me work to do to my room."[7] Other married Chinese women Chun Shee, Jow Shee, and Tai See also indicated that they were seamstresses when asked about their occupations.[8] Money earned from sewing was significant to these women's family economy.

While the Chinese immigrant women in urban communities engaged in the above work, their counterparts in rural areas shared farming and other productive activities with their husbands in addition to their domestic chores. They gardened and tended livestock. Some of the Chinese farmers' wives took part in farm work. In Georgiana, California, a farm family was headed by Gee Chom, aged 37. The family included his wife Kee, aged 23, who had been in the USA since she was five years old and was one of the few women working as a farm laborer in 1900 (Chan 1986: 397). This expansion of women's labor was more common and noticeable in Hawaii. Unlike the mainland immigrant laborers, Chinese laborers in Hawaii were encouraged to bring their wives, who were paid to work in rice plantations (Yung 1986: 36).

In this sense, Chinese immigrant women's new role could be seen as co-providers for the families, though they were not necessarily making 50 percent of the family income. To most Chinese immigrant women, the focus of their lives was survival through hard work. The work conducted by Chinese immigrant women was vital for their family economy. Their wage-earning and non-wage-earning work made survival possible for their families in a strange land. As commented by historian Roger Daniels, the fact that many married Chinese women worked "illustrates an important and often unnoticed factor in Asian American economic success: that is, the contribution made by Asian American married women at a time most married women in this country were not in the labor force" (Daniels 1988: 78). Therefore, Chinese immigrant women were not only producers of children but also providers of a bowl of rice.

These new roles reinforced Chinese women's position in families and they began to share decision-making with their husbands. When working jointly with their spouses, immigrant women generally had more input in family affairs and decision-making, as was the case with Irish immigrant women. Historians have found that Irish immigrant men generally experienced a decline in status and power within their families as a result of migration, which pushed women into more authoritative roles than they had experienced in Ireland. The comparatively open range of economic options for many young Irish women made them more influential in family and community (Diner 1983: 46). Similar changes were also evident among Chinese immigrant women. For most Chinese immigrants, a family was a basic productive unit, in which husband and wife formed a work-team and they were indispensable to each other. The equal sharing of responsibilities enabled the wife to have a higher voice in family decision-making.

In the same light, it is instructive to draw parallels between white frontier women and Chinese immigrant women. For both white frontier women and Chinese immigrant women, survival in a harsh and alienating environment required involvement of all members of the family. Unpredictable weather, expenses of farming, shortage of cash, and isolated environment forced frontier husband and wife to work together as a team in order to survive. While the husband worked in newly opened fields, the wife had to cook, clean, take care of children, garden, tend livestock, can food, slaughter and cure meat, chop wood, make soap and candles, and take boarders.[9] As a result of this work sharing, historian Julie Roy Jeffrey believes, the line dividing the actual activities of men and women blurred and, in some cases, disappeared. When women were both practically and emotionally involved in the family economy, their power in the families increased. Therefore, the activities of these self-reliant frontier women defied a number of nineteenth-century stereotypes about women (Jeffrey 1979: 44–5, 60–5).

Similarly, when Chinese immigrants came to the New World, they faced a strange and hostile environment in which they were discriminated against and excluded from the mainstream labor market. They consequently had to work in trades that white laborers were unwilling to embrace such as hand laundries, restaurants, and grocery stores, or work as common laborers and farm laborers. The necessity of survival required all Chinese family members, especially the wives, to participate in productive activities. The majority of early Chinese immigrant women, as discussed earlier, whether they lived in urban communities or rural areas, had to raise families and help with husbands' businesses or work in the fields and tend gardens and livestock. Therefore, Chinese immigrant women's labor was indispensable in their families' survival. Moreover, Chinese immigrant families in urban areas often lived in the back of their family businesses. As in the cases of Gue Gim Wah, Chin Shee, and many other urban Chinese immigrant families, many small Chinese entrepreneurs had converted the rear part of their stores into family quarters (Chung 1989: 50; Wong 1945: 5; Yu 1989: 37). The overlapping of family life and work life made a wife's involvement in the family business inevitable. Meanwhile the expansion of the female sphere enhanced Chinese immigrant women's sense of self-esteem and

self-confidence. They consequently became more comfortable in sharing family decision-making with their husbands.

At the same time, the new environment, though unfriendly and alienating, had fewer cultural restraints than their old societies. The white frontier women were less concerned with nineteenth-century domestic social theory than economic survival (Griswood 1985: 15–33). Likewise, Chinese immigrant women were free from dominance of their mother-in-laws in the USA. Therefore, both internal migration and external emigration provided women with a favorable climate for expansion of the female sphere.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most Chinese immigrant women, however, were still careful to pay homage to ideas of male authority. Although immigration elevated a woman's position in her family as she became joint family head and co-provider for the family, moving from China to America did not shake her belief in family solidarity that could only be maintained when a wife was subordinate and compromising. As one Chinese girl in Hawaii noted, her father "was the dominating head of the family," even though her mother played an important role in her family life.[10] This conservative attitude toward family order was not uncommon among many immigrant groups in the USA. The similar cultural behavior was also found over half a century later among Vietnamese immigrant women. Nazli Kibria's study on Vietnamese American women reveals that Vietnamese immigrant women continue to expect men as breadwinners and view men's economic obligation to their families as an important aspect of family order (Kibria 1993: 131).

Conclusion

This chapter finds that immigration had an enormous impact upon family and marriage of Chinese women. The new environment altered family and marriage structures; as a result new variations of family and marriage emerged. The marriage patterns among the Chinese transnational communities reveal the practicality and adaptability of the Chinese in coping with the difficult immigrant realities. The transnational split marriage was an arrangement and a practical compromise invented by the immigrants to deal with the marital separation caused by immigration, in which a concubine, who was arranged by parents or the first wife of an immigrant with a specific purpose of taking care of his physical needs while abroad, and the first wife, who remained in the home village to fulfill the filial piety on the behalf of her husband, jointly completed the biological, socioeconomic, and emotional duties expected of a traditional wife by society. This marriage pattern was more a ramification of restrictive American immigration policies that resulted in severe shortage of Chinese women than a product of patriarchal Chinese culture. To cope with the gender-unbalanced immigrant life in America, Chinese immigrants naturally and subconsciously developed different strategies to sustain the survival and continuation of their communities. These strategies, on the one hand, are suggestive of the adaptability and resourcefulness of Chinese immigrants in surviving in America. On the other hand, these poignant practices reveal, in a subtle manner, the destructive and inhumane nature of the human movement in general and immigration to America in particular. Meanwhile the variances of American urban marriages – love union and interracial marriage – indicate the inevitable transformation of marriage, which as an institution tends to adjust to the prevailing socioeconomic and cultural environment.

The necessity of survival in a foreign land and the frequent overlapping and oftentimes lack of distinction between family life and business affairs inevitably caused the transformation of the Chinese immigrant family, in which a woman changed her role from primarily a reproducer and care-giver to a joint family head and co-provider. The transformation of women's role in

family and the alteration of family structure could only be made possible within the context of immigration, a process produced by a distinct cultural institution – the Chinese American family, unique from its counterpart in China. Immigration was certainly meaningful to Chinese women in this regard.

Notes

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1 For examples of financial inability of Chinese immigrant men, see Case 19571/18-5, RG 85, National Archives, Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno, CA; "Survey of Race Relations," document 251, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace archives; and Ling (1998: 25–26). For examples of Chinese patriarchal control, see Cases 19571/18-5, 14284/4-4, RG 85, National Archives, Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno, CA; Ling (1998: 26–7); and Chan (1991a: 104).

2 Case 3358d, Entry 134, "Customs Case File No. 3358 Related to Chinese Immigration, 1877-91," Case 1355, Entry 132, "Chinese General Correspondence, 1898-1908," RG 85, National Archives, Washington, DC.

3 Case 19571/18-5, RG 85, National Archives, Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno, CA; and Lin (1948: 196–97).

4 Entry 132, "Chinese General Correspondence, 1898–1908," Entry 134, "Customs Case File No. 3358 Related to Chinese Immigration, 1877–91," Entry 135, "Chinese Smuggling File, 1914–21," Entry 136, "Chinese Division File, 1924–25," and Entry 137, "Applications for Duplicate Certificates of Residence, 1893–1920," RG 85, National Archives, Washington, DC.

5 For works on traditional family and marriage in China, see, for example, Lang (1946); C.K. Yang (1959); Francis L.K. Hsu (1970); and Levy Jr. (1971).

6 Cases 16135/5-11, 19938/4-11, 12017/36900, 33610/7-1, RG 85, National Archives, Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno, CA.

7 Case 9514/536, RG 85, National Archives, Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno, CA.

8 Cases 9514/537, 9514/538, and 9509/37, RG 85, National Archives, Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno, CA.

9 For works on frontier women's contribution to their families' economic survival, see, for example, Patterson-Black (1976: 72, 74); and Riley (1981: 52, 57–58); Myres (1982: 160–64).

10 "Life history" (*c.*1920), William Carlson Smith Documents, MK-12, Special Collections, Main Library, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.

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Part IV

Economic and political involvement

15

Southeast Asian Chinese business and regional economic development

Linda Y.C. Lim

Ethnic Chinese minorities in Southeast Asian countries have attracted most of the scholarly and popular attention on the Chinese diaspora worldwide. This is due to their large absolute and relative numbers in this region, and to their observed disproportionate role in the economies of which they are nationals, particularly as owners of private sector businesses. Most of the literature in the economic realm has concentrated on the reasons for the business dominance of ethnic Chinese minorities.

My own, hardly unique, work has explored the specific roles of ethnicity (Lim and Gosling 1983) and minority status (Lim and Gosling 1997) in explaining this dominance. I, like many others, attribute this to a combination of location-specific market knowledge, family culture, network assets and political connections (Lim 2000), added to the migrant and "middleman minority" characteristics found among other ethnic populations and in other geographical locations, such as Jews in Europe and Indians in East Africa and the Caribbean. With other scholars (e.g. Mackie 1995), I also attribute the significance of these ethnic Chinese competitive advantages to market imperfections at transitional stages of development in Southeast Asia's emerging economies, expecting such "Chineseness" to diminish in importance as modernization and corporatization of the private business sector proceed with economic development (Lim 1996). Others see the "success" of Chinese business in the region deriving primarily from macroeconomic and structural developments in their host economies, without ethnic characteristics being particularly salient (e.g. Go 1996; Lee 2002), while yet others reasonably caution against the dangers of generalization and cultural reification given the historical and contemporaneous diversity of the Southeast Asian Chinese business experience (e.g. Chan and Ng 2002), and its ongoing contextual evolution (e.g. Yeung 2007). Some scholars even argue that traditional cultural explanations for Chinese business success are neither unique to them nor necessarily beneficial in economic impact (e.g. Hodder 1996). However, more recently, some scholars have explored the contribution of "Chineseness" to specific management practices in Asian business (e.g. *Asia-Pacific Business Review* 2005; *Journal of Asian Business* 2006/7), suggesting that cultural relevance may persist even in advanced modern economies.

This chapter has a different focus. Rather than revisiting the influence of (in this case, diasporic) ethnic Chinese characteristics on business structure, organization and practice in Southeast Asia,

it discusses the role and impact of ethnic Chinese business on national and regional economic development in the region, which has been somewhat less considered (Mackie 2000).

Colonialism and independence

Historically, Chinese minorities occupied particular niches in the colonial and early post-colonial economies of Southeast Asia. Their activities were propelled by typical migrant motivations and organizational networks, and circumscribed by discriminatory local and colonial regulations which both excluded them from land ownership and hence agriculture, and favored them as tax-farmers and rural crop-brokers (e.g. Cribb 2000). Ethnic Chinese merchants and laborers thus helped to develop the commodity export sectors of Southeast Asia, as middlemen, traders, bankers and processors of agricultural commodities, linking indigenous peasant economies to world markets, usually in *comprador* (agent) relationships with Western colonial trading houses (e.g. Khanh 1996). They also served as manual labor and small business owners in mining, construction and other sectors of the colonial economy.

Chinese immigrants thus contributed to the increase in productivity and output growth of Southeast Asian economies under Western colonization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But in so doing they were also part of a pattern of colonial exploitation of the region's natural resources and associated ethnic division of labor which arguably disadvantaged segments of the indigenous population even as GDP and exports expanded and average incomes rose. This happened with the diversion of arable land and labor from subsistence to export cultivation (especially in Indonesia with the introduction of sugar into Java's peasant rice economy), the depression of local wages with the increase in foreign labor supply (especially in colonial Malaya with the massive import of migrant labor from China and India for mines and plantations respectively), the "crowding out" of potential local entrepreneurs by immigrant competitors in the small business sector, and the outflow of profits earned in colonial enterprises to their "mother countries," and remittance of savings to their homelands by diasporic communities.

At the same time, the colonized economies of Southeast Asia did benefit from colonial public and ethnic Chinese private investments in infrastructure (e.g. transportation, utilities) and human capital (e.g. schools, hospitals), and the development of institutions and relationships which increased productivity and facilitated the global market integration that benefited the region's economic growth in the post-colonial period. New migrant inflow and remittance outflow ceased with Japanese occupation during the Second World War, national independence after the war, and the 1949 communist takeover of China which cut that country's links with the outside world, including Southeast Asia, thus eliminating these sources of potential negative impact on host populations.

The post-war emergence of independent nation-states contributed to rooting the Chinese, their investments and enterprise, in their respective countries of domicile, but also subjected them in some places to various forms of ethnic discrimination, including in access to citizenship rights and property ownership, and through restrictions imposed on their previous dominance of trading activities, as happened in Indonesia and the Philippines (Golay *et al.* 1969). A nationalist backlash against colonialism and those seen as its agents and beneficiaries was complicated by the suspected or actual sympathizing of ethnic Chinese Southeast Asians with the state communism ascendant in China, especially as all countries in the region battled their own internal communist insurgencies. This resulted in further discriminatory restrictions up to and including forced relocation and even repatriation to China.

Anti-Chinese economic policies in the early post-colonial period led to disruptions in internal commerce and external trade which naturally retarded economic growth, particularly in

Indonesia, where they were aggravated by the nationalization of Western enterprises as well (Golay et al. 1969). To sustain their livelihoods in the face of ethnic ownership and employment restrictions, Chinese merchants developed so-called "Ali-Baba" relationships with indigenous "sleeping partners" who provided legal "fronts" for their continued trading activities, and "patron–client" relations with government bureaucrats and politicians on whom they were reliant for various licenses and regulatory permissions. This arguably led to the subsequent entrenchment of "crony capitalism," corruption and rent-seeking in the region's economies (e.g. Backman 1999).

Import substitution and export manufacturing

When national development policies turned to import substitution, the import–export business which colonial and Chinese enterprises dominated was undermined. Foreign multinationals which then established local manufacturing for tariff-protected markets often sought or were required to have local joint-venture partners. Chinese-owned businesses were frequently the only candidates with the requisite capital, expertise and connections, including access to ethnic distribution networks by virtue of their previous trading activities, such as acting as agents for the same foreign multinationals. This perpetuation of a *comprador* role with foreign (including Japanese) capital contributed to the rise of what Yoshihara (1988, 1995) has called "ersatz" capitalism in Southeast Asia – or the failure of (mostly ethnic Chinese) Southeast Asian businesses to develop into the globally competitive "national" enterprises which emerged from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and (to a lesser extent) Hong Kong over the same historical period.

Relying on connections which delivered quasi-monopolistic rents in protected market segments contributed to the evolution in Southeast Asia of conglomerates rather than companies focused on core competences in technology, production or marketing, which did emerge in Northeast Asia (including as the focused business units of larger conglomerates, especially in Korea). This inhibited the development of robust national capitalisms that could drive economic growth, which in Southeast Asia remained heavily dependent on foreign multinationals and indigenous state-owned or government-linked corporations, in part because of nationalist-indigenist fears that domestic private enterprise would end up dominated by ethnic Chinese (who nonetheless, and in response, developed close linkages with foreign and state corporations).

As with import substitution, the development of labor-intensive export manufacturing in the region from the late 1960s was driven mainly by multinationals and other foreign enterprises, including foreign ethnic Chinese from Taiwan and Hong Kong. There were some exceptions, most notably in Thailand (Doner and Ramsay 1997). Some Southeast Asian Chinese businesses became part of integrated East Asian global manufacturing supply chains, e.g. in garments, textiles, footwear, toys, electronics, computer and telecommunications equipment, while others diversified into rapidly expanding services sectors, finance, construction, properties, infrastructure, tourism and retail, and yet others remained grounded in agribusiness but in higher-value-added operations (such as fruits, vegetables, chicken and seafood), still mostly oriented to global markets. The family-owned conglomerate continued to be the typical Southeast Asian Chinese business, with government and external connections becoming more important over time, and regional trade, investment and financial liberalization from the 1980s propelling some cross-border ventures, including into China.

The Asian financial crisis and its aftermath

The Asian financial crisis of 1997–9 was a setback to Southeast Asia's economic growth. Southeast Asian Chinese business arguably contributed to the build-up of domestic asset bubbles

pre-crisis through excessive borrowing and over-investment enabled by the widespread practice of related-party lending between mostly Chinese-owned banks, conglomerates and their many affiliates, as well as the "crony capitalism" resulting from Chinese reliance on government privileges and patronage networks. The crisis then led to the collapse or shrinkage of many Chinese businesses and networks, with the most dramatic example being that of the Salim Group of Indonesia, closely linked with then-President Suharto.

But other than as a consequence of dominating local private sectors, Chinese businesses were not alone or disproportionate in either contributing to or suffering from the crisis. Its causes were largely macroeconomic and regulatory, affecting most regional businesses regardless of ethnicity or nationality, and South Korean financial institutions and conglomerates as well. Except for Indonesia, the other crisis-hit regional economies recovered rapidly, with the assistance of currency depreciation, IMF emergency funds (except for Malaysia, which chose temporary capital controls instead), and a mix of fiscal and monetary policies. Some countries also initially received large amounts of foreign investment, especially in the form of multinational acquisitions of crippled local financial institutions and manufacturers such as automotive and electronics parts suppliers and the capital-intensive cement industry.

Regional economic integration

Following recovery from the crisis, the integration of the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) into global production networks and markets intensified as their export competitiveness improved. The slow-developing ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) finally came into being in 2003. In addition to reductions in intra-regional trade barriers, ASEAN programs to foster private sector linkages also served to bring Chinese-owned businesses closer together after decades of focusing on national or global markets.

However ethnicity does not appear to have played any role in the still modest number of intra-ASEAN joint ventures. If anything, Southeast Asian Chinese companies have been more likely to be competitors rather than partners, given similar firm-specific advantages and technology levels, with cross-border investments responding more to comparative advantage – as, for example, in the move of Malaysian apparel manufacturers to Cambodia as that country's apparel export industry took off, and of Malaysian oil palm plantations into Indonesia as Malaysian land and labor costs rose.

It is in the growth of trade and investment linkages with "Greater China" – the People's Republic, Taiwan and Hong Kong – that ethnicity may have played some role (e.g. Chong Carino 1995; Chou 1998). In the 1980s and 1990s, Taiwan factory-owners relocating labor-intensive export manufacturing out of their home base used to say that "language and culture" facilitated their investments in Southeast Asia, which were encouraged by the Taiwan government's "Go South" policy as an alternative to investments in China, then still seen as a political competitor. But in fact there were some tensions between them and local Southeast Asian Chinese businesses, especially in Malaysia, because of the Taiwanese preference for transplanting their entire supply-chains based on home-country networks, rather than partnering with local Chinese, with whom they competed in both product and factor markets. There was also some resentment that Taiwan and Hong Kong manufacturers received foreign investor privileges from host governments. Many if not most Southeast Asian Chinese then also did not speak Mandarin and Hokkien (Taiwan) or Cantonese (Hong Kong), but rather their national languages, and had some concerns about the potential for ethnic tensions arising between the foreign Chinese and their culturally different and unfamiliar indigenous employees. Taiwan and Hong Kong firms also invested heavily in Vietnam which had very few local Chinese left after their

post-1975 involuntary exodus. And it was not long before many of them left Southeast Asia for China itself when the latter became more open, in addition to being cheaper and closer, including in terms of "language and culture".

China's rise

It is with the rise of China's economy, especially from the 1990s, that ethnicity in the form of linguistic and cultural similarity and networks became a factor in facilitating Southeast Asian Chinese investments in China, particularly from Singapore and Malaysia, and in labor-intensive export industries. This outward investment was intended to improve the competitiveness of Southeast Asian Chinese businesses, and give them eventual access to the anticipated large China market. But many of these companies faltered in China's unfamiliar post-communist environment, where they lacked the firm-specific advantages to compete with foreign investors from more technologically advanced economies like those of the USA, Western Europe, Japan and Korea, and the intimate cultural knowledge, local connections and even languages of native Chinese, Taiwan and Hong Kong investors. Competition and imitation from Chinese state-linked and private enterprises was intense, especially in low-end consumer goods industries such as food processing, and "It is difficult to make money in China" became a common complaint, leading to eventual disinvestment by some Southeast Asian Chinese companies. Those which prospered in the China market usually did so by leveraging firm-specific advantages they had developed at home, e.g. in industries ranging from food, tires and electronic components to hotels, retail and property development.

At the same time, China's rise created competition for Southeast Asian economies both for investment "diverted" there from home-based (mostly ethnic Chinese) companies and third-country multinationals, and in world markets where Chinese goods were often cheaper, especially in the 2000s after its currency became progressively undervalued with the depreciation of the US dollar to which it was fixed. Despite this, Southeast Asia continued to attract significant amounts of foreign direct investment, with occasional dips in particular countries owing more to domestic political developments (e.g. political instability in Thailand since 2006) than to competition from China. Southeast Asian currencies appreciated in large part because of persistent export surpluses, as well as increasing inflows of foreign portfolio capital, both before and after the global financial crisis which most adversely affected developed economies in 2007–9.

Trade liberalization between China and ASEAN – both bilateral preferential trade arrangements like the 2003 China–Thailand Free Trade Agreement in agricultural products, and the 2010 regional China–ASEAN FTA – may have hurt certain economic sectors in Southeast Asia – such as Thai farmers, and Indonesian textile manufacturers. But ethnicity has had nothing to do with this, since trade policy is decided by states at the national level. Indeed, in the case of Indonesia, objection to the China–ASEAN FTA came disproportionately from the local ethnic Chinese business community that would now face intensified competition from cheap Chinese imports. At the same time, China has become a major importer of ASEAN commodities – both natural resources and agricultural products, and the manufactures (electronics, computer parts) which account for over 60% of China–ASEAN trade, reflecting the increasing regional integration of global manufacturing supply-chains in East Asia, with Japan, Korea and Taiwan as well as ASEAN countries exporting parts to China where they are processed and re-exported to world markets. Again, these trade patterns are determined primarily by location-specific comparative and competitive advantage, with little if any role for ethnicity.

Ethnicity may be more important to China's foreign investment in Southeast Asia, which has expanded rapidly since 2000 but is still very small, at less than 5% of total inward foreign direct

investment (FDI) into the region, and less than half of the ASEAN FDI flow to China. My current research on this subject shows that availability of local ethnic Chinese managers, employees, partners and agents – if they speak and are literate in Mandarin – facilitates Chinese companies' investment in the region, and in particular explains Malaysia's popularity as a regional headquarters for Chinese companies, given the large (30%) multilingual Chinese population there. For a minority of Chinese companies, the local ethnic Chinese market of consumers for Chinese foodstuffs, medications and other "ethnic" products is an attraction. But most Chinese FDI in ASEAN is non-ethnic in character – about half is invested in globalized Singapore, and there is diverse sectoral distribution, with the largest individual investments by capital invested typically being in natural resource acquisitions and partnerships with local state enterprises. Although it is difficult to evaluate relative impact, one might expect technology transfer to be less in investments by Chinese companies than investments from more technologically advanced countries. There have also been complaints that Chinese infrastructural companies especially prefer importing both low- and high-skilled labor from their China workforce, than employing and training local workers (e.g. Brown 2009).

Most recently, rising wages and other costs in China, together with the anticipated continuing appreciation of the Chinese yuan, have led to increased interest by global investors in alternative or second-source manufacturing locations outside of China, particularly for labor-intensive export industries like garments, footwear and toys. Chinese companies are also subject to the same pressures, with Southeast Asia – especially its less-developed locations like Cambodia and Vietnam – being the logical targets, given their geographical proximity and lower cost. Relocation by Chinese companies is limited so far, and as with the previous relocation of Taiwan and Hong Kong companies to the region, ethnicity does not appear to be a factor in location choice.

In the longer term, China's economic rise and continued development of trade and investment linkages with its neighbors will likely both expand the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia – as is already happening with both long- and short-term new migrants to the region, especially along the northern borders of mainland Southeast Asia, particularly in Myanmar – and involve more Southeast Asians of all ethnicities, many of whom are now learning the Chinese language as a tool for personal economic advancement. It remains to be seen if the positive growth impact from input enhancement – through new labor migration and capital investment from China – exceeds any negative impact of "crowding-out" local workers and entrepreneurs, similar in many ways to the economic impact of Chinese immigrants in the Western colonial period.

Ethnicity and economic development

In describing the changing economic role of the ethnic Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, the foregoing discussion takes a deliberately ambivalent view about the likely developmental impact on their host economies. Definitive evaluation is impossible given the lack of data correlating ethnicity (itself subject to ambiguous definitions especially where intermarriage with non-Chinese is common, as in Buddhist mainland Southeast Asia and the Christian Philippines) with specific economic roles, and with variation by country, location, sector and historical period. As immigrants bringing additional labor, capital and entrepreneurship, the Chinese most likely enhanced output *growth*. But whether they accelerated or retarded economic *development* depends in part on how one evaluates the type of activity they were engaged in, and whether their role was complementary to or competitive with that of the majority indigenous population. For example, the ethnic division of labor which developed during the Western colonial era may have perpetuated the "specialization" of indigenous populations in lower-productivity, lower-income

rural and extractive activities, delaying transition to a higher-productivity urban-industrial economy, preempting the emergence of a broader private entrepreneurial class and more sectoral diversity, and inhibiting competition. However this result would have been due not necessarily to the role of the middleman minority per se, nor to its specific ethnicity, but rather to the entire exploitative complex of a colonial plantation or extractive economy.

The political insecurity of an ethnic trading minority, especially if it were "favored" by colonial authorities, might lead in the post-colonial era to "protective" ties with national states involving the creation and distribution of monopoly rents through patronage networks (e.g. Gomez 1999), distorting the allocation of resources. Resentment against the "privileged" minority might also give rise to discriminatory policies and practices that result in inefficiency and slower growth for all. In Southeast Asia, this resulted in the post-colonial preference for state entities that would substitute for and perhaps nurture an underdeveloped indigenous entrepreneurial class, while reducing reliance on the ethnic Chinese minority (e.g. Wibisono 1995). In Indonesia, foreign multinationals were similarly discouraged, while in Malaysia they were encouraged as a means of creating urban-industrial employment and entrepreneurial opportunities for the ethnic Malay population, as part of the New Economic Policy. Even in Singapore, a Chinese-majority city-state, investment by multinationals and state enterprises was promoted as an alternative to local Chinese private business, which was seen as excessively trade-oriented and independent from if not hostile to the predominantly "English-educated" post-colonial state.

These state- and multinational-centered investment strategies, developed as responses to the peculiar economic role of ethnic Chinese minority business, may partly explain the failure of Southeast Asian countries to replicate the vigorous local capitalisms and both large and small-scale, globally competitive private enterprises that emerged in Northeast Asia (Japan, Korea and Taiwan), despite similar macroeconomic and industrial policies which contributed to rapid output and employment growth based on exporting manufactures to world markets. Northeast Asian exporters managed to develop firm-specific manufacturing, technology or marketing advantages that enabled them to maintain and increase their global competitiveness as domestic costs rose and comparative advantage shifted, as examples like Samsung in Korea and Acer in Taiwan demonstrate. But this did not happen in Southeast Asia, for reasons that might derive partly from the minority status of local ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, including the perpetuation of relationship-based conglomerate structures, continued dependence on multinationals and state support, and actual or perceived ethnic discrimination.

In the case of Malaysia, which for four decades followed a policy of affirmative action for the indigenous Malay population in education, employment and business, economic growth has slowed especially since the Asian financial crisis, making it unlikely that the nation will achieve its goal of becoming a "developed" or "high-income" country by 2020. A major reason is ethnic discrimination, which has caused Chinese Malaysians, especially the highly educated, to emigrate in large numbers, thus depriving the economy of their human capital and financial investment, with neighboring Singapore being the main beneficiary (World Bank 2011). As a result, the government has embarked on a "New Economic Model" that in addition to moving toward "merit-based affirmative action," envisages a shift from state investment to private-sector-led and market-driven economic growth, while welcoming "talent and skills from anywhere" (Quah 2010). In a much more dramatic example from the region, communist Vietnam's expulsion of its ethnic Chinese minority in the 1970s contributed to a long period of slow growth which has reversed with market economic reforms, and a welcoming back of emigrant Vietnamese – including Sino-Vietnamese – capital and skills. The outflow of Chinese capital from Indonesia, following anti-Chinese riots in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and subsequent collapse of the Suharto regime, also contributed to the severity of the crisis and the delayed recovery from it.

In short, discrimination against Southeast Asian Chinese communities and business, rather than any actions or inactions of the Chinese themselves, has been partly responsible for some of the more disappointing aspects of economic development in Southeast Asia, including lower output growth, a slower move up the value-chain, and the failure to produce globally competitive national private sector businesses. (Other reasons given for the economic underperformance relative to Northeast Asia include inadequate investment in education, ethnic and religious diversity, and "predatory" rather than "developmental" states.)

Prospects for the future

Focusing only on internal national developments, the likelihood is that differences – including economic differences – between ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese indigenes in Southeast Asia will diminish over time, as discriminatory policies are eliminated, non-Chinese enter the private sector in larger numbers including in partnerships with Chinese businesses (e.g. Chin 2007), and Chinese participate more in national politics and government, e.g. in now-democratic Indonesia, thus breaking down the previous ethnic division of labor.

The saga of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra presents an interesting case-study. The Chinese in Thailand have always been more integrated with the indigenous population than elsewhere in the region, in part because of the ease of intermarriage and social interaction among fellow Buddhists. Thaksin, an ethnic Chinese, operated both in the "Thai" government space (the police) and the "Chinese" business space, leveraging the two to develop the telecommunications company Shin Corp. which made him Thailand's richest man. From this perch Thaksin entered national politics and was elected Prime Minister in 2001 with widespread popular support, including from Bangkok's heavily ethnic Chinese population. Subsequently, however, his monopolistic tendencies both in politics and business, capped by his tax-free sale of Shin Corp., a "national treasure," to Singapore's state-owned Temasek Corp. for $2 billion, caused him to lose the support of Bangkok-based elites as well as other groups. Ousted in a military coup in September 2006, and living as an exile overseas since then, Thaksin nevertheless retained the support of the mostly ethnic Thai rural population in Thailand's North and Northeast, who had benefited from many of his "populist" policies, while earning the ire of many of his fellow ethnic Chinese in Bangkok. The violent clashes between pro-Thaksin "Red Shirts" and anti-Thaksin "Yellow Shirts" in Bangkok in May 2010 did not have any noticeable ethnic cast, with ethnic-Chinese business support found on both sides. Thaksin's political influence subsequently declined, but tensions remain mainly along "class" ("elite–mass") and geographical (rural–urban, Central/South–North/Northeast) lines. Interestingly, while some (mostly ethnic Chinese) Thaksin opponents blame him for being "too pro-China" in, for example, his government's negotiation of the Thailand–China FTA in agriculture which supposedly hurt Thai farmers, this does not appear to have dampened his support among ethnic Thai rural voters.

If this example is representative of the possibly declining salience of Chinese ethnicity in Southeast Asian business, politics and economies, the rise of China may be exerting influence in the opposite direction. China's approximately 12% share of ASEAN's trade is already as large as that of Japan and the European Union, and larger than the USA. Its FDI in ASEAN, though small relative to these other regions and to ASEAN's own FDI in China, is growing very rapidly, though thus far mostly concentrated in Singapore and in natural resources. China is already the largest foreign investor in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. It is the largest source of foreign tourists to ASEAN countries, sending more than five million visitors a year. Given China's size, the rapid growth of its economy (far surpassing the growth of other regions, especially developed countries), its geographical proximity to, and good relations with, Southeast Asia, these and

other economic linkages are bound to expand in both absolute and relative terms. There is also a large migration of students, workers and traders from China to Southeast Asia that is largely undocumented, but possibly reaching as many as half a million in Myanmar alone.

These developments have increased the economic value of Chinese language in the region, resulting in the increased popularity of Chinese language learning among non-Chinese indigenes as well as ethnic Chinese nationals of ASEAN countries. It remains to be seen to what extent cultural assets uniquely possessed by ethnic Chinese add value beyond purely linguistic capabilities that others can also acquire through education. The possible permutations here are many and complex. Already there are cultural as well as linguistic differences within Southeast Asia among ethnic Chinese of different Chinese dialect-groups, geographic and political affiliations, and of different immigrant vintages, nationality, education, occupation and location. Cultural differences are likely to be larger between long-domiciled Southeast Asian Chinese and recent-arriving migrants and visitors from the post-communist "mainland," especially if the latter are economically competitive with the former, and benefit from favored treatment from home or host governments. Southeast Asian Chinese may fear that tensions arising from expanded linkages with China might undermine their own hard-won peaceful relations with indigenous Southeast Asians, or that they might be caught in a new wave of discriminatory treatment aimed at restricting the influence and especially the new immigration of Chinese from China. Although scholars in China tend to view the role and reception of the new Chinese migrants positively (e.g. Zhuang and Wang 2010), there are reports of resentment over the competition they present for locals in the labor market (e.g. Brown 2009), and other tensions (e.g. Chan 2007).

Southeast Asian Chinese may see themselves as benefiting disproportionately from the expanded two-way trade, investment and employment opportunities provided by China's economic rise and closer integration with its ASEAN neighbors. This is most likely to be the case in Malaysia, where the "re-Sinification" of ethnic Chinese as a response to decades of perceived ethnic discrimination under Malaysia's affirmative action policies has resulted in nearly all Chinese under the age of 50 being schooled and literate in Mandarin, as well as Malay and English. This makes Chinese-Malaysians particularly attractive as linguistic interlocutors and cultural intermediaries for businesses from China operating throughout the Southeast Asian region, just as they already are for Western and other Asian multinationals operating in China, Indonesia and other countries.

Overall, China's rise should contribute positively to economic growth and the stabilizing diversification of external economic linkages in Southeast Asia, especially in an era where the region's previously dominant trade and investment partners – the West and Japan – are experiencing slower growth. The Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora may be expected to enhance this interaction and impact, rendering both more positive than they otherwise might be. At the same time, parallels with the Western colonial era are possible, with increases in aggregate output growth coinciding with an uneven distribution of the benefits of that growth to local populations, and with Southeast Asian Chinese unwittingly serving as *compradors*, this time to Chinese companies.

> One wonders if the relationship with China is not reproducing the old colonial division of labor, whereby low value-added natural resources and agricultural products were shipped to the center while Southeast Asian economies absorbed high-value manufactures from Europe and the United States. … Despite the official propaganda, the China-Asean trade agreement that came into effect on Jan. 1 2010, is likely to disadvantage Asean.
>
> *(Bello 2010)*

If this happens, it could reintroduce the specter of retaliatory or "protective" ethnic discrimination, which I have argued above, is prejudicial to economic development.

Conclusion

Southeast Asian Chinese business has played an important role in the economic growth and development of countries in the region since the era of Western colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Often this role has been distinctive, involving specialization in specific economic niches, usually trade and finance. Almost always it has been disproportionate relative to the ethnic group's share of the local population. But it is difficult to argue that it has been definitive, in the sense of driving the growth and shaping the development of national economies, which has been mostly the result of, first, colonial, and later, national government policies, and of global market forces. While ethnic Chinese capital, labor, entrepreneurship and cross-border networks certainly aided the growth of Southeast Asia's economies, in their absence other groups would likely have stepped in, given the region's long, rich and multicultural trading history.

Historical hypothetical assumptions are problematic, but any difference Chinese ethnicity itself made to regional economic development would have had to be due to cultural characteristics or relations with China, both of which could have negative as well as positive impacts on growth. For example, Chinese family structure, culture and ethnic social networks facilitated capital accumulation, risk-taking, labor recruitment, efficient organizations and supply-chains, resulting in higher investment and growth. But the monopolistic family-controlled conglomerates they gave rise to might also have reduced competition, efficiency and equity, preventing both the emergence of indigenous non-Chinese capital, and the transformation of ethnic Chinese capital itself into the globally competitive enterprises which emerged from Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea over much the same historical period. Close relations with China facilitated Southeast Asian Chinese enterprises' access to outside sources of capital, labor, management and technology, as well as a large external market in more recent times. But they also "crowded out" local labor and entrepreneurs, contributing to an outflow of capital through remittances and outward FDI, and creating foreign competition for Southeast Asian export industries.

Regardless of how the positives and negatives of Chinese ethnicity for economic growth might balance out (if they could be calculated), the policy discrimination meted out to the Chinese because of their minority and immigrant status (as distinct from ethnicity per se) has hurt economic development. Discrimination has distorted resource allocation (e.g. diverted it from regulated sectors), reduced long-term investment (e.g. in manufacturing versus shorter-term trade and finance), and led to the outflow of Chinese capital and talent (e.g. emigration of highly educated Chinese). It has also encouraged or necessitated the minority practice "crony capitalism" and even corruption, based on the need for government "protection" of their investments and for access to state-mediated business opportunities. Fortunately, discriminatory policies are being eliminated, and discriminatory treatment will also taper off in time.

The "wild card" is the rise of China as an economic partner for Southeast Asia. On the one hand, it enhances the region's growth prospects, and also increases the value of Chinese ethnicity (language, culture) in regional business and economic relations, thereby providing more opportunities for ethnic Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, it may increase competition for Southeast Asia's economies, including for its minority ethnic Chinese business community, and by fostering "re-Sinification" could heighten inter-ethnic tensions leading to the re-introduction of discriminatory policies. Much depends on whether China – which, unlike the region's former colonial powers, is very large, very close by, with a very strong role for the state in its economy and international relations – is viewed by Southeast Asians of all ethnicities as an essentially benevolent power, or not, and on the relations that develop between it and non-Chinese Southeast Asians. China itself is also evolving economically, whether in a more or less ethnically determined direction it is not possible to ascertain. One might expect that continued market

liberalization, capitalist development, and both inward and outward globalization would result in reduced ethnic characteristics of China's economy and its state and private businesses. But nearly 30 years ago, I concluded my study of export-oriented, multinational-linked Chinese electronics firms in "capitalist" Malaysia and Singapore with these words:

> as Chinese business enters modern industrial sectors, its traditional distinctiveness declines, as indeed it must for it to compete and survive in international markets. Pre-capitalist modes of operation which may have an ethnic character give way to strictly capitalist forms of business organization and operation in which ethnicity becomes irrelevant. Dependence on ethnically-unrelated multinational corporations and foreign agents for access to factors of production and markets causes Chinese business to become absorbed into the sphere of international capital, where the influence of ethnic and even national identity on firms' operations becomes indiscernible and inconsequential over time.
>
> *(Lim 1983)*

As it turned out, Overseas Chinese electronics firms, mostly from Taiwan, retained many of their "Chinese" characteristics (family ownership, ethnic networks) as they globalized, obtaining ever-greater shares of manufacturing supply-chains developed with and for their (mostly Western) multinational customers. Ethnic networks and the ability to develop and utilize local government relations, and negotiate boundaries in a culturally distinctive environment, became even more of a global competitive advantage as supply-chains were transplanted to China. Whether this trend will continue as China becomes more central to the world as well as the regional economy depends on the extent to which China's adaptation to universal economic policies, global standards and business practices exceeds or falls short of the rest of the world's adaptation to China's policies and practices. In this context, Southeast Asian Chinese's cultural and business evolution, and their associated contribution to the economic development of Southeast Asia, will lag rather than lead developments in China and the world economy.

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16

The Chinese in Europe

Population, economy and links with *qiaoxiang* in the early twenty-first century

Li Minghuan

In September 2008, the European Federation of Chinese Organizations (EFCO) held its 15th congress in Berlin. More than 500 Chinese organization leaders from all over Europe attended the congress. The general secretary of EFCO presented a survey in the name of EFCO: nowadays there are about 2.5 million Chinese migrants and their offspring living in Europe. In total, Chinese migrants in Europe have organized more than 800 associations, published 101 Chinese magazines, newspapers and bulletins. Also, they have set up 340 Chinese weekend schools that have recruited 55,000 pupils; almost all pupils are children of Chinese migrant parents.[1]

The EFCO survey provides a reference to a general picture of the Chinese in Europe. Comparing with the Chinese community in the mid 1950s which only composed of 10,000 migrants, it is obvious that the size and composition of the Chinese migrants in Europe have clearly expanded because of the migration waves from the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the last decades. Moreover, their economic activities, political identity, and living styles have experienced great changes. In general, the social profile of the Chinese immigrant community in Europe as a whole has been greatly highlighted by their public activities. This chapter will portray the collective features of the Chinese immigrant community in Europe in the early years of the twentieth-first century.

Size and composition

Official statistics published by the Overseas Chinese Society in Taipei shows that there were 11,491 Chinese in Europe in 1955. The number increased to about 50,000 in the 1960s and the majority of the new migrants came from Hong Kong. After the mid-1970s, because of the "boat people" from Indochina, of which about 60% were ethnic Chinese, the total number of the ethnic Chinese migrants in Europe had jumped to about half a million. Then, it surged rapidly after the 1980s, when mainland China reopened its emigration gate. At the end of the last century, a common estimate among the Chinese association leaders was that the total number of Chinese in Europe was around one million (Li 2004).[2]

Entering the twenty-first century, there is still a new tide of Chinese migrants to Europe, particularly to Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and Russia. Thus the total number keeps growing.

Nowadays, the most conservative estimate is that there are about 1.5 million Chinese migrants in Europe; but I also came across an overestimated figure of more than five million.[3] There is really no reliable census on the Chinese migrants in Europe.

All of these different figures are based on some kind of estimate. Instead of discussing the exact number of the Chinese migrants in Europe, I am going to use the EFCO's survey as reference and classify the size of the Chinese community in each European state into three groups, and in addition there is a special case.

The first group includes France and the United Kingdom, the two European states with the biggest and the most active Chinese migrant community. A lower estimate shows that there are about 400,000 Chinese in either of the two states; but a higher estimate puts the figure at more than 600,000 each. A French journalist, however, stressed that "there are more than one million Chinese in France in 2007."[4] The big difference between the estimates is due to two factors. One is whether the number includes tens of thousands of Chinese students who are holding study visas.[5] Second, whether the large number of undocumented migrants has been counted or not.

The second group comprises the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Spain. The number of Chinese migrants in each of these countries is between 100,000 and 200,000. Among them, the Chinese migrants in Germany and the Netherlands have increased steadily; and the number grows by leaps and bounds in Italy and Spain due to non-scheduled legalized movements. In Italy, the legalized movements between 2003 and 2006 have given official status to more than one million irregular migrants. In Spain, during the period from 1985 to 2007, up to seven legalized movements had been put into practice. According to the introduction of the Chinese association leaders, among the legalized migrants, about 5–8% are Chinese. Therefore, going along with the legalized movements, more Chinese have joined the official migrant community. Meanwhile more irregulars are coming to wait for the next legalized opportunities.

The third group comprises the remaining countries and the number of the Chinese migrants is about 30,000 or fewer. Countries like Belgium, Sweden and Austria have each accommodated about 30,000 Chinese. But in a country like the Czech Republic there are only about 6,000 Chinese immigrants. In Hungary, Chinese migrants first appeared as a socially visible group in the early 1990s, when China and Hungary enacted visa-free policy between 1988 and 1992. The Chinese immigrant community peaked to about 50,000 in the early 1990s but quickly decreased to less than 30,000 in the late 1990s because of fewer economic opportunities (Nyiri 2002).

The special case is Russia. The gap between the relevant estimates of Chinese migrants in Russia is unbelievably wide. The lowest estimate is about 100,000 while the highest estimate reaches to more than three million. The reasons behind the phenomenon are as follows. First, many Chinese in Russia are floating people without permanent living permits. Second, the Chinese students in Russia are a group that keeps changing. The third reason is the most important one which has to do with how to count the Chinese migrants in the region of the Far East. Russia and China share a long border. Over 100 million people live in the three provinces of Northeast China and the population density is more than 80 people per square kilometer; while across the border on the Russian side on average there are only 1.3 people per square kilometer. Thus the number of Chinese migrants in the Far East is a sensitive topic. In February 2007, in Russia's Siberian city of Irkutsk, a group of local activists occupied the municipal immigration office to demand the expulsion of the Chinese migrants. The activists said that the number of the Chinese migrants in Russia had surged greatly from a few thousands in 1989 to 3.26 million in 2002.[6] Undoubtedly there is a considerable number of Chinese migrants making their living in Russia, but it cannot be as high as a few millions. Further study is needed.

Economic activities

The Chinese migrant economy in Europe flourished in the first decade of the twentieth-first century. Beside the fact that they have shown striking characteristics of being a hard-working, frugal and enterprising group, the fact that China itself has become the biggest workshop of cheap commodities has clearly contributed to the emigrants' recent economic success.

Traditionally, the economic activities of the Chinese immigrants in Europe concentrated predominantly in the catering business (Western Europe), woodwork (France), garment, and leather goods factories (Southern Europe). Instead of tracing the historical trajectory of how Chinese constituted these niches in Europe, this section will focus on their current development in the first decade of the twentieth-first century.[7]

Chinese catering business

According to the documents I have found, the earliest Chinese restaurant in Europe can be traced to the year 1884, when a Chinese delegation was invited to present Chinese culture in London. Together with the Chinese music, painting and woodwork presentation, a Chinese restaurant named Purple House was set up and all cooks were selected from China. The restaurant was open for more than half a year and built up a reputation among the British gentry. When the restaurant was to be closed, British revenuer James Duncan Campbell hosted a banquet in the restaurant to celebrate its successful presentation (Zeng 1985: 722–78). Since then and up to now, the development of the Chinese catering business in Europe has gone through many twists and turns.

In the EFCO's survey mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it points out that there are 43,083 Chinese restaurants all over Europe; compared with the numbers of 6,000 in the mid-1970s and 20,000 in the mid-1990s. The top three countries sorted by the total number of the Chinese restaurants are United Kingdom (11,000), France (8,000) and Germany (5,000). According to my research, the recent development of the Chinese catering business in Europe shows diverse orientations, not only because of tough competitions among the Chinese catering business themselves, but also because of some Chinese entrepreneurs' active shifts in marketing strategy.

The first orientation that can be seen clearly is the pursuit of being top grade by creating a perfect environment to let customers enjoy genuine Chinese cuisine. Such high standard Chinese restaurants are only a handful in each European state. Often the decor is very Western and moreover, very clean and quiet, using small candles instead of hanging large red lanterns and playing soft Western classical music instead of Chinese. Furthermore the service has been adapted to suit European gentle palates. Their customers are normally more European than Chinese.

The second orientation is to meet the needs of the Chinese migrants themselves. Their customers come from not only the Chinese migrants living nearby but also Chinese tourists from China as well. Also, such restaurants often have a big hall that can be used for holding Chinese wedding banquets, funerals or other significant events. In such restaurants, customers can talk loudly while eating and toasting. Some restaurants also provide Karaoke equipment for the customers if they like to have entertainment while eating and drinking. Some Chinese believe that this is the way to show their joy or excitement by talking loudly and toasting.

The third strategy is to fit into the local taste. For instance, in the Netherlands, at the hands of chefs in Dutch Chinese restaurants, a so-called "Chinese-Indonesian cuisine" differing from both standard Chinese cuisine and indigenous Indonesian fare came to be part of Dutch popular culture. This arose in the 1950s with the return migration of colonial administrators and soldiers as well as the immigration of Indonesians, many of whom were ethnic Chinese, from the Netherlands'

former colonies in the East Indies. In France, the historical relationship with Indochina has meant French Chinese restaurant menus have some Vietnamese or Cambodian tastes. Another interesting phenomenon is the emergence of the so-called "wok restaurant." The most important symbol of this kind of restaurant is that they have an open kitchen in the hall. Since Chinese cuisine often suffers from fierce criticism about its unsanitary condition, wok restaurants serve to show the customers the clean workplace and the chefs' personal hygiene. Customers pick out half-prepared meat and vegetables from a set of open glass cupboards, which are then given to the chef who will cook in the open kitchen in front of the customers.

In addition, it is not unusual to see Chinese migrants become owners of a Western café, snack bar, or French *tabac*. Some even serve local dishes. These efforts are a reflection of their pursuits of expanding their market shares.

Garment and leather goods industries

The second economic sector concerns clothing and leather goods industries, especially among the Chinese in France, Italy and Spain (Benton and Pieke 1998). The French fashion design, the skill of leather processing and the shoe leather made in Italy and Spain are well known all over the world. Both clothing and leather goods making are labor intensive, but they require relatively small initial investment. Benefiting from the new wave of immigration from mainland China, the Chinese migrants have thus developed them into an important ethnic economic niche.

The period between the 1980s and the 1990s shows a fast development of this sector. Renting a cheap basement to turn it into a workshop, recruiting new Chinese immigrants as cheap labor, working round the clock with piecework rate – all of these measures have made the Chinese production highly competitive. The strategy is as follows. New migrants first had to work in a garment or leather workshop with long working hours but with low pay. After having commanded basic skills and obtained some knowledge of dealing with the business, some would try to set up their own workshop with the money they had saved and borrowed from relatives and friends. In this way, small garments and leather workshops snowballed fast among the Chinese immigrant community.

However, since the late 1990s and particularly after the twenty-first century, many clothing and leather goods were imported from China with even lower price and better quality. The golden age of Chinese garments and leather workshops in Europe had passed. Some closed their operations and some others simply switched to selling imported clothing and leather goods. Some of the sustainable ones became subcontractors of European top trademark manufacturers. They either remake the European fashion label or produce on-demand fashion. Worth noting is that a few successful Chinese entrepreneurs now are trying to create their own brand. They have recognized that this is the right way to become competitive with their European peers.

Selling "Made in China" in Europe

Nowadays it is obvious that selling MIC (Made in China) goods has become the most important sector of Chinese migrants' economic activities in Europe. The Chinese migrants working in this field range from street peddlers, stall keepers, grocery owners, supermarket and wholesale businesspersons, to multinational companies. Since the 2000s in particular, a succession of Chinese-run import–export companies, goods wholesalers and commercial malls of various sizes have been set up in different European countries, from London in the north to Madrid in the south, from Moscow in the east to Paris in the west. This development has created new Chinese business centers beyond Chinatowns in Europe.

For instance, up till the late 1990s three big Chinatowns had become well known ethnic quarters of Paris. The 3rd arrondissement (which is also known as Wenzhou Jie, Wenzhou Street) is the earliest one. The first group of Chinese to settle there was from the Wenzhou district through chain-migration. The arrondissement has largely maintained its specific Chinese regional character. The French Chinese Club (renamed as the Association of Chinese in France in 1998), the oldest and the largest Chinese association in France, has bought a house in the center of the arrondissement to be the association's office. The second Chinatown is located in the 13th arrondissement. It is the biggest in Europe and consists mainly of former Chinese refugees from Indochina. The third one did not emerge until the 1990s and is located in the 19th arrondissement or Belleville, called Meili Cheng (Beautiful City) by Paris' Chinese. Most of its residents are newcomers from mainland China. However, nowadays the most important Chinese business center in Paris is a new one that has been established in Aubervilliers, a region located on the north outskirt of Paris. It had been a ruined industrial zone up until the mid-1990s. Hundreds of Chinese migrants moved into this zone to set up their wholesale shops and made it a flourishing commercial center in the early years of the twenty-first century. An investigation made in mid-2008 shows that more than 900 Chinese wholesale shops had been set up in Aubervilliers, and these comprised one-third of the commercial shops of the whole of Aubervilliers. The impact of the financial crisis in late 2008 bankrupted some Chinese wholesale shops but more than two thirds have successfully overcome the impact of the crisis and continued their business in Aubervilliers.[8]

In Lavapies of Madrid, more than 300 wholesale shops and stores stand one by one. An estimate made by a local Chinese association leader in 2010 points out that its output value had reached five billion RMB per year.

In the area around the Piazza Vittoria of Rome, about 150 Chinese stores have formed a visible Chinese quarter. In Prato, a medieval city just outside of Florence, hundreds of Chinese wholesale shops selling MIC and hundreds of Chinese workshops producing "Made in Italy" (MII) products are standing side by side. The line between MIC and MII is indistinct, since MII may use the materials or accessories imported from China as well.

In Russia, Chinese traders have brought over many Chinese goods to contribute to the prosperity of the local market, although now and then the police officers, tax collectors or other state officers raid Chinese businesses, swoop on Chinese shops and companies, or the relevant authorities suddenly close down the market where Chinese stalls and shops are concentrated.

The common feature of these commercial or wholesale centers is that almost all products are "Made in China" for sale at low prices to Europe-wide retailers. The redistribution chain is vast. During opening days, many retailers, some are Chinese but more are Europeans or other ethnic immigrants, will come to order merchandises to resell back home at marked up prices. The big retailers come to order the merchandise and the wholesalers have to be responsible for packaging and providing "door-to-door" service. Some retailers come with vans to pack goods on site but some lowest-end retailers just come with bags. Often deals are carried out in cash to avoid paying tariffs.

These trading centers are an extension of the Chinese economy abroad. Thousands of Chinese migrants are bridging China with the rest of the world. However, the development of this economy is a double-edged sword from the perspective of the local authorities. On the one hand, the people have more or less benefited from the cheap and new Chinese products via the channeling of these Chinese-run wholesale centers; but the grey economy, carried out by both sellers and buyers, has breached the rigid trading game that has been carried out for decades in Europe. The competition between new immigrant manufacturers and the established ones is rather harsh.

Newly emerged economic sectors

In addition to the great Chinese commercial centers, the newly emerged economic sectors that are worth noting can be briefly described as follows.

One is the tourist business, which is also a by-product of the rapid economic development of China. In the years between 2005 and 2010, on average the total number of the PRC Chinese people traveling abroad was at 22.7% annual growth, and Europe is an attractive destination. In 2009, about 1.9 million Chinese visited Europe.[9] Seeing that Chinese tourism constitutes an excellent market, the Chinese travel agencies in Europe have kept mushrooming since the turn of the twenty-first century, increasing quickly from about one dozen to several hundred and resulting in a rising competition among themselves. In 2001, the first European-wide conference of Chinese travel agencies was held to reduce competition and strengthen mutual cooperation. In 2008, at the eighth annual meeting of the Chinese travel agencies in Europe, the proposal to establish a united federation to coordinate their relationship was adopted; following which a united federation called the European Federation of Chinese Tourist Professionals was established. About 400 members hailed from almost every well-known European city. A couple of top travel agencies in China were invited to be the special members of this European federation.

Vegetable farming is a new effort among the Chinese in Europe. Since the 1990s, some Chinese pioneers started to establish vegetable farms in cold and desolated Siberia. They built greenhouses to plant cabbage, cucumber, tomato, sweet corn and some fruits. A report shows that the price of one kilogram of cucumber was about 180 rubles before the Chinese came to establish farms; but now it has decreased to about 30 rubles. Nowadays, along the Siberian railroad, Chinese farmers are scattered on almost every city's outskirt. It is said locally that there are more than 2,000 small Chinese vegetable farms in Russia's Far Eastern Federal District. Recently, the Chinese vegetable farms have emerged in Western and Southern Europe as well, to provide Chinese vegetables to meet the needs of thousands of Chinese restaurants and Chinese migrant families.

The fact that Chinatowns are expanding and becoming prosperous in almost every metropolis of Europe is significant. In today's Chinatowns, not only high quality Chinese restaurants predominate, but almost all kinds of services needed by the Chinese can be found easily. Most are made by the Chinese and for the Chinese. In Chinatowns, there are shop signs in both Chinese and local languages advertising Chinese mobile phones, computers with Chinese software, Chinese printing, wedding photography, construction companies dealing in particular with Chinese restaurant decoration, and beauty salons with designs of Chinese black hair and body complexion, etc. Moreover, traditional Chinese clinics sell Chinese herb and provide acupuncture and massage services. Translation and consultant agencies advertise that they are willing to provide any official documents needed. Gambling parlors for playing Chinese mahjong or cards can be found here and there. These Chinatowns are not only a cultural focal point of the local Chinese community but some of them, such as those in London, Paris and Amsterdam, have become tourist attractions.

Social visibility

Until the end of the Cold War, most Chinese immigrants in Europe preferred to lead their social lives apart from the European society. Often their contacts with Europeans were limited to Chinese restaurants. They remained a silent group, suggesting that all problems were supposed to be solved among themselves, although as an ethnic immigrant group they were highly visible in the European world. They faced formidable obstacles derived from cultural and national differences, including the deep-seated social and racial prejudice of some Europeans (Benton and Pieke 1998; Li 1999).

Such a state of affairs, however, has changed since the 1980s, after the PRC opened its door to the West and especially during its current rise as an economic power house. Chinese immigrants in various European countries have become visible through more and more purposed collective action, by setting up associations at either national or European level, organizing great-scale public activities, integrating Chinese into local politics, and very recently, even by evoking civil-rights campaigns for pooling their strengths and experience to address important issues concerning the Chinese immigrants.

Participation in election campaigns

The Chinese in UK are comparatively much more active in participating in the politics of the host country than their peers in other European states. One reason may be due to their longer history of immigration; the other reason is due to the fact that a considerable number of the Chinese migrants in UK came from Hong Kong and Malaysia, who have relatively rich experiences in political involvement.

In the UK, quite a number of Chinese activists have participated in the government dialogues to represent and provide support for the Chinese migrant community. By the end of January 2011, an English website named Visible Chinese: A Guide to Achievers in the UK's Chinese Culture has in total provided 115 profiles, of which 20 profiles belong to the category of politics.[10] For instance, Ms Mee Ling Ng, a Chinese migrant from Malaysia, successfully stood as the Labour candidate for Lewisham Borough Council, becoming the first Chinese woman councilor to be elected in Britain in 1986. For over 20 years, she contributed a lot in social services and she received an OBE in 2007.

Stephen Sing, a Chinese migrant from Hong Kong who works in his family-run Chinese take-away outlet, was elected councilor for Willingdon, Polegate and East Dean in 2001, after having been a parish councilor for Willingdon and Jevington since 1997 and representative for Willingdon on Wealden District Council since 1999.

Christine Lee, born in Hong Kong, is now a prominent figure in British Chinese society and one of the leading Chinese lawyers practicing in the United Kingdom. In 2005, she embarked on the campaign against the Immigration Asylum and Nationality Bill. Together with her peers, they traveled widely to organize meetings and encourage the Chinese to speak out. Furthermore, in 2006, she launched the project "Integration of British Chinese into Politics (also known as BC Project)" with support from the House of Commons, the House of Lords and the Chinese Embassy. The message they tried to send to every Chinese in the UK was: "Without political participation, we do not have a voice. If our voices aren't heard we fail to have any influence in key decision-making processes." Then, for the first time in the history of the Chinese in the UK, they felt a strong need to come before parliament and enter into the public domain to register their grievous objection and strongly protested the Government Bill of 2006. Finally some items in the Bill were revised.

Also worth noting is Steven Dominique Cheung, the first British Chinese to have sought support to stand in the European Election in 2009 when he was only 19 years old. He is the first British Chinese-Filipino MEP Candidate and the world's youngest. Although he was not successful, Cheung did quite well in getting 4,918 votes. His effort was admirable, especially in encouraging others in the Chinese community to make a positive impact on British society. Some similar efforts can be found in other European states as well. In France, a Chinese migrant from Cambodia was selected as the current French president's consultant for Asian affairs, by acting as a volunteer activist in the election campaign. In the local election campaign of 2008, for the first time there were a dozen Chinese standing as candidates for local government positions.

One of them was voted in as the Vice Mayor of the 13th arrondissement of Paris, and another as the Vice Mayor of Esbly, a commune in north-central France.

In the Netherlands, in a bid to increase voter registration and reverse voter apathy within the Chinese community, an association called the Organ of Chinese Involvement (*Inspraakorgaan Chinezen* in Dutch) was set up in early 2004. Its aim is to highlight the low awareness of politics among the Chinese migrants in the Netherlands and to encourage those eligible to vote. By organizing public lectures and meetings, it wishes to let more Chinese migrants know how important it is to have their voices heard through voting. In Spain and Italy, two European states with tens of thousands of new Chinese immigrants who did not form a socially visible community until the 1990s, a couple of new Chinese migrants have been voted as local councilors, too.

Given that political apathy has been a common feature of the Chinese overseas until recently, one can appreciate how much progress the Chinese in Europe have made in becoming active in political participation.

European-wide association

The establishment and continual functions of EFCO, a European-wide Chinese association, is one example that shows the collective efforts made by the European Chinese to highlight their social status in both China and Europe. EFCO was officially established in May 1992 in Amsterdam. Its initial purpose is to improve mutual communications among fellow associations and for the establishment of a unified voice. Twenty-two Chinese associations coming from 11 Western European countries became the co-initiators of the federation, the most active being those from the Netherlands, France, and United Kingdom. The leaders of EFCO have made great efforts to attract attention from the Chinese government to legitimate and highlight their position.

Since the establishment and up until the year 2010, EFCO has in total held 16 congresses. Each congress was held in a different European metropolis in succession. When the congress was held, the organizers would invite high-ranking officials of the host country and China to either attend the opening ceremony or send enthusiastic letter of congratulations. It is interesting to point out that its fifth congress was held in the Dutch Parliament Mansion in The Hague and one standing committee's meeting in 1998 was held in the EU Mansion in Brussels in order to pursue higher social visibility. Also, since 1998, the delegation in the name of EFCO has been visiting the European Committee. Their purpose was multifold: to present a general picture of the Chinese who live in the European Union; to call for proper attention to their presence; and particularly to highlight their human and economic potential for the European Union and the obstacles in the way of its full realization. No matter whether there is any practical effect, all these serve to make a symbolic statement that the Chinese are here in Europe, and EFCO is their exclusive representative. In addition, traders, tourist professionals, scholars and some organizations from specific towns and regions in China have set up their respective European-wide association as well. These European-wide associations seem to highlight social visibility rather than any practical function.

The first large-scale demonstration

On 20 June 2010, for the first time in the history of the Chinese in Europe a large-scale demonstration was held in Belleville, home to the new Chinatown in Paris as described earlier. All of the reports appeared in either Chinese or Western language media expressed their surprise that nowadays the Chinese immigrants have started to use Western approaches to demand their rights.

The cause of the demonstration was an accident which happened on midnight of 1 June 2010. A Chinese couple, whose original hometown is Wenzhou, got married and held a wedding banquet in the biggest Chinese restaurant in Belleville. Only after nine or ten o'clock in the evening after most guests have closed their own restaurants or shops, would such a banquet really begin. Normally a banquet would end after midnight. It was said that on that night a number of men waited not far from the restaurant and robbed the guests who left. While hearing a Chinese woman screaming and seeing someone was trying to rob her handbag, an angry Chinese youth, who had just left the restaurant, rushed to get the gun out of his car trunk and shot the robber. Hearing the gunfight, French policemen rushed over. The gunman was arrested and the wounded robber was sent to hospital.

The incident immediately became a hot topic among the Chinese in Paris. The local Chinese were very angry that in Belleville Chinese were often looted but one hardly ever saw French police coming over to provide support. They said that the Chinese in Belleville lacked security so the youth had to keep a gun for self-protection. Moreover gossip spread quickly in Belleville that the gang of robbers wanted to retaliate against the Chinese. Many Chinese had little sense of security while working or living in Belleville. They were outraged.

On 6 June, one Chinese youth association initiated a meeting among the Chinese association leaders in Paris to discuss how to deal with the affair. At the meeting, the suggestion of holding a demonstration was debated hotly before reaching a consensus. Five bigger Chinese associations in Paris became the initiators of the demonstration and their leaders formed a steering group, which was headed by the chairperson of the Association of Chinese in France, the biggest Chinese association in France.

On 10 June, the steering group sent an application for permission to hold a demonstration to the police. After obtaining the permission, on 12 June, a demonstration was officially organized, with several affiliated groups in charge of publicity, material, security and secretariat respectively. The slogan of the demonstration was "No violence! Assure safety!"

Following the Western-style demonstration, a couple of news conferences were held to provide relevant information in both Chinese and French. Meanwhile, a website called Chinese Street (*Huaren Jie* in Chinese) was used to disseminate the information about the demonstration and call for participation. Very soon more than 30,000 Euros were collected to support the demonstration; and 5,000 T-shirts with the slogan of the demonstration were prepared.

On the day of the demonstration, tens of thousands of Chinese wearing the demonstration T-shirts came together at the center of Belleville. All participants waved flags and shouted slogans, walking along Rue de Belleville. The majority of participants were Chinese; while some French officials of local authorities and local residents of Belleville jointed the demonstration as well. The whole demonstration lasted for about two hours.[11]

According to the Chinese media, the number of demonstrators was nearly 30,000, while the French newspaper reported a figure of about 8,500. In any case, the social significance of this first demonstration to be held by Chinese immigrants in Paris should be studied from a comprehensive perspectives. It highlighted the social profile of the Chinese community in today's Europe, and mirrored the history of Chinese immigrants adjusting themselves to the Western political context.

Internal differentiation

Seen from a social point of view, the Chinese in Europe, like those in other continents, comprise a diverse and segmented community, which can be observed from both horizontal and vertical levels.

At the horizontal level, key factors that affect the different immigrant groups include the context of arrival, geographic location, and the presence or absence of pre-existing mobility ladders. More precisely, they can be roughly divided into three categories. The first category includes entrepreneurs and businesspersons. Some of them arrived in Europe with little money but have realized their dreams of getting rich quickly in Europe; while some wealthy migrants use the capital they had accumulated in their original region, mainland China, Taiwan or Southeast Asia, to invest in Europe. Often the leaders of Chinese associations belong to this group of people, no matter whether they really contribute to the association's activities or not, as long as their names and donations are relevant to the association.

The second group includes the skilled migrants. Among them, quite a number first came as students but then worked in the host country after completing their studies. It is worth noting that recently, some European states have issued new policies to provide a shortcut to high skill migrants on the basis of their annual income. For instance, in the Netherlands, according to the regulation enacted in 2007, the immigration application will be approved immediately if the applicant's annual income is higher than €46,541; and if the applicant is younger than 30 years old, then the requirement should not be lower than €34,130. In Denmark, the relevant standard is 450,000 Danish Krone; in Germany, it is €85,000 and in Ireland, it is €40,000. The gap between these high skill migrants and other migrant workers is obvious, since they are able to enjoy comfortable lives with a decent salary. Often their ways of life are much more westernized.

The third category includes the mass grassroots. Some came with official documents but some are undocumented. In the Southern European states such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, the established Chinese migrants could apply to be recruited as workers from China, either as workshop employees or domestic servants. In the Western European states, some Chinese restaurant owners apply for cooks from China, too. However, no matter whether they are documented or undocumented, all costs of transnational travel, including rather expensive warranty costs, have to be undertaken by the migrants, and quite a number arrive with heavy debts. Moreover, many came with little knowledge of the immigration or labour law of the host country. It is an open secret that they are exploited by co-ethnics who have used common ethnicity to traffic them. Although many Chinese immigrants know that the working conditions of a "European job" are better, it is almost impossible for newcomers to find one because of language barriers, lack of necessary skills and access. For them, cherishing a dream of having a legal status and then becoming a boss in the near future has a strong push to make the immigrants accept hard working conditions, since mobility within Chinese immigrants is rather high. For those who came via chain migration, they often feel that they have to repay the kindness of their warrantor, who is often their relative, close friend or co-villagers. However, it is worth noting that in the recent transnational migration trend, more undocumented migrants have been trafficked by professional brokers, and there is no private relationship between the employees and employers. Thus those who become deeply disappointed with the situation may go to extremes. This has been described as one factor of rising criminal cases among the Chinese migrants.

At the vertical level, two differentiations are obvious. One is the generation gap that is prevalent everywhere and the other is the emerging difference between the established ones, who were adult migrants in the early years of China's opening period, and those who were born after the late 1980s and formed the so-called post-80s or post-90s generation.

Concerning the generation gap, although it can be seen everywhere, it is usually much wider between the migrants and their local-born descendants. Many parents insist on tying their children to ancestral and communal culture, but the latter are reluctant to accept "outdated tradition" and are much more concerned with the society they inhabit. There is also a newly emerged gap between the migrants who emigrated before the 1990s and those who were born

after the 1980s. Unlike their hard-working pioneers, they usually pay much more attention to the quality of daily life and they have a certain consciousness of human rights. The employers, who usually are established immigrants, often complain that the newcomers are "too lazy", "a spoiled generation", and moreover are "unlike we-Chinese."

In reality, although the majority of the Chinese in Europe belong to the first generation of immigrants, they are segmented into the rich and the poor, established migrants and newcomers, high skilled and unskilled, documented and undocumented, rural and urban (counted on their original background before emigration), as well as, the "post-generations" and so on.

Transnational living and links with *qiaoxiang*

The traditional *qiaoxiang* (emigrant regions) ties maintained by Chinese overseas have been widely studied by scholars (Douw *et al.* 1999; Li, 2005; Tan, 2007; Kuhn 2008). However, a new phenomenon concerning Chinese overseas and their links with *qiaoxiang* is worth noting: with the current "rise of China," some new Chinese migrants urge the Chinese government to accept "dual citizenship." For them, dual citizenship is convenient for doing business or securing better treatment, not a marker of political loyalty or emotional attachment to China.

In the Bandung conference held in 1955, the PRC government clearly announced its policy that China encouraged ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia to naturalize as local citizens; they would lose their Chinese citizenship when they were so naturalized. Since then, it is obvious that dual citizenship is not recognized by the PRC.

In 1999, for the first time 12 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) members submitted a draft resolution to suggest to the Chinese government to accept dual citizenship. Since then, almost in every annual national CPPCC conference, there are a couple of proposals concerning dual citizenship. The prohibition of dual citizenship has become a contentious issue in today's China.

The strongest push factor comes from the new but established migrants in developed countries; and the Chinese migrants in North America and EU states are amongst the vocal advocates. Normally, they have closer ties with China and travel frequently between their settled country and China, either for individual or business purposes. The dual citizenship advocates can be further divided into the following categories. The retired Chinese who like to re-settle in their original home region want dual citizenship. For instance, those who have established in Europe do not want to give up their European citizenship since they need it to enjoy their pension and social welfare benefits. But they also want to have Chinese citizenship since they plan to pass most of their remaining years in China. They have to renew their living permit regularly if they cannot have permanent residence in China, which is too much trouble for elderly persons.

Then there are those who have invested in China who also want to have dual citizenship. During the early years of the reform movement in mainland China, the foreign investors, Chinese migrants abroad included, enjoyed various foreign investment incentives and preferential taxation policies. Since the early twenty-first century, however, the relevant acts or polices have expired step by step. Nowadays, these overseas Chinese investors find that it would be more profitable to have a Chinese citizenship. They need it when they want to get a loan from China's national bank, to contract a great national construction project, or to invest in real estate which has been a market where one can make sudden huge profits in recent years.

Those who sent their children to study in China also want dual citizenship for them. The parents who are still in the stage of building personal careers abroad often send their foreign-born young children to their grand parents in China. Normally the parents will retrieve their children when they are teenagers. While going to primary school in China, the "foreign kids" need to pay extra

tuition since they are not the object of the Chinese national compulsory education. The migrant parents are in a dilemma since they want to keep their children's foreign citizenship, which is generally acquired by birth, but at the same time they want them to enjoy the same free compulsory education as the local Chinese students. Thus the only possibility is to ask for dual citizenship.

Those who had a piece of land either in an urban suburb or in a newly developed region before their emigration strongly request to get back their Chinese citizenship. For instance, Wenzhou is the main hometown region of many Chinese in Europe, and it is one of the developed areas in China where private enterprises are very prosperous. Some local peasants of Wenzhou became rich quickly by "selling" their private land to entrerpreneurs or making higher profits by building houses on their private land and then renting them out. The emigrants feel relatively deprived, seeing their peers get rich in such an easy way. The perception is that if they were still living in their home region, they would have had many more opportunities than what they can find as an outsider in Europe. Some have sought to ask for their land right. They cannot win the case if China keeps its policy of rejecting dual nationality.

The economic boom in China adds new meanings to the relationship between Chinese emigrants abroad and *qiaoxiang*. An obvious changing direction is that the pursuits of some emigrants have switched from patriotic, supportive and charity activities to obtaining new opportunities in *qiaoxiang* areas. Also, with the new emigration trend spreading widely, many new emigrants in fact migrated from beyond the traditional *qiaoxiang* areas, thus expanding the concept of *qiaoxiang* greatly. A typical example is that a Chinese encyclopedia on *qiaoxiang* has listed all provinces of China as *qiaoxiang* (Zhou 2001). Therefore the new implication of the relationship between Chinese emigrants and *qiaoxiang* is similar to their links with wider China.

In general, as I have argued elsewhere, consciously or unconsciously, Chinese migrants often cherish "two worlds," that is, they try to convert their achievement in one society into capital for upward mobility in another society (Li 1999). This undoubtedly is influencing the relationship between Chinese emigrants and *qiaoxiang*, particularly when China's status in the world is rising immensely.

Notes

1 The 15th EFCO congress held in Berlin, *Ouzhou shibao*, 11 September 2008. According to the report, the survey was made through the network of EFCO's member associations, which are widely spread over the whole Europe.
2 The author has provided detailed historical descriptions of the Chinese migration to Europe in the twentieth century in her book (Li 2002), particularly in Chapter V.
3 The author has attended dozens of symposia on Chinese in Europe. It is noted that often the Russian scholars provide very high statistics on the Chinese migrants in Europe. The estimation of "5 million Chinese in Europe" was provided by a Russian scholar. Further analysis will be given later.
4 "European Chinese are creating miracle," in *Asian Weekly*, No. 42, 2007. http://www.yzzk.com/cfm/Content_Archive.cfm?Channel=ae&Path=2222470742/42ae1a.cfm
5 In June 2007, when Sir William Ehrman, the British Ambassador in PRC was interviewed by the reporter of *China Daily*, he said that there were more than 60,000 PRC students registered in British universities (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqpl/2007-06/28/content_904796.htm; accessed 5 March 2011). If the "part-time Chinese students" and "minor Chinese pupils" who are recruited in primary or middle schools of UK have been counted, then the total number of the Chinese students in the UK should reach about 100,000. In France, the total number of the Chinese students has increased greatly since 2002. An official report published in 2007 points out that there are about 20,000 Chinese students in France, which is 12 times higher than the number in 1998. (http://www.chinanews.com.cn/edu/cglx/news/2007/02-28/880513.shtml; accessed 5 March 2011).
6 "Russian activists demanding the expulsion of the Chinese migrants" (http://news.sohu.com/20070214/n248228318.shtml; accessed 5 March 2011).

7 The history of the early Chinese economic activities in Europe can be found in Li (2004: 660–62).
8 The information of Chinese businesses in Aubervilliers was collected from my interviews with Mr. Xia. Xia was among the first group of Chinese businessmen in Aubervilliers. Also, he was among a few initiators to set up the Association of Chinese Businessmen in Aubervilliers. Xia was elected as its first chairman.
9 "Changes that Chinese Travel Abroad", in *Going Abroad*, 2010 (11): 46. See also: http://www.welltrend.com.cn/magzine/zz_show_1242808371437_12778878559683_0.htm.
10 Checked on 31 January 2011: http://www.visiblechinese.com.
11 In the late afternoon, after most of demonstrators had left, some Chinese teenagers clashed with the French police and 23 persons were arrested.

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17

Southeast Asian policies toward the ethnic Chinese

A revisit*

Leo Suryadinata

Ethnic Chinese as a heterogeneous group

For the purpose of our discussion, the term "ethnic Chinese" refers to people of Chinese descent including those who have not been completely assimilated into the indigenous population. As such, *peranakan* Chinese in Indonesia and *baba* (also known as Straits-born Chinese in the past) in Malaysia are included in our definition. Persons of Chinese descent who have been absorbed into and are accepted as members of the indigenous population are excluded.

The Chinese in Southeast Asia form the largest ethnic Chinese community outside China. They constitute about 75% of the total number of Chinese overseas. As many countries in Southeast Asia do not include their ethnic Chinese in their population census, the current numbers and percentages that are presented are mainly estimates rather than actual figures. There are approximately 23 million Chinese in Southeast Asia constituting 4% of the total ASEAN population. These Chinese are often considered by many indigenous leaders as a homogeneous group that is loyal to China, culturally Chinese, and economically dominant.

In fact, the Chinese in Southeast Asia are a heterogeneous group. In terms of citizenship, some are nationals of the People's Republic of China or of Taiwan, but the majority comprises citizens of the respective Southeast Asian states. Politically, some are oriented toward either Beijing or Taipei but most are oriented toward their adopted land. There are those who are still culturally Chinese, but there are also many who have been either acculturated or even assimilated into the host society. The majority appear to have experienced varying degrees of localization and acculturation. The number of acculturated Chinese in some Southeast Asian states increased significantly in the twentieth century. They have generally lost an active command of the Chinese language. Economically, there are rich and poor Chinese. It is true that the Chinese as a group have been economically influential and often form the middle classes of the countries where they live. However, with the exception of the Chinese in Singapore, they do not control the economies of the countries where they reside.

Indigenous elite's perception of the ethnic Chinese

Despite the heterogeneity of the Chinese, the perception of a homogeneous Chinese community persists among the indigenous elite. This is due partly to the relatively strong economic position of the Chinese as a group, and partly to the continued existence of those Chinese who refuse to fully identify themselves with the indigenous population. The perception is also often linked to the tendency of the PRC government in the past to use the Chinese abroad to serve the interests of China. All of this has helped to perpetuate the prejudice of the indigenous population against the Chinese. There is one more important factor: the "indigenous state" in Southeast Asia has gone past the nation-building stage based on the "indigenous model" which tends to exclude the Chinese.

Apart from Thailand, the Southeast Asian states are relatively new "nation-states." It is the desire of the indigenous-dominated governments to integrate, if not assimilate, their Chinese population into the host societies. This was especially true prior to the end of the Cold War and in the era of globalization. The indigenous (i.e. non-Chinese) elites believed that by making the ethnic Chinese less "Chinese," the Southeast Asian states would be more "secure," since the PRC would have less opportunity to use the local Chinese community to its advantage. Whether culture and political loyalty always go hand in hand is highly debatable, but here, the perception of the indigenous leadership is important as the government's policies are often influenced, if not determined, by these perceptions.

The attempt to make the ethnic Chinese less Chinese is often behind the government measure of banning the so-called three cultural pillars of the Chinese minority: ethnic Chinese organizations (especially social and political organizations), Chinese medium schools and the Chinese mass media (especially newspapers and periodicals).[1]

Southeast Asian "indigenous states" have not been whole-hearted in introducing an assimilation policy.[2] The reason probably lies in the different sizes of the Chinese communities in the region. If the size of the Chinese population is very small, it is tempting for the government of a Southeast Asian state to introduce the assimilation policy, but if it is large it will be problematic and unrealistic. In the latter case, the indigenous government will introduce an accommodation[3] or partial acculturation policy.[4] However, regardless of the size of the Chinese population, the indigenous-dominated government will attempt to keep it small (by stopping new Chinese immigration into the country) or reduce the number of the Chinese relative to the indigenous population (by importing indigenous migrants from the neighboring countries). From various studies of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the following generalizations can be made.

Government policies toward the ethnic Chinese

Apart from the size of the ethnic Chinese population, the most important factors affecting a country's policy toward its Chinese minority are as follows: first, the political system of the country (i.e. whether it is a liberal democratic system or illiberal democratic system); second, its economic situation; third, relations between the indigenous elite and the local Chinese in the country; and fourth, the country's relations with China. If the country has a liberal democratic system, it is likely to introduce a policy of cultural pluralism[5] toward the Chinese. Nevertheless, social pressure to integrate is often applied. If the country is illiberal, it is likely that a policy of accommodation or acculturation or assimilation, depending on the size of the Chinese community, will be applied.

However, when the economic situation of the country is in trouble and relations between the indigenous elite and ethnic Chinese turn sour, the government is likely to introduce an

authoritarian rule and adopt a policy of assimilation and expulsion or genocide. Domestic instability in Southeast Asia and anti-Chinese policy may or may not result in China's intervention. If China does not intervene, the combination of assimilation and expulsion will not escalate, but if China intervenes, the expulsion policy will be intensified, at least for a period of time.

It is obvious that the above policies, with the exception of "cultural pluralism," are aimed at reducing, if not eradicating the Chineseness of the community. The success or failure of a particular policy (i.e. to reduce the Chineseness of the Chinese minority) depends on a number of factors, of which the following two are most important: first, the degree of acceptance of the Chinese by the indigenous population (in reference to the cultural rather than racial concept of a "nation"), and second, the nature of the Chinese population (e.g. local or foreign-born). Of course, the role of China may also influence the outcome of Southeast Asian policies toward the Chinese minority.

This chapter attempts to use the various concepts above in analyzing the Chinese in the Southeast Asian states. The results of various policies will also be briefly assessed.

Indonesia

Indonesia has about five million Chinese constituting around 2% of its total population, decreasing in terms of percentage. The Indonesian government policy has changed from time to time, depending on the nature of the government in power. During the Constitutional Democracy period (1949–58), a liberal policy, something like "cultural pluralism," was introduced. During the Guided Democracy era (1959–65), a policy of integration was implemented. But during the Soeharto era (1966–98) a policy of assimilation was adopted. Occasionally the government also applied the policy of "expulsion." After the fall of Soeharto, cultural pluralism has again been introduced.[6]

Soon after Indonesia's independence, the government passed regulations restricting Chinese economic activities. The most well-known is the *benteng* (castle) system introduced in the early 1950s in which import licenses were reserved for the indigenous population. However, most of the indigenous persons who were license-holders lacked experience and capital. They were forced to cooperate with Chinese businessmen, resulting in the emergence of the so-called "Ali Baba" companies. Indigenes became the front men while Chinese businessmen financed and ran the business. Under this system, the economic strength of the ethnic Chinese was not undermined.

After Sukarno came to power and introduced "Guided Democracy," a new economic policy known as the Presidential Regulation No. 10 (Peraturan Presiden No.10, also known as PP 10) was promulgated. It prohibited aliens from engaging in retail trade in the rural areas. A large number of Chinese who were affected by the regulation moved to the urban areas and more than 100,000 left Indonesia for the PRC.[7] Indonesia's economy was seriously affected, resulting in economic chaos. The government then suspended the implementation of the regulation and Indonesia's economy gradually stabilized.

After Soeharto assumed power, the government loosened up the restrictions on the economic activities of the ethnic Chinese. The economic strength of the Chinese also increased. The power-holders (mainly the military) collaborated with Chinese businessmen, forming an alliance of "power and money." This alliance, later known as the *cukong* system, adversely affected the growth of some indigenous businessmen who had been critical of the measure.

The Soeharto government gave the Chinese a lot of freedom in the economic field but introduced assimilation policies in other areas; the "three pillars" of Chinese culture were eradicated. In fact, as early as 1957, Indonesian students of Chinese descent were prohibited from entering Chinese-medium schools and were permitted to enter only Indonesian schools, thus compelling the existing Chinese-medium schools to be restructured into two schools. In 1966, all Chinese

schools which were in fact attended by children of non-Indonesian citizens were closed down. Faced with pressure, the Jakarta government eventually allowed Chinese private groups to open at least eight Special Project National Schools (SPNC). In Sumatra, some SPNC schools were also allowed to operate. These schools used Indonesian as the medium of instruction, and their curricula were identical with those of ordinary Indonesian schools. However, Chinese was allowed to be taught after school hours and was listed as a non-examination subject. Understandably, the standards of Chinese in these schools were very low. In 1975, the government took action against some SPNC schools for using Chinese as the medium of instruction. It eventually banned all such schools, and converted them into regular Indonesian schools: no Chinese was allowed to be taught. From that time onwards, Indonesian Chinese children could only go to Indonesian schools which have made them more Indonesianized.

After 1966, the Soeharto government encouraged Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent to change their Chinese names to Indonesian-sounding names. Some Chinese continued to keep their Chinese names, but the majority, in order to adjust to the new political situation, changed their names. This speeded up the assimilation process. At the same time, the government also restricted the use of Chinese in public places. For instance, Chinese signboards were not allowed to be displayed, and Hong Kong/Taiwan movie posters were required to be written in Indonesian. All Chinese language newspapers were closed down at the beginning of the New Order era, and only one so-called Chinese newspaper, *Yindunixiya Ribao* (*Harian Indonesia*), consisting of eight pages (half Chinese and half Indonesian), was permitted to publish throughout the Soeharto era.

To promote ethnic Chinese integration into local society, the Soeharto government liberalized the citizenship policy. In 1980, in anticipation of the normalization of Sino-Indonesian relations, the government issued two regulations to enable the resident Chinese to take up Indonesian citizenship. In 1990, there were only 300,000 alien Chinese in Indonesia.[8] In the 1970s, there were at least one million such Chinese. In the 1980s, 700,000 ethnic Chinese succeeded in getting Indonesian citizenship. The number of alien Chinese has been drastically reduced since then.

Despite the assimilation policy, Chinese Indonesians enjoyed a certain degree of religious freedom owing to Pancasila (Indonesian state ideology). And through practicing Chinese religions – Buddhism and the Confucian religion (Agama Khonghucu) – Chinese Indonesians were able to preserve their Chinese identity.[9] Nevertheless, Chinese religions had been highly Indonesianized as all were taught in the Indonesian language. Moreover, in 1979 the Soeharto regime de-recognized the Confucian religion, making it difficult for it to function and develop. The Soeharto government accused the Confucian religion of being "not a proper religion," but the real reason was the government's disapproval of it being "too Chinese" and hence "un-Indonesian."

As a result of the absence of massive new Chinese migration from China to Indonesia, the closure of Chinese-medium schools, and the disappearance of Chinese organizations and publications, *totok* Chinese ("pure Chinese") society has gradually become *peranakanized*, if not Indonesianized. This process is particularly obvious in Java. However, it does not mean that Chinese society in Indonesia has disappeared.

The fall of Soeharto in May 1998 gave rise to a democratic government, first led by B.J. Habibie, then Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. This coincided with the era of globalization and the rise of China. These new governments have introduced the policy of "cultural pluralism" in the sense that the three pillars of overseas Chinese culture were revived, although the pre-Soeharto Chinese-medium schools have not as they are no longer in demand. Instead, the so-called tri-lingual schools (teaching Chinese, English and Indonesian) have been established.[10] Nevertheless, these schools are established in big cities and are few in number. Moreover, their school fees are rather high. As a result, the impact on the Chinese Indonesian community in general may be limited.

However, the Chinese language has been popularized after the fall of Soeharto; even indigenous Indonesian schools offer Mandarin as a subject. The Chinese government has also sent Chinese language teachers to Indonesia to teach the language. Both government and private schools have benefited from this new development. The tolerance toward ethnic Chinese culture after the fall of Soeharto has tended to strengthen ethnic Chinese identity, but it has not been able to alter the mould cast in the 32 years of Soeharto's rule. Chinese Indonesians continue to accept their Indonesian names and Indonesian medium schools are still the schools that the majority of Chinese Indonesians go to.

The liberalization of policy toward the Chinese is not only in the cultural but also the economic field. The economic strength of the Chinese community, especially the business group, has continued to grow. Of course, indigenous Indonesian business groups have also been expanding, but less conspicuously than among the Chinese. This often gives one the impression that much of the wealth has been concentrated in the hands of the ethnic Chinese. The truth is, indigenous Indonesian society in fact has not been as liberal as the Indonesian government policy. Prejudices against the Chinese are still around and ethnic tensions between Chinese and non-Chinese still exist as reflected in the ethnic conflict in the Outer Islands over small incidents or cultural symbols.

Vietnam

Vietnam has about 863,000 Chinese forming 1.13% of its total population.[11] In fact, before the Sino-Vietnamese War, the percentage of the Chinese in Vietnam (the so-called Hoa) constituted more than 2% of the population. Prior to the unification, there were 270,000 Chinese in North Vietnam, many of whom were engaged in commercial and industrial activities, but very few capitalists; in South Vietnam, there were 1,550,000 Chinese who were also engaged in commercial and industrial activities and the number of capitalists was large.

Prior to unification between North and South Vietnam (1976), relations between China (PRC) and North Vietnam were cordial, and nationality was not an issue. In South Vietnam, the Ngo Dinh Diem government introduced a policy of naturalization, making the majority of the Chinese in Vietnam citizens of South Vietnam. As the South Vietnam government prohibited foreign nationals to engage in almost all retail, food and transport sectors by 1960, approximately 90% of the Chinese in South Vietnam had become Vietnamese citizens.

Before the unification, in North Vietnam there were still Chinese-medium schools, ethnic Chinese organizations and Chinese newspapers. In South Vietnam, despite the naturalization policy, these three pillars of Chinese culture were also still in existence. However, there was a split between Hanoi and Beijing after the unification as Hanoi resented Beijing's influence in Vietnam and its support for the anti-Vietnam regime in Cambodia. The new Hanoi government purged the pro-Beijing elements within the government and began to impose the "assimilation" policy on the ethnic Chinese. Apart from forcing the Sino-Vietnamese to become Vietnamese citizens, the three pillars were also being proscribed. At the same time, the Vietnamese government adopted the "socialist" economic policy, forcing the Chinese to go to the new economic zone to open virgin land. This affected the Sino-Vietnamese who were mainly in the commercial and industrial sectors resulting in the exodus of the ethnic Chinese. Many went overseas by sea; a significant number walked across the Thai borders or returned to China, crossing the northern borders. The Sino-Vietnamese war in February 1979 further aggravated the ethnic relations between Chinese and Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) did not trust the ethnic Chinese and in 1982 issued guidelines restricting Chinese Vietnamese to employment in the armed forces and security-related

occupations (Amer 2011). Nevertheless, the departure of large numbers of Chinese, the change of regime in the Soviet Union which had been the major donor and supporter of Vietnam, and the failure of the socialist economic system forced Vietnam to introduce economic reform. In 1986, the Vietnamese Government began to revise its policy toward the Chinese Vietnamese and removed all restrictions in their employments. By 1995, the VCP had issued a decree restoring all the civil rights of Chinese Vietnamese. In the following year it issued a similar decree, formalizing the decision of the party (Amer 2011). Many scholars take the view that the Vietnamese government has abandoned the discriminatory policy toward the ethnic Chinese and started to re-integrate the Chinese into the Vietnamese society.

The change of policy undoubtedly is linked to the revival of the free market economy in Vietnam which requires capital and networks. Overseas Chinese Vietnamese are again welcome and Vietnam's policy toward the ethnic Chinese has become more accommodating. Many Chinese Vietnamese have also returned to Vietnam although the number is unknown.

Laos

Laos, a close ally of Vietnam, is estimated to have around 30,000 ethnic Chinese constituting about 0.5% of the total population (Cui 2010: 159). Its policy toward the Chinese changed from period to period, rather similar to that of Vietnam. Laos gained its independence from France in 1945 and became a monarchy. The newly independent state needed foreign investment and so it had no objection to the Chinese staying in the country, and there were not many Chinese in Laos to begin with. However, since 1955 a revolutionary party allied with the Vietminh was formed and from that time onward until 1975, Laos was involved in the Cold War. Nevertheless, that did not have much effect on the development of the Chinese community. There was reportedly a coup in 1962 and the new authorities confiscated some Chinese factories and enterprises. However, it seemed to have been short-lived and soon a liberal policy was brought back and the Chinese ran their businesses as usual (Cui 2010: 160). By the early 1970s the Chinese community may be said to have reached its peak. There were around 100,000 Chinese and the three pillars of the overseas Chinese culture namely, Chinese newspapers, Chinese organizations and Chinese schools, were firmly in place. There were 20 Chinese schools in operation, according to one source (Cui 2010: 161).

However, as a result of the 1975 revolution the Lao People's Revolutionary Party took over the government and the monarchy was abolished; Laos became Lao People's Democratic Republic. Since then Laos has been a close ally of Vietnam, and sided with Vietnam in 1979 during the Sino-Vietnamese war. Laos adopted an anti-Chinese policy: ethnic Chinese shops and properties were confiscated and Chinese organizations and schools were closed down. About 90% of the Chinese fled the country to Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. Those who could afford it migrated to the West. Only the poor and those who did not have the means to leave stayed behind. According to estimates, there were only 5,000 Chinese in Laos during that period.

The situation of the Chinese began to improve from1986 when Sino-Laotian ties were re-established. The economic condition in Laos also improved. Chinese began to return to Laos and new migrants also came. Like the Chinese in other Southeast Asian states, Laotian Chinese are heterogeneous: apart from the Teochiu and Yunnanese, there are Cantonese, Hokkien and Hainanese. Most of them live in urban areas. It is estimated that 95% of the local-born Chinese are citizens of Laos. It is also estimated that 90% of the Laotian Chinese have intermarried Laotians (Cui 2010: 162). They are different from the *xin huaqiao* (new overseas Chinese) who are the more recent comers.

With globalization and the rise of China, the Laotian government also adopted a liberal policy toward its Chinese minority. Five Chinese schools were allowed to be re-established. The largest one is Liao Du Gong Xue (public school in the Lao capital) which is a bilingual school, using Laotian and Chinese as mediums of instruction. However, as the number of Chinese is small, other Chinese schools use Laotian as the medium of instruction, and Chinese language and English language are taught as foreign language subjects (Cui 2010: 165–7). It appears that the Laotian Chinese are moving toward integration. Like Chinese communities in other countries, there are also Chinese organizations of which the most influential is Zhonghua Lishihui (Chinese Council), which is located in Vientiane.

Cambodia

Cambodia, at one time occupied by Vietnam, is estimated to have 600,000 Chinese, constituting less than 0.4% of the country's total population.[12] The country gained its independence in 1953 under Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Under his rule, the Cambodian kingdom introduced a liberal policy toward the ethnic Chinese minority. Nevertheless, like Laos, Cambodia was also the venue of the struggle between the communists and the anti-communists. In 1970 Norodom Sihanouk was toppled by General Lon Nol, who was known to be an American ally. Suspecting the Chinese community as being pro-communist, Lon Nol introduced an assimilation policy toward the Chinese. Chinese organizations, schools and newspapers were all banned. It was also reported that he instigated the Khmers to attack the ethnic Chinese. The worst nightmare started after April 1975 when the Khmer Rouge, or Red Khmers, took over Cambodia (1975–8), and this was followed by the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia for ten years (1979–89). The policy during these two periods can be described as that of genocide.

Once in power, the Khmer Rouge introduced a policy to transform the Kampuchean society into a "primitive" communist country. To achieve this, the population was forced to move from the cities and towns to the rural areas. The Chinese, being mainly urban dwellers, like other urban Cambodians, were affected. They were sent to the countryside to be farmers and their properties were confiscated. Many were also sent to exploit the virgin lands. To establish a "Socialist State," the Khmer Rouge decided to eliminate the "enemies of Socialism," namely, capitalists, intellectuals, professionals, school teachers, merchants and others. According to the refugee reports, these "enemies of the people" were ordered to dig their own holes and were buried alive. Many of them were ethnic Chinese (Suryadinata 1985: 39). Most Chinese were urban dwellers and this accounted for their terrible suffering. However, the Pol Pot's policy was not without ethnic overtones. The Khmer Rouge not only prohibited the Chinese from using their own language but also induced them to abandon their traditions (Suryadinata 1985: 38–9). The Khmer Rouge regime was also reported to have forced Chinese girls to marry Khmer soldiers.

Extreme hardship and inhumane treatment by the Khmer Rouge led many ethnic Chinese to escape to Thailand or other countries. Some also went to Vietnam and later became "boat people." The Chinese in Cambodia appealed to Beijing for help but they were ignored as China was cultivating the Khmer Rouge with a view to stopping Vietnamese expansion. The three-and-a-half years of Khmer Rouge rule reduced the number of Cambodian people from seven to four million, and the number of the Chinese was also drastically reduced. Vietnam which wanted to dominate the Indochinese states was only able to do so in Laos. It met with hostile resistance from Pol Pot's Cambodia, which later resulted in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and its eventual occupation. The Hanoi Administration installed a new regime known as the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).

Under this new regime, the ethnic Chinese in Cambodia were blamed for their association with the PRC and the PRC was blamed for its support for the Khmer Rouge. The PRK policy (1979–85) toward ethnic Chinese in Cambodia was not much better than that of the Pol Pot regime. The new regime forced the Chinese to leave the towns and clear the land for cultivation. It also "enforced a near universal ban on Chinese schools and cultural associations. The Chinese in Phnom Penh were denied the freedom to celebrate Chinese New Year, practice ancestor worship, or honor Chinese shrines"(Sean 2009: 7). People of Chinese descent were distrusted and once they were found out, they would be dismissed from the army. At one time many Chinese were transported to the border of Cambodia and Thailand and met with gunfire from the Thai border soldiers. There was also the so-called K5 Plan which forced the Chinese to do hard labor in the areas where the Khmer Rouge guerrilla was still in operation (Sean 2009: 8). Under this kind of situation, many Chinese fled or hid their Chinese identity. The policy began to be relaxed after 1986 but the real change only took place after the departure of the Vietnamese from Cambodia in 1989.

In 1989 the PRK was renamed the State of Cambodia (SOC) and relations between the PRC and SOC improved. In 1991 Norodom Sihanouk returned to Cambodia, and a liberal policy was re-introduced. The new Cambodian constitution stipulates that all citizens enjoy equal rights and obligations. There are also the rights to practice minority religion and traditions. Gradually, Chinese culture began to be tolerated and accepted. In order to re-build Cambodia, overseas Cambodians and Chinese overseas were encouraged to invest in the country. Ethnic Chinese began to rebuild their adopted country. Nevertheless, there was also an influx of the new migrants who came to make a fortune in Cambodia.

In 1990, with the encouragement of the new government, a major Chinese organization known as Jianhoa Lishi Hui (Cambodian Chinese Council), which consists of five major dialect groups in Cambodia, was established with more than 100 branches all over the country. There are also about 40 Chinese temples and about 70 Chinese schools of which Duan Hua Xue Xiao boasts to be the largest Chinese school in Southeast Asia with 130,000 students (Cui 2010: 183). It appears that there is a full revival of Chinese society in Cambodia. However, many Cambodian-Chinese have lost active command of the Chinese language.

In fact, Cambodian Chinese are not a homogeneous group. They can be divided into those who have integrated and new migrants who came to Cambodia after 1990. According to Sean Sok Phay, the integrated Chinese have identified themselves with Cambodia (Sean 2009: 3). With the influx of new migrants, Cambodian Chinese society has been rapidly re-sinicized. Nevertheless, in light of the historical development, Cambodian Chinese society will remain divided.

Myanmar

Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is estimated to have 2.5 million Chinese who constitute about 0.5% of the total population (Cui 2010: 205). The country was granted independence by the British in 1948 but the multi-ethnic problem has not been resolved. The military made attempts at destabilizing the civilian government, once in 1958 and the second time in 1962, leading to military rule. General Ne Win introduced the nationalization policy; many banks, shops, schools and newspapers were nationalized. The Chinese suffered great losses. In 1965 there was a further "nationalization" scheme which affected 5,000 enterprises when many Chinese again went bankrupt. Many Chinese left the country but a larger number had nowhere to go and stayed. In 1967, coinciding with the Cultural Revolution in China, there was ethnic conflict between the Chinese and Burmese resulting in anti-Chinese riots. Many Chinese fled Myanmar for the second time.

The military government of Myanmar adopted an assimilation policy toward the Chinese minority. For a long period of time, Myanmar Chinese were not allowed to receive Chinese education. Nevertheless, the Chinese were still able to make a living in Myanmar. Many Chinese in Myanmar hid their ethnic identity and identified themselves with the Burmese. In 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi led the democracy movement and won the majority of the votes during the general election, but she failed to assume power as the military refused to go back to the barracks. Aung San Suu Kyi was then put under house arrest for almost 20 years.

In order to survive the military rule, the Chinese in Myanmar, in addition to integrating with the local communities, avoided talking about three things: politics, the woman and the American dollar. Politics was sensitive. Talking about the woman (i.e. Aung San Suu Kyi) was dangerous. The US dollar was illegal (Cui 2010: 208). Despite various hardships, the Chinese community in Myanmar has survived. Since 1988, the barter trade along the Sino-Burmese border has been restored. Gradually Myanmar is opening up and welcomes foreign investments. The Chinese often play a go-between role. There has been a relaxation toward the Chinese minority. The Chinese language is tolerated and Chinese-language classes are allowed to operate.

Relations between Myanmar and China have also improved. Since 2002 China has sent Chinese teachers to teach the Chinese language to Burmese as well as ethnic Chinese. Students have also been allowed to go overseas to receive education. Under international pressures, the military government gave in to a certain extent and a military supported civilian government emerged at the end of 2010. A more liberal policy toward the Chinese minority is expected to follow.

The Philippines

The number of ethnic Chinese in the Philippines has been estimated at 1 million or 1.1% of the total Philippine population (Cui 2010: 23). When the Philippines attained independence in 1946, the government began introducing a series of nationalization regulations aimed at reducing the economic strength of the Chinese, similar to the situation in Indonesia. These included "Nationalization of the Public Markets, Retail Trade Nationalization Act, and Nationalization of Rice and Corn Industries" (Tan, A. 1988: 183). In the 1950s and 1960s, more nationalization laws were promulgated covering almost every sector of the economy.[13] In 1961, there was the so-called "Filipino First" Policy which gave priority to the "natural-born" Filipino citizens, not the naturalized citizens, in various economic activities. Some argue that after several decades, the economic strength of the Chinese has become considerably weakened.

Initially, the Philippine government did not encourage the China-born Chinese to be naturalized.[14] However, many Philippine-born Chinese, particularly children of Chinese Filipino parents, or Chinese mestizos, easily became Philippine citizens. These Chinese are often assimilated into the Philippine society. However, prior to 1975, Chinese immigrants had difficulties in obtaining Philippine citizenship, and as a result, there was a large number of alien Chinese. It was only later that Ferdinand Marcos promulgated naturalization regulations to liberalize the acquisition of Philippine citizenship with a view to establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC. Consequently many alien Chinese were able to become citizens (Suryadinata 1985: 107).

National education has also been used to assimilate the Chinese. Since 1976, all Chinese schools in the Philippines have been "Filipinized," and the Philippine National Language (based on Tagalog) became the medium of instruction. Chinese is allowed to be taught but the time of instruction is reduced from 18 to 10 periods per week. All schools have to be administered by Philippine citizens (Tan, A. 1988: 189–90; Wang 1990: 8; Li 1991: 20–1).

However, unlike Soeharto's Indonesia, the Philippine nation is defined in cultural rather than racial terms. A Chinese mestizo is considered to be a Filipino. For instance, President Corazon

Aquino and Manila Bishop, Cardinal Sin, are Filipinos of mixed Chinese descent. Mrs. Aquino's maiden name was Cojuangco, which was derived from the surname Co (Koh or Xu 许), while Sin is a Chinese surname, Xin (辛). A "full blooded Chinese" who identifies with the Philippine nation completely will also be considered a Filipino (Wickberg 1970; Tan, A. 1985). Local-born Chinese have changed their national identification and become *Tsinnoy* (i.e. Chinese Filipino), a term coined by an influential Filipino Chinese organization called Kaisa.

Nevertheless, many first generation immigrants have continued to identify themselves with the Chinese nation. Unlike in Indonesia, there are still 127 Filipinized Chinese schools with 50,000 students (Tan, A. 1988: 188). In addition, Manila still allows Chinese organizations and the Chinese press to operate. There are four Chinese daily newspapers in Manila, viz. *Shijie Ribao (World News), Lianhe Ribao (United Daily News)*. *Shangbao (Chinese Commercial News*) and *Feihua Ribao (Sino-Filipino Daily*) (Cui 2002: 226–34).

In recent decades, a fair number of Chinese new migrants have arrived in the Philippines, giving rise to some ethnic tension between the Filipino Chinese and the new migrants. The arrival of the new migrants who are culturally different from the locals has posed a problem to the integration of Chinese Filipinos (Ang See 2009). However, Filipino nationalism is still on the rise, and the non-racial concept of a Filipino nation is easier to be accepted by the Chinese. It appears that the Chinese in the Philippines will continue to be integrated into local society.

Thailand

Thai Chinese are estimated to be around 7 million, constituting about 10.4% of the Thai population (Pan 2006: 218; Cui 2010: 23). Thailand has also followed an assimilation policy. The assimilation rate of the Chinese in Thailand has been high. An American scholar pointed out that in Thailand it was difficult to find a fourth-generation Chinese. In other words, the Chinese have disappeared after three generations (Skinner 1960: 86).

In the past, Chinese primary and secondary schools were allowed to operate in Thailand and many new migrants continued to send their children to Chinese schools, so that they would be able to retain their Chinese culture and identity. However, since the October 1976 coup, Chinese secondary schools have been closed down, and Chinese primary education has been shortened from six to four years. The number of hours allocated to teaching Chinese was also reduced from 20 to five per week (Li 1991: 20–1; Chang 1990: 10). Although there were Chinese who went to these schools, the majority received Thai national education. Those who read and write Chinese have shrunk in number.

The Thai government has long used the *jus soli* principle for its citizenship law. All persons born in Thailand are automatically Thai in nationality. They have to adopt Thai names and receive Thai education. As Buddhism is a Thai state religion, and Buddhism is a main part of the traditional system of Chinese beliefs, the Chinese have understandably integrated into Thai society rather easily. As a matter of fact, many Thai leaders such as Thanat Khoman (former foreign minister), Boonchoo Rojanasathien (former Deputy Prime Minister), Chuan Leek Pai (former Prime Minister) and Thaksin are Thai nationals of Chinese descent. Similar to the Philippines, there are six Chinese language newspapers in Thailand (viz. *Shijie Ribao* [The Universal Daily News], *Zhonghua Ribao* [Tong Hoa Daily News], *Jinghua Zhongyuan Lianhe Bao* [Kia Hua Tong Nguan "Daily News"], *Xin Zhong Yuan Bao* [The New Chinese Daily News], *Xinxian Ribao* [Sing Sian Yit Pao Daily News] and *Yazhou Ribao* [Asia News Time]) (Cui 2002: 169–225). Chinese associations are still in existence. In the past, the Thai-zation of the local-born Chinese was rapid, and only those who were first generation migrants could still retain their "pure" Chinese identity. Nevertheless, with globalization and the rise of China, together

with the influx of illegal Chinese migrants, the integration of the Chinese in Thai society has been affected.

Malaysia

There are about 6.2 million Chinese (2010) in Malaysia who constitute approximately 22% of the total population (Tey 2007: 311). Malaysia's government policy toward the Chinese differs from the seven ASEAN countries discussed above. It has introduced the so-called "accommodation policy" in response to the large size of the Chinese population in Malaysia. The constitution guarantees the right of each racial (ethnic) group to use its own language and retain its culture. Both Chinese and Indians have long operated their own schools. However, in 1961, the Education Act stipulated that only non-Malay primary schools were entitled to receive government subsidies. Non-Malay secondary schools were required to be converted into national type secondary schools (i.e. using English as their medium of instruction) if they wanted to qualify as recipients of government subsidies (Chen 1987: 56–7; Tan, L.E. 1988: 61–74).

In 1961, there were 70 Chinese secondary schools in Malaysia, of which 54 accepted the Education Act. The rest (16) refused and became the so-called independent schools (*Duli Zhongxue or Duzhong*). After the 1969 racial riots, the government decided that all national type schools should use Malay as the medium of instruction. Primary schools using the mother-tongue as the medium of instruction could still operate but the students were expected to have a good command of Malay. Malay is the national language of Malaysia. Since 1969, it has become the most important medium of instruction in schools. However, the so-called independent schools did not disappear. In 1983, there were 37 independent schools in Peninsular Malaysia with 36,623 students, constituting 12% of the Chinese secondary students (Tan, L.E. 1988: 66). In other words, the majority of Chinese secondary students were in Malay-medium schools, and they were being influenced by Malay culture. At the same time, the number of Chinese studying at *Duzhong* continued to increase. By 1996, there were 59,773 students studying in 60 independent schools (Tan, L.E. 2000: 228).

It should be noted that a large number of the Chinese children continue to receive their primary education in Chinese schools. Besides, the Chinese-educated are still zealous in safeguarding their language and culture. Apart from Chinese schools, Chinese newspapers based in peninsular Malaysia such as *Xingzhou Ribao* (*Sin Chew Jit Poh*), *Nanyang Shangbao* (*Nanyang Siang Pao*) and *Guanghua Ribao* still have wide circulations. While in East Malaysia, there are also more than 10 regional Chinese newspapers which have wide readership (Cui 2002: 50–118). Various Chinese associations are also very active. The presence of these Chinese cultural pillars enables Malaysian Chinese to continue to maintain Chinese culture and identity. This is strengthened by the presence of a political parties system which is based on race. (For instance, United Malays National organization (UMNO) is a Malay party, Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) is a Chinese party and Indian Congress Party (ICP) is an Indian party.) However, it should be noted that Malaysia is a Malay-dominated country, therefore, the development of Chinese culture in Malaysia is not without its limitations.

It is also worth noting that the percentage of the Chinese in Malaysia in general and Peninsular Malaysia in particular has been on the decline. In 1970, the percentage of the Chinese in Peninsular Malaysia was 35.4%, in 1980 it was 33.8%, and in 1985 it was 32.8% (Oo 1991: 117). In Malaysia as a whole, there is also a similar trend. In 1970, the Chinese constituted 34% of the total population, in 1980 they formed 32%, and in 1985 they constituted only 31% (Oo 1991: 117). In 1984 Prime Minister Mahathir announced a new population policy which aimed at achieving 70 million by the year 2020 (Suryadinata 2009: 71). Although the policy was

linked to industrialization, many Chinese leaders believe that under this policy the number of the Malays will increase rapidly. This in turn will affect the ethnic composition in the country. The MCA projected that by the year 2020, the Chinese in Peninsular Malaysia would only form between 13.1% and 23.7% of the total population (Chua 1988: 106–7). The decline of the Chinese percentage in the Malaysian population will have a profound impact on Malaysian politics and Chinese society in the country.

Brunei

Brunei Darussalam is also a Malay state, and its Chinese (42,700) constituted only 11.1% of the total population (*Brunei Darussalam Key Indicators* 2006). In the early years of its independence, Brunei's policy toward the Chinese was quite similar to that of Malaysia.

When Brunei became independent in 1984, only 19.4% of the Chinese were Bruneian citizens (Brunei Darussalam 1986: 45). To become a citizen, a Chinese is required to have lived in Brunei for at least 20 years, to live like a Bruneian, and to pass the Malay language examination. Many observers have noted that the Malay language examination is very difficult, and as a result, many Chinese were unable to obtain Bruneian citizenship.

Like many Chinese in the other Southeast Asian states, the Chinese in Brunei are also actively engaged in trade and business. The Brunei Chinese Chamber of Commerce is the most important association in the Chinese community. When Brunei was still a British Protectorate, the Chinese were allowed to have schools. After independence, Chinese schools were still allowed; however, Malay had to be taught as one of the subjects. There were eight privately run Chinese schools in Brunei: five primary schools and three secondary schools (Cui 2010: 230). From 1992 all private schools had to adopt a bilingual policy. However, in reality, these private schools are tri-lingual schools. The Malay language and the Chinese language are taught in Malay and Chinese respectively, but all other subjects are taught in English, so that the private school graduates can sit for the Cambridge and A-level examinations. These schools are Chinese in the sense that they are run by Chinese, financed by the Chinese communities, the Chinese language is taught as a subject and the majority of the students are ethnic Chinese. Nevertheless, there are also some Malay students who attend these schools. In 2007, for instance, there were 612 Malay students in these Chinese schools, constituting 18% of the student population (Cui 2010: 230).

Prior to independence, some Chinese had begun to migrate, Canada being a favorite destination. However, since the middle of the 1980s, Australia has welcomed Chinese investment, and many rich Bruneian Chinese have also migrated to Australia (Brunei Darussalam 1989: 2). But, the majority of Bruneian Chinese have nowhere to go. They have to continue to adjust and adapt to the changing situation in order to survive and, hopefully, prosper.

Singapore

Unlike other Southeast Asian states, Singapore is an ethnic Chinese-dominated state as the 2,794,000 Chinese constitute 74.1% of the total population. (Singapore 2010). Since self-governing in 1959, Singapore introduced a policy of cultural pluralism. After independence in 1965, this policy was retained. As the "indigenous" population (that is, Malay) forms a minority, it is unrealistic to expect the Chinese to be assimilated into the Malay minority; neither would it be wise for the Malays to be assimilated into the Chinese majority as Singapore is located in the so-called Malay Sea. Therefore, cultural pluralism has become the policy of independent Singapore. The government encourages each racial group to retain its religion, customs and language.

Singapore has four official languages (English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil), but English is the language of administration. When Singapore attained a self-governing status, English and Malay had been stressed because it wanted to merge with Malaya. After leaving Malaysia, however, the government introduced "an English and a Mother-tongue policy." The Chinese emphasized English and Chinese. For a long period of time, English and Chinese schools existed side-by-side. But in the 1980s more and more parents sent their children to English schools resulting in the closure of all Chinese-medium schools.

In the late 1980s, the government felt that Singaporeans were too "Westernized" and losing their Asian values. It began to stress the study of the mother tongues in the hope of salvaging "Asian values." The government also launched the "Speak Mandarin" campaign among the Chinese (Tan, E. 2004). Confucian ethics was also incorporated as one of the subjects in the school curriculum. The purpose was to make Chinese children identify with Chinese culture. The government also revitalized Chinese clan associations which had been on the decline. Although the number of Chinese newspapers has been reduced, circulation figures are still high (Cui 2002). The television and radio programs in Chinese have also been increased noticeably.

The "Speak Mandarin" campaign and the promotion of Asian (read: Chinese) culture irritated some neighboring states. However, the Singapore government believes that promoting Chinese language and culture is the domestic affair of Singapore; other countries should not interfere. Also, language and political loyalty should not be seen as one.

The rise of China as an economic power has also induced the Singapore government to encourage Chinese Singaporeans to be bilingual. Nevertheless, the promotion of Chinese has not been at the expense of the English language. Singapore uses English as the medium of instruction. Nevertheless, because of the large size of the Chinese population and the continuing mother tongue policy, it seems a high degree of Chineseness will be prevalent in Singapore society.

Conclusion

Based on the above description and analysis, we come to the following conclusion. There are at least six types of government policy toward the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: assimilation, acculturation, accommodation, expulsion, genocide and cultural pluralism. A government may introduce different policies during different periods, depending on the political system of the country concerned. For instance, Indonesia adopted a pluralist approach during the period of liberal democracy but an expulsion policy during the early Sukarno period. During the Soeharto era, a total assimilation policy was introduced, but a short-lived expulsion policy was also resorted to. The assimilation policy together with the expulsion policy was also used in Vietnam after the Unification. Thailand, on the other hand, has continued to use an assimilation/acculturation policy. Such a policy was also introduced during the Marcos era in the Philippines.

The countries in Southeast Asia generally still allow the existence of some of the Chinese cultural pillars, such as the Chinese newspapers and Chinese associations in Thailand and the Philippines. The more rigid form of assimilation policy was perhaps introduced by Soeharto when he eradicated the three pillars of Chinese culture, including the prohibition of displaying Chinese characters. The extreme form of the assimilation policy (or eradication of ethnic differences) was introduced in Cambodia during the Pol Pot rule and the first five years of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. A policy of genocide was implemented to eliminate the local Chinese who were considered as the "enemies of the people."

The rate of Chinese assimilation in Thailand and Philippines is the highest. This may be due to the prevalence of different concepts of the nation (or ethnic identity). In Thailand and the Philippines, "nation" has been defined more in cultural rather than racial terms. In addition, the

two countries are dominated by Buddhists and Christians respectively. It appears that Buddhism and Christianity are more easily accepted by the Chinese, while Islam often emerges as an obstacle to the assimilation of the ethnic Chinese in the local communities. Nevertheless, if the two countries no longer accept massive Chinese migration, local Chinese will be further "indigenized."

The accommodation policy has been adopted by Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. Nevertheless, some argue that their accommodation policy often has an aspect of acculturation. These two countries have a large Chinese population and both are Muslim countries. Because of the large size of the Chinese community, Malaysia, and to a lesser extent, Brunei, allow the existence of Chinese religions and culture, but require the Chinese to learn Malay. It is also plausible that the two governments want the Chinese to identify themselves with the Malay language policy and Malay values. However, Malaysia and Brunei have not adopted identical policies. Malaysia has been more liberal because of the presence of Chinese political and economic influence. There is a guarantee in the constitution on the cultural rights of the Chinese; Chinese schools so far have been allowed to operate. Brunei, however, appears to be more restrictive, Chinese schools have been transformed into trilingual schools emphasizing Malay and English. It seems that in the long run, Chinese society in Malaysia will be more Chinese than that in Brunei. Nevertheless, because of strong Malay nationalism in both countries, the "Malaysianization" and "Bruneianization" of Chinese communities appear to be unavoidable.

The policy of cultural pluralism has always been adopted by Singapore but not by Indonesia. Indonesia adopted such a policy only soon after independence and re-adopted it after the fall of Soeharto. However, the cultural pluralism introduced in post-Soeharto Indonesia is different from that of Singapore due to different histories and ethnic compositions. Being a Chinese-dominated state in the Malay Archipelago, Singapore has introduced cultural pluralism since it achieved self-government. The language policy has developed in accordance with the changing political situation; but English as the language of administration/communication for various ethnic groups has been maintained. A bilingual policy has been emphasized in recent years to enable various ethnic groups to retain their cultural traditions. The Chinese in Indonesia form a minority and have been subjected to nation-building pressures for a long period of time. Despite the pluralist policy after the fall of Soeharto, the integration of the Chinese is still expected by the majority of the indigenous population. Nevertheless, the onset of globalization and the rise of China as an economic and political power have impacted Southeast Asian government policies. No matter what the policy the government of Southeast Asia has introduced, it seems that the arrival of Chinese new migrants (legal or illegal) is often seen as posing a challenge to the nation-building process of Southeast Asian Chinese.

Notes

⋆ This article is a completely revised version of my published conference paper from 17 years ago. I have not only updated my information but also added "political system" as a new independent variable in discussing the formulation of government policy toward ethnic Chinese. Besides, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar are included as additional examples. My original paper was entitled "Government policies toward the ethnic Chinese in the ASEAN States: a comparative analysis," in Ang See and Go (1994: 67–80).

1 In fact, there is another Chinese cultural pillar, "Chinese religions." However, this has been mentioned but not fully integrated into the arguments of this article.

2 The term "assimilation" here refers to "a blending process whereby two distinct groups form a homogeneous entity." See Martin and Franklin (1973: 128). Donald L. Horowitz (1975: 115–16) identifies two types of assimilation, one is "amalgamation" defined as "two or more groups united to form a larger group"; the other is "incorporation" defined as "one group assumes that identity of another." In the case of many Southeast Asian states, "incorporation" is more often used than "amalgamation." With regard to expulsion policy, it is self-explanatory.

3 The term "accommodation" means that "the groups develop working arrangements while maintaining their distinct identities" (Martin and Franklin 1973: 130). However, I use this. term in a liberal way and do not exclude a certain degree of common national identity. In Southeast Asia, the accommodation is often accompanied with "linguistic assimilation" through the national language policy.
4 Acculturation refers to "the process of acquiring the culture of another ethnic group" (Shibutani and Kwan 1965: 470).
5 The term "cultural pluralism" is defined as the opposite of assimilation and acculturation. It encourages maintenance of one's different cultural identity. Many western writers argue that "there can be a permissive attitude toward cultural heterogeneity or even internal and external rewards for preserving ethnic identity" (Martin and Franklin 1973: 96–7).
6 On Indonesia's various policies toward the ethnic Chinese, see Suryadinata (2005: 103–48, 205–19).
7 In 1959, the Sukarno government of Indonesia promulgated the Presidential Decree prohibiting aliens (mainly Chinese) from engaging in retail trade in the rural areas. As a result, more than 100,000 Chinese left Indonesia. One can argue that this is a form of "expulsion" policy. However, the largest scale of departure took place between 1978 and 1979 from Vietnam. This was a result of various government policies. One can also argue that this too is an "expulsion" policy.
8 For the number of the alien Chinese, see *Kompas,* 9 October 1990, p. 1.
9 According to the 1971 census, about 0.8% of the Indonesians were Confucianists and 0.9% were Buddhists. However, the percentage of the Buddhists in the 2000 Indonesian population census was only 0.82%, while the percentage of the Confucianists was much less than 0.2%. For a detailed discussion on Buddism and the Confucian Religion in the last 50 years, see Liao (2010: 27–84).
10 For a discussion on the post-Soeharto situation, see Suryadinata (2008: 1–16).
11 This is the 1999 census figure, see Amer (2011).
12 See Cui (2010: 175). But Sean Sok Phay, a young Cambodian scholar, noted that there are only 150,000 Chinese in Cambodia. See Sean (2009).
13 These include "nationalization of abaca, lumber, copra the manufacture of automobile spare parts, remnants and textiles, gasoline and oil, coffee, the import and export business, poultry, sugar, tobacco, dried and salted fish, pigs, chickens, eggs, vegetables, the restaurant business and dairy industry" (Tan, A. 1988: 184).
14 In 1972, for instance, 150,000 out of 600,000 Chinese in the Philippines were China-Born. They were therefore aliens (Tan, A. 1988).

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18

Globalization and localization of the Chinese diaspora in the USA

Bernard P. Wong

Introduction

The Chinese overseas have been characterized as "essential outsiders" (Chirot and Reid 1997), "pariah entrepreneurs" (ibid.), and as residents "un-committal to host societies" (cf. Meisner 1999). With the advance of the modern global economy, some erroneously argued that the itinerants-transnationals, who commute frequently between the USA and other countries, "have become rootless and flexible citizens of ungrounded empires" (see Ong and Nonini 1996: 3–27). This chapter attempts to address these questions with data from fieldwork on US Chinese communities (Wong 1977, 1978, 1987), particularly, on the Chinese in Silicon Valley, California (Wong 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2006).

Historically, many ethnic groups' members were diasporants longing to return to their homeland after they had become successful. In the modern world, certain ethnic groups may do so depending on the countries in which they have been residing. It is imperative to appreciate the fact that there are spatial and temporal dimensions as well as class background and national differences. In the case of the Chinese in America, there have been sojourners, mostly in the past. Today, the majority of the Chinese Americans, including the new immigrants and the American-born Chinese, want to establish roots in the USA. Although among them there are transnationals who have to commute internationally due to the global economy, they are, like the majority of the new immigrant and local-born Chinese, generally followers of the "*luodi shenggen*" (establishing root) strategy. In the analysis of identity and commitment of the overseas Chinese, a number of scholars (Wang Gungwu 1994; McKeon 2001; Wong 2006) have pointed out that the overseas Chinese need to be studied in their respective national environment. The nature of the host society and its ethnic policy, social and economic opportunity can influence tremendously the sense of commitment and the speed of integration of its ethnic group into the host society (Wong 1978).

Further, I would like to point out that there is also an internal difference among the Chinese Americans in terms of cultural identity. There is a spectrum of ethnic identity among the Chinese. Some call themselves "real Chinese." Some are in favor of having a hybrid identity; they may assume the identity of Chinese-American, Asian American, Taiwan-American or Hong Kong American (Wong 2006). Thus, the identities taken could range from hybridity to essentialized

identity. This chapter, while appreciating these differences, concentrates mainly on the issue of globalization and localization. It seeks to elucidate the reciprocal relationship between how these two processes influence each other: how the "global" affects the "local" and vice versa.

Some scholars have suggested that globalization diminishes citizen attachment and participation in local and national institutions and will create a rootless society of transnationals who have severed their ties with family and nation states (Appadurai 1995, 1996; Hannerz 1990, 1993, 1996; Hannerz and Lofgen 1994) and become noncommittal flexible citizens (Jacobson 1996; Ong 1996, 1999; Ong and Nonini 1996; Soysal 1994). The present study will argue that this expectation is far from the truth. The data obtained from my research show that the Chinese in the USA have made extraordinary efforts in localization – grounding economically and politically in their receiving country. The process of establishing themselves locally includes the use of cultural and economic resources to find lucrative employment in the USA and overseas and to develop global and local entrepreneurship. They have achieved, as will be demonstrated in this paper, the bi-directional flows of capital, trade, and talents. Transnationalism through the use of social and economic resources in two or more countries is now commonplace. However, the use of these resources does not preclude civic engagement, participating in local politics and experimenting a form of cultural citizenship and incorporating oneself in one's local community. Further, global economic transactions require linkages between the transnational migrants with the host and home communities.

A brief historical background

China was not a country which supplied much immigration to the world until the nineteenth century. Strong feelings existed about the ancestral land and its cultural superiority and that anyone who left to live among foreigners was thought to be degrading himself (Morse 1918; Tien 1953; Hsu 1971). International migration from China started during the Qing dynasty in the 1800s. Paradoxically, under the Qing dynasty, stiff penalties were enacted for persons who left the country, yet some Chinese started to leave China in search of fortune. In fact, until 1894, any Chinese who left China were committing a capital offense (Morse 1918). For many years the Chinese government did not have any representatives overseas to protect the Chinese abroad. Therefore, any Chinese who went overseas did so at their own risk and had to rely on other Chinese immigrants for protection (MacNair 1925).

In addition to legal difficulties and emotional stress, there was the hardship of travel by junk boat or steamboat. Travelling conditions for the Chinese contract laborers were so bad that many Chinese laborers died on the way to their destinations. More than 200 laborers died on one such journey to Peru (Morse 1918; Tien 1953). Chinese who wanted to go abroad had to take this risk into consideration. Living in a strange land without knowing the language and customs was another serious problem.

Despite these hardships, many individuals decided to go abroad because they encountered far more serious and numerous problems in their homeland. Economic pressure was excessively strong (Cheng 1923; Wu 1958). Poverty and overpopulation were so great in nineteenth-century China that they need not be elaborated on here. The Taiping rebellion of 1840 had a devastating effect on China's economy (Cheng 1923; Tien 1953; Wu 1958). Losses resulting from war and natural calamities also ruined the livelihood of many. In the middle of this kind of economy many Chinese were forced to look elsewhere for their fortunes and therefore left their homeland.

Overseas opportunities were known to the Chinese in the nineteenth century, especially to those in the coastal regions of Fujian and Guangdong. The major areas to which the Chinese

migrated were the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the USA. Traditionally, Southeast Asia had been a favorite place for the Fujianese, Tiochiu, and the Hakka to migrate to (Tien 1953). Cantonese from Zhongshan and Nan Hai went to Latin America (Ho 1959, 1967) while Chinese from Siyi and Sanyi districts south of Canton came to the USA (Heyer 1953; Lee 1960; Wu 1958). People from the same locality of origin tended to cluster in the same overseas Chinese community. The reason for this was that the Chinese had a tendency to travel and sponsor friends and relatives who spoke the same dialect and who were from the same district in China. Once emigration began from a given location, it tended to continue. Since the people from the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian were the first to emigrate, they established the patterns and were the principal constituents of the traditional overseas Chinese communities.

From the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, the overseas Chinese communities were organized with social organization principles from their home communities in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. These principles included consanguineal kinship, clanship, and friendship, locality of origin, language or dialect similarities. These principles were the bases of the social structure of the Chinese diaspora communities around the world. Family name or clan associations, friendship networks, regional and local association, dialect associations, and political parties oriented to the old countries were visible in many overseas Chinese communities. Additionally, in each overseas Chinese community, there was an overall Chinese community association like Consolidated Chinese Benevolent Association or Chinese Six Company. The overall community organization together with the various kinship, regional, dialect and friendship associations formed the visible social structure of the overseas Chinese communities. Within the rubrics of these associations, much of the social, cultural, political and even economic lives were conducted. As a result, there was certain predictable patterns of social organization among the Chinese diaspora. Ideologically, many of the traditional immigrants in the nineteenth century were culturally oriented to China. Migration to them was a practical solution to economic difficulties at home. They aspired to get rich and later went home to lead an elegant retirement (Lee 1960). With the wealth accumulated, they could purchase land, provide support to their families. In doing so, they could "glorify their ancestors and forebears" (Hsu 1971). Many of the old immigrants were thus sojourners and were not committed to the host countries. However, this situation was undergoing changes in the contemporary era: 1965 to the present day.

The early Chinese immigrants were recruited principally to work as laborers, miners and railroad builders in many colonies of the Western Powers. Today, the paths of the new immigrants deviate from those of the nineteenth century. The overseas Chinese now live in 135 countries of the world with a total population of 35 million in 1990 (Poston *et al.* 1992). Some 88% of them reside in Asia, 9% in the Americas, 2% in Europe, 1% in Oceania and less than 1% in Africa.

Outside of Asia, the following countries have large Chinese populations: Canada, Peru, USA and Australia. All of these have an annual growth of 9% and more. This growth, according to Poston *et al.* (1992) is not due to the natural growth of the local Chinese population. The increases of the overseas Chinese population are due principally to immigration.

The USA, Canada and Australia still attract Chinese immigrants for a number of reasons: (1) perceived political and economic stability; (2) the opportunity for education for their children; (3) the existence of established Chinese communities; (4) kinship and friendship connections; (5) the enticement of visa allocation for the skilled and educated immigrants; and (6) the availability of investment visas. In terms of investment visas, the USA is the most expensive, requiring an investment of $1million US dollars or more. Canada and Australia require only about $180,000, which some Chinese can afford. As a result there are more new Chinese immigrants who have gone to these places with investment visas. In the USA a majority of the Chinese immigrants

enter through family reunion preference. They came to join their relatives who have been in the USA. The new Chinese migration movement since 1965 has another face. In additional to a large number of family reunion visas holders, there is a surge in the number of H1B (temporary skilled and business) visa holders (Wong 2006). These are the high-tech, highly educated scientists and technical personnel. Some of them were foreign students from China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and from the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and South America. After their graduation in the USA, they stayed to work as high-tech workers. Some of the Chinese high-tech workers were recruited from Canada and England. Thus, the Chinese high-tech immigrants in the USA today are drawn from all over the world and some of them speak Spanish as their mother tongue. Some speak Chinese or English as their primary language.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, many Chinese communities became more open due to many factors (Wong 1977, 1986). Diminished discrimination of the larger society, the desire of the local Chinese to participate in the host societies and the encouragement of the motherland, especially, the People's Republic of China (PRC) to assimilate with the host society are some of the deciding factors. This phenomenon is found in different Chinese communities, such as in Kobe, Yokohama, Manila, Lima, New York City and San Francisco (Wong 1978, 1982, 1985, 1998a). They wanted to be permanent residents or citizens, made permanent plans to stay in and participate in the social, economic and political life and the resource distributions of the larger society. This process of localization is particularly obvious in the case of the Chinese in the USA since the enactment of the new immigration law of 1965. The 1965 Immigration Law abolished the "national origin" quotas and established a system of preferences. Immediate relatives, skilled and unskilled workers, refugees, scientists, and technical personnel were listed under different categories of preferences. For the first time the Chinese immigrants were treated equally with other nationalities by the administration, and thus ended some 83 years of biased immigration laws directed against the Chinese (Wong 1988a).

The Chinese diaspora in the USA

When did the Chinese first come to America? Some claim that they were here in the fourth century AD, long before Christopher Columbus (Fang 1980: 65). Others claim that the Chinese arrived a thousand yeas ago (de Guignes 1761). According to reliable historical records, the first large influx of Chinese immigrants to the USA dates from the 1850s (Wong 1982). The number of immigrants steadily increased over the years and peaked in 1890 with a population of 107,488. Discriminatory legislation, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the anti-Chinese Scott Act of 1888, and the Geary Act of 1892, were designed to prohibit the entry or re-entry of Chinese immigrant laborers, thus putting an end to any Chinese immigration. By 1920 there were only 61,639 Chinese in the USA. Racism and fear of economic competition from Chinese immigrants were the principal factors contributing to this discriminatory legislation. It was not until after the Second World War that Chinese immigration recommenced, although significant influxes did not appear until the passage of 1965 immigration legislation. By 1990 the Chinese population in the USA had grown to 1,645,472. The census data of 2000 indicates that there were 2.43 million Chinese Americans living in the USA (Wong 2001b). The US Census of 2010 indicates that the Chinese American population increased to 3.858 million.

In the 1850s, the Chinese settled on the West Coast where they found jobs as railroad workers, miners, farmers, and domestics. Upon completion of the Central Pacific Railway in 1869 and the closing of many mining companies, Chinese and the white laborers alike sought employment elsewhere in California. Economic competition with whites led to various anti-Chinese campaigns and the passage of discriminatory legislation in California as well as other parts of the

USA. One example of anti-Chinese legislation was the Sidewalk Ordinance of 1870, which outlawed the Chinese pole method of peddling vegetables and carrying laundry. The Chinese carried heavy loads balanced on a pole resting on their shoulders, with the pole as a fulcrum. The Sidewalk Ordinance was directed specifically against the Chinese since non-Chinese people used wagons or carts to peddle their goods. There were also ordinances prohibiting Chinese from working in federal, state, county, or city governments, and even barred from the fishing industry (Wong 2001b). Laws prohibited the education of Chinese children in the public schools and prohibited Chinese from testifying against white defendants in court.

The Chinese responded to these legislative acts and discriminatory sentiments by establishing businesses such as Chinese restaurants and laundries which were not directly competitive with white enterprises. They organized self-communities, interest groups and protective societies. Many moved to the major metropolitan areas of San Francisco, Los Angles, Chicago, Boston, and New York City, where they could attract a larger clientele for their ethnic businesses. As a result of this movement, Chinese enclaves known as "Chinatowns" developed. From the 1880s to 1965, the Chinese depended almost entirely on ethnic businesses for their survival. In these Chinatowns, they developed an ethnic economy that catered to both Chinese and non-Chinese customers. Their social organizations in the enclaves were the associations based on kinship, friendship, locality of origin, trade, dialects and political parties. Through these associations, the Chinese mediated their own disputes, promoted their own economic interest, and fought against discriminatory practices emanating from the larger society. By 1940 there were 28 Chinatowns in the USA. As discrimination against the Chinese diminished and they became more accepted by the larger society, Chinese were able to move out of Chinatowns and pursue other economic activities. By 1955 there were only 16 Chinatowns in the USA. With the influx of new immigrants after 1965, the already existing Chinatowns in the USA got a boost to their populations as new arrivals tended to move into preexisting Chinatowns.

After 1965, the passage of the new immigrations laws and the Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Act changed the social landscape of the Chinese in the USA. Many who came to the USA were educated immigrants who could obtain employment from the larger society. These highly skilled scientists, educators, engineers, accountants and the like constitute an important labor force, working as professionals in the establishments and business organizations of the larger society. They work also in the high-technology sectors in places like GE, NASA, IBM, CISCO, and Hewlett Packard.

Before 1965 many immigrants were merely "sojourners" who had no intention of staying in America permanently. After making enough money in America, they would return to their roots – China – to become entrepreneurs or lead blissful lives in retirement. They were temporary residents; they are called the sojourners by a number of specialists of the overseas Chinese (Siu 1952; Lee 1960).

Luodi shenggen: establishing roots

After 1965, the population characteristics of the Chinese in America changed. There were more educated Chinese among the newly arrived immigrants. Further, the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s changed America's racial attitudes toward the Chinese Americans. In general, there was more tolerance and acceptance of the Chinese in America than in the previous periods where anti-Chinese legislations and anti-Chinese feelings were abundant (Konvitz 1946; Wu 1958). Moreover, among the new immigrants, there were many different kinds of Chinese. It is a heterogeneous group. Some are born locally and others are new immigrants from different parts of China. Some depend on the ethnic businesses for their livelihood, others are highly successful.

Today, the Chinese Americans defy stereotypes labeling them as "refuse" of their society, "welfare recipients," "illiterates," "unsophisticated villagers," or "burdens of American society." Most are self-sufficient and resourceful. To a great extent, their economic success in America has been due to their ability to create their own opportunities or to exploit the existing opportunity of structure of their larger society with their own economic, educational and cultural resources (Wong 1998a, 1998b, 2001b). Today, roughly speaking, half of the Chinese working force still depends on the enclave business and another half work as professionals. While some of the old immigrants were mostly "sojourners" the new immigrants and the American born Chinese are interested in making America their permanent home. New immigrants' attitudes toward the USA are reflected in the phrase *luodi shenggen* – establishing roots. This ideology of establishing roots includes: (1) grounding in the host society with property, business, careers and other tangible assets, (2) participating politically in the receiving countries and (3) actively contributing to the host society.

Anju leye: establishing home and business

After 1965, most of the Chinese who came to the USA wanted to stay permanently. The first step in achieving their desire was to secure a job and to send their children to receive training or higher education oriented toward a career with a handsome income. Meanwhile, the first generation immigrants wanted to improve their livelihood by having a business and acquiring a home. *Anju leye*, which literally means "establishing home and business (or career)," is the aspiration of most of the new immigrants. One informant told me that to be successful and to be respected in America one must own a business:

> I worked for a number of years for a big company after I got my Ph.D. From working and living in America, I learned that I could teach in a university and publish a number of books. It would be a comfortable life for me. But this will not earn me much respect in society. I would be known among my colleagues and in the university circle. I will not be respected by my fellow men and American society. I notice that if you are a Ford, a Rockefeller or a successful entrepreneur, and if you have a business and contribute employment to the community, you will be somebody. Since I left China, I wanted to be successful in the USA, I decided that I need to start a company. After I have a successful business and contributed to society by producing a useful product, hiring employees and giving much to charity, I would be respected by the community.
>
> *(Personal interview)*

Another Chinese immigrant businessman echoed this sentiment. He said that having a successful company that provided others with employment would earn him respect in American society. He said he started first as an engineer, and then later became an entrepreneur. With his financial success, he was able to contribute much to the community. Thus, entrepreneurship has helped him to establish a position in the community. He is completely rooted in America. For immigrants, one's business is thus a means to establish roots. This desire to make their host country their permanent home is common among the new immigrants, whether or not they are connected to the traditional ethnic enclaves or the new economy in places like Silicon Valley, Monterey Park or other American suburbs. Contrary to the popular perception that the Chinese are foreigners who are not committed to their host country, I found that many of the Chinese are firmly grounded in the USA. In major metropolitan areas with large Chinese populations, there are Chinese Americans who participate in the federal, state and city governments. One of the main reasons for their political participation is the Chinese presence in American life. Through

the political process, these Chinese Americans seek to become full-fledged members of American society. Today, there are Chinese American Congressmen, governors (on state level), mayors and city council members. In the San Francisco Bay Area, many of the towns were headed by Chinese Americans.

Of the 100 entrepreneurs for whom I have biographical data, most are seriously interested in community affairs. Many are highly dedicated to community activities and civic and local affairs. For instance, Leonard Liu is California Motion Pictures Commissioner, David Lee was a regent of the University of California system, and Stanley Wang was a member of the Board of Trustees of the California State University system. Presently (2001) Leslie Tang serves on the Board of the UC Regents while Kenneth Fong and Hsing Kung serve on the Board of Trustees of the California State University System. Some Chinese are activists who participate in American politics through community involvement by running for political office or by supporting other Asian politicians and politicians who are sympathetic to Chinese American or Asian American concerns. When I interviewed them about their commitment, the majority told me that they wanted to establish roots in America. Their professed ideology is *luodi shenggen* (establishing roots). Some even said, "If we don't stay in America, where shall we go?" or "We have lived in this country for such a long time. We work here and our children were born here. Our work is here and our family is here. Whether we like it or not, we are going to stay permanently in this country."

Occasionally, there are other voices, **"**Taiwan is very similar to the United States now. Whatever we have in the United States, Taiwan has also. The differences between the two are becoming less and less. I may go back to Taiwan to lead my life of retirement but it does not mean that I do not like America." Others said, "Even if I want to go back to Taiwan, my children may not want to live there permanently. They were born and raised here in America. This is their country. For this reason, I will stay here." Several informants did tell me that they would return to Taiwan to stay there for good. However, an overwhelming majority of the Taiwanese Chinese prefer to stay in the USA permanently.

The majority of the Hong Kong Chinese and mainland China Chinese immigrants whom I interviewed told me that they also wanted to stay in the USA permanently. Many applied for citizenship as soon as they qualified for it. An overwhelming majority of the Chinese have only one passport. As compared to Europeans from Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, France and Spain, the Chinese immigrants are the ones who want to be naturalized citizens as soon as they are allowed legally (Wong 2006). Among the Europeans whom I interviewed in Silicon Valley, they prefer to keep their original citizenships and are content with having their "green cards" (permanent residency). The Chinese are eager to be American citizens. Some of them even bring their newly acquired passports to show their friends in their offices. They are anxious to purchase homes in the USA. To this end, the new immigrants, especially those who are married, are concerned about accumulating enough money for the down payment on their future home. Many banks in various Chinese communities are familiar with the consumption patterns of Chinese Americans and have invented special banking products just for them such as savings accounts for college education. "Work" and "home" are two most important preoccupations of the Chinese Americans. After working for hours, these Chinese spend much of their free time on their homes, their families, and the education of their children. These are root-planting activities. In Chinese, one is said to be working to *anju leye* (comfortably settling in and establishing one's work).

Political participation and the civic activities of the Chinese

It is common knowledge that in order to fully participate in the larger society, ethnic groups need to have political representation. Knowing the importance of having elected officials to

fight for their interest, the Chinese in America have sought to participate in local and national politics through (1) registering Chinese voters, (2) competing for political office at all levels, city and county, and (3) forming coalitions with other ethnic groups so as to elect politicians who are sympathetic to their concerns. Participation in the political process is deemed to be vital for the protection of the Chinese ethnic group in the USA.

Globalization activities have not deterred the commitment of the Chinese to the USA. In San Jose, the registrar of Voter Registration Programs indicated that more and more Asians, including the Chinese, are voting. Former mayor Michael Chang of Cupertino explained that the Chinese are participating in local politics in increasing numbers. They normally start with school boards and move to city council elections. He stated that the Silicon Valley Chinese are sympathetic to Chinese candidates in general. They also encourage and support both local and national Chinese politicians. Many Chinese politicians from out-of-state come to do fundraising among the Chinese of Silicon Valley, including Gary Locke (during his run for governor of the state of Washington) and S.B. Wu (lieutenant governor of Delaware).

Chinese Americans are adamant in the fight for their rights. News about discrimination in business practices spreads quickly via e-mail in the valley. Racial slurs of white salesmen and other discriminatory practices are reported instantly. Supportive of the cause of Wen Ho Lee, many valley Chinese donated money for his legal defense.

The Wen Ho Lee incident

The experience of Dr. Wen Ho Lee touched many Chinese in Silicon Valley. They believed that he was wrongly accused as a spy and unfairly imprisoned. In a sense, his life echoes the lives of many Taiwanese Chinese. Wen Ho Lee was born in 1939 to a poor peasant family in Taiwan. He was one of ten children in the Lee family. When he graduated from middle school he was able to pass a competitive university exam and was admitted to Cheng Kung University. Upon completion, he came to the USA to study at Texas A&m. He got his MSc in 1965 and his Ph.D. in physics in 1969.

Wen Ho Lee has two grown children, one a software engineer and the other a computer technician (Wong 2006: 217). In December of 1999 he was accused by the US government of being a spy. Then in September of 2000 he was cleared of 59 charges derived from that accusation, and he pleaded guilty to a lesser felony count of "knowingly violating security rules in downloading classified nuclear data" (Sanders 2000). Downloading data to work at home is a common practice many engineers did, while other white colleagues, including the director of his lab, did this frequently not one of them was ever sanctioned or accused of being a spy.

The high-tech Chinese are familiar with the case of Wen Ho Lee. Many feel that Dr Lee was targeted due to his race. Some Chinese were disappointed, and others angry with Dr Lee's decision to accept the plea-bargain deal because they did not think he was guilty of any of the allegations of espionage that cost him his job and caused him the pain and suffering he had to endure. Because of the Wen Ho Lee case, some American politicians demanded close scrutiny of ethnic Chinese businesses in the scientific community and tighter controls of US high-tech transfers and export. Some of the Chinese believe that these politicians were unfairly stirring up hatred against Chinese American high-tech personnel and their businesses. Their beliefs were a result of the conviction Chinese Americans feel that American society has a habit of distrusting and treating the Chinese as scapegoats since the California Gold Rush in the 1840s. Today in the popular press in America, the stereotype that Chinese cannot be loyal citizens is still being perpetuated. To combat this unfair depiction, as will be demonstrated later, many Chinese Americans in Silicon Valley are determined to correct this image through their political and civil participation in the USA.

From the perspective of Chinese Americans as well as some insiders at the Alamos Lab where Wen Ho Lee worked, there was a clear racial aspect to the case. Were Dr Lee not a Chinese American, many Chinese argued that he would not have been singled out for investigation. They wonder why their heritage is a liability and they ask why this was a case of racial profiling. Many of the Chinese have served the USA and fought for it. Yet, they felt they were being singled out for unusual and unfair treatment (Kim 2001). Despite such fears, some Silicon Valley Chinese believe that the best way to fight racism is through coalition building with other ethnic groups, and in this way to change the system by participating in it. They feel that more Chinese Americans must participate in the political system so as to give voice to the concerns and interests of the Chinese in America. Some, in fact, do run for electoral office and attempt to fight racism through the system.

Voter registration

The Chinese in the USA are gradually realizing the importance of participating in elections, and they have started to organize voter registration drives. Kansen Chu, a Taiwanese immigrant in San Jose, David Lee of the San Francisco based Chinese American Voters Education Committee, and Michael Chang, the former mayor of Cupertino, have made great efforts to register Asian voters.

In Santa Clara County, the heart of Silicon Valley, Asian Americans make up 23.4% of the county's population. However, not all of those eligible to vote have registered. Realizing the importance of voter registration, Kansen Chu and David Lee asked for help from the Chinese ethnic press, the *Sing Tao Daily* and the *World Journal*, which have a combined daily readership of 230,000. Apparently, their work was quite successful. For the March election of 2000 in Santa Clara, there were 23,244 registered Chinese voters who were immigrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China. Among registered Chinese voters, 11,050 voted, giving a participation rate of 47.5% (Wong 2006: 121–22).

Elections

Chinese immigrants in the USA have learned that they need to have elected officials who will represent their interests, and so many Chinese now run for political office. There were two Chinese candidates for the Cupertino Union School District in 1997 and both won. One was Julius Chiang who was a manger of two bank branches and a graduate with a bachelor's degree from the University of California, Berkeley. The other candidate was Ben Liao, a software engineer with Apple Computer, Taligent, and HP. He graduated with a master's in computer science from Texas A&M University. In 1999 Barry Chang, a civil engineer, was elected as a member of the Governing Board of Cupertino Union School District. Meanwhile in the Foothill/De Anza Community College District and the Fremont Union High School District, Chinese American candidates, Kathryn Ho, Hsing Kung, and Homer Tong have been active participants in school elections.

Formerly the mayor of Milpitas was Henry Manayan, a Filipino Chinese. Michael S. Chang, the former mayor of Cupertino City, is now a city council member. The current mayor of Cupertino is Gilbert Wong. For the Santa Clara election of 6 November 2001, there were six Chinese Americans running for various political offices. Brothers Paul Fong and Alan Fong ran for Foothill/De Anza Community College District and Orchard School District. Ben Liao and Pearl Cheng ran for the Cupertino School District. Patrick Kwok ran for the city council of Cupertino, and Wei Wong for the city council of Palo Alto (Wong 2006: 122). Patrick Kwok, Ben Liao, Pearl Cheng, and Alan Fong won their elections. In 2011, both the City of San Francisco

and the City of Oakland are headed by Chinese Americans. This is an indication of Chinese Americans' determination to win and to ground themselves in the valley community.

Coalitions

In order to make an impact on the larger society, the Chinese in the USA realize that it is important to build coalitions with other ethnic groups that have common interests and have had similar experiences in the USA. Coalition politics have proved to be successful in America. The Afro-Americans, the Rainbow coalition, La Raza, Hispanic American and other groups have all found that there is strength in numbers. For Chinese Americans, this means forming a united front with Vietnamese Americans, Filipino Americans, and Japanese Americans. (In official statistics, the Chinese and other ethnic groups are often lumped together as Asian Americans.) Some of the successful coalitions that have been formed with this in mind include (1) the Asian American Public Policy Institute of San Jose, (2) the Asian Americans for Community Involvement of San Jose, (3) the Asian Pacific American Consortium of San Jose, and (4) the Cross-Cultural Community Services Center of San Jose. Asian American coalitions also leads to an expansion of ethnic identity. Interviewing Chinese politicians in Silicon Valley, I learned that the Chinese American population alone is not large enough to assert any political influence but the Asian-American population, numerically, could have a considerable influence. They could form a sizeable voting block to fight for more citizenship rights and equality.

The Committee of 100

The Committee of 100 is a national nonpartisan organization composed of American citizens of Chinese descent. Members come from different walks of life but are generally successful citizens in the USA. The goal of the committee is to promote the interests of the Chinese in America by addressing important issues concerning the well-being of the Chinese community and issues affecting US–China relations.

The Committee of 100 has some famous and highly accomplished Chinese Americans. Its membership includes well-known cellist Yo Yo Ma, celebrated architect I.M. Pei, and Chancellor Chang-lin Tien of the University of California, Berkeley. Quite a few Chinese American entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley are also members, including David Lam, George Koo, and Milton Chang. The committee aims to eradicate prejudices against and obstacles to the advancement of the Chinese in America. It has undertaken tasks such as helping to clear the name of Dr Wen Ho Lee, and it has given awards to journalists who are helpful to the Chinese community. The Committee of 100 in its 2001 annual meeting presented a Headliner Journalism Award to CBS correspondent Mike Wallace for an objective presentation of the case of Wen Ho Lee on *Sixty Minutes* (Wong 2006: 219). The committee recognizes the achievements of Chinese Americans as well as other Asian Americans. The achievements of Norman Mineta (former Transportation Secretary), Elaine Chao (former Secretary of Labor), and Mike Honda (Congressman from California) have been recognized by the committee, as have the accomplishments of Chancellor Chang-lin Tien and Jerry Yang of Yahoo! The committee's work is an example of how Chinese Americans, including those in Silicon Valley, are anxious to establish roots in America.

The 80/20 of Silicon Valley

The 80/20 is a national, nonpartisan project devised by a group of concerned Chinese Americans. It was originally an attempt to create a block-vote among all Asian Americans in order to

influence the 2000 US presidential election. The organization hoped to unite 80% of all Asian Pacific American voters in the support of one presidential candidate. Such a block would be attractive to any politician, and it was hoped that the candidate who won the election with the support of this block would take an interest in the Asian community.

Many Chinese Americans are active in this organization. The 80/20, together with the Committee of 100, has sponsored the Flag Project, a movement to promote Asian Pacific American involvement in the patriotic flying of the flag on national holidays such as Memorial Day and Independence Day. The project is designed to show mainstream American society that the Chinese are also Americans. It is a tool used to inform the larger society that the Chinese are part of America and that they are just as loyal as other Americans (Wong 2006).

Civic duties and voluntarism

Chinese Americans, especially those from affluent neighborhoods realize the importance of contributing to the community and participating in civic activities. On 28 October 2001, in Sunnyvale's Chinese Cultural Center, a seminar focused on Chinese voluntarism. Seminar participants all agreed that it was meaningful and valuable to do voluntary civic work. In fact, the Taiwan-based Buddhist Compassion Relief Tsu-chi Foundation has shown the value and meaning of such civic involvement by being active in voluntary work. A spokesperson explained the foundation's position:

> Our master reminds us quite frequently that we are newcomers to this country. We have gotten a lot from this society and we should therefore give back to this society. Since we want to establish roots in America, we have to contribute our talents and our resources. The service of Tzu-chi transcends politics, religion and ethnicity. We want to be part of the mainstream society and want to help the mainstream society and their problems.
>
> *(Wong 2006: 123–4)*

Chinese immigrants in Silicon Valley also believe that there are other benefits for the Chinese community in their voluntary work. These include the elevation of the status of the Chinese community. Charitable work is an important tool for community or public relations. When the seminar on voluntarism was offered, the attendance was good with more than 100 people from the Chinese community present. They were eager to find out what they could do to help the less fortunate among themselves and in the larger society.

Social interactions and paying back the community

The Chinese in America are concerned about paying back to their community. As a further example of this concern, the Chinese in Cupertino, including Councilman Patrick Kwok, Councilman Michael Chang, Barry Chang of Cupertino Union School District, and other elected officials, decided to organize a Chinese buffet at Quinland Community Center to entertain the low-income and senior citizens of the community. Some cynics argued that paying back to the community is not the real motive, but rather a strategy to convert their economic capital to social capital – to earn "respectability" and social prestige. Some may have this motive. However, analyzing the backgrounds of the public service people, one could quickly find out that most of the volunteers, donors of social services and community activists are committed to help their fellow citizens. Some feel that they have gained a lot from their community and want to pay back their community.

Chinese Americans are learning how to organize voluntary services to help the less fortunate in the community. Chinese American students in local high schools are also looking for opportunities to help others by participating in peer tutoring and other community service projects. There were many fundraising activities to raise money to support the victims of the 9/11 incident. Thus, civic engagement is highly visible in this community.

Multiple passport holders and "flexible citizenship"

It is a myth that many Chinese immigrants are multiple passport holders. From my fieldwork, I found that a majority of Chinese immigrants do not have two passports, except for the very rich from Southeast Asia and Taiwan. Some extremely successful entrepreneurs from Hong Kong may have British and American passports and some wealthy Chinese from Taiwan may have dual citizenship. Some Chinese criminals who engage in illegal activities like trafficking human beings (snake heads) and drug dealing have also multiple passports. However, a vast of majority of the Chinese simply could not be citizens of two or more countries. First, the law in China does not allow dual citizenship. When someone becomes a US citizen, one has to give up the Chinese citizenship. Although the Nationality Law of the Republic of China allows dual citizenship, elected government officials have to renounce their foreign citizenship (Wong 2006). In the case of the Hong Kong Chinese, a vast majority of them do not have the means to become naturalized citizens of the UK. It is safe for me to say that 99% of the Chinese in America are not multiple passport holders.

On the contrary, the Chinese immigrants in the USA are anxious to get their "green cards" or citizenship. As soon as they have earned their "green cards", they will try to get naturalized as quickly as possible. This practice differs from European immigrants, as mentioned earlier. Why do the Chinese immigrants in the USA want so desperately to become citizens? From my fieldwork, I learned that once the Chinese make up their mind to become immigrants, they want to be part of the UAS and do not want to be treated as "foreigners." Second, the USA is one of the most desirable countries for them to settle in. Educational opportunity and political stability are some of the reasons why they choose this country. Further, the current laws require that only citizens can receive social benefits in the USA. Moreover, the current policies in PRC encourage the Chinese Americans to assimilate into the receiving country and in fact, give special treatment to Chinese with American citizenship in investment, travel and employment in China (Wong 2006). Finally, American citizens will earn more social and political benefits capital. One can vote and seek help from government offices and one can run for political offices.

Data from my fieldwork in the USA indicates that they want to retain Chinese culture and at the same time participate in the US society as citizens with the human and civil rights as citizens. They want to be free of being scapegoated as spies and they want to be free from discrimination in hiring, promotion, education, housing and other aspects of social life. In a word, they want to be treated as other citizens in America (Wong 2006). At the same time, there is an indication that the Chinese from different regions of China want to maintain their local cultures. Expressions like *tai meiren* (Taiwan American) and *meiji huaren* (American Citizens with Chinese Descent) are being used to indicate their cultural differences. Other regional cultural affiliations are being used to distinguish themselves such as Hong Kong Chinese, Shanghai Chinese, Beijing Chinese. Even in community events or festivals in Silicon Valley, Cinco De Mayo, Chinese New Year Celebrations and other festivities may have Chinese American citizens who feature their local cultures: Beijing style Lion Dancers, Hong Kong styled music (western rock music sung in Cantonese), Taiwan styled boy scouts (with Taiwan insignia and American flags). What is happening is the making of cultural citizenship. Members are citizens of the USA and members

of their respective cultures. Increasingly there is the teaching of local dialects such as Fujianese, Hakka and Cantonese in many of the Saturday Chinese schools. The attendees are the second generation Chinese in the USA. They are enculturated into their ancestral (regional) cultures. This form of multicultural citizenship is a new phenomenon, even in Silicon Valley. Traditionally, to be an American was to be "anglicized American." Today the trend is to be a multicultural citizen. In the local Chinese press, phrases like "Taiwan American," "Chinese American," and "Hong Kong American" are being used to depict the different ethnic identity of the American citizens of Chinese decent. To what extent this is the trend among other ethnic groups needs more data to make any conclusive statement.

Globalization and Americanization

The occupations of the Chinese Americans has undergone a drastic change since 1965. Before then, many depended on the ethnic enterprises such as Chinese restaurants, laundry, garment factories, gift shops, and grocery stores. After 1965, with the infusion of the highly educated new Chinese immigrants and the coming of age of the local born Chinese, more than 50% of the Chinese labor force in the USA are highly educated professionals employed in high-tech industries, education institutions, medical facilities and scientific fields.

Chinese professionals tend to be better trained than professionals in other ethnic groups. US census statistics indicate that there are more Chinese with advanced degrees than other groups. However, they are not free from discrimination. A number of Chinese professionals have experienced barriers that hinder them from advancing in their chosen field. Chinese have to excel simply to get employed, and employment does not guarantee success or promotion. Many complain that they are paid less than white Americans doing comparable jobs. Many also experience difficulty in receiving promotions. The "glass ceiling" is frequently cited by Chinese as an obstacle preventing them from advancing to higher levels within their companies.

Some Chinese professionals feel that because of the subtle level of prejudice present in the USA, their opportunities will be limited if they work in companies run by non-Chinese. As a result, some professionals prefer to start businesses of their own. In Silicon Valley alone, there are about 2,300 Chinese run high-tech companies. Some new immigrants find opportunities overseas in China, Taiwan, South Africa, and Latin America. Instead of confining themselves to one location, they conduct their businesses on a global scale. Many believe their children will have a better chance of getting into universities in the USA than in Taiwan or Hong Kong. This practice of leaving children behind in the USA and flying back and forth for professional opportunities has become a noticeable trend. Some call these global businessmen/workers "astronauts" because they spend much time flying. This trend to commute to Asia to seek better employment and quick riches is a reversal of the traditional immigration pattern. In the past among Chinese, it was the man who went overseas and the wife who remained at home in China. Now, it is the man who returns to Asia and the wife who remains in the USA.

Some members of the Chinese community in the USA, especially those who are from Silicon Valley and those engaged in the high-tech industry, have become transnational workers or businessmen participating intensively in the global economy. To begin with, the Chinese in the USA are immigrants from different parts of the world – Taiwan, Hong Kong, the PRC, Southeast Asia, Europe, Canada and South America (Wong 2006). By far, Taiwan and mainland China are the two main sources of Chinese immigrants. Many of these immigrants are transnational workers who straddle two or more cultures. Many of the high tech engineers or technicians who work in the high tech industries are employees. Some are entrepreneurs who have started companies in the USA with branches in Taiwan or China. For those who are

employees, it is customary for them to commute to different parts of the world as trouble-shooters to solve problems of their companies in various areas of their operation, from technology, investment, sales, production, and personnel management to research. Their cultural connections with one or more localities in the world facilitate not only economic activities but also the establishment of their roots in a country where they choose to settle.

In fact, most of these international itinerants are concerned with establishing roots in the USA. These new immigrants attempt to achieve their "American Dream" via participating in the global economy. Their return trips to Asia are vehicles for them to generate wealth to establish them in the USA. The multifaceted aspects of the existence of these transnational migrants show that it is difficult to have a monolithic categorization of these globe trotters simply as transnationals (Basch *et al.* 1994) or flexible citizens (Ong 1999). The Chinese community in the USA shows that one can be a transnational and at the same time a committed citizen with a cultural heritage. They are experimenting a form of "multicultural citizenship" (Rosaldo 1989) with feet in two cultures but citizenship rooted in one national state (Wong 2006). Some argue that transnationalism existed in the nineteenth century. However, the extent of transnationalism among the old overseas Chinese is not as common as today. Further, many of the old settlers before 1965 had the intention of returning home to stay there permanently. They committed to the ideology of "*luoye guigen*" – returning to China to retire. Moreover, the intensity and frequency of transnational activities differed greatly between the old and contemporary immigrants. Today, some transnationals criss-cross the national boundaries by jet planes and some of them launch their intercontinental trips five to ten times a year.

The US economy took a decisive turn in 1980s. First, it disengaged from manufacturing. Second, it concentrated on high-tech, finance and services. Third, it moved manufacturing to other low cost areas of the world. These moves coincide also with the rapid economic globalization of the twentieth century. Contemporary globalization refers to the increasing flow of trade, finance, culture, ideas and people brought about by modern technology and high-speed transportation vehicles. As a result of global flows, the economic fields have transcended national boundaries and function in an integrated global space. The Chinese immigrants, with their educational background and their social capitals (connections with the receiving and sending countries), situate themselves in a unique juncture which enables them to play a significant role in the transnational economy between the USA and Asia.

In the Chinese communities in the USA, many of the ethnic enterprises, whether they are situated in the suburbs or urban areas, try to participate in the global economy. Resourceful talents may return to China to become trouble shooters in IT or international businesses, consulting engineers or managerial moguls for American companies, traders, bankers, businessmen from America's Chinatowns who may become leaders of the global economy. They could be venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and businessmen who move capital, goods and other technical resources between continents. The bi-directional or multi-directional flows of "brain-power," goods and services between China and America are made possible by these transnational movers. Thus, one could argue that the "locals" and "globals" are not mutually exclusive. The local Chinese American communities and their economic activities transcend their local community; they reach out beyond the USA. They are connectors of the USA and the world economy. Some Chinese American businesses have expanded into the territories of European and Asian countries. Some have their research plants in the USA, production plants in Asia and their products marketed in the USA and Europe. The Chinese American community also attracts investors, culture performance groups, musicians, scientists, engineers, businessmen, talents and entrepreneurs from the overseas to the USA (Wong 2006). This is particularly evident in Silicon Valley where the Chinese Americans play an important role in bridging China and America. One needs to witness the

various sister cities established between the US and Chinese cities. Many Silicon Valley and Las Vegas trade and job fairs feature products and recruiters from China. Music and dance groups that come from different parts of China are invited by Chinese American organizations. Many San Francisco trade groups, through the efforts of the Chinese Americans, are able to conduct business deals in China. It is another case showing how the "local" can influence the "global." Thus, the Chinese Americans are facilitators of bi-national economic and cultural exchanges.

The paths of Americanization among the Chinese Americans are diverse. They started as "sojourners" leaving their loved ones to seek fortunes in America. Then, after the 1960s, they broke out of their ethnic community to participate in the US society and eagerly to pursue the "American Dream" and to find a place in America. Changing from sojourning to establishing roots permanently in the USA beginning from the early twenty-first century introduces a new twist on their *luodi shenggen* strategy in "transnationalism" to participate in the global economy. These are known in the community as the "*taikongren*" (literally, astronauts). They are the actors, participants and sometimes, movers of the trans-border/global economy.

When economic spheres extend beyond traditional national boundaries, economic opportunities become enlarged as well. Not only do Chinese engineers of Silicon Valley return to the other side of the Pacific, but an excess of talent in China will come to fill market gaps or shortage areas in Silicon Valley or other parts of America.

Why do these Chinese return to work in Asia? One of the reasons is that globalization has created entrepreneurship and employment opportunities for Chinese Americans. Another reason is the slow job market during the recent recessions in the USA. A third reason is the glass ceiling of US corporations that prohibits the upward mobility of the Chinese in Silicon Valley (Wong 2006: 112). The movement of these former immigrants does not follow the direction prescribed by globalization theorists like Andre Frank (1967) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1980). People and goods, as indicated in this chapter, flow in a bi-directional or circular way (Rouse 1996).

When the US economic downturn was at its peak in 2001, many cities and provinces in mainland China attempted to seize the advantage and lure high-tech professionals from Silicon Valley. On 28 November 2001, at a job fair in Silicon Valley, more than 100 representatives from 17 provinces and the national government of China sought candidates for 800 positions (Wong 2006: 102–3).

Data obtained from my fieldwork indicate that the engineers who are willing to go to Asia are often younger. They have US citizenship, green cards, or permanent residency in the USA. If they have not yet acquired these, however, they prefer to wait until they have obtained them before they seek employment in Asia. This is just another indication that they are interested in returning to America.

Their base is still the USA and Asia is only a place in which to find work or to start a company. This differs from the Chinese immigrants of the nineteenth century who came to the USA to make money and who planned to return home to lead a life of elegant retirement. As noted earlier, some Silicon Valley Chinese professionals feel that because of the level of prejudice in the USA, their opportunities for promotion will be limited if they work in companies run by non-Chinese Americans. Some feel that there is and will always be a glass ceiling. However, I use the word *some*, because not *all* the Chinese feel that way. To avoid this predicament, there are several adaptive strategies. One is for a Chinese engineer to start his or her own business.

Another reason is to find better employment opportunities in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. This is what causes "return migration." However, I must qualify the use of this phrase for the move is often not necessarily a return since it is not permanent. These workers return temporarily to work or to be entrepreneurs in Asia, always with the notion of one day

returning to America permanently. In a sense, "return migration" is used as a strategy to establish oneself economically in America.

Returning to Asia was an adaptive strategy that Chinese engineers used to fight discrimination. Commonly the husband returns to Asia but the wife stays in America. This is also a reversal of nineteenth-century Chinese immigration patterns in which the men left for the USA and the women stayed in China. Modern-day Chinese returnees still believe that their children will have a better chance of getting into universities in the USA, and they themselves prefer the physical environment of the USA. There is also a concern about political stability in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China. This practice of temporarily returning to the land of one's origins or to another overseas location in order to seek employment and other economic opportunities was quite common in the US recessions of the early 1990s, and the return migration phenomenon was not unnoticed by the US media (*New York Times* 1995; Nash and Guest 1994). The *San Jose Mercury News* (1993) estimated that 30% of the Taiwanese immigrant engineers who formerly worked in Silicon Valley had returned to Taiwan in search of better opportunities. My informants estimated that during this time at least a quarter of the valley's Hong Kong immigrant professionals returned to their land of origin as well. Census data taken from the San Francisco Bay Area in 1990 indicate that Chinese immigrants did tend to receive lower salaries when compared to the white population, and this data has been confirmed by the research of Analee Saxenian (1999). Those engineers who felt that they were being discriminated against were not hesitant to leave their jobs in the USA to return to Asia.

There were additional factors that motivated the temporary return of high-tech Chinese personnel to Asia. During the early 1990s, the Taiwanese government made deliberate efforts to recruit Chinese high-tech engineers and companies and to secure their return to Taiwan. In the 2000s, the People's Republic of China also made conscientious efforts to attract venture capitalists and high-tech talents to work in their modernization program.

Accordingly, some Taiwanese engineers returned and became vice presidents or presidents of new companies in Taiwan. Others arrived on the new campus to work in research and development offices sponsored by the government. By early 2000 the tide had changed, and ever more Chinese were returning or going to China to assume employment or to start new businesses. As implied above, two factors fueled this exodus: (1) the recession of 2001, and (2) the preferential treatment given to these returning workers by the government of China. Taxes, for example, were low, and the workers were given such benefits as housing subsidies and transportation assistance. Not least of these perks was the respect accorded to the returned Chinese engineers. Scientists and engineers are highly respected in China, and those who have higher degrees from overseas are particularly valued: they are said to be "gold-plated." Many informants told me that when they worked in US high-tech companies, they were considered nothing more than run-of-the-mill employees or *gaoji huagong* (high-class laborers). But when they returned to China, they were treated as special and valuable talent, or *gaoji zhishi fenzhi* (high-class intellectuals). They told me that in China they have higher positions and enjoy more prestige compared to when they were doing the same job in the USA.

Most of these workers go to China with the intent of only working there for a few years. After they have accumulated enough savings, they intend to return to the USA. With their savings and connections, some are then able to start global businesses with branches in the USA and China. This is called *liangdi touzi* (investment in two places). Or they might organize a research and development office in the USA, but have their sales and production facilities in China. Having interviewed 100 engineers, I can safely say that these returnees eventually want to settle in America permanently. They may use their connections, bilingual abilities, and bicultural backgrounds to conduct a transnational business, but they intend to stay in the USA. Thus,

there is no divided loyalty. They are committed to America. It is only out of practicality and for the sake of their economic survival that they may have to go back to China or Taiwan. Chinese American engineers can be adamant about the fact that mainstream American society often suspects the Chinese of divided loyalties. One Chinese engineer told me the following story:

> My friend is a German American. He lived and worked in Germany for seven years for an American company. He speaks German and his family even moved there living in a huge mansion. No one called him unpatriotic. But when a Chinese American returns to do the same, he will mostly be suspected by the immigration official as unpatriotic. My friends, who have to travel back and forth between Taiwan and the USA, were often questioned by immigration officials for spending too much time overseas. This is unfair! Some people have to travel overseas to do business. They have to make a living!
>
> *(Personal interview)*

Returning to Asia to find better employment and economic opportunities does not imply that professional Chinese are abandoning America. Paradoxically, the Chinese immigrants in the USA are committed to the USA. That explains why they leave spouses and children behind. The majority of the Chinese immigrants are committed to the *luodi shenggen* ideology – establishing roots in the USA. This commitment is evident in their willingness to participate in American politics. Chinese Americans have been quite active in voting and supporting candidates of Chinese descent. Some are actively seeking political office through elections. Other are successful office holders, for example, Elaine Chao was the Secretary of Labor in the Bush Administration, Gary Lock was the Governor of the State of Washington and is now US Ambassador to China. Steven Chu is the Secretary of the Energy Department of the Obama Administration. David Wu was a US Congressman representing the State of Oregon, Judy Chu is a US Congresswoman representing the State of California. On the local levels, Julie Teng, Leslie Teng, Michael Chang and Leland Yee are prominent politicians in Northern California. In the California State Assembly, there are now Chinese American representatives and in the San Francisco Bay area; there are many Chinese American mayors of different municipalities. The most well-known of them all are Mayor Edward Lee of the City of San Francisco and Jean Kuan of the City of Oakland. One of the main reasons why so many Chinese are participating in the political process is that they want to be part of the country they live in. They want to have a permanent root in the USA.

Conclusion

The Chinese in the USA invest considerable energy in establishing themselves economically, socially and politically in the USA. Their globalization efforts do not decrease their dependence on the USA. The transnational flow and cross-cultural networks and organizations they maintain do not diminish the importance of place or traditional culture. On the contrary, these transnational networks are used to assist new immigrants in grounding themselves economically in the USA. There is also a continued linkage with the national institutions of the USA: elections, coalitions, political parties, and special-interest groups. My findings here echo those of other globalization studies (Evans 1999; Escobar 2001).

Luodi shenggen (establishing roots), and *anju leye* (comfortably settling in and establishing one's work) are professed sentiments of the Chinese in Silicon Valley. This is also reflected in their interest and participation in local and national politics. The *New York Times* (3 January 2004) has

noted the eagerness of the Chinese to be part of America, and their success in making political inroads in many cities and towns in America. To grow roots in a community requires journeys back to the ancestral land. This is an unusual kind of journey for new immigrants; they left their ancestral home to establish a new home. Now in order to fortify and enrich their new home in America, they have to return to their ancestral home once again. It is clear these new immigrants are actively engaged in shaping their destiny. This new way of searching for the American Dream is indeed novel to transnational migrants, but their activities are directed to building a new life in America.

This chapter has shown that certain aspects of globalization may be worthy topics for future research. How has globalization created opportunities for the transnational migrant's entrepreneurship and employment? How has globalization provided ways for the transnational migrant to fight racism and obtain personal dignity? Many nation-based scholars who look at the movement of people in terms of one-way migration will need to reexamine such concepts as brain-drain, assimilation, community, ethnic entrepreneurship, and citizenship. The present study has found that among Chinese transnational migrants, discussion of the circulation of talent, jobs, and wealth is more meaningful than a discussion of "brain gain" or "brain drain." Similarly, amidst political assimilation, there is cultural pluralism. Many Chinese-Americans participate in domestic and national politics while still valuing their culture. Thus, political assimilation and maintenance of cultural and ethnic boundary go hand in hand. Furthermore, the circulation of talent and the continuous back-and-forth movement of the Chinese transnationals do not necessarily mean that Chinese transnationals are not loyal citizens of America. They are American citizens who participate in the new global economy. In conclusion, globalization and localization can coexist. Globalization does not imply political apathy or non-commitment to local culture, community, and nation-state. Rather, transnationalism can be useful for the establishment of roots and the protection of minorities in the context of globalization.

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19

Stateless or belonging to Taiwan or PRC?

Nationality and passport of overseas Chinese

Lara Chen Tien-shi

Introduction

Chinese migrants have long dispersed all over the world. The ethnic Chinese have often been tossed up by the turbulent situation in international politics and the volatility of national regimes. As "overseas Chinese" they are always destined to be torn between different courses of action, such as whether to leave their home countries and whether to re-migrate to a third country from the land they have once settled in because of sociopolitical changes they encounter in those countries. Their sensitivity toward these changes can be seen during the Chinese Civil War in the post-Second World War era that prompted many to leave China, and the height of the Vietnam War in the 1970s that forced many ethnic Chinese to leave the war-torn land for the USA, France or other countries. And more recently, there was an exodus on the eve of the return of Hong Kong in 1997, that is, many Chinese living in Hong Kong who felt uncertain about its political and economic future moved on to such Western countries as Canada and the United Kingdom.

Many researchers have studied the history, business activities, education and cultural life of the overseas Chinese. There are, however, rather few studies about the political and legal issues facing them, such as immigration policies, citizenship and nationalities. In this chapter, I will focus on the political and legal aspects of the issue of statelessness. More specifically, I intend to shed light on the effects policy changes in the countries of birth and in the countries of residence have on the overseas Chinese. Among other things, I will discuss in depth how it has affected them when mainland China and Taiwan underwent changes in their respective political regime and relations with foreign countries. I will discuss the effects these changes have on the legal status of individual members of these Chinese. I have been interested in the study of the Chinese in East Asia, particularly Japan and South Korea, where they have encountered enormous difficulty with regards to their nationality and identity. Some of the overseas Chinese in these countries have lost their nationality, and they are not allowed to have dual nationality. I will use my findings from interviews I have conducted with these people to show how they have lost their nationalities and what statelessness means exactly.

Huaqiao, huaren, nationalities, and passports

How to define huaqiao *and* huaren *in relation to their nationalities*

First of all, let us discuss the terms *huaqiao* and *huaren* from the perspective of nationalities. According to China's official definition, *huaqiao* are "Chinese people (i.e. those with Chinese nationality) who live overseas with permanent residence status" (Mao and Lin 1993: 3–9). This definition is often accepted in academic circles, too (Kani *et al.* 2002: 105–6). One must meet two conditions to fall under this classification: he or she has permanently settled down in a foreign country and still retains Chinese nationality. More specifically, this Chinese nationality can either be that of the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China (Taiwan). This definition excludes the Chinese living in China – the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau – from the category of *huaqiao*. By the same token, tourists, students, diplomats, business persons and temporary workers who stay in foreign countries for a limited period of time only cannot be called *huaqiao*.

On the other hand, it should also be noted that the ethnic Chinese who have nationalities of countries other than China do not fall under *huaqiao*. Instead, they are called *huaren*. Unlike *huaqiao*, *huaren* are ethnic Chinese who have settled down in a foreign country and acquired the nationality of that country.

One may think that the distinction between the two terms is based on residence status, and more importantly on nationality. In reality, however, there is much ambiguity and complexity which cannot be understood by the straightforward definitions of these labels. The reason behind this is the fact that the migration of these Chinese mostly took place after the Asian countries had transformed themselves into modern nation-states. Until the concept of the nation-state, which has its origin in the West, spread to Asia, there was no clear association with state boundaries and nationalities. People were interconnected with each other by blood and neighborhood relations. In this connection, it is intriguing to note that the process of the integration of Asian countries into the global framework of nation-states roughly coincided with the acceleration of Chinese immigration into Southeast Asian countries. This has caused an added complexity to national and international politics (Tanaka 2002: 7). Furthermore, the fact that China remains divided constitutes an added complexity to the issue, together with the varying sense of belonging on the part of *huaqiao* and *huaren*.

The Republic of China (ROC, i.e. Taiwan) virtually allows people to have dual nationality. That is why there are people who have migrated to foreign countries and become naturalized while retaining ROC nationality. Take Chinese immigrants in the USA for example. Not a few US citizens with Chinese origin have settled down there without abandoning their ROC nationality. Their status shows that the aforementioned rule for demarcation based solely on nationality does not always help distinguish between *huaqiao* and *huaren* clearly. Another case in point shows that certain numbers of overseas Chinese are becoming stateless because of legal and procedural hiatuses arising from changes in international relations (Chen 2005). This brings us to the questions of how to describe overseas Chinese who are stateless.

How statelessness comes into being

In the world we live in today, people tend to take it for granted that everybody has a nationality, and thus is a member of one nation-state or another. For one thing, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted in 1948, stipulates that "everyone has the right to a nationality." This is a manifestation of the idea that it is beyond dispute that having a

nationality is an integral part of fundamental human rights. In reality, however, there are people who do not have any nationality at all.

Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) put the stateless population in the neighborhood of 11 million worldwide (IPU and UNHCR 2009). When it comes to the situation in Japan, according to the 2010 edition of *Statistics about Foreign Residents*, there were 1,234 foreign residents whose Alien Registration Cards explicitly stated "Nationality: Stateless" (Japan Immigration Association 2011). It is the common practice of Japan's immigration authority to issue the Alien Registration Card as an identification paper to foreign residents without nationality, along with the Reentry Permits which serve as the substitutes for passports when they travel overseas.[1] Similarly, it has been learned that the immigration authorities in the Philippines and Lithuania provide foreigners without nationality with identification cards and special passports (Chen 2009; Komori 2009).

As a general rule, one's nationality is certified by his/her passport or other identification papers. If one takes a look at passports or other identification papers of overseas Chinese living in Japan without nationality, one will notice an intriguing thing: the definition of an individual varies from country to country, and as a result, identification papers do not always represent the real status of each individual. A state enacts its nationality law in order to take control of individuals, and issues passports in order to keep track of their cross-border movements. However, the situation facing stateless Chinese living in Japan, who are the main subjects of this chapter, reveals that the Japanese system is defective. Furthermore, these flaws in the principle of certifying nationality of the stateless people and in the formalities of procedure can sometimes jeopardize fundamental human rights. Another fallout from the defective system is that, as one can see when looking more in-depth into the thoughts and behaviors of stateless individuals of Chinese origin living in Japan, they are, on the one hand, supranational citizens, and on the other hand, social outcasts abandoned by both the nations they come from and live in.

Nationalities and passports

Before discussing specific cases of stateless overseas Chinese, let us look at nationalities in association with passports.[2] Most of the time, one's nationality is certified by his/her passport. So most people take it for granted that it is a universal practice for a government to issue a booklet called "passport" to certify one's nationality, and to authorize entry and travel within a country. However, there is no universal standard on the functions of a passport (Haruta 1994). That is because a passport is a matter of domestic legislation which defines the criteria for allowing nationality. By the same token, it is up to each country to decide who is considered eligible to obtain its passport. There is no international law which stipulates a rule to govern travel across borders.

At present each of the more than 190 sovereign countries in the world determines on its own what conditions one should meet to be given nationality, and enacts its nationality act to that end. For instance, there are two different ways to determine one's national identity based on birth. Some countries adopt *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) principle which determines one's nationality by bloodline while others go for *jus soli* (right of soil) which considers it should be determined in accordance with one's place of birth. Aside from the criteria for determining nationality at birth, each country has also established its own rules on how to handle the acquisition or loss of nationality resulting from naturalization and the change in nationality necessitated by status-affecting events such as marriage and adoption. Those countries that adopt *jus sanguinis* include the Republic of China (ROC), Japan, the Republic of Korea and Italy, while such countries as the USA, Canada, Brazil and Australia all adopt *jus soli*.

If we compare the propensities of Chinese migrants who are distributed around the world, one will notice that those who have settled down in countries where the rule of *jus soli* governs have almost always become naturalized as *huaren*. That is why most *huaren* in the USA, Canada and Australia have acquired nationality in their adopted countries. On the contrary, Chinese migrants who live in countries where the rule of *jus sanguinis* prevails are not directly influenced by the fact that they are native to their countries of residence when forced to make a decision about whether to acquire the nationality there. As a result, not a few of them opt to retain their Chinese nationality, or go stateless, even when they are the second or third generation of un-naturalized immigrants. Ethnic Chinese living in the Republic of Korea or Japan, more often than not, fall under this category.

Formalities to go through when applying for a passport also vary from country to country. Let us take a look at the procedural differences between Japan and China. Entry into and exit from Japan require any one of the three types of permit, i.e. ordinary passport, official passport and diplomatic passport. Aside from these documents, he/she may need to apply for a "permit for return trip" when he/she has lost his/her regular passport while staying abroad (Song 2009: 34–8). These are passports solely meant for Japanese nationals, but there is a special type of passport called the "reentry permit" which is issued by the government to some foreign residents in the country, such as those who are stateless or have foreign passports which are considered invalid for one reason or the other.

Similarly, the Chinese government issues ordinary passports, official passports and diplomatic passports. The only difference between the two countries is that the ordinary passports issued by the Chinese government are subdivided into ordinary ones issued for official purposes and those issued for private purposes. The former type allows employees of government agencies or state-owned enterprises to engage in economic, business, scientific or engineering activities overseas. The latter type is meant for those who go abroad to migrate, have a family reunion, study, work or take a sightseeing tour in the countries of destination. Aside from these types of passport, the Chinese government also issues what it calls the permit for cross-regional movement to those who travel between mainland China and such regions as Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.

Visas as the tools to control people's cross-border mobility and stay

It should be noted that the "bottom-up initiative" on the part of individuals to acquire or change their nationalities and passports for civil rights and freedom is an equally important factor as the "top-down control" by government authority. It is true that most individuals are entitled to a nationality at birth, but it is also true that for various reasons not a few of them have to change their inherent nationalities, acquire passports of foreign countries, or go stateless later in their lives. In fact, Chinese migrants have long been practicing the "bottom-up initiative" in search of business opportunities, a better environment for raising their children, or a better life.

Today, cross-border mobility is getting easier than it used to be, and yet, anyone who attempts to enter a foreign country is required to show his/her passport upon arrival at the airport, seaport or other immigration checkpoint. Moreover, most of the time the passport alone is not sufficient for one to be allowed entry. One must also have a visa, in advance, from the embassy or consular office of the destination country that permits one's entry into and stay in that country.

It is just a matter of formality to acquire an ordinary passport from the Japanese government as long as the applicant submits the necessary documents such as the copy of his/her *koseki tohon* (family register). Furthermore, what makes it easy for Japanese citizens to go abroad is the fact that many foreign countries grant them the privilege of visa-free entry. More often than not, therefore, it only takes a passport and air ticket for a Japanese to visit a foreign country.

Nonetheless, when it comes to visiting a country which has no visa-exempt agreement with Japan or a visa-exempt country for a long stay, he/she needs to have a visa to enter that country. On the contrary, as the specific case I will touch on later in the chapter shows, one who travels on a Chinese passport often faces greater difficulty because China has a smaller number of visa-waiver countries. An added difficulty for the Chinese lies in the fact that it often takes months to obtain the necessary visas. Apparently, this can be explained by the fact that the more trustworthy a nation is considered, financially or otherwise, within the international community, the more passable its passports are. This, of course, also depends on the mutual arrangement between countries.

Now let us take a look at passports issued to people without nationality and the way they cross national boundaries. As we have already seen, the stateless are people who have no nationality and have not legally established themselves in any country. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) classifies statelessness into two types. The "*de jure* stateless person" who does not have any nationality as a legal status is one; the other type is the "*de facto* stateless person" who has a nationality which is, in effect, invalid.

In general, one's nationality is automatically determined at birth, either by place of birth or the nationality of his/her parents. But if this person is not given a nationality at birth for one reason or another, he/she falls under the first type of UNHCR's classification, which also includes a person who has lost his/her inherent nationality and has not acquired another nationality for any reason. On the other hand, a *de facto* stateless person refers to one who nominally has a nationality but is in a state where he/she is divested of all the rights by the particular country. This type also includes one whose nationality is stated in his/her identification card, but the regime that has issued it in the past is virtually nonexistent.

In the following paragraph, I will focus on passports and identification cards given to stateless people to look into how their sense of belonging varies from country to country, how the general perception about national identity diverges from the reality, and how these legal papers affect their cross-border movement and sense of identity.

Disunited homeland and emergence of stateless overseas Chinese

In general, there are various reasons people go stateless, such as changes of territorial borders, deprivation of nationality at government's discretion, and hiatuses and conflicts between national laws. But when it comes to *huaqiao*, the most common factor that underlies the loss of nationality is the fact that their homeland has been split up. Since 1949 China was divided into two separate political regimes, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. Consequently the lives of *huaqiao* worldwide have been seriously affected in many ways. As the countries where they live have taken different attitudes toward the two Chinas, their legal status has kept changing while they are often being prompted to switch their nationality from one to the other. Not a few have become *huaren* by acquiring the nationality of the nation where they live, but some have opted to be stateless.

Research conducted thus far has revealed that the Chinese who were born in the Golden Triangle overlapping Myanmar and the northern border of Thailand after the Civil War fought between the nationalist Kuomintang and the communist rebels are still living there as stateless people (Bo 1987; Chang 1999; Loa 2007). In Brunei and Malaysia there are also stateless people of Chinese origin who do not have Bruneian or Malaysian nationality although they have resident status there.[3] I shall now show more specifically how *huaqiao* are becoming stateless under the influence of changing national and international political situations in the nations where they live and came from.

The "two Chinas" and overseas Chinese living in Japan

Ms Lin, as we call her by her pseudonym, is a *huaqiao* who has permanent residence status in Japan. The nationality column of her alien registration card shows her nationality is "stateless." The reason she became stateless lies with the fact that the foreign policy of the Japanese government toward China has changed since the division of her home country.

She was born in 1954 to Chinese parents, who had migrated from mainland China to Taiwan after the war. The ROC nationality law is, like Japan's, based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. For that reason, Ms Lin was given the same nationality as her parents, which was the Republic of China. In 1964, when she was 10 years old, her parents brought her to Japan to settle down there.

There had been a great number of Chinese migrants in Japan serving as compradors for their Western counterparts since the opening of the ports in 1859. As the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty of 1871 allowed them free access to this country, they started building Chinese communities in port cities such as Nagasaki, Kobe, Yokohama and Hakodate. In the early years of the new era, most of these communities were formed by groups of people who came from the same regions of the continent, such as Guangdong and Shanghai. But toward the end of the nineteenth century, the consuls from the Qing dynasty, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen, promoted the formation of cross-regional organizations such as the Nagasaki Chinese Chamber of Commerce and similar associations in Yokohama, Kobe and Hakodate. This trend helped breed nationalism among *huaqiao*. Chinese schools were also founded in Yokohama, Kobe, Nagasaki and some other port cities (Chen 1984; Chuuka Kaikan 2000; Shiba 1991; Wang 2000).

During the Second World War, *huaqiao* in Japan were subjected to strict supervision by the government and persecuted by discriminatory treatment by ordinary citizens. Local organizations were all disbanded to form a nationwide body called the Overseas Chinese Association. In those days the Taiwanese were subjects of the Japanese empire but in 1952, they embarked on new life as people of a victor country with their Chinese nationality fully reinstated. The occupation authorities gave *huaqiao* in Japan a Certificate of Registration which entitled them to the "Special Food Rations for Foreign Nationals," and in turn, to a major role in the black market.

In September 1945, *huaqiao*, both from mainland China and Taiwan, founded an integrated organization called Federation of Overseas Chinese Associations in Japan. By that time, the process of consolidation of groups of *huaqiao* had also been completed at the local level. Then in 1949, the "two China" situation came into being when the Communist Party of China established the People's Republic of China and started to claim its legitimacy while the Kuomintang-led Republic of China did not abnegate its sovereignty. Under the circumstances, by the early 1950s communities of *huaqiao* had been divided into two groups, one pro-communist or pro-PRC and the other pro-Kuomintang or pro-ROC (Chen 2004). Overseas Chinese Associations were no exceptions. In Yokohama, the ideological conflicts between the two groups even affected the educational institution for children of *huaqiao* living in the city. In 1955, the school became separated into Yokohama Yamate Overseas Chinese School and Yokohama Overseas Chinese School. The two schools are still in operation today under these names.[4]

In the early years of the Cold War, Japan had diplomatic ties with the ROC. Therefore, there were consulates of the ROC, but there were none representing the PRC. *Huaqiao* who sided with the PRC set up a friendship association which is a co-op type organization to promote cordial relationships and mutual aid support among its members, such as taking care of the due paperwork every time one of their households had a childbirth. In those days, there was a large population of *de facto* stateless persons who could not expect any consular protection (Yokohama College of Commerce 2009: 99).

Unaware of the chasm in the Chinese communities resulting from the new political situation, Ms Lin accompanied her father to Yokohama where he had found a new workplace. That is how she settled down in the Chinese community in Japan. Because she came from Taiwan, she attended the pro-ROC school and became associated with predominantly pro-ROC and Taiwanese neighbors.

Fallout from the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan

In 1972 something that dramatically affected the lives of Ms Lin and overseas Chinese living in Japan happened. On 29 September the governments of Japan and the People's Republic of China announced the formal resumption of diplomatic ties. The Tokyo government had to make the tough decision to break ties with the Republic of China. This sent shockwaves among overseas Chinese in Japan. Their reactions varied to a great extent from one individual to the next. The embassy of the ROC was closed down, and subsequently taken over by the embassy of the PRC.

Overseas Chinese, both pro-communist and pro-Kuomintang, had difficulty with their national identity. Now it was getting worse. The Japanese government was now forcing these people to choose between two irreconcilable courses: which nationality to take. All overseas Chinese considered themselves to be just "Chinese" but now the Japanese government had changed its definition of China. The people were at a loss.

In the late nineteenth century, there was no such concept as nationality among people. So most Chinese migrants who came over to Japan in those days, and their descendants as well, had no passports or travel certificates to tell where they came from. Hence, the change in the way Japan recognized China made little difference to these people. On the contrary, those who had held the ROC passport were now facing a serious dilemma. There were not many options before them if they wanted to stay in Japan:

- They could have their nationality rewritten to the PRC, the only Chinese nation recognized in Japan.
- They might opt for naturalization and became Japanese.
- They could even choose to do nothing with their status, in which case they would become virtually stateless.
- They could register as stateless.

The government set up a temporary measure to simplify the screening procedure for those who would apply for naturalization. Capitalizing on the remedial plan, some Chinese quickly assumed Japanese names to acquire nationality. There were also some who changed their nationality to become nationals of the PRC. Some others gave up their lives in Japan and left for other countries such as the USA and Canada.

Worrisome rumors spread around the Chinese communities during those days: if you dared to retain the nationality of the ROC, you would be subjected to unpredictable disadvantages. An overwhelming sense of uncertainty cast a dark shadow on those who were inclined to do so.

According to Mr Qiao, who was an officer serving in the ROC government's embassy in Japan, more than 20,000 overseas Chinese lost their ROC nationality because of the breakup between the two countries.[5] A staff in charge of family registration matters at the Internal Affairs Department of the ROC also confirmed this number.[6] It is not possible to tell exactly how

many of them became naturalized afterward, and how many opted to acquire the PRC nationality. But if we look at the statistics compiled by the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Justice, we can see that the stateless population increased from 930 to more than 9,200 between 1971 and 1974, and then decreased to about 2,900 by 1977. It is obvious that the ups and downs were mostly attributable to the behavior of overseas Chinese during those turbulent years.

The Lin family is a typical example of those who went stateless without choosing any nationality. At that time, Ms Lin was 18 years old. Ever since, the nationality column of her Alien Registration Card has always read "Stateless."

Social barriers facing stateless people

What is it like exactly to live one's life as a stateless person? Impediments arising from statelessness are beyond imagination. More specifically, the barriers facing stateless persons involve three different dimensions. First, stateless persons are nonexistent from a purely legal point of view. Second, their status often hinders an unfettered exercise of civil rights. The other dimension is the fact that they suffer various disadvantages when crossing borders. As a result, they become susceptible to social discrimination which often tampers with one's sense of identity (Tsukita 2008).

The implication of having no nationality is that there is a lack of the fundamental vinculum with a nation which would acknowledge one as a citizen. Therefore, the administrative services necessary for everyday life are not always available to a stateless person. Needless to say, he/she always remains disfranchised at home. Moreover, since today's international community comprises nation-states around the world, a stateless person is denied job opportunities abroad, such as a position at the United Nations or one to represent a nation at the International Olympic Committee. Likewise, he/she is not entitled to protection by any foreign country.

As a matter of fact, the general awareness of these difficulties being suffered by stateless people is so poor that they are prone to discriminatory profiling. This bias often causes formidable problems when they want to get married or seek a job. It is also true especially with stateless children that the inner conflict often hampers the establishment of a sound sense of belonging.

Ms Lin did not suffer from a serious identity crisis because she became stateless when she was already an 18-year-old grown-up. With her permanent residence status, she has always been treated as if she were a foreign resident. She is eligible to be covered by the local health insurance, to open bank accounts and own real estate. But that does not mean she has not been discriminated by the way the bias-laden society has treated her.

People without nationality feel they are shackled especially when moving from one country to another. In the absence of a regular passport, they are often denied entry into a foreign country, or required to apply for a visa in advance where there would be no such requirement if they were not stateless.

Passports and citizenship of overseas Chinese

As a stopgap measure for overseas Chinese who have lost their nationality, the ROC government issues its formal passports in order to save them from otherwise unavoidable trouble when traveling abroad. The special passports are issued to overseas Chinese, irrespective of whether they have lived or even set foot in Taiwan in the past. The rationale behind this extension of the principle of *jus sanguinis* to almost *all* Chinese regardless of their countries of residence, as well as the recognition of dual citizenship is to acknowledge the historical support they have given to the Kuomintang regime.

In practice, the exercise of civil rights, such as suffrage, labor rights, and access to national health insurance, requires possession of the Republic of China National Identification Card, which is only issued to persons with household registration in Taiwan and aged 14 and older. Overseas Chinese who do not hold household registration in Taiwan are not automatically allowed to stay in Taiwan; nor do they have the rights to work, to vote, etc. In other words, while the general perception is that a passport is always linked to a full nationality accompanied by civil rights, that is not so in the case of the overseas Chinese having special passports issued by the ROC government. Their passports are valid only when "the Amendments and Endorsements of Certificate of Overseas Chinese" (visa) is stamped on them, and moreover, they expire on a predetermined date.

In the past, the ROC passports issued to *huaqiao* were not valid in Japan because there are no diplomatic ties between the two nations.[7] As a result, stateless *huaqiao* living in Japan, such as Ms Lin, had to obtain a reentry permit from the Japanese government every time they left and returned. It did not make any difference to the requirement for the reentry permit whether or not one had permanent residence status. In the worst case, an overseas Chinese without nationality would be denied entry into any country if he/she failed to obtain a visa beforehand.[8]

At present, Ms Lin is required to produce two documents to identify herself upon entry and departure, which are intriguingly inconsistent with each other. The one issued by the ROC government says she is a national of the Republic of China whereas the other document she has obtained from the Japanese government states she is stateless. It is also noticeable that when her travel destination is the PRC, she has to obtain from the Chinese embassy in Japan the "travel document," which does not refer to her nationality at all.

The fact that her national identity varies from one document to another reveals that one's legal status can also vary depending on what country he/she is in. It is true that Ms Lin has two or more nominal passports, but she has to have a visa to enter any country. In reality, therefore, overseas Chinese who are in a status similar to hers are virtually denied their fundamental right to return to their home These people fall under the classification of "*de facto* stateless persons" as defined by the UNHCR.

Overseas Chinese in South Korea: the wavering sense of belonging to their imaginary home country

Overseas Chinese who have token nationalities like Ms Lin are found not only in Japan but also in the Republic of Korea, better known as South Korea. Let me briefly touch on the historical background which shows how *huaqiao* in South Korea lost their national identity.

During the Cold War era that ensued after the Second World War, South Korea sided with the anti-communist bloc and maintained diplomatic ties with the Republic of China instead of the People's Republic of China. Despite the fact that a majority of Chinese living in South Korea came from Shandong province, most of them have maintained a hostile attitude toward the communist-led PRC and thus have been favorably disposed toward the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan. Against this backdrop, coupled with the fact that the South Korean nationality law is, like Japan's, based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, Korean-born offspring of *huaqiao* have, more often than not, acquired the nationality of the ROC. Until 1997 when the law was amended to make it easier for some *huaqiao* to become naturalized citizens there, the general perceptions among South Koreans had been that their country was a mono-racial society. In this climate, even *huaqiao* who were born and brought up in South Korea were treated as aliens, i.e., Chinese. The prevailing social milieu was discriminatory.

In the 1960s when Park Chung-hee was in office, a stern policy was adopted toward the *huaqiao* in Korea. For one thing, Park enacted a law to restrict foreign ownership of real estate.

Another example is the 1962 legislation concerning resident registration which exclusively allowed Korean nationals to be registered. Left unregistered, *huaqiao* suffered disadvantages in many ways. Under the new system, Korean citizens who held the resident certificate were treated as "lawful individuals" whereas those who did not were labeled as unlawful ones (Wan 2008: 231–4). This is why the *huaqiao* in Korea were always looked at with suspicion, denied the right to have their own internet domains or subscribe to cell phones that required personal identification, or were turned down when they applied for a bank loan. As a result, "they were inclined to think they belonged to China, not South Korea."[9]

Mr. Sun (pseudonym) who was born in South Korea and currently lives in Inchon told me his experience this way:

> I still keep my passport issued by the Republic of China because to me it's out of the question to acquire any other nationality. But recently I have started suspecting that in recent years, the ROC does not consider *huaqiao* like me as her national. I feel it is humiliating to have to obtain a visa to get back to my home country.[10]

Like Ms Lin, whom I mentioned earlier, *huaqiao* in Korea do not have free access to Taiwan despite the ROC passport they have. In other words, they are, in fact, stateless.

According to Mr Sun, it is "in recent years" that *huaqiao* like him have been alienated from their home country. Let us look into the background behind this. In 1992, the Republic of Korea established diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China, and subsequently broke official relations with the Republic of China, the nation the *huaqiao* in Korean had thought of as their home country. And these events have since shaken their sense of national identity. Mr Sun recollected the day he had taken part in a protest rally of 1992 like this:

> We *huaqiao* in Korea marched carrying high the ROC flags known as Blue Sky, White Sun and Wholly Red Earth. Many were shedding tears. We were, however, filled with an unfathomable sense of relief deep inside because South Korea had now established diplomatic ties with the PRC, our real home country. We took pride in the PRC which had grown into a great nation.

From Mr. Sun's accounts, it is evident how the *huaqiao* in Korea have been torn between the PRC and the ROC which used to be one nation. In this respect Wan (2008: 469–75) argues that their self-perception has been undergoing a marked change from "nationals of the Republic of China" with empathy for the Kuomintang to "Chinese people" with affection toward their motherland. Wan attributes the change to the accelerated Taiwanization of the ROC and a growing awareness that the unification of the home country they identified with was an illusion as a result of the presidential election of 2000.

Actually, a similar trend can be seen among the *huaqiao* in Japan. In the face of the ongoing Taiwanization and the way Taiwan now treats them as aliens who do not have free access to the island, they have realized that there is a huge gap between Taiwan they used to perceive as their home country and the reality of the ongoing Taiwanization that now treats them as aliens. And now with their sense of identity wavering more than ever, they feel let down by the myth of the nation-state and nationality it gives. In the case of the overseas Chinese in Korea, they seem to be at a loss between the divided nation and the country where they reside. They are now stateless, no matter the wording on their passport or identification card. They are questioning who they are and where they belong, the answer to which will not be given by any nation-state.

Conclusion

As we have seen in this chapter, the breakup of China into the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China has had a profound effect on overseas Chinese. On the one hand, many ethnic Chinese living in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world have opted to become *huaren* by acquiring the nationality of the countries where they have settled down. On the other hand, there are *huaqiao* who have lost or abandoned their Chinese nationality – this has not been sufficiently studied by researchers.

I have focused more on the *huaqiao* in Japan, although I have also done research on the *huaqiao* in Korea. The field researches I have conducted in Inchon and Seoul reveal that most of the Chinese there suffer seriously from a sense of uncertainty over their vulnerable legal status and lost identity. They have often expressed their grief this way: "We are treated as aliens in South Korea while our home country requires us to obtain a visa to get there. So we feel that we do not belong to Mainland China, Taiwan or South Korea."

Overall, *huaqiao* and *huaren* have had difficulty coping with the identity crisis arising from the accelerated orientation toward democratization and independence in Taiwan since the late 1980s. In this context, Mr Chen's case is noteworthy. Born in mainland China, he migrated to Taiwan in the wake of the Civil War and moved on to Japan where he had to abandon his nationality in 1972 when Japan and the PRC normalized diplomatic ties. He has remained stateless ever since. In recent years, he has devoted himself to the unification movement of China. He told me that "I cannot choose either Taiwan or the mainland China, because to me the peaceful unification is the only solution."[11] Mr Han, who is considered a patriarch among the ethnic Chinese community in South Korea, is also seeking the same cause with the same motivation.[12]

In this chapter, by studying their passports and nationality, we have examined the social and legal status of *huaqiao* who have been torn between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, and sometimes they have opted not to choose either nationality. More often than not there are inconsistencies in nationality between identification cards issued by two or more governments, and these people are often treated as second-class citizens despite nominal nationalities stated in their passports.

It is true that there are *huaren* who may be known as "global citizens" because they have obtained nationalities from two or more countries, be it one they live in or one in which they have investments, and they can use them interchangeably in accordance with different privileges (Ong 1999). But it is also true that there are underprivileged *huaqiao* who have become stateless due to inevitable reasons such as the gap in nationality law or historical twist in diplomatic relations between their country of origin and their country of residence. In the era of globalization, the most critical question we must ask is how to protect the fundamental human rights of stateless *huaqiao* especially in a situation of emergency. In this context, the dilemma of the stateless *huaqiao* deserves our attention. At the same time, we should re-examine the role of the nation-state which is the source of statelessness.

Notes

1 This is the special travel document issued to a non-Japanese resident of Japan without valid nationality. When foreign residents of Japan travel abroad with the intention to come back, they need to obtain a reentry permit in advance and have their passports affixed with a seal as the certificate of the permission. However, those without a valid passport, such as stateless people and some "Korean (*chosen*)" nationals, must apply for this special reentry permit. As for stateless people, the substitute for a passport only serves as a reentry permit and it does not assure the passport holder any consular protection in case

of an emergency. It should also be noted that if the reentry permit expires during his/her stay overseas, the permanent residence status will be lost because he/she will be denied reentry.

2 "Passport" is a generic word for an identification paper to be used when traveling abroad. International agreements on passports term it the "travel document." In Chinese it is called *huzhao* while the Japanese sometimes call it *ryoken*. In this chapter, it is mostly referred to as passport.

3 For further details on stateless Chinese in Brunei, see the documentary film Chen Tien-shi produced in 2003 in collaboration with NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) under the title of *Watashi wa Nanijin Desuka – Lara Mukokuseki* (What Country Do I Belong to? – Stateless Lara). See also Chen Tien-shi (2005: 226–32; 2010: 30–4).

4 The breakup of the Overseas Chinese School in Yokohama is often referred to as the "School Incident" (Yokohama College of Commerce 2009: 102–4).

5 February 2000, an interview with Mr Qiao who was an officer at the Representative Office of the ROC in Japan. At that time, he was in charge of issuing renunciation of nationality in the 1970s.

6 August 2002, interview with a staff in the Internal Affairs Department in Taipei.

7 The ROC passport has been acknowledged as a valid travel document in Japan since 1996 as far as immigration control and refugee recognition are concerned.

8 Chen Tien-shi (2005) contains the author's personal account of the troublesome experience in 1992 of being denied entry into countries which were supposed to be her "home" simply because of not having a valid visa. Both Japan, her permanent resident country, and Taiwan, which was supposed to be her home country that issues the passport to *huaqiao*, did not permit her entry and the author was often stuck in the airports.

9 Onsite interviews with *huaqiao* in Korea on several occasions (September 2008, May 2010, September 2010, etc.) when the author conducted field research in Inchon, South Korea.

10 Interviews with Mr Sun, September 2008 and September 2010.

11 October 2010, Interview in Yokohama, Japan with Mr Chen, President of the Japan Association for Promoting Peaceful Reunification of China.

12 September 2010, Interview in Beijing, China, with Mr Han, Honorary Advisor of Seoul Overseas Chinese Association.

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20

Chinese overseas and communist movements in Southeast Asia

Hara Fujio

Introduction

From the very beginning of the formation of the Communist parties of various Southeast Asian countries up to the end of the Cold War, ethnic Chinese played a very important role in the respective parties. For example, most leaders as well as members of both the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP) were Chinese. It was common that in the earlier stages of the respective parties, leaders were dispatched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was formed in 1921. An exception was the Communist Party of Indonesia (commonly known as Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). As its establishment was initiated by the Dutch Communists in 1920, that is, one year earlier than the CCP, no Chinese members were there in the early leadership. Chinese leaders emerged later, and they were local-born *peranakan* whom the colonial authorities dared not repatriate to China.

Before the Pacific War started in 1941, many Communist leaders had been deported to China by the colonial authorities. Besides, after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Central Committee of the CCP decided to dissolve the Thai Overseas Chinese Party (Qiao Dang, 泰国侨党) in January 1952. And in September 1953, the CCP Central Committee prohibited the CCP as well as its fraternal democratic parties to establish branches abroad.[1] After that, communist movements were mainly led by the local-born Chinese (*qiaosheng* 侨生 in Malaysia and Singapore) or the native persons. It became difficult to distinguish "Chinese movement" from "communist movement" in general. As such, a few outstanding Chinese leaders of each party will be referred to here.

Before the Pacific War, these parties' (except for the PKI's) activities were to a great extent focused on anti-Japanese movements to support China. As this chapter is intended to analyze the role the Chinese Communists played in local politics, I will mainly confine the period to the post-war era. Of the Southeast Asian Communist parties, some lack material for analysis. Hence only selected parties will be analyzed here.

Communist does not necessarily mean Communist Party members. There were, and still are, many persons who, though they believe in communism, were not party members. In the Southeast Asian political history, however, it is difficult to judge whether they were

communists or not. In this chapter, this author confines "Communist" to the Communist Party member.

The Communist Party of Indonesia

The PKI and the Chinese

When the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) was formed in 1920, no Chinese membership was reported. In its rebellion of 1926–7 against the Dutch colonial government, two Chinese members participated. Three *peranakan* Chinese who were to become influential party leaders after the end of the Pacific War, Tan Ling Djie (陈赓如), Tjoa Sik Ien (蔡锡胤), and Oei Gee Hwat (黄义发) joined the PKI in 1936 (Xiao 2001: 36, 58). The three were concurrently members of the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (PTI, Indonesian Chinese Party) that had been formed in 1932 and, consolidating with the *pribumi* (native) people, they intended to overthrow the colonial rule. Siauw Giok Tjhan (萧玉燦), who was to lead the largest Chinese political organization during the President Sukarno era, namely Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki, Indonesian Citizens Consultative Organization), was enlightened by them in the PTI. Tan, Tjoa and Oei led the PKI not as Chinese but as Indonesians.

In the cabinets of the Sukarno era, there were no Chinese PKI members, but there were two Chinese Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis, PS) members, viz. Tan Po Guan (陳宝源) and Siauw. In the same era, Tan Ling Djie and Oei were elected as MPs representing the PS, not Chinese community. Chinese MPs representing the PKI were Oey Hay Djoen (黄海春), Tjoo Tik Tjoen (曹德崇) and Lauw King Hoo (刘金和).

As to Dr. Tjoa Sik Ien, who was born in Surabaya in around 1910 and the once President of the PTI, there is insufficient information. Brief biographies of Tan, Oei and Oey are as follows.

Prominent Chinese leaders of the PKI

1 Tan Ling Djie (1904–69)

Born in Surabaya, east Java. While studying law in Holland in the early 1930s, he joined the Dutch Communist Party together with Indonesian Communists including Musso. In 1947 he became Secretary General of the Partai Sosialis which was formed in 1945. In 1947 also, Tan and Oei represented the PS in the working committee of the Indonesian Parliament (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, KNIP). When the PS and the Labor Party merged with the PKI in September 1948, Tan was appointed as the PKI's Deputy Secretary General, and Musso as Secretary General. After the PKI's Madiun revolt of 1948 was crushed by the republican government and Musso was killed toward the end of that year, Tan was appointed as Secretary General. Since then he steered the legal line of the PKI until 1951 when D.N. Aidit won control of the Party (appointed as First Secretary in 1951, Secretary General in 1953, and Chairman in 1959). Tan was purged from the Politburo in 1951 and from the Central Committee in 1953. His line was criticized by the new leadership as Tan Ling Djie-ism. The major criticisms were: (a) Tan denied the role of the PKI as a vanguard of the working class and made it a tail of the PS; (b) Tan was too legalistic; (c) Tan's ideology was dogmatism as well as empiricism ignoring the conditions in Indonesian. However, pertaining to the unification with West Irian, his "adventurism" was criticized as well. Yet, he was elected as Member of Parliament as a PKI candidate in 1955.[2] Though retaining no position in the PKI, Tan was arrested in 1967,[3] two years after the 30 September Incident, and died in prison.

2 Oei Gee Hwat (1925–48)

Born in Madiun, east Java. He was one of the earliest members of the Gerindo (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia, People's Movement of Indonesia) which had been formed in 1937 as – like the PKI – a party of no ethnic boundary in principle. Together with the Indonesian PKI comrades, he led the left wing trade union federation, SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesia Central Organization of Labor), which was formed in 1946. He was arrested in the Madiun revolt, and was executed on 19 December 1948.

3 Oey Hay Djoen (1929–2008)

Born in Malang, east Java. In his Catholic school days, he learned Dutch, English and revolutionary spirits. He joined the PS in 1946 and then the PKI. Oey became a member of the left-wing cultural organization, Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (LEKRA, People's Cultural League) in 1951 and a member of its central secretariat in 1959. Besides writing various revolutionary articles, he translated many Marxism books into the Indonesian language. He was, at the same time, a successful businessman as a cigarette manufacturer.

Soon after the 30 September Incident of 1965, he was arrested and imprisoned for 14 years. After his release, he completed the translation of Marx's voluminous *Das Kapital* and published it in 2005.

Unlike other Communist Parties of Southeast Asia, Chinese cadres of the PKI were not CCP members but *Peranakan*s. They resolutely struggled for the betterment of Indonesian people as Indonesians. Yet, many of them were killed by the colonial government and, worse than that, by the Indonesian government. More than a decade after the fall of Suharto, however, re-evaluation of their role seems to have started.

The Communist Party of Malaya

The CPM and the Chinese

The first communist organization in Malaya was established as the Nangyang (South Sea) Provisional Branch (NPB) of the CCP in the mid-1920s. It was re-organized as the Malayan Communist Party (later the Communist Party of Malaya) in April 1930 at the 3rd Representative Conference of the NPB that was presided by Nguyen Ai Quok (Ho Chi Minh). Most leaders of the NPB as well as of the CPM of the early 1930s were Hainanese. Owing to the efforts by the PKI leaders who tried to spread communism among Malays in the early 1920s, there were some Malay members. However, due to oppression by the colonial authorities and lack of support by Malay peasants, Malay membership was limited before and during the Pacific War. Its Secretary General between 1939 and 1947 was exceptionally a Vietnamese called Lai Teck. He was an agent of France (before coming to Singapore in 1934), Britain (pre-war and post-war years) and Japan (during the war), and he sold out almost all the Party's Central Committee members, who were all Chinese, to Japanese Kempei Tai (Military Police) during the war.

After the end of the war, Malay radical lefts including the members of the Malay Nationalist Party, which had been organized in 1945, joined the CPM. One year after starting the armed struggle against the colonial rule in June 1948, the CPM established the National Liberation Army in February 1949, which eventually consisted of one Malay and two Chinese regiments. The Chairmen of the Party were Malays, Musa Ahmad from 1955 till 1968, and after 20 years of vacancy, Abdullah C.D. from 1988 until the time of this writing. There were also several Malay

members in its Central Committee. Yet, the actual power was held by the Chinese Politburo members including Secretary General, Chin Peng (陈平). When the Peace Treaties between the CPM and the Malaysian government as well as between the CPM and the Thai government were concluded respectively in December 1989, the Politburo members were as follows. (Figure in parentheses shows the year of appointment.)

- Chin Peng (1947–, Secretary General 1947–)
- Lee An Tung (李安东, also called Lao Xie 老谢, 1947–; Deputy Secretary General 1960–)
- Zhang Chuanqing (章传庆 also known as Siao Chang 小章, 小张, Zhang Lingyun 张凌云, A Su 阿苏, Lin Wen 林文, 1947–)
- Shan Ruhong (單汝洪 also known as Ah Hai 阿海, A Cheng 阿成, 1955–)
- Abdullah C.D. (1957–, Chairman 1988–)
- Wu Rui'ai (伍瑞靄 also known as Ah Yen 阿焰, Zainon, 1960–)
- Wu Yit Shih (吳一石, 1960–)
- Chen Kai (陈凯 also known as Ah Ho 阿和, Chen Lifa 陈立发, 1960–)

Besides the above members, Wu Tianwan (伍天旺), who had been appointed as a Politburo member in 1952, was executed in the base as a traitor in 1971. Years after the CPM ceased political activities following the Peace Treaty, the Party cleared him of the charges and rehabilitated him. Except for him, no one was discharged.

The first Chairman of the Party, Musa Ahmad, was not a Politburo member. It implies that, though assuming a nominally highest ranking position, his power and influence were very limited.

Therefore, it can be assumed that the Party's activities are at the same time Chinese Communists' activities. It is difficult to distinguish the Chinese elements from the Party activities. Needless to say, however, without participation as well as support from all the Malayan people, especially Malays, the struggle of the CPM can never develop, let alone be successful. Policies, programs, strategies and objectives of the Party always took all the nationalities (民族) of Malaya into consideration. In this chapter, I will refer to (1) the changes of the major policies of the Party and (2) the brief biographies of its top Chinese leaders. Combining them together, we may be able to understand, as for Malaysia, what the "Chinese communist movements" meant. From these policies we can discern how the Party tried to explore and win support from the other nationalities, especially Malays.

Loci of the changes of important policies

In February 1943, when Malaya was still under the Japanese occupation, the CPM Central Committee proclaimed the Nine Point Program as below.

1. Oust Japanese fascists from Malaya and establish the Democratic Republic of Malaya.
2. Establish a national regime through universal suffrage by all the nationalities. Fraternity, freedom and happiness of all the nationalities.
3. Freedom of speech, the press, association and belief.
4. Improve public welfare and working conditions. Relieve unemployed refugees.
5. Restructure the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army to the regular national army.
6. Implement general education by way of each ethnic language. Develop each ethnic culture.
7. Return the assets confiscated by Japanese fascists to the people.
8. Independent customs duties. Free trade with the fraternal countries.
9. Associate with the Soviet Union and China. Support independence of the oppressed nations in the Far East.

Two points should be emphasized here. First, prior to this, the CPM regarded Chinese and Tamil languages as the respective home country's language. In this program, the CPM regarded both languages as one of the ethnic languages of Malaya for the first time. It implied that the CPM considered Malaya as the home country of the Malayan Chinese in general. Second, "Democratic Republic" meant that the CPM intended to abolish the Sultan system.

On 25 August 1945, ten days after the end of the war, replacing the above Nine Point Program, the CPM Central Committee decided on the Eight Point Opinion initiated by Secretary General Lai Teck.

1 Support democratic allies of China, Soviet, the USA and Britain. Support the new international peace organization, the United Nations.
2 Implement democratic system. Establish a people's organization (民意机关) consisting of both ethnic groups and anti-Japanese parties.
3 Revoke all the Japanese organizations and laws.
4 4 to 6 correspond to 3, 4, 6 of the 9 points above.
7 Crackdown on corrupted bureaucrats and black market.
8 Favorably treat Anti-Japanese soldiers and relieve their bereaved families.

(Chen Yan 1951: 163–6)

This program has been repeatedly criticized as betrayal by the Party ever since it radicalized the political line. Critics say the "Opinion" replaced the struggle for independence with the request for self government. Based on this policy also, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, a resistance guerrilla force organized by the CPM immediately after the Japanese invasion of Malaya, was dissolved on 1 December 1945. Precisely speaking, "self government" is not referred to here as shown above. It is actually referred to in the new "Democratic Program" decided at the CPM Plenary Central Committee meeting held in January 1946. It states:

1 Establish the self government of Malaya.
2 Establish Parliament both of Malaya and of each State through universal suffrage by all the nationalities.
3 to 7, 9 are almost similar to 3, 4, 6, 8, 9 of the Nine Point Program mentioned above.
8 Equality of men and women (point 8).

A peaceful legitimate line based on this policy did not bear fruit and the British colonial government gradually strengthened its persecution against the Party. After Lai Teck absconded in early 1947, the new leadership headed by Chin Peng (appointed as new Secretary General in 1947) groped for a new strategy and finally decided to wage an armed struggle in May 1948. Mass arrests on 20 July 1948 by the colonial government forced the CPM to start an unprepared armed struggle.

In December 1948, the CPM Central Committee decided the Struggle Program that consisted of the establishment of a fully independent People's Republic of Malaya, total equality of each ethnic group, and nationalization of assets of British monopolistic capital.

On 25 January 1949, the CPM Central Committee announced a new Program as follows.

1 Establish People's Republic of Malaya.
2 Establish new democratic economy.
3 Abolish extortionate taxation.
4 Improve people's life.
5 Develop social welfare.

6 Establish new democratic culture.
7 Establish the National Defense Army.
8 Formulate equal and mutually friendly diplomatic policy.

(Chen Yan 1951: 174–5)

These policies were accompanied by extreme tactics to fight against the national bourgeoisie on the one hand and irrationally played down the enemy on the other. From 1951, the CPM began to reassess the policy and it led to the Baling Peace Talks of 28–29 December 1955 between the then Chief Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and Chin Peng. Prior to the Talks, the CPM clarified the following opinion in April 1954.

1 Stop anti-people's aggression war of British imperialists. Abolish "Emergency Regulations."
2 Establish a provisional coalition government consisting of patriots of each ethnic group and obtain full national independence.
3 Lift the embargo and expand foreign trades.
4 Profits of the British monopolistic capital in Malaya should be the main resources of revenue of the people's government.
5 Cultivators should own their cultivating lands.
6 Develop national commerce and industry. Equally treat workers regardless of gender and ethnicity.
7 Replacing the slavery education system, develop new patriotic culture of each ethnic group. Develop the education of each ethnic language.

(Shijie Zhishi Chuban She 1960: 13–31)

A week before the Baling Talks, on 22 December, the CPM Central Committee decided a new program called the CPM Declaration. It states:

1 Stop the war by negotiation and through just, reasonable conditions.
2 Realize independence of Malaya as early as possible.
3 Establish the parliament through full universal suffrage within the shortest period.
4 Respect the status of the Sultan of each State. Prescribe their status by the constitution enacted in the parliament.
5 Guarantee people's democratic rights. Everyone who regards Malaya as one's home country and pledges allegiance to it can become its citizen. Freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, demonstration, religion and belief.
6 Malay language is the national language. Recognize due position of other ethnic languages including English. Malay language should be a compulsory subject in non-Malay schools. Strengthen solidarity of all the ethnics.
7 Improve people's life and working conditions. Government cultivates savage lands and distributes them to peasants having little or no land.
8 Protect and develop national industries, agriculture and commerce. Foreign enterprises in Malaya should not be given more favorable rights than the Malayan local enterprises. Support replanting of rubber smallholders.
9 Observe international peace. Oppose aggression war. Implement equal, mutually beneficial and friendly diplomatic relations with other countries, especially the UK.

(Shijie Zhishi Chuban She 1960: 33–6)

For the first time, the CPM admitted the Sultan system and accepted the Malay language as the national language. In Baling, Chin Peng even accepted to dissolve the CPM. To replace it,

he requested the right to form a new entity which would not be termed a communist party. The Tunku not only rejected it but also demanded surrender and interrogation of every Party member. Thus, notwithstanding profound concessions by the CPM, the Talks broke down. Yet, the CPM continued with its moderate strategy in this period and only the hard core guerrillas remained in the jungle of southern Thailand close to Malaya.

Following advice from the CCP, the 11th Plenary Central Committee meeting of the CPM held in September 1961 decided to correct a "wrong, right-inclined line" and to adopt a correct armed struggle line. This was called the New Policy (新方針). After preparing gradually for several years, the CPM restarted armed struggle in mid-June 1968. Battles with the Malaysian army were intensified between the late 1960s and the early 1970s. At the peak of this armed struggle era, the CPM Central Committee decided a new program called "Program of New Democratic Revolution and Struggle," as follows.

1 Overthrow the rule of British imperialism and its puppets. Establish People's Republic of Malaya.
2 Guarantee democratic rights of people, respect the freedom of religion and belief.
3 Confiscate and nationalize enterprises of the imperialists and their running dogs. Protect national commerce and industry.
4 Abolish the feudal and semi-feudal land system. Execute the land system of "cultivators own their lands."
5 Improve working conditions. Equal wages for men and women.
6 All ethnic groups are equal. Oppose ethnic discrimination and oppression.
7 Establish strong people's army.
8 Develop patriotic, democratic and scientific culture of each ethnic group.
9 Support struggles of North Kalimantan people and of all the oppressed peoples.

(Barisan Sosialis Singapore 3 May 1970)

Radicalization of the policy can be read in "People's Republic" (meaning the abolition of the Sultan system), nationalization of imperialistic enterprises and no reference to Malay language as the national language.

Prolonged fierce armed struggle waged from 1968 did not bear satisfactory results. Besides it, China, the main supporter of the CPM and its armed struggle, changed the diplomatic policy to pursue cordial relations with the Southeast Asian anti-communist governments. Malaysia established diplomatic relations with China in 1974. Since the end of the 1970s, the CPM tried to explore ways to reach peaceful solutions. The new program promulgated by the CPM Central Committee in April 1980 is as follows.

1 Establish a democratic coalition government comprising representatives of all patriotic parties and non-party patriots.
2 All patriotic forces unite and wage a resolute struggle against hegemonist aggression and subversion and defend our national security.
3 Oppose foreign monopoly capital as well as the New Economic Policy aimed at developing bureaucrat capital. Protect the middle national capitalists and the interests of the workers.
4 Implement the agrarian system for land tillers. Grant land to peasants having little or no land.
5 Oppose corruption and increases in consumer prices. Protect fishermen, the urban poor and small holders.
6 Guarantee the freedom of individual thought, religious belief, expression, publication, assembly, association and strike. Safeguard basic human rights.

7 Respect the customs, ways of life and religious beliefs of the various nationalities. Guarantee complete equality for all the nationalities. Safeguard the right of each nationality to receive education in its mother tongue. Abolish national discrimination. Encourage the use of Malay as the common language of all the nationalities. Solve discord among the nationalities through consultation.
8 Encourage the different nationalities to learn from one another.
9 Develop the National Liberation Army into a powerful force for opposing hegemony and protecting the people's interest. Firmly oppose the anti-communist and anti-popular war being waged by the ruling clique.
10 Resolutely oppose imperialism, colonialism and hegemony.[4]

Coinciding with diplomatic policy of China in this period, "hegemonies" (meaning Soviet and Vietnam) became the most fatal enemy of the CPM, too. Patriotic forces, with whom the CPM would unite against hegemonic aggression, could include rational elements of the ruling clique. Establishment of the republic was withdrawn. Yet, neither the Sultan system nor the national language was referred to. Malay language was prescribed as the common language, although not as the national language.

Unofficial ceasefire negotiations with the Malaysian government and the Thai government began in early 1985, the official lower level one in May 1988 and the official high level one in February 1989. Apparently in order to prepare for the negotiation, the CPM Central Committee proclaimed the revised program as follows on 29 April 1985.

1 Establish democratic coalition government consisting of patriotic, democratic parties and non-party representatives. Support the constitutional monarchy system and the parliamentary democracy.
2 Oppose exploitation and control of our wealth by foreign monopolistic capital. Protect foreign capital that contributes to our national economic development. Oppose the New Economic Policy, various bureaucratic organizations and big bureaucratic as well as comprador capitalists. Improve working conditions.
3 Cultivators own their lands for cultivation.
4 Guarantee interests of fishermen, small holders, small businessmen and urban poor.
5 Protect fundamental human rights and democratic rights. Guarantee freedom of thought, etc.
6 Guarantee equal political and economic right, equal opportunity for entering school and right to use the mother tongue. Respect the special position of the Malays and the important position of the Chinese and Indians.
Malay language is the common language among all nationalities and the medium language for diplomatic relations. Guarantee legal status of other nationalities' languages including English. Propel development of Malay language education.
7 Develop patriotic, democratic and scientific people's new culture of each nationality. Our national culture consists of Malay culture as the main form, Chinese and Indian cultures as important forms as well as minorities' culture.
8 Respect freedom of religion and belief of each nationality. Raise patriotic spirit of Muslims and support their righteous struggle. Protect mosques, temples, churches and assets of each religion.
9 Stop continuation of anti-people, anti-revolutionary war of the Kuala Lumpur ruling clique.
10 Oppose dictatorial rule of the People's Action Party. Realize re-integration of Singapore and Malayan peninsula through negotiation.

11 Support the struggle of the people of Sarawak and Sabah to protect their rights. Support alliance of people of Sarawak, Sabah and Malaya through their voluntary will.
12 Oppose imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism and their penetration, subversion and invasion against our country. Protect security and territorial sovereignty of our country.

(Nandao Congshu Bianji Weiyuanhui 2000: 2–11)

The pivotal change here is the admission of the Sultan system. Based on this program, it might not be thoroughly impossible to negotiate with the government that claimed to uphold national sovereignty. Thus the peace accord was concluded in December 1989, and the CPM ceased political activities afterwards.

Main Chinese leaders of the CPM

Brief biographies of a few Chinese top leaders who were politburo members are as follows:

1 Chin Peng (陈平) also known as Ong Boon Hwa (王文华) (1924–)

Born in Sitiawan, Perak. Toward the end of the 1930s, while studying in a secondary school, he joined the anti-Japanese, relieve China movement. He engaged in underground activities in July 1940 and soon afterwards joined the CPM. During the Japanese occupation, as a CPM's Perak State Committee Member in 1942 and then as its secretary, he led the 5th Regiment of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army.

Soon after the end of the Pacific War, he was appointed as a Central Committee Member of the CPM. In 1947 he played a pivotal role to reveal the then Secretary General, Lai Teck's betrayal and to expel him from the Party. In 1947, he was appointed as Secretary General. Ever since then, he had retained this position as well as unshakable leadership. After starting armed struggle against the colonial rule in June 1948, his Headquarters was located in north Malaya for several years and then shifted to south Thailand in 1953. Toward the end of December 1960, he left the Headquarters in Sadao, south Thailand. After staying in Bangkok, Laos and Vietnam, he reached Beijing in June 1961. The first CPM Chairman, Musa Ahmad, had stayed in China since 1955. Deputy Secretary General, Lee An Tung, reached China at almost the same time as Chin Peng. Several Central Committee Members including Politburo members concurrently stayed in China. Sometimes receiving advice from the CCP, they discussed and decided important policies there.

In October 1989, Chin Peng flew from China to Thailand to conclude the Peace Treaty. After that, he stayed mainly in Bangkok, where he looked after the former MCP members. His wish either to return or to visit the home country, Malaysia, has been rejected obstinately by the Malaysian government.

2 Lee An Tung (李安东) also known as Li Changzhen (李长镇) and Lao Xie (老谢) (1917–99)

Born in Chaozhou, Guangdong. Following his mother, he went to Singapore in 1922. After graduating from Shantou Higher Secondary School in 1935, he taught at primary schools in Singapore and Johor. He joined the CPM in 1937. Prior to the Pacific War, he was in charge of the CPM's propaganda department. During the anti-Japanese war, he became a CPM Perak State Committee Member in 1943. He was appointed as a CPM Central Committee Member in 1947 and as a Politburo Member soon afterwards. He was elected as Deputy Secretary General in 1960. He left the Headquarters in Sadao toward the end of that year and reached Beijing in December 1961.

In the mid-1960s, influenced by the Cultural Revolution in China, he and his wife Ling Ying Ting (林英婷), who had been staying in China since 1951, insisted on immediately resuming the armed struggle inside Malaya. The Party leadership decided to send them back to the Headquarters in south Thailand to lead the guerrillas. In 1967 they arrived there and Lee was appointed as First Secretary of the CPM North Malaya Bureau, the highest commander of the front line. Real power was, however, taken over by Siao Chang (Zhang Chuanqing) soon afterwards. Convicted of trying to seize power, Ling Ying Ting was executed. Though he remained in the Headquarters, Lee had no influence. Nonetheless, when he passed away in south Thailand in 1999, the funeral service for Lee as Deputy Secretary General was reverently performed by the CPM members, including Chin Peng.

3 Zhang Chuanqing (章传庆) also known as Siao Chang (小章、小张) (1921–89)

Born in Temerloh, Pahang. When studying at a secondary school in Malacca, he participated in the anti-Japanese movement. He joined the CPM in 1938 and was appointed as a CPM Pahang State Committee member in 1941. He led the anti-Japanese guerrilla war in West Pahang and became Secretary of the CPM West Pahang Regional Committee in 1942. He was appointed as a CPM Central Committee Member in 1946 and as a Politburo Member in 1947.

In August 1952, he left Bentong, Pahang, where the Headquarters were located at that time, and through Thailand reached Beijing in April 1953. His role as a representative of the CPM Overseas Office was to consult with the CCP and the Soviet Communist Party. In order to lead the guerrilla war in the front line, he left China in January 1963 and, via Vietnam and Thailand, arrived at the Headquarters in south Thailand in January 1964.

He was CPM's chief negotiator of the tri-party peace negotiation started in Phuket Island in February 1989. Without seeing the conclusion, he passed away in Guangdong in May 1989.

Top leaders mentioned above started their communist activities prior to the Pacific War. All the other Chinese Politburo Members, Shan Ruhong (單汝洪) (1919–2011), Wu Rui'ai (伍瑞靄) (1923–2000), Wu Yit Shih (吳一石) (1922–90), Chen Kai (陈凯) (1921–2001) had done the same. Furthermore, two of them stayed in China, namely, Shan Ruhong (also known as Ah Hai, from 1949 till 1959 as well as from 1965 till 1972, and Wu Rui'ai from 1968 till 1987. This shows their special relations with the CCP on the one hand and their enduring, steadfast resolution to realize their ideal nation on the other hand. Conversely speaking, it means the Party did not satisfactorily nurture succeeding generations. From 1967 until the early 1970s, those who had joined the guerrilla force after 1962 were suspected of being government agents. Many were executed and the dissidence split the Party. Though after the 13 May Incident of 1969[5] many leftist youths who despaired of legal struggle joined the guerrillas; the CPM could not make the most of them.

The North Kalimantan Communist Party

Brief history of the NKCP

The official party documents state that the North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP) was formed on 19 September 1965. It was basically a communist organization of Sarawak (presently a state of Malaysia). British colonial authorities (who ruled Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei), and subsequently the Malaysian government called the local clandestine communist body the Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO). The SCO was actually the Sarawak Liberation

League (SLL, 砂罗越解放同盟) formed in July 1953 by young Chinese leftists led by Wen Ming Chyuan (文铭权). Its main objective was to overthrow the colonial rule and at its peak period had 3,000 members (mostly Chinese). Under its influence, the Sarawak Advance Youths' Association (先进青年会) and clandestine Sarawak Farmers' Association (农民协会) were formed in 1955 and 1961 respectively.

SLL's leading members were simultaneously involved in legal activities, too. Co-operation between them and the moderate leftists led by Ong Kee Hui (王其辉), Stephen Yong (杨国斯) (both of whom became Federal ministers after Sarawak joined Malaysia) resulted in the formation of the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP, 人民联合党) in 1959. With regard to the formation of Malaysia proposed by the then Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in May 1961, the SUPP, together with the leftists parties in three northern Borneo states, insisted that these three states should be unified and be granted independence first. In order to suppress opposition against the formation of Malaysia, the colonial authorities arrested radical leaders of the SUPP including Wen and Bong Kee Chok (黄紀作) on 22 June 1962. Wen, Bong and their wives were deported to China. SUPP's ally in Brunei, the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB, People's Party of Brunei) won all 55 seats in the first-ever general election for District Councilors held on 20 August 1962. As the British government entirely ignored the mandate, the PRB waged an armed rebellion on 8 December 1962. It was, however, quickly crushed. Mass arrests of leftist activists were carried out on 11 December in Sarawak. The remaining Communists gradually escaped to West Kalimantan (West Borneo of Indonesia) where they received military training from the Indonesian Army. Both Wen and Bong also secretly reached Indonesia from China in early 1963. From 1963 on, trained groups were sent back to Sarawak to conduct guerrilla war against the UK and then Malaysian government.

In April 1963, President of the PRB, A.M. Azahari, established the Revolutionary Government of the Unitary States of North Kalimantan in exile in Jakarta. In March 1965, three Chinese SLL members including Wen, who were all stationed in Indonesia, participated in the Azahari's cabinet. Meanwhile, two guerrilla units were established, the Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force in March 1964 (Renamed the North Kalimantan People's Guerrilla Force in July 1969) and the North Kalimantan People's Army in October 1965.

On 19 September 1965, top leaders including Wen and Bong convened the Plenum Central Committee Conference of the SLL in Pontianak, West Kalimantan. It decided to form the North Kalimantan Communist Party in replacement of the SLL. On the 28th of the same month, Wen and Azahari left for Beijing to attend China's national day ceremony. Two days later, the 30 September Incident took place and, soon afterwards, anti-communist General Suharto seized power. Communists from Sarawak were not only unable to receive support from the Indonesian government but were severely suppressed by it. Wen could not return to Indonesia. Guerrillas began to return to Sarawak from 1966 and completed the shift in 1972. Its membership reached a peak, more than 900, in 1971.

Guerrilla war inside Sarawak was not as successful as expected. Bong Kee Chok signed a peace agreement with the Sarawak government in October 1973 and his followers totaling 570 came out of the jungle in July 1974. Led by Ang Chu Ting (洪楚廷) and encouraged by Wen Ming Chyuan who stayed in China, the remaining 185 members continued with the armed struggle. From 1978 they tried in vain to establish enduring bases in West Kalimantan again. Due to harsh mopping up operations by both Indonesian and Malaysian armies, they all had to return to Sarawak by the end of 1985. Following the CPM, the NKCP concluded the Peace Treaty with the Malaysian government on 17 October 1990. Fifty-two remaining fighters came out of the jungle and the struggle of the NLL and the NKCP came to an end. Of five NKCP representatives who attended the signing ceremony, three were Chinese, one was an Iban and

another one was a Penan. Of the 52 fighters mentioned above, one was Iban, six were Penans and 45 were Chinese. From here we can discern how Chinese were dominant in the NKCP.

To understand for what purpose the Party was tenaciously fighting, its "Program of Present Struggle" published in 1983 is outlined here.

1 Overthrow imperialism as well as the dictatorial "Malaysian" feudal, bureaucratic and comprador cliques. Establish independent, democratic North Kalimantan.
2 Restrict foreign monopolistic capital and local bureaucratic compradors.
3 Oppose national chauvinisms.
4 Based on unified North Kalimantan, respect the autonomy of each nationality.
5 Guarantee workers' rights.
6 Protect farmers living in mountainous areas and other poor farmers of various nationalities.
7 Take care of the welfare of hill nationalities.
8 Protect the rights of each nationality.
9 Guarantee jobs and freedom of management.
10 Protect equality between men and women.
11 Reduce taxes.
12 Approve free usage and education of the mother tongue of each nationality.
13 Protect freedom of belief and religion.
14 Guarantee freedom of speech, assembly, publication, organization and demonstration.

(North Kalimantan National Liberation Publisher 1983: 27–9)

Lastly it should be pointed out that those who came out of the jungle in 1990 did not regard those that had come out in 1974 as renegades. They kept cordial relations as ex-comrades.

Top leaders of the NKCP

4 Wen Ming Chyuan (文铭权) (1932–)

Born to a Hakka farmer's family in Kuching. While studying at Chung Hua Middle School, he organized the SLL. While in the first term of the SUPP leadership he ostensibly held no official position, he assumed the role of head of the propaganda division and deputy secretary for the second and the third term respectively. He was arrested and, at his own will, was deported to China in June 1962. He went secretly to Indonesia in early 1963 and, while staying in Jakarta or Pontianak, led the armed struggle. Intending to return to Indonesia soon, he visited China on 28 September 1965. Due to the 30 September Incident of Indonesia, he had no other option but to continue to stay in China. *People's Daily* of China reported his activities in China 18 times between June 1966 and March 1978. When the Peace Treaty was concluded in October 1973, Wen, as Chairman of the NKCP, announced a statement severely criticizing it as betrayal. As for the Peace Treaty of 1990, however, he approved it. It reflected not only changes of the local situation but also the international situation after the end of the Cold War. As of this writing he is believed to live in China.

5 Bong Kee Chok (黄紀作) (1937–)

He was a Hakka. Educated both in Chinese and English schools he came under the influence of Wen at the Kuching Chung Hua Middle School. After the inauguration of the SLL, he was the right-hand man of Wen. Following Wen, in 1963 he secretly went to Indonesia from China,

where both had been deported in 1962, to lead the movement. When the North Kalimantan People's Army was established, he was appointed as its Commander cum Political Commissar. His younger brother, Bong Kee Siaw (黄紀晓), a Nanyang University ex-graduate, was also an influential leader of both the NKCP and the People's Guerrilla Force. According to a recently published history book (Yu Dong 2009: 121–31, 241), in early 1973, Kee Siaw received a letter from Wen instructing that legal as well as illegal (guerrilla) struggles should be carried out concurrently. Observing this instruction, Kee Chok concluded the Peace Treaty. He planned to execute legal struggle after coming out of the jungle. Wen, however, severely criticized the treaty five months later. Because of it, the Bong brothers abandoned politics.

6 Ang Chu Ting (洪楚廷) (1937-)

A Teochiu, Ang came to Sarawak from China at the age of 12. Dispatched to Sibu by the SLL in 1957, he vitalized the communist activities in the Sarawak Third Division. After the majority group led by Bong left the movement, Ang was elected Secretary of the 2nd Bureau (virtually the sole regional bureau) of the NKCP and Political Commissar cum Commander of the NKPA. In 1990 he signed the Peace Treaty as the chief representative of the Party.

To sum up, the NKCP, whose members were mostly Chinese and were devoted to all the people of North Kalimantan (formerly British Borneo), nevertheless failed to win enough support from the native people. This might be the main reason it had to conclude the peace treaty. If, however, the PRB had legally formed the government of Brunei and the 30 September Incident had not occurred, the situation might have been quite different.

The Communist Party of the Philippines

The Party and the Chinese

The first Chinese communist organization in the Philippines was the Chinese Labor Party (中华工党) formed in 1918. It supported the 5.4 Movement of mainland China in 1919, but waned by 1923. In 1928, the Chinese General Labor Union of the Philippines (CGLUP, 菲律宾华侨总工会) consisting of various Chinese trade unions was established by Xu Li (许立 also known as Xu Jingcheng 许敬诚). In 1929, it affiliated with the Philippine General Labor Union led by the native Philippino leftists. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was formed in 1930. The Philippine branch of the Chinese Communist Party (Qiao Dang, 侨党) led by Xu Li and Li Bingxiang (李炳祥 also known as Li Yongxiao 李永孝) affiliated with it. In the course of the anti-Japanese movement in the late 1930s, the CGLUP expanded its influence and was re-organized into the Federation of Chinese Labour Unions (FCLU, 菲律宾华侨各劳工团体联合会). Under the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the Qiao Dang and the FCLU organized the Anti-Japanese Chinese Regiment (华侨支队). By mid-1944, it had a membership of 700, of which 200 had experienced military training by the CCP in China. At first, it was a part of the Philippine People's Anti-Japanese Army (Hukbalahap, the Huks), the CPP's guerrilla force. In May 1943, however, it separated from the Huks, though retained cooperation, and it carried out its own warfare.

After the US re-occupied the Philippines in July 1945, the Qiao Dang, the FCLU and the Chinese Regiment executed legal struggles for a while. Their main objective was to support the CCP and oppose Chiang Kai Shek's Kuomintang. The US as well as the Philippine independent government turned to suppression of the Communists in 1946. Both Xu and Li had to leave the Philippines in the latter half of 1946. Between 1946 and 1949, 200 influential Chinese

Communists returned to China. Thus, prior to the ban of the Qiao Dang by the CCP in 1952, its activities had almost disappeared.[6]

From 1946 on, though the CPP adopted a legal, parliamentary line as well as an illegal, armed struggle line, it was not successful. In 1967, a new leader, Jose Maria Sison, re-established the Communist Party, and in 1968 established the New People's Army. Its armed struggle, though greatly ebbed, still lasts to this day. Nonetheless, no influential Chinese leaders are known in this movement.

Top leader of the CPP Chinese section

Xu Li (许立. also known as Xu Jingcheng 许敬诚) (1905–71)

Born in Jinjiang of Fujian Province. Xu Li went to Hong Kong in 1917 to study and was involved in the labor movement. He moved to the Philippines in the early 1920s and engaged in the student as well as the labor movement there. He joined the Communist Youth League (共产主义青年团), which was formed by Chinese young communists against Chiang Kai Shek's suppression, in 1928. He was dispatched by the labor union to Shanghai in 1929 and to Moscow in 1930. When he came back to the Philippines, he was already a CCP member. In the late 1930s, he led various anti-Japanese, save-China, support CCP movements and established an anti-Japanese newspaper. During the Japanese occupation period, he led underground anti-Japanese struggles, including the guerrilla war.

After the end of the war, he was elected as Chairman of a pro-CCP party, the Philippine Chinese Great Democratic League (菲律宾华侨民主大同盟). Due to suppression by the government, he was compelled to leave for Hong Kong in late 1946.

When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, he assumed the position of Deputy Director of the CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department. During the Cultural Revolution, he as well as 200 of his former comrades in the Philippines were said to be persecuted as agents of the USA and Chiang Kai Shek. His memorial service was held as late as in 1978 (Huang 2000).

It seems Xu and his comrades considered it much more important to win support of the Philippine Chinese for the CCP than to cooperate with the indigenous section of the CPP to liberate the Philippine people as a whole. It reflected the general atmosphere of overseas Chinese in the era of the national salvation movement. As for Chinese Communists who participated in the CPP movement after its re-start in 1968, new research is needed.

The Communist Party of Thailand[7]

The CPT and the Chinese

A communist clandestine organization in Thailand was originally formed in 1923 by the Chinese who were sent by the Chinese Communist Party or who ran away from Kuomintang's oppression. In the late 1920s, the Vietnamese also developed communist movements among Thai peasants in Northeast Thailand. Both forces merged to form the Siam Communist Party (SCP) on 20 April 1930. The inaugural conference was presided by Nguyen Ai Quok (Ho Chi Minh) who then was to come down to Malaya to convene the inaugural meeting of the Communist Party of Malaya. In the early stage of the Party, Vietnamese and Chinese were predominant both among the leadership and the membership. The first native Siamese Central Committee member was appointed in 1934. By 1936 the Vietnamese movements lost momentum due to

the oppression by the government and internal conflict. From then on, the SCP was virtually an Overseas Chinese Party (Qiao Dang 侨党).[8] It fought against colonialism as well as the feudal system represented by the monarchy. In the late 1930s, it mobilized masses for anti-Japanese movements mainly to defend China. In December 1942, a year after the Japanese military occupied Thailand, the SCP was reshuffled to form the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). Except for Thong Chamsri, of Vietnamese descent whose parents had migrated to Thailand, all the other top leaders were Chinese CCP members or persons of Chinese descent. The CPT led anti-Japanese resistance movements including small-scale armed operations.

After the end of the war, the ban against the Party was lifted temporarily in 1946 until it was banned again by Phibun, who seized power via a coup d'état, in 1947. During this period, the Party's influence extended amongst the local Siamese. Toward the end of 1946, the CPT was separated into the Thai section and the Chinese section. The former was led mainly by local-born persons of Chinese descent, and the latter (Qiao Dang) by the CCP members and consisted mainly of Chinese *sinkehs* (new migrants). When the second Party Congress was held in 1952, while the former had 200 membership, the latter had as many as 4,000 (Ness 2009: 3256–65). Following the CCP Central Committee's directive of January 1952 to dissolve the Thai Qiao Dang, it was dissolved in 1953. Many members including Qiao Dang's Secretary General, Li Chi Sin, went back to China and the rest joined the Thai Party. Prominent leaders of the Thai Party, including those of non-Chinese descent, went to China one after another to learn Marxism-Leninism and Mao Thought for several years each.

The third Party Congress held in 1961 decided on the inception of armed struggle. Cadres left cities for the countryside. Armed struggle started in August 1965. After the democratic movement was crushed by the military regime that had taken power again in 1976, thousands of leftwing students joined the forces. In 1979, at its peak, the CPT guerrillas were estimated to number from 12,000 to 20,000. Then, their forces began to decline because of (a) Sino-Vietnam conflict (both countries had been reliable supporters of the CPT), (b) China's rapprochement with the Thai government, (c) generational and linguistic barrier (old Chinese descendant leaders couldn't speak Thai well), (d) undemocratic Party system, (e) amnesty policy of the government. By the fourth Party Congress of 1982, half of them had left the jungle. In the 1980s, the Party virtually ceased operations.

The Secretary Generals of the Communist Party of Thailand were as follows.

1 Ngo Chinh Quoc (1930 to *c.*1931, Vietnamese)
2 Teng (1932–34, Hainanese?)
3 Tran Van Chan (1934–35, Vietnamese)
4 Le Manh Trinh (1935–36, Vietnamese)
5 Liu Shushi (1936–39, Chinese, 刘漱石)
6 Li Hua (1942–43, Chinese, 李华)
7 Pitchit Sukothai (1943–?)
8 (Chinese Section) Li Chi Sin (李啓新) also known as Bun Teck Chai (文[閔]德才) (1946–49, Chinese)
9 (Thai Section) Prason Wongwiwat (1943 or 1947–61, also known as Song Nophakhun, Chinese, Yu Song 余松)
10 Charoen Wangam (1961–79 also known as Mit Samanan, Thai of Vietnamese descendant)
11 Thong Chamsri (1979–2008, Thai of Vietnamese descendant)
12 (Splinter group) Wichai Chootham (2008–)

(This party was called the Siamese Communist Party in 1930–42, and the Thai Communist Party after 1942.)

Top Chinese leaders

Brief biographies of the top Chinese or leaders of Chinese descent are as follows.

1 Li Hua (1912–88)

Born in Guangdong, Li Hua came to Thailand in 1931. He was President of the Siam Chinese General Anti-Japanese Salvation Union (暹罗华侨各界抗日救国联合会) in 1938. He led the Chinese anti-Japanese underground movement and was the most influential leader of the CPT during the Japanese occupation period.

2 Li Chi Sin (1910–2007)

Born in Hainan, Li Chi Sin joined the CCP in 1927. He went to Malaya in 1929 or 1930. He was Secretary General of the CPM from 1933 until his arrest in 1934. Repatriated to China in the same year, he was detained by the Kuomintang government until 1938. After that he was sent to Thailand in 1941. He is said to have assumed the first Secretary General of the CPT when it was formed in December 1942. In 1943, as a top leader of the CPT he secretly sent a letter to the then CPM Secretary General of the CPM, Lai Teck. In 1947, he played a part in revealing Lai's real status as an agent of both the United Kingdom and Japan (Chin Peng 2003: 93, 94, 190). He became Secretary General of the Thai Qiao Dang from 1946 until May 1949 when he went back to China. In the PRC government, he assumed positions of General Secretary of the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee (in the 1950s) and Deputy President of the Hong Kong branch of the New China News Agency (1978–84). He was criticized during the Cultural Revolution.[9]

3 Prason Wongwiwat (*c.*1910–)

Born in Northeast Thailand (held Thai nationality) Prason Wongwiwat joined communist activities in 1935. He was arrested before the Pacific War and was released soon afterwards. He succeeded Li Hua as Secretary General.

4 Wirat Angkhathawon (1921–97)

His Chinese name is Fang Liu 方流 also known as Chen Yuan 陈远. Born in Bangkok to a Teochiu family, Wirat Angkhathawon started communist activities in 1940 and was sent to southern Thailand. He joined the Communist Party in 1943, and was elected to be a Politburo member in 1952 and to the the five-member secretariat in 1961. In the 1950s, he frequently visited China. From 1965, he lived alternatively in China, northern Thailand and the training base in Laos. In 1982 he joined a CPT base to participate in the fourth congress. In 1983 he was sent to China to treat an illness and never returned to Thailand. Though he never assumed the post of Secretary General, he was the most influential leader of the CPT after the end of the war. His Thai language with a Chinese accent was said to hinder communication with the newly joined youths who spoke Thai only. (This section on Wirat is based mainly on Ness 2009: 3538–9.)

5 Among the CPT Politburo or the Central Committee members, there were such persons of Chinese descent as Damri Raungsutham (Wu Weishi 吴维实) and Chao Phongphichit (Liu Yuanhong 刘源泓). Damri was born in Bangkok in 1923 and joined the Party before

the Pacific War. He was a leader of the labor movement. Chao was born in southern Thailand in 1923 to a family of Guangdong origin. He also joined the Party immediately before the war. He was a prominent theorist of the Party in the 1970s.

It should be noted that these Chinese Communists fought not for the Chinese community but for the whole Thai nation.

Conclusion

Communism and Communists principally surpass state (国家) and nation (民族). It is regarded as proletarian internationalism. When a country a Communist lived in was under colonial rule, his or her most crucial priority was to fight to win independence. After the independence of the respective country, the Communists fought for the liberation of other suppressed, marginalized people irrespective of nationality and ethnicity.

Chinese Communists in Southeast Asia embodied, or tried hard to embody this proletarian internationalism. This internationalism, however, tended to decline during the Sino-Soviet conflict after the 1950s. In this conflict, Southeast Asian Communist Parties, especially their Chinese leaders, sided with the CCP. Internationalism came to mean solidarity with the CCP. That is why they were seriously affected when the CCP began to prefer the relations with the respective governments. This solidarity came about because of the political situation of Southeast Asia rather than the blood connections.

In the case of the CPM and the NKCP, most of the leaders as well as the members were Chinese and most Party documents were written in Chinese. This might have brought about the lack of the native people's support. Chinese leaders of both parties could not fully unite with, nor could garner enough support from the natives, that is, the majority and decisive forces of each country. Meanwhile, in the case of the CPT, ethnic Chinese leaders played an important role as Thai leaders. Furthermore, in the case of the PKI and the CPP, the native leaders played a much more important role than the Chinese. As such, Chinese dominance inside the respective party was not the most fatal reason of their failure to seize power. More important reasons might be (a) exhaustive suppression, (b) lack of right, consistent policies and strategies, and (c) lapse of the Socialist Block. Anyhow, it cannot be denied that the Chinese Communists devoted their lives for the benefit of all the compatriots regardless of ethnicity and they covertly and overtly forced the respective governments to improve the basic human rights. And, finally, it cannot be denied that after the demise of their movements, disparities between the rich and the poor, the privileged and the deprived in Southeast Asian countries (actually in the world) seem to have widened.

Notes

1 CCP Central Committee's decisions are based on Mao and Lin (1993: 271–81). According to it, the decision of 1953 is as follows:

> Formerly through establishing branches among overseas Chinese, the CCP worked on Chinese workers and students. Then tried to organize and expand local Communist Parties consisted of the native peoples. Since the Second World War, the Overseas Chinese Party (华侨共产党) members waged and led anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the Philippines (hand in hand with the local nationals) and in Malaya. In Thailand, while carrying out anti-Phibun, Japanese puppet, struggle, the Overseas Chinese Party helped the native Siamese people to form their own Communist Party. The Burmese Overseas Chinese Party assisted the Burmese Communist Party in

various ways. Now that the PRC has been established, this situation cannot keep running any more. CCP's works on the overseas Chinese (华侨工作) should be separated from the national liberation movements of each country. The CCP decided not to establish branches among the overseas Chinese and advised the Chinese various democratic parties to do the same.

2 While Siauw Tiong Djin narrates it like this (Xiao 2001: 151), Brackman (1963: 207) states that Tan was expelled from the Party in 1954.
3 Years of his birth, arrest and death are based on Zhou (1993: 454). On the other hand, Siauw Tiong Djin narrates that Tan was arrested in 1966 and died six months later at the age of 65 (Xiao 2001: 271).
4 "Voice of Malayan Revolution," 28, 29 April 1980. (*Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 10(3): 345–53).
5 A bloody ethnic conflict took place in Kuala Lumpur three days after the general election. Hundreds of residents, mostly Chinese, were killed. The government proclaimed a state of emergency and the Parliament was closed down until February 1971.
6 The description here is mainly based on Liao (1993).
7 Unless specifically noted otherwise, this section on the CPT is mainly based on Murashima's various works (2002, 2005, 2008, 2009).
8 This can be discerned from the list of Secretary Generals, the top leader of the Party, discussed below.
9 The description here is mainly based on: http://nanhai.hinews.cn/thread-84816-1-1.html and http://club.sohu.com/read_elite.php?b=wangzhai&a=8018621 (accessed on 9 January 2011).

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Part V

Localization, transnational networks and identity

21

Diaspora and hybridity

Peranakan Chinese culture in Indonesia

Charles A. Coppel

This chapter argues that the terms "diaspora" and "hybridity" both illuminate and confuse our understanding of the Chinese overseas. It will use the culture of the *Peranakan* Chinese in Indonesia (most notably in Java) as the site for the discussion of this apparent paradox.

As Raymond Williams observed in the introduction to his classic *Keywords* (1976), there are some words that we use frequently in our most general discussions that pose difficulties because they seem to be "inextricably bound up with the problems [they are] being used to discuss" (Williams 1976: 15). Such words take on different meanings at different times and in different contexts, and are often subject to contestation. This is true of both "diaspora" and "hybridity."

For a long time the term "diaspora" was used specifically to refer to "the exile of the Jews from their historic homeland and their dispersion throughout many lands, signifying as well the oppression and moral degradation implied by that dispersion" (Safran 1991: 83). In recent decades, however, it has been increasingly used to refer to other peoples who have been dispersed from their places of origin across national boundaries (Cohen 1997) and has "lost its paradigmatic association with exile from home and the myth of return" (Ang 2005: 83). The first appearance of the term "Chinese diaspora" in a book title appears to have been in the American edition of Lynn Pan's *Sons of the Yellow Emperor* (Pan 1990a; cf. the English edition Pan 1990b).

Southeast Asian Chinese have been slow to accept the term as applying to them. They have had to struggle hard to demonstrate their local identification, and "fear being perceived as scattered communities without a sense of belonging" (Tan 1997: 28). By identifying themselves locally as Southeast Asians they have rejected the label "overseas Chinese" (*huaqiao*) with its connotation of "sojourning." In recent decades Chinese Indonesians have believed themselves to be overseas when they are in China, at home in Indonesia. Chinese immigrants in earlier generations may indeed have longed to return to their Chinese homeland but this longing is not shared by their Indonesia-born descendants. There has been almost no fresh immigration from China since the 1930s, and less than 4% of the ethnic Chinese population in Indonesia today are citizens of the People's Republic of China.

Another reason for the reluctance of Chinese Indonesians to regard themselves as part of a diaspora is the "archetypical status of the Jews among so-called diasporic peoples" (Ang 2005: 82). The use of the term diaspora may be new in this context, but making comparisons between the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Jews in Europe has a venerable pedigree. Negative

stereotyping of Southeast Asian Chinese in tropes colored by European anti-Semitism dates back to the earliest period of colonialism in the region. These were transferred into indigenous Southeast Asian nationalist discourses in the early twentieth century (Cribb and Coppel 2009: 456–8; Reid 2010: 375–8). Western sociological literature is rife with references to such categories as "entrepreneurial minorities," "pariah" capitalists or entrepreneurs, "trading minorities," "middleman minorities," and "essential outsiders." The parallels have been drawn for various purposes, principally to explain the role of the stranger in the rise of capitalism, the economic success of an ethnic minority, and the antagonism and violence shown toward members of such minorities in periods of stress (see, for example, Blalock 1967; Bonacich 1973; Chirot and Reid 1997; Dobbin 1996; Freedman 1959; Wertheim 1964). It is likely that the equation of their position with that of the Jews in Europe has even inspired the myth (widely held outside Indonesia) that hundreds of thousands of Chinese Indonesians were massacred in 1965–6 (Cribb and Coppel 2009). Within Southeast Asia, the prevalence of anti-Jewish rhetoric in Indonesia and Malaysia since the 1980s has given rise to suggestions that it may be a thinly veiled expression of racial hostility toward Chinese (Hadler 2004: 307, 309; Reid 2010). This is an additional reason for Chinese Indonesians to be wary of being thought a diaspora, or at least to wish to avoid explicit comparisons with the Jews.

Ien Ang (2003) has launched a different critique of the use of the term "diaspora" from a theoretical perspective. She acknowledges the liberating value to an ethnic minority of a transnational identification that can challenge "the territorial boundedness and internally homogenizing perspective of the nation-state" (Ang 2003: 142) but points out that it can come at a cost. A movement to create a worldwide diasporic community of people of Chinese ancestry (leading to what Ang [2003: 145] calls "transnational nationalism") creates a boundary between them and "non-Chinese." It assumes that "Chinese" everywhere are homogeneous and thereby distinctive from their "non-Chinese" neighbors. Against this "absolutising tendency in the vision of diaspora" – and, indeed, the concept of ethnicity upon which it rests – in an increasingly globalized world, Ang foregrounds the concept of hybridity. Her purpose is to enable us "to think for the world as a whole rather than for any particularist identity or community" (Ang 2003: 153).

Marwan Kraidy has remarked that hybridity is "a concept whose definition is maddeningly elastic, whose analytical value is easily questionable, and whose ideological implications are hotly contested" (Kraidy 2005: 3). The logic of Ang's argument suggests that the human race is hybrid, and that (to use Kraidy's words) hybridity can serve as "a universal description of culture" (Kraidy 2005: vi). The usefulness of the term thus seems to be limited to deconstructing the claims of ethnicity and diaspora.

Chinese around the world have become localized and have adapted their ethnic and cultural identities in different ways. In that sense they are all indeed hybrid, but perhaps it can be said that some Chinese are more hybrid than others. There is one category of Chinese in Southeast Asia – the *peranakan* Chinese of Indonesia – who have been singled out as a prime example of hybridity both in scholarly writing and in their own estimation.

Peranakan and *totok* Chinese in Indonesia

The modern, scholarly understanding of the term *peranakan* Chinese is a cultural one. It dates from anthropological and sociological studies of Chinese communities in Java in the 1950s. Willmott (1960: 103), for example, saw the line between *totoks* and *peranakans* as "one of the clearest social boundaries in the Semarang Chinese community … based upon linguistic, social, cultural, educational, and ethnic differences between the two groups." G.L. Tan found that in Sukabumi *totoks* and *peranakans* were "two distinct groups of ethnic Chinese … each with its

own identity and interests" (Tan 1963: 276). The most influential figure in this discourse, however, is that of G. William Skinner. In a series of articles published between 1958 and 1963 (Skinner 1958, 1960, 1961, 1963) he addressed the questions of acculturation and assimilation, giving particular attention to persistence in Java of the *peranakan* Chinese as a group intermediate between the *totok* Chinese and indigenous Indonesian society. In a more recent essay, he returned to the *peranakan* Chinese of Java in a wider comparative framework as the outstanding case of a "creolized Chinese society" in Southeast Asia (Skinner 1996).

The key (but not sole) distinction between *totoks* and *peranakans* in these writings is one of language usage. *Totoks* are "those whose language of daily use is Chinese … " (Skinner 1958: 3); "the distinguishing mark of a Peranakan is his inability to speak one of the dialects of China's coastal provinces … " (Willmott 1960: 111). The terminology was drawn from established usage among *peranakan* Chinese in Java that was current at the time, and it was soon adopted by political scientists and historians writing about the politics of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (Coppel 1973: 143–5; Somers 1964: 4; Suryadinata 1976: 4). Although similar *peranakan* Chinese communities have existed in Indonesia outside Java (Coppel 1973: 158–60) and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, none of these "creolized Chinese societies" can compare in size and continuity with those of Java (Skinner 1996).

Although much of this chapter will discuss the culture of the *peranakan* Chinese of Java, it is necessary to enter a caution at this stage. Analytical concepts of this kind are attractive for their seeming ability to convey a quick and fundamental understanding, but they should not be taken as absolutes that are either fixed or uniform regardless of time and place. Ien Ang has perceptively described the concept of "Chineseness" as "an open signifier, which acquires its peculiar form and content in dialectical junction with the diverse local conditions in which ethnic Chinese people, wherever they are, construct new, hybrid identities and communities" (Ang 2001: 35). In a narrower frame of reference, much the same may be said of the use of the word *peranakan* in relation to the Chinese in Indonesia. The term *peranakan* has been used in ways that differ from the social science meaning just referred to, and significant regional variation among *peranakan* Chinese communities in Java itself should make us beware of the dangers of generalization.

The word *peranakan* is not Chinese in origin. Its etymological origin is *anak*, a Malay/Indonesian word that means "child." A standard Indonesian dictionary defines it as "offspring of indigenous and foreign" (*keturunan anak negeri dng orang asing*) (*Kamus Besar* 1989: 32). It can be used in this sense (which has echoes of the origins of the term "hybrid" in the natural sciences) to apply to others of mixed indigenous and foreign ancestry, such as Europeans and Arabs, as well as Chinese. Its antonym is the word *totok*, which carries the meanings of "pure," "real," "genuine," "full-blooded" (*Kamus Besar* 1989: 959).

Another usage of the term *peranakan* in relation to the Chinese has been to denote those born in the Netherlands Indies as opposed to the new arrivals from China (*sinkheh*). Before the twentieth century there were few *sinkheh* women. As a result most "local-born" Chinese were to some extent of mixed (i.e. non-Chinese) ancestry. It did not follow, however, that the "local-born" Chinese were *peranakan* in the social science sense. In areas outside Java like the "Chinese Districts" of West Kalimantan, for example, they retained Chinese as their first language (Heidhues 2003: 192–4). In the early twentieth century the rapid growth in the number of *sinkheh*, including for the first time significant numbers of women, combined with the development of Chinese nationalism and the spread of Chinese schools, made it possible for a settled *totok* society to be established alongside the older, numerically larger *peranakan* society. Even in Java the "local-born" children of marriages between male and female *sinkheh* could now grow up *totok* (Skinner 1963: 105–10).

The usage of the term *peranakan* to refer to the "local-born" matched the Dutch law of 1910 which claimed as Netherlands subjects (*Nederlandsch Onderdanen*) all those who were born in the Indies of "foreign" (especially Chinese and Arab) parents who were domiciled in the Indies (Coppel 2002: 142). In colonial Malay parlance, therefore, *peranakan* could be shorthand for "foreign" Netherlands subjects of Chinese ancestry, thereby distinguishing them from the foreign Chinese who were for the most part *sinkheh*.

Hoadley (1988) draws attention to the use of the category *peranakan* in Cirebon by the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) after 1730 to draw a line between those of Chinese ancestry and the Javanese majority. "[P]ersons born of Javanese mothers and Chinese-origin fathers who were also Muslim" (Hoadley 1988: 504) had taken up Javanese names and could become ministers to the Javanese princes. In response to Dutch moves to transfer these people (whom they called *peranakan*) to the authority of the *kapitan cina* (a company official responsible for the Chinese), the Cirebon princes established a *kapitan peranakan*. The outcome was to constitute these *peranakan* as an ethnic group intermediate between Javanese and Chinese (Hoadley 1988). The Cirebon case is but one example of a wider identification over several centuries of local-born *peranakan* Chinese with Islam. In the early nineteenth century it was common in Java to have a *kampung peranakan* under the authority of a *kapitan peranakan* but these positions were gradually abolished from the 1830s (Lombard and Salmon 1994; Salmon 1996: 194). Thereafter, the colonial government increasingly used the term *peranakan* to apply to the local-born Chinese in general rather than those who were Muslim.

The most recent attempt to redefine the term *peranakan* is by historian Anthony Reid. He suggests that in the circumstances of Indonesia since the fall of President Suharto in 1998 "Indonesians of some Chinese heritage" need a new label to replace "Chinese" to help them "escape the burdens of Chineseness." He believes that *peranakan* is "the least offensive and most appropriate label now on offer for one Indonesian ethnic group among others" (Reid 2009, 2010: 379 fn 7). This proposal abandons the established social science cultural meaning of *peranakan* and applies the term to all Indonesian citizens of Chinese ancestry, a usage close to that of the late colonial era.

The purposes of this chapter are best served by using the social science definitions of *peranakan* and *totok*, but it is important not to essentialize or reify either of these terms. Hybridity is not a *peranakan* monopoly; *totoks* can be hybrid too. At the time of the 1920 census the language of daily use of many of the Chinese communities outside Java was overwhelmingly some form of Chinese (Coppel 1973: 158–60), but the culture of these *totoks* was influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the indigenous communities amongst whom they were settled. As Skinner (1963: 104) put it: "The locally rooted Chinese communities in Indonesia can be ranged along a gradient according to the degree of indigenous influence in their synthesized culture." In his view, the *peranakan* Chinese of Java stood at one extreme of this gradient with an essentially separate social system. At the other extreme were the locally rooted Chinese of Bagan Siapi-api "whose emerging culture [was] far more Hokkien than Malay, and the language of daily use [was] virtually unadulterated Hokkien" (Skinner 1963: 104). The other locally rooted Chinese communities could be placed between these *peranakan* and *totok* poles, depending upon the degree of indigenous influence on their synthesized culture.

The *peranakan* Chinese communities of Java themselves have been far from uniform. This can be illustrated from the data in the 1920 census. Of the 69.9% of the Chinese population who were *peranakan* (because they did not use some form of Chinese as their "language of daily use"), 51.1% used Malay, 14.5% Javanese, 3.5% Sundanese, and 0.7% Madurese. The variations from one administrative region to another across Java were even more striking. In Batavia – where almost 80% of the Chinese were *peranakan* – almost all of them used Malay as their

language of daily use. In Banyumas, with a similar percentage of *peranakans*, almost all of them used Javanese and only 8% used Malay (Coppel 1973: 153).

At best, these figures from the 1920 census can only give us a snapshot, however. There are no data from other censuses from which we could measure changes in "language of daily use" among the Chinese population which would enable us to determine, either in Java as a whole or in particular regions, whether the proportion of *peranakans* was rising or falling or, among the *peranakans*, whether the proportion who used Malay or another local language was changing. The history of language usage among the Chinese in Java has been very complex and contested (Oetomo 1991; Rafferty 1984; Skinner 1996: 59–60).

The 1920 census data are also quite crude. While they are valuable in delineating broad regional variations, they cannot tell us about variations within particular regions. They cannot tell us whether the *peranakans* spoke a distinctive dialect of Malay or Javanese. Nor can they tell us what other languages they had at their command or in what circumstances they switched from one language to another (Oetomo 1988; Rafferty 1984; Wolff 1997). Like the broadbrush division of the Chinese into a *totok/peranakan* dichotomy itself, they are silent about households in which the husband/father is *totok* and the wife/mother is *peranakan*. Furthermore, they fail to capture an important sociolinguistic development among the upper echelons of the *peranakan* Chinese – the growing use of the Dutch language. The number whose language of daily use was Dutch would have been statistically insignificant in 1920, but the introduction of Dutch-Chinese Schools (Hollandsch-Chineesche School) in 1908 had set in motion a process that consolidated the separation of *peranakans* from the *totoks* (Govaars 2005).

Notwithstanding these qualifications, the 1920 census data at least enable us to establish the size of the Chinese *peranakan* communities (in the accepted social science cultural meaning of the term) in Java and Madura at that time. Numbering more than 268,000 people, they were on a scale sufficient to support an impressive and variegated hybrid culture. This "creolized culture," as Skinner called it, went well beyond their mother tongue being a local language influenced by Hokkien (Skinner 1996: 59–64). In various cultural realms there could be found features that were Chinese, indigenous and creative adaptations of both. As in the case of language use, these features were not uniform across Java or constant over time.

Nor was change only in one direction. An earlier trend toward acculturation could be reversed under the influence of a movement toward resinification. This happened in the mid-nineteenth century in Surabaya, for example, where the Hokkien Kong Tik Soe (Temple of the Merits of Fujian) was established "to restore Confucian social order and eradicate superstitious beliefs" among Chinese who had adopted practices such as worshipping at the tombs of Muslim holy men (Salmon 1996: 195–9). A similar case is the more widely known Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (THHK) established in Batavia in 1900 "to promote the reform of the customs of the Chinese people as far as possible in accordance with the teachings of the Prophet (*Nabi*) Confucius" (Coppel 1996: 121). The modern Chinese schools, with their instruction in Mandarin, pioneered by the THHK in Batavia, and with encouragement from the Chinese government, quickly spread across Java and elsewhere in the archipelago. Their initial success in resinifying the *peranakan* contained the seeds of their ultimate failure to unite the *peranakan* and *totok* Chinese. It was the catalyst for the decision of the colonial government to establish Dutch-Chinese schools which proved more attractive to the *peranakans* (Govaars 2005: 104–13).

A trend in the opposite direction occurred under the New Order government of President Suharto (1966–98), which adopted much of the agenda of a small group of Chinese Indonesian assimilationists and extended it to a broad suppression of Chinese culture (Coppel 1983). Chinese schools, which had already been limited to students who were not Indonesian citizens, were closed down. All ethnic Chinese, whether they came from *peranakan* or *totok* families, now had to

attend national schools in which the medium of instruction was Indonesian. Publications in Chinese characters were officially banned, and had to be declared for customs purposes in the same way as drugs, firearms and pornography. Although the restrictions were not watertight – Mandarin films could be smuggled in from Hong Kong or Taiwan, for example – the younger generation of ethnic Chinese grew up in an Indonesian environment in which Chinese culture was stigmatized. Chinese associations (except those in certain specified fields) were outlawed. Under pressure from the government, large numbers of Indonesian-citizen Chinese changed their names to Indonesian-sounding ones, but their identity cards were still marked with a distinctive code. Expressions of Chinese religious belief and traditional customs could only be performed at home or inside temples, not in public view. After three decades of Suharto rule, in which two generations of ethnic Chinese were Indonesian-educated, the distinction between *peranakan* and *totok* lost its salience except for the older generation. The younger generation of today are largely unaware of its existence and are more likely to identify themselves simply as "Chinese-Indonesians" if they acknowledge themselves to be "Chinese" at all (Dawis 2009; Hoon 2008: 4–6, 80).

Indeed, the very existence of a *peranakan* community (as well as the meaning of the term) has been a product of particular historical circumstances in particular localities. The national census in 2000 showed that the number of Indonesians with a Chinese ethnic background who identified themselves as Chinese had declined markedly (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta 2003). The 2005 Intercensal Population Survey showed that the decline was continuing despite the dismantling of most if not all formal discrimination against the ethnic Chinese (Ananta *et al.* 2008: 20–25; Lindsey 2005). Identifying themselves as being something other than "Chinese" in answer to a census question about ethnicity does not preclude Indonesians of Chinese ancestry from presenting themselves as Chinese in other circumstances, however (see Hoon 2008: chapter 7 on ethnic boundary crossing and hybridity). Nevertheless, a discrete *peranakan* Chinese culture in Java is best understood as a phenomenon of the past which is now celebrated and commemorated as part of the Indonesian national heritage (e.g. Peranakan 2009).

Peranakan Chinese culture in Java

Cultural expression among the *peranakan* Chinese of Java has been rich and variegated. Over a long period they were active as patrons and participants in various cultural forms. The discussion here is necessarily selective and it will give special attention to those that demonstrate their hybridity with some emphasis on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The earlier history is often obscure because of deficiencies in the available sources. For that period a few examples will have to suffice.

It is evident that for centuries the Chinese were actively engaged in the arts in Java. Much of this must have been originally entertainments associated with the temples imported from China, but we know that at least as early as 1814 a *peranakan* Chinese in Semarang called Tan Tiang Tjhing pioneered a fashion for Javanese *gamelan* music (Kartomi 2000: 282–4, citing Liem Thian Joe's history of Semarang). The Chinese in central and eastern Java also sponsored leather shadow puppet performances (*wayang kulit*) which included not only the Javanese *wayang purwa* (based on the traditional Mahabharata and Ramayana epics) but also the rare hybrid *wayang thithi* (based on traditional Chinese stories) (Pausacker 2005). Performances of *gamelan* music and *wayang purwa* were held at Chinese temples for religious festivals and were commissioned by Chinese patrons for other special occasions elsewhere. *Peranakan* Chinese were among the performers as *dhalang* (puppeteers) or instrumentalists.

During the nineteenth century *peranakan* Chinese in Java developed a taste for traditional Chinese literature translated into local languages. The translations into Javanese rarely appeared

in print but some manuscripts have survived, and there is ample evidence of *peranakan* who were able to read and write in Javanese characters (Salmon 1987a). Translations into Malay were much more numerous. Salmon's 1981 bibliography lists 759 translations from Chinese excluding re-editions (Salmon 1981: 10). From the fact that over 40 Malay translations of Chinese novels appeared in print within the space of only three years during the 1880s, she infers that they must have previously circulated in manuscript form or been published in serial form in the press (Salmon 1987b: 404, 412). These translated works, which included historical novels, love stories, stories of trial cases about righters of wrongs, and novels dealing with the supernatural world, were very popular among *peranakan* Chinese who were unable to read them in their original language. Their popularity stimulated continued production of new translations in succeeding decades, either as books published in installments or as serials in the press. Some of them were extremely long. For example, two different translations of the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* were published in installments between 1910 and 1913, one of them running to 4,655 pages, the other to 5,308 pages (Salmon 1987b: 414–15). The most popular genre of works translated from Chinese in the last decade of colonial rule and again after Indonesian independence was the cloak-and-dagger or *kungfu* novel (known in Malay as *cerita silat*) which also had strong appeal for indigenous Indonesians (Salmon 1987b: 421–6; Suryadinata 1987). One of the most prolific authors of cloak-and-dagger stories was Kho Ping Hoo who wrote original stories in this genre under the name Asmaraman Sukowati (Sidharta 1994).

In addition to fiction, translations from Chinese into Malay included a substantial number of religious and didactic works, which were published in serial form in the press or in separate books. Among these works, translations of the Confucian classics were particularly important, as they were regarded by some as the Holy Books of a Confucian religion. In some cases they were accompanied by parallel texts of the original in Romanized Hokkien and/or Chinese characters (Coppel 1981: 183, 187–9). In the twentieth century *peranakan* Chinese were active together with Javanese and Europeans in the Theosophical Society and in Javanese mystical sects (*kebatinan*) such as Sumarah. The prolific and versatile writer Kwee Tek Hoay, who had such interests, was a key mover in the Buddhist revival in Java in the 1930s (Brown 2004; Sidharta 1989).

Peranakan Chinese writers were also active in translating European works into Malay. The Salmon bibliography lists some 233 of these, almost all of them published in the twentieth century. Unsurprisingly, Dutch and Eurasian translators were at work earlier in this field, but it is noteworthy that a translation of *The Count of Monte Cristo* by Alexandre Dumas appeared in the 1890s, apparently done in collaboration by Lie Kim Hok and the Eurasian journalist and author Ferdinand Wiggers (Salmon 1981: 10, 31). At that time such collaboration across the ethnic divide grew naturally out of their working for the same Malay newspapers, which sought a readership from "all nations" (*segala bangsa*) (Coppel 1995: 18). When a vernacular press in Malay Romanized script began to appear under Eurasian leadership in the middle of the nineteenth century, it is clear that *peranakan* Chinese were subscribers, and contributed letters, news and articles to the newspapers (Adam 1995: 58). By the 1880s they were beginning to own printing presses and to publish printed books and newspapers themselves (Salmon 1981: 95–100, Adam 1995: 63–71). It should not be assumed that their literary activity in Malay only began with the availability of printing presses using Romanized characters, however. It is evident from poems (*syair*) surviving from the early twentieth century that some still wrote or copied Malay manuscripts in *jawi* (Arabic-derived) script which were available to be borrowed from lending libraries (Chambert-Loir 1992; Salmon 1981: 15–16). This activity, practiced mostly among the *peranakan* Muslims, probably predated publication in print, but the evidence is scarce and the subject under-researched (Salmon 1992: 2).

The literature in Malay by the *peranakan* Chinese in Indonesia is extensive and wide-ranging. Salmon's bibliography listed 3,005 titles published between the 1870s and 1960s, the work of

806 authors and translators. Excluding re-editions and translations of Western and Chinese works, this enormous corpus, which is by no means exhaustive, includes some 1,654 original novels and short stories, poems of *syair* type, and plays (Salmon 1981: 10). This output dwarfs the production of the body of modern Indonesian literature written by indigenous Indonesians in the same period, but until recently it has been neglected by the mainstream. The rationale for the neglect was the belief that the *peranakan* Chinese used a distinctive and separate dialect (Chinese Malay) and that their literary production, a Sino-Malay literature, was likewise separate from Indonesian literature. Before about 1920, however, *peranakan* Chinese writers understood themselves to be writing in what many of them called "low Malay," "Batavian Malay," or simply just "Malay." It was the written form of the *lingua franca* Malay used by all ethnic groups in the cities of Java. *Peranakan* Chinese, Eurasian and indigenous journalists worked on the same "low Malay" newspapers (Adam 1995; Coppel 1995; Oetomo 1991: 55; Salmon 1981: 115–22). The publications of Lie Kim Hok (1853–1912) include *Malajoe-Betawi* (a pioneering Malay grammar which appeared in 1884). His mastery of the Malay language was widely acknowledged and not only by his fellow Chinese. According to Adam (1995: 66) "his works left an indelible mark on the development of modern Indonesian language and literature." Ironically, in later years many referred to him as "the father of Chinese-Malay" but the idea of a Chinese-Malay literature or an ethnically separate variant of Malay language was not born until about a decade after his death (Coppel 1995; Salmon 1981: 115–22).

Apart from their translations and journalism, *peranakan* Chinese writers embarked on what proved to be a major body of original writing. In the late nineteenth century, they wrote *syair* (a form of verse) for various purposes. Some were for pure entertainment. Others commemorated important recent occasions, like the visit of the Siamese king to Batavia, the inauguration of a railway line, the visit of a Japanese circus troupe to Yogyakarta, or the founding of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan in Batavia. Others were versions in *syair* form of an emerging genre of "stories which really happened" (*cerita jang betoel soeda kedjadian*). From around the turn of century this genre usually appeared in prose. Written by Eurasians and *peranakan* Chinese, these stories were either novels (hitherto unrepresented in Malay literature) or stories about sensational events reported in the press.

The period around the turn of the century can be regarded as a high point for a multiethnic mestizo society in the urban centers of Java (Coppel 1997). *Peranakan* Chinese interacted with Eurasians and Javanese in various cultural fields. Kartomi speaks of *gambang kromong* music and *lenong* theater as examples of "a new, syncretic, creative impulse and style" in which *peranakan* and indigenous artists each "contributed elements from their own cultural traditions" (Kartomi 2000: 308; see also Kwa 2009a). The *Komedie Stamboel* popular theater of the time reflected the hybridity of the society. It was a multiethnic enterprise in which *peranakan* Chinese participated as impresarios, actors and audience together with people from other races. Their performances included dramatic renderings of the low Malay "stories that really happened" (Cohen 2006). According to Kartomi, *peranakan* Chinese were "in the forefront of the development of the commercial music industry" and some families opened up music businesses, publishing records and selling gramophones, musical instruments and sheet music (Kartomi 2000: 293–4). *Peranakan* Chinese also had an important influence on the textile traditions of Java. Their women wore the *kain/kebaya* (the Javanese skirt cloth and blouse) but developed their own distinctive styles, most noticeably in the *batik* cloth produced in urban centers along the north coast of Java (Maxwell 1990: 260–80; Kwa 2009b). Ethnic Chinese owned most, if not all, movie theaters in the Netherlands Indies in the early twentieth century, and were at the forefront of the film industry there. Although the Wong brothers, who pioneered the latter, were *totok* Chinese from Shanghai, the industry was funded by *peranakan* businessmen and a number of the films

were set in the Indies, including one based on Kwee Tek Hoay's best-selling novel *Boenga Roos Dari Tjikembang* (The Rose from Tjikembang) (Sen 2006). The *peranakan* Chinese Kho Wan Gie created the first comic strip (*Ko Put On*) to be drawn by an Indonesian. It was immensely successful, appearing regularly in the newspaper *Sin Po* (1930–42 and 1946–60) and its successor *Warta Bhakti* (1960–5) (Sidharta 2000).

Nevertheless, the most spectacular manifestation of the hybrid *peranakan* Chinese culture was its literary production. As well as the literature in Malay catalogued by Salmon, this includes the enormous output of the *peranakan* Malay newspapers and their magazines like the weekly edition of *Sin Po* (Suryadinata 1971). The press had become more ethnically defined by the 1920s than in its formative years, but it did not confine its coverage to matters internal to the Chinese community. Because their literary production was written and published in a language and script that were intelligible to the indigenous community, the *peranakan* Chinese were never as "foreign" as colonial government policy dictated.

Peranakan Chinese and Yiddish cultures compared

The Chinese and Jewish diasporas have typically been compared in ways that tend to essentialize them. They have both been portrayed as trading minorities separate from the majority among whom they live; as essential outsiders seen as an unchanging foreign body in the host country; and as victims of violence fated to be the object of stereotyped prejudice.

Such comparisons emphasize the separateness of the diasporic communities from their neighbours, but pass over the different ways in which they have adapted to local conditions. Shifting the focus to *peranakan* Chinese culture in Indonesia emphasizes the hybridity and changeability of Chinese in the diaspora. It would be instructive to compare this cultural phenomenon with its counterpart in the Jewish diaspora, namely the Yiddish language and culture of Ashkenazic Jews in Europe before the Holocaust, but no detailed comparison has been undertaken. In her introduction to the first volume of the Gramedia series republishing works of Chinese Malay literature, Myra Sidharta referred briefly to Yiddish language and culture among European Jews (Marcus and Benedanto 2000: xiv) but this is a rare exception (see also Reid 1997: 46–7 and 50–1).

The Yiddish language is a form of German strongly influenced by Hebrew and Aramaic which was used widely across central and eastern Europe before the Second World War. Originating in earlier centuries with translations of and commentary on religious texts, in the late eighteenth century Yiddish was the literary vehicle both for the spread of Hasidic Judaism (using stories based on folk tales) as well as for opponents of Hasidism led by secularist Jewish proponents of the Enlightenment (*Haskalah*). In Germany the famous philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, who translated the Torah into German, was prominent in the latter group. Although he spoke and wrote Yiddish, Mendelssohn disparaged the language as "jargon," "an impure language that lacked beauty and coherence." In Germany "[a]bandoning Yiddish for German soon stood as a hallmark of enlightened, integrationist German Jews" (Shandler 2006: 7). By the late nineteenth century many German Jews were highly educated with extensive interests in high German culture (Lowenstein 2005: 127–9). In their desire to identify with the Indonesian nation after Indonesian independence, the *peranakan* Chinese abandonment of "low Malay" and their embrace of standard Indonesian (*bahasa Indonesia*) show some similarity with the earlier experience of the German Jews. Standard Indonesian developed from the form of Malay promoted by the colonial government's Balai Poestaka as a "language of culture" and the hybridized "low Malay" which was favored by the *peranakan* Chinese was denigrated as a mere "language of communication" or even as a "gibberish-Malay" (Maier 1991). In the changed circumstances after Indonesian independence, this pejorative understanding of "low Malay" was internalized even by those

who had been its practitioners (Tjan 1992: 163). The use of *bahasa Indonesia* was now the hallmark of educated Indonesians, including those of Chinese ancestry.

In Eastern Europe, by contrast with Germany, a modern Yiddish literature began to flourish from the late nineteenth century and reached its fullest maturity in the early decades of the twentieth century until the catastrophes of the Holocaust and Soviet antisemitism virtually extinguished it. Coincidentally, this was also the heyday of *peranakan* Chinese literature and culture in Indonesia before nationalist pressures to assimilate made it, too, a "vanished world" (Abramowicz 1999; Vishniac 1983). As in the case of the *peranakan* Chinese of Java, there was a large and significant body of Yiddish literature, music, theater and cinema. The postwar vogue of Ashkenazic *klezmer* music in the USA and elsewhere has helped to create what Mark Slobin has called "nostalgic diasporism," a yearning for the Yiddish world that existed before the Holocaust (Slobin 2000; Strom 2005). Strom gives examples such as the screening of films about *shtetl* life before its destruction, the revival of pre-war Yiddish-language films, the publication of new Jewish magazines with a focus on Yiddish culture, the proliferation of Yiddish language and studies courses, a growth in interest in Jewish genealogy and subsequent growth of travel to former and current Jewish communities in Central and Eastern Europe. There are some parallels to this in the case of *peranakan* Chinese culture. In Malacca, Penang and Singapore traditional houses have been restored and decked with *peranakan* furniture and artifacts to serve as museums or boutique hotels. Restaurants specializing in *nyonya* cuisine also cater to tourists. *Peranakan* Chinese culture is commemorated in the Peranakan Museum and Baba House in Singapore, and hybridity among the Chinese overseas has been foregrounded in the exhibition "Chinese More Or Less" at the Chinese Heritage Centre at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. *Peranakan* Chinese associations exist in countries to which Chinese Indonesians have emigrated like the Netherlands and Australia.

The *peranakan* Chinese past has been increasingly celebrated in the more democratic and pluralistic Indonesia that has emerged since the fall of President Soeharto in 1998. In 2000 Indonesia's largest publisher Gramedia published the first volume in a series of reprints of Chinese Malay literature (Marcus and Benedanto 2000). Some 150 works totalling 15,000 pages have been selected for republication in the series, to appear in 25 volumes, of which ten have so far appeared. A much larger corpus of this literature comprising 953 titles from Myra Sidharta's personal collection has been reproduced on microfiche and is available for study in major libraries including the Library of Congress. The magazine *Sinergi* republished selected *Ko Put On* comics, serialized Chinese Malay novels and *cerita silat*. In 2009 a sumptuously illustrated book was published containing chapters on the Chinese Malay literature and press, architecture, household furnishings, decorative arts, clothing, music, dance, ritual and cuisine (Peranakan 2009). In November 2011 the Benteng Heritage Museum opened in a restored nineteenth-century building in Tangerang (near Jakarta).

The parallels between *peranakan* Chinese and Yiddish culture should not be stretched too far. We can recognize similarities in the use of low Malay and Yiddish as languages of communication across state boundaries but the low Malay of the *peranakan* Chinese was a lingua franca for all races in the archipelago whereas Yiddish was quite foreign to the speakers of Slavic languages in eastern Europe. It is true that low Malay and Yiddish had similarly low status among speakers of the official languages of what would become Malaysia/Indonesia and Germany, but the Chinese Malay literature was accessible to the majority population in a way that Yiddish was not. The fact that the latter was published in Hebrew script cut it off from non-Jewish speakers of German (even if Yiddish might be to some extent intelligible to them in spoken form), whereas the Malay used by the *peranakan* Chinese was in a familiar script (Romanized or *jawi*) and was never published in Chinese characters.

These differences suggest that there are important distinctions to be drawn between the "nostalgic diasporism" of the two cases. One obvious distinction is that there are few survivors of the Holocaust who still live (or live again) in central and eastern Europe, whereas many descendants of *peranakan* Chinese still live in Indonesia even if the younger generation now see themselves as Indonesians of Chinese ethnicity (or at least Chinese ancestry). Second, the culture of the *peranakan* Chinese was much more accessible to the local population and less inward-looking than Yiddish culture. The similarities were greater in the case of the German Jews who adopted high German culture in the nineteenth century and the Chinese Indonesians who participated in mainstream Indonesian culture after Indonesian independence. A third related difference is that the *peranakan* Chinese were at least initially the outcome of mixed marriages between immigrant Chinese and local people, whereas Jewish communities were quite strictly endogamous.

In 1959 the Jewish social anthropologist and Sinologist Maurice Freedman wrote that it would make an "interesting and instructive study" to find "what things are common and not common to Jews outside Israel and overseas Chinese" (Freedman 1959: 68). He might have extended this suggestion to include a comparison of the speakers of Yiddish who settled in Palestine before the establishment of Israel and the *peranakan* Chinese speakers of Javanese and Balinese who "returned" to China in the 1950s and 1960s (Chaver 2001 and 2004; Godley 1989; Tan 2010). In making a preliminary attempt to take up Freedman's challenge, this chapter accepts that there may be value in making a comparison between Chinese overseas and Jews outside Israel, but it seeks to avoid making generalizations about the two diasporas which can all too easily tend to reinforce stereotypes by blocking out the historical phenomena that do not fit the generalizations. This would be particularly inappropriate when comparing two such hybridized cultures. The purpose of the comparison here is to shed light on these two "vanished worlds" and to stimulate new questions about their respective rich cultural life and experience.

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22

Changing identities of the Chinese in the Anglophone Caribbean

A focus on Jamaica

Yoshiko Shibata

Chinese arrival in the Anglophone Caribbean consists mainly of three stages: first, as indentured laborers between the mid-1850s and the late 1870s;[1] second, as voluntary migrants between the 1890s and 1940s; and lastly, as voluntary migrants from the late 1970s or 1980s until today. The majority came from Southeast China, especially from Guangdong. Among them, Hakkas predominated especially in the first two stages, for example, in Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana. The number and the proportion of the population in residing societies have remained small from the beginning.[2] This together with the physical characteristics and cultural distinctions made the Chinese in the Caribbean appear as "visible minorities."

Chinese as a whole have been categorized simply as "Chinese." While they themselves have generally used the term, they have never been homogeneous. Criteria for such demarcation have varied with time, but the following are usually mentioned: origins/roots (both factual and imagined) or place of birth and upbringing, migration routes, occupation, socioeconomic class, mother tongue, religion, and political standpoint. Their internal diversities, with differences causing occasional schisms, have carefully been negotiated to re-define their ethnicity while consolidating its assumed boundary and deepening mutual understanding. In other words, despite there being generalized images and stereotypes, their identity as Chinese has never been unanimously defined. It has been constructed and re-interpreted according to circumstances combined with biological and socio-cultural linkages to China and the Chinese both in the mainland and their diasporas. Their perception of nationality, citizenship and the sense of belonging therefore have fluctuated.

A large majority of the first and second sets of Chinese in the Caribbean are regarded as local and creolized, while contemporary newcomers are either "in transit," remaining as foreign migrant workers, or becoming local. With increasing intermarriages, mixed-race Chinese have also increased. Often they are loosely regarded as "Chinese," or they may be alternatively considered as "mixed (race)," officially or otherwise. Their identity is often a hybrid and may change through the stages of life or in time.

I will introduce the heterogeneity and Chineseness of the Chinese community in the Caribbean, as well as their socio-cultural changes, focusing on the name, language, intermarriage and the mixed-root offspring.[3] I shall distinguish the "Old Chinese" and the "New Chinese."

From adjustment to localization

"Founding fathers" of the Caribbean Chinese: from indentured laborers to settlers

After the Emancipation in 1838, much needed cheap labor was recruited from China and other nations, such as Portugal and India, to replenish African ex-slaves. With the earliest Chinese experimental immigrants to Trinidad in 1806 failing, Chinese indentured workers were reintroduced after the 1850s,[4] more than a decade later than the (East) Indians. While the 1850s and the 1860s were the heydays of the indenture system, roughly 19,000 Chinese went to the British West Indies until the 1880s (Look Lai 1998: 6).

The Chinese entered peculiar colonial societies with a fairly rigid racial/ethnic pyramidal hierarchy: a small white European ruling class on top, a large majority of "Africans"/Blacks at the bottom, and a minority of mulattos/Colored in between including recently introduced Indians and Portuguese.[5] Blacks were mostly creolized apart from the newcomers (free voluntary workers mainly from other West Indian societies and Africa). They were not merely accustomed to the European colonial systems and cultures but absorbed colonial norms and values albeit with appropriation. Creolized migrants tended to be more favored than un-acclimatized newcomers because of their better understanding of plantation routines, expectations and prohibitions in the new settings.

The newcomers' positioning therefore was tricky and thus sensitively and tactfully maneuvered: after the settlement, the Chinese were destined to compete with those newcomers as well as the creolized Blacks. In other words, from the beginning Chinese were compared with such others with demarcated ethnicity. With their reputation of diligence and reliability,[6] the Chinese were relatively preferred as industrious workers, albeit not always,[7] to the Indians and especially Blacks who had long been stigmatized by the European colonizers. Racial/ethnic stereotypes, primarily as a consequence of racism, affected their inter-ethnic relationships: the Chinese were susceptible to such influences.

A large majority of Chinese chose to remain in the colonies after their contracts expired.[8] A few re-indentured themselves but most left the estates to seek for better opportunities especially in towns and cities, mainly to start small businesses (typically opening a grocery shop) or re-migrated to more promising places within the Caribbean.

Some local governments supported such ventures. From 1865 British Guiana allowed the Chinese to have their own settlement, called Hopetown, in an area far away from the capital Georgetown (up the Demerara River, on a little creek). This was organized by a Singaporean Chinese missionary, and it developed into a fairly thriving ethnic community with its peak year in 1874 holding 800 Chinese[9] based on charcoal and shingles business with some agricultural work. Though it came to be abandoned because the residents sought after better fortunes one after another in Georgetown and elsewhere, they found a breakthrough into retail trades, hitherto monopolized by the Portuguese.

One of the characteristic problems of this period was the imbalance of sex ratio. Generally, only a few women left their homeland to work.[10] While the indentured men tried to fulfill their responsibilities to send remittances back home, many men not only found local sexual partners but settled and formed families with various races (mostly Blacks and Colored) and produced "mixed-race" children. The localization thus began.[11]

Importation of Chinese indentured labor ceased in the 1880s mainly because the system was too costly and the Chinese Government refused to continue with it on the basis of the length of servitude and obligatory entitlement of the return passage. Indentureship was short-lived:

British Guiana between 1853 and 1879, Trinidad between 1853 and 1866, and Jamaica between 1854 and 1884. The survivors would be later honored as the founding fathers of the Chinese communities by their descendants.

Recently there has been an increased desire within the Chinese community to rekindle their past. While many present descendants may no longer actively pass on detailed oral histories of their ancestral past, individual and network-based projects to collect and retrieve memories of the Chinese in the Caribbean have been praised within and even outside the Chinese community. This is very significant because they succeeded in showing their heterogeneous "Chineseness," embracing atypical experiences and stories told and written by themselves. At the same time, some have realized that much more should be done. Resources and materials (e.g. memories, objects, memoranda/notes, correspondence, photos) that were neglected, forgotten, or buried are to be sought for and restored, recorded, examined, analyzed, and even reproduced. It is clearly important for the local Chinese to have recognized, remembered and commemorated their shadowy history, local-cum-transnational, which started as indentureship. This is their local history.

Chinese community development by free migrants

The second stage of migration consisted predominantly of free migrants aspiring for economic betterment, who would form an emerging merchant sector. A minority of ex-indentured workers joined in, therefore creating increasingly visible expansion of the ethnic community. These groups are known to have laid the foundation of Chinatowns and Chinese communities.

Trinidad, for example, encountered a noticeable increase in the Chinese traders, merchants and shopkeepers from 1911 (Chinese revolution), and also between the 1920s and 1940s. Most of this increase was due to the chain migration of families, relatives and "friends" of preceding immigrants. In addition, ex-indentured laborers from other neighboring colonies, primarily from British Guiana, joined in.[12] After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the number of new immigrants decreased.

Within this second stage, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, the Chinese population reached its zenith with accumulated wealth from trade and commercial activities. They formed an ethnic enclave downtown,[13] albeit on a small scale, while also spreading into rural communities mainly as shopkeepers.[14] Such development and interactions with the locals led to the formation of images or stereotypes of the Chinese as diligent and frugal, generous and smart, but also stingy and cunning.

The Chinese adjusted themselves to the new environment but the processes were neither easy nor unilateral. They tried to maintain their "traditions" through locally available resources, even if they might not be regarded as "authentic" any more by the conservative "China-born" Chinese. Such unique processes of blending and merging gave rise to the Chinese Creole and the localized Chinese culture.

Willing and unwilling adaptations and adjustments led the way to multiple localization processes. The gender imbalance of the immigrants was remedied by seeking partners overseas and to a certain extent even by bringing women from China through kinship networks.[15] The men having sexual relationships with non-Chinese women brought forth a new generation of "mixed-race" children. The distinctions between "pure-blood(ed)" and "mixed" Chinese were used more internally than externally; it was not easy for a non-Chinese to distinguish the differences among them.

Emerging sub-ethnicities, especially those based on places of birth and languages, began to influence internal dynamics of ethnic communities. In particular, the distinctions between "home-born/

China-born" vs. "local-born", or "Chinese nationals" vs. "local Chinese" would influence many aspects of Chinese lives and community.[16] Their identity, nationality and sense of belonging, all of which are inseparable, intricately layered and intertwined, were negotiated and sometimes surfaced as topics of discussion both orally and in writing. Here the language, both spoken and written, mattered: Chinese proficiency was regarded as essential to be "pure" and "authentic" Chinese.

With their variant Chinatown and various associations/networks, the Chinese communities built up fortunes and reputation. Since the late nineteenth century they became very active in both further adapting to the local societies and keeping up with their "traditions" and ethnic culture. Their efforts to not only contribute to their fellow ethnic Chinese (including the increasing "mixed-race" citizens) but also to the wider society were appreciated on the whole.

However, their success, economic and otherwise, attracted jealousy and even animosity from other ethnic communities especially around the turn of the century and the early years of the twentieth century.[17] Efforts to limit and hinder Chinese immigration became a national issue. For example, in Jamaica, a law was passed to regulate immigration in 1905, followed by additional legal enforcement to levy a deposit per person and to impose an English language test in 1911. In 1931 the Jamaican government demanded Hong Kong not to issue passports to those intending to emigrate to Jamaica. Finally in 1940, all Chinese were banned from entry except diplomats, students and tourists with permits.

Tightened border controls and immigration laws with impositions of monetary and linguistic constraints aroused suspicions about their positions and statuses in local societies. While immigrants were principally Chinese nationals, the already settled Chinese had regarded the host society as the very base of their livelihood and they tried to gain acceptance and respect from the wider society. Opinions varied on the reasons behind the tightened immigration. The spread of opium, gambling, liquor shops and the like, together with impervious state controls over them came to be problematized by Jamaicans. The Chinese were mainly blamed for the increasing moral degradation despite the lack of clear evidence (Bryan 1996: 217–25). As a result of such turbulent pressures and repercussions, the Chinese became more aware of how they were observed and socially positioned by the wider society.

Chinese visibility became more noticeable downtown with an expanding Chinatown, while a large majority of residents, i.e. lower class Blacks, remained economically deprived. After Independence in the 1960s (Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in 1962; Guyana in 1966), the widening gap between the wealthy and the destitute frustrated and irritated the Blacks, whose racial-cum-class consciousness was stirred through the concurrent radicalized Black Power movement. Most of the Chinese had established themselves as the "haves." However, regardless of their age or sex, the Chinese were occasionally targeted with stereotyped name-calling like "*Chiney nyam dawg*!"[18] ("Chinese eat dogs," suggesting "how low, crude and uncivilized!"), and "*Chiney, gu-weh* (go away)!" or "*Gwaan ome* (go home)!" A majority of those who regarded themselves as proud citizens felt hurt and humiliated. The 1965 anti-Chinese riot in Jamaica was interpreted by the local Chinese as evidence of insults and not being regarded as "fellow" countrymen but rather, to their dismay, as one of the exploiters of the "have-nots."

Such turbulent years were followed by more "unfavorable" political (e.g. democratic socialist) and socioeconomic changes especially in the 1970s. Many Chinese in British Guiana/Guyana left for the North (e.g. UK, USA, Canada) together with many other upper and upper-middle class people largely due to the leftist political leaderships and racial disturbances. Such brain-cum-finance-technology drain, they say, devastated the on-going process of decolonization and nation-building. Jamaica also saw successive "exoduses" to the North from the late 1960s through the 1970s, while Trinidad experienced more prolonged outward migration well

into the 1980s. Hitherto thriving Chinese communities declined rapidly, dwindled, dissolved, or nearly disappeared.[19]

The New Chinese

In the 1980s, the major Anglophone Caribbean nations shifted toward neoliberal policies after the leftist governments failed economically. In Jamaica, the new government created economic free zones to attract foreign capital. Together with the Chinese Open Door Policy, this brought a new influx of Chinese migrants. There were mainly two types – contractual free zone workers and those who sought entrepreneurial opportunities.

The free zone workers were mainly recruited from Hong Kong, largely constituting young women who spoke Cantonese and Mandarin (*Putonghua*). They were considered as cheap labor and were willing to work even below the national minimum wage. The local lower-class majority often felt bitter toward them and many joined workers' unions.[20]

Their presence was invisible to the eyes of the non-Chinese Caribbean who bracketed all those with oriental features as Chinese, but they were conspicuous to the settled Old Chinese. These workers kept to themselves and were rarely integrated into the wider society. Apart from Sundays, they were in factories, dormitories, or commuting to and from on the contracted mini-buses. The opportunities to build relationships with the others were mostly confined to work breaks with Afro-Jamaican co-workers and at stores. However, the language barrier limited conversations and many preferred to congregate within their own group. They would not engage with the local Chinese either. After the work contracts ended, these free zone workers returned to China or signed new contracts elsewhere and stayed in the free zones.[21]

The other Chinese came to Jamaica with the aspiration to start up their own businesses. They saw the Anglophone Caribbean as a favorable location as it was reputed to be "easy for money." These New Chinese regarded themselves primarily as temporary traders because they intended to build enough capital and knowledge/skills to re-migrate to economically wealthier countries such as the USA.

The aftermath of the political "exodus," as mentioned previously, left the Chinese community to disintegrate. Its once thriving Chinatown became occupied and controlled by lower-/lowest-class residents, street vendors, unemployed, and even criminals and gangs. Although the daytime activities recalled what this downtown area used to enjoy, the Old Chinese avoided stepping foot there at all costs for their own safety. This was where the New Chinese ventured for business opportunities.

They learned the basics of Creole language (*Patois*), business skills including risk management, and became street smart. Various precautionary measures were implemented such as conducting business transactions through wired fence (as some Old Chinese did), not completely trusting the local employees to handle financial matters, promptly closing shops, and swiftly heading back to their uptown homes. In time, they sought to reach out and started networking transnationally.

However, they did not actively engage in localization and creolization. This may be partly because their ultimate goal was to re-migrate. They viewed the locals as customers, employees, or even business rivals rather than as neighbors, friends, or community members; hence their interactions and transactions remained as such. They could not relate to the Old Chinese. The settled locals were clearly (if not too) localized and different – their roots had already grown deep into the soil and expanded, nurtured by the tropical sun and water to have born different kinds of flowers and fruits from those in their "ancestral" land.

The Old Chinese, who worked up from the ground and viewed themselves as established, kept their distance from these "reckless" and "un-established" people. Many confessed they could

not consider these New Chinese, including free zone workers, as their "compatriots." The Old marked the New as the "Others": their mannerisms and even their appearances were perceived as "foreign" and even "bizarre." Sharing apparent oriental features meant that the Old inescapably faced being categorized the same as the New by the non-Chinese locals, and that made them feel all the more uncomfortable and even disturbed. In this sense, perhaps it is not surprising that the Old broadly considered the New as "real Hakka (guest family)," irrespective of their homeland.

The existence of the otherness, especially in an intra-racial context, is an essential factor in better understanding one's own identity, social positioning, local societies and cultures. Both Old and New Chinese were aware of their own perception of the other and the others' perception of them: they were "othered" by the others.

Most Old Chinese cultivated a multi-layered sense of self with different concepts of "home." Especially for those who lost direct contacts or had unverifiable memories or knowledge, "routes" may have become "roots" as Clifford aptly put it (Clifford 1997). They may feel and think of the Caribbean more as their "home" than their ancestral homeland in China. One's own birthplace and the land of upbringing matter to most, although the idea of lineage still may fabricate different homeland(s). Nationality also differed between them though some recent migrants and multiple diasporas who extend their family ties transnationally and therefore moved fairly frequently between "homes," held dual nationalities, using the passports befittingly. For those Caribbean Chinese who have experienced intra-Caribbean migrations,[22] their sense of belonging may well show the plurality of Caribbean nations.

Furthermore, the exodus generation of the Old Chinese, even after they settled with (semi-) permanent homes and established themselves as respectable citizens of the host nations, also maintained their ethnic identity based on their birthplaces, i.e. specific countries in the Caribbean. They formed and activated Caribbean-based ethnic (Chinese) communities and associations between the Caribbean and the North through multiple diaspora networks. Moreover, the recent use of the internet, especially of social networking, websites, and being part of the online community have and will continue to play a significant role in the resurgence of transnational ethnicity.

With time, nationality and citizenship as well as sense of belonging, became more diversified even within a family. They became more aware of their own dynamic ethnicity, multiple senses of belongingness, and changing identification (Hall 1990). Such processes were often challenged by their observation and communication with "'othered" compatriots particularly in a metropolitan environment. Re-construction of identity and ethnicity, or re-ethnicization emerged especially when they encountered "other" Chinese (of course including those from mainland China) and other Chinese diasporas who had different origins with contrasting roots and routes.

Changing self and ethnicity for further heterogeneity

Names and naming

Foreign names can be awkwardly handled/processed by those who do not speak the language. Such was the case when the Old Chinese stepped into the Caribbean. When registering upon arrival, the Romanization of the names was subject to interpretation by the Western ear and even with the help of a translator, it was not uncommon for the name order to be changed, its spelling to be twisted into familiar pronunciations, hard phonemes to be left out, or even for it to be converted to an English sounding name. Such transformation can be seen in Guyana and Trinidad where Chinese honorifics such as "A" often became part of the official surname such as Achong and Sue-A-Quan.[23] The Chinese often acquiesced to these anomalous/odd derivations

but continued to use original names and nicknames among the compatriots. Some were given or gave themselves English names to be easily identifiable for official and business purposes, which gained more currency. Chinese began to contrive and manipulate names, both given at birth and after emigration, to be used by Chinese and non-Chinese, official and non-official, depending on suitability. Gradually the use of bynames and double naming became customary and grew in popularity.

Many second generation Chinese were given Chinese names, but these were rarely recorded officially. If any, their spellings were written close to English. Among family members and relatives, particularly if both parents were "pure" Chinese, their Chinese names were used. But if either parent was a local-born (most likely a mother), English names were also used.

The family, especially the children, usually quickly learned to appraise the situations for the appropriate use of their names. For example, original Chinese names were relatively avoided in public spaces including schools. At home, they were called by their Chinese names by parents while hired domestic helpers ("nanas"), if they had one, called them in English or English-sounding names. Some children were taken to Sunday schools by neighbors and might be christened later. For the sake of avoiding cumbersome embarrassment, first names were usually chosen from common Christian or English names. On the whole they learned to survive by two different names, and this became customary. Thus Westernization-cum-localization advanced in both parents' and children's worlds through different settings and in a variety of manners. But some Chinese recall fond childhood memories with their parents and grandparents, cherishing their Chinese names. As years passed by, only a few have accurate memories of the literal meanings of their names and fewer yet can write them in Chinese.

Even the New Chinese created bynames and would use English names for official/public purposes, business, socialization and even domestically (e.g. with hired "nanas"). As with the Old Chinese, these attitudes and practices were primarily adopted out of necessity. Gradually, however, with continuity, willingness came to dominate, and they also practiced selective usage of names depending on situations.

Language

Language – whether as a communication tool (social interaction, education, work, etc.) or for ethnic pride – is one of the key areas that has seen significant change. For indentured laborers, even from the pre-embarkation stage, a bilingual interpreter played a role to mediate between the Chinese and English worlds. When a problem arose, this language "expert" was called. Naturally the Chinese needed to understand the new language(s) as soon as possible for survival and preparation for the next stage because the language skills would lead to empowerment.

The Chinese needed to deal with the locals and officialdom for business negotiations, transactions, bargaining as well as settlement of disputes. They gradually learned the language hierarchy: the official language (English) was/is considered the most prestigious, while the locals commonly use(d) the lingua franca Creole (called *Patois* in some societies). Often the shop counters were the very place for contacts and "encounters" between adult Chinese and the local residents (Lee 2003). The locals themselves were not homogeneous in racial/ethnic/socio-cultural backgrounds and these factors reflect their linguistic habits and speech acts. Therefore the district of residence and the type of locals they negotiated with influenced the kinds of language they became familiar with.

Children on the other hand, would be more exposed to localness, including the Creole language. School and church became the key agents for acquiring respectful English. But even there, their ears caught melodious Creole. They learned folk culture through Creole: folk tales

(*Ananci* stories), folk songs, Afro-oriented beliefs, witchcraft (*obeah*), and folk religions. They also began to understand linguistic hierarchy and colonial prejudice.

Since the parents' generation (i.e. first generation) was primarily tied to work from early morning till night, they spoke their native language among themselves (mainly Hakka or Cantonese, and to a much lesser extent Fujianese), alongside their rapidly acquiring local language. They might speak to their children in their "dialect" from time to time, but they did not have enough time to "teach properly," especially written Chinese. It was inevitable for those children without Chinese instruction at home or elsewhere to lose Chinese proficiency. Unique phenomena toward English/Creole-based monolinguality emerged among children's generations. Although local-born children hardly forgot or lost their sense of being Chinese, the heritage of language became an issue.

When they were eager to settle down with good reputation, their primary linguistic concern was directed more toward speedy acquisition of the correct and official English. This was a natural course of action for successful development in an ethnic community. However, the advancement of localization went hand in hand with evident disinheritance of Chinese proficiency and literacy; that is, the Chineseness was being "diluted."

Chinese language classes and Chinese schools were established with the ethos of using the language as the backbone to re-identify their ethnicity and diverting the interests of the local Chinese to their "homeland," China. Even the language schools sought to ingrain solid historical and cultural knowledge. At one point, the Chinese education and language instruction were well-received. They were financially supported by the Chinese nationals and willing local-born parents together with locally organized associations. However, soon a number of problems arose such as the cost of recruiting Chinese teachers, formulating curricula, and determining pedagogical approaches. These issues were not simply about Chineseness but were to do with their social positioning within the settled society. Chinese in Guyana, for example, pleaded with the then government for financial support to recruit a Chinese teacher from China. While they regarded such petition as quite natural, this plea was refused and they were advised that such matters should be dealt only among themselves.

The force of creolization was visible. Jamaica's Chinese Public School was established as Sin Min School in 1924 but was closed 41 years later in 1965, mainly due to financial problems (dwindling student population) and the decline in prestige and stature within the ethnic community. The 1943 census showed the increasingly hybridized residents: the proportion of "Chinese Colored" occupied as much as 45% (5,515) out of the total Chinese (12,394) (Lind 1958: 152–3) which combined both the China-born and the local-born. Furthermore, the shrinking number of Chinese readers became evident as the Chinese journal written in English (*The Pagoda,* 1940 to 1970s) outlasted newspapers and journals written in Chinese (mostly published since 1930s).

Although Chinese literacy was not necessarily associated with ethnic orientation or even nationality, one's language ability was significant to the community. This is still true today even though the large majority of local-born Chinese are no longer competent in Chinese speech or literacy. The recent encounter with the New Chinese led them to question their hybridized Chineseness. Consequently, many have felt the urge to re-construct what they have considered as "authentic" Chineseness through re-examining themselves without negating localization and creolization in the process.

At the same time, language-cum-(sub)ethnic differences remain important to the Chinese. They know that languages are associated with certain social positions: this is not only an intra-racial matter but also about how the wider society perceives them. They evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy of using certain languages/dialects over others (whether using standard or Creole English; and/or Hakka, Cantonese or Mandarin), depending on situations (to whom and in

what context). While the wider society certainly has checked their English abilities, English and Creole should not be considered as opposing but are interconnected with colonial prejudice. Hence proper language usage has been deemed mandatory to gain and maintain respectability and trust.

Many local-born Chinese recall bitter and yet amusing anecdotes of their Chinese parents' (largely the fathers') clumsiness in English or the mélange of verbal mannerisms in their mother tongue. Prevalence of English/Creole usage accelerated, accompanying the negligence of Chinese heritage transmission, but such processes and experiences were very complicated. Local contact zones became the negotiating space for localization, hybridization and ethnicization with essentialism vectoring inclusion–exclusion dynamics both within a loosely defined Chinese community and with the wider society.

The internal demarcation along language lines has never been static, but that aside, English skills have been unvaryingly important for the settlers. On the other hand, they also understood the value of bilingualism. Those who could afford to send their children "back home" to China (usually their hometown) immersed them in the Chinese language and culture through schools and daily interactions, hoping to invigorate and re-identify themselves as more authentic Chinese.[24] But most local-born Chinese whose parents aimed to become respectable citizens with upward mobility, hardly had such opportunities and they encouraged receiving English education.

By the time the new immigrants came, the Old Chinese as a community had nearly lost their linguistic ancestral heritage whilst maintaining familial and business contacts. New encounters with the Old (mainly Hakka-speakers) and the New Chinese (mainly Cantonese-speakers with Mandarin) evoked sharper differences than perceived sameness and have triggered a re-examination and even resurgence of their ethnicity (Shibata 2005, 2006a).

The recent expansion of Chinese global presence through its increasing economic empowerment has bestowed pride and confidence in having a Chinese heritage, even to the Old Chinese. However the opening of a new Mandarin class at the Chinese Benevolent Association in Jamaica (2003) was not initially received with the enthusiasm the organizers had hoped for. It was not directly intended to bridge the Old Chinese and the New Chinese but opened doors to anyone who might be interested. Despite the repeated publicity within the Chinese community, those who enrolled in the beginning were only a small (though currently increasing) number of children, summoned by their eager families, and several adult local Chinese. The language gap between the Old and the New has remained wide.

Hence, language-based "ethnoscapes" (Appadurai 1996) have shown both juncture/junction and disjuncture/disjunction among them. Language-related local needs as well as desires have been so diversified that it may no longer be possible to embrace and consolidate them unanimously. Because of such heterogeneity, however, or rather therefore, their on-going negotiation and appropriation of ethnicity may develop further, incorporating wider networks with the globalized Chinese diasporas, whose roots and routes have expanded more elaborately. This time will be more transnational than before.

Intermarriage[25]

The Caribbean region, widely known for its unique composite with an on-going process of creolization and hybridization, has enriched its societies and cultures through embracing the Chinese. The Chinese contribution to physical and cultural amalgamation, however, is less known, compared with other racial/ethnic groups.

From the early stages of settlement, Chinese learned racial politics and even absorbed a part of the colonial hierarchy that was based on racism. They tended to emulate prevalent colonial

racial/ethnic superiority especially over "Africans"/Blacks,[26] even if they themselves were discriminated against and laid close to the bottom of the social scale. Notwithstanding their feminized stereotypes (e.g. docility), they showed their ethnic pride through "violent" strikes[27] against wretched working and living conditions, demonstrating their manly force with a sense of rivalry. At the same time, they could cooperate beyond racial/ethnic boundaries when necessary and even developed comradeship.

As mentioned earlier, the lack of Chinese women resulted in men looking for alternatives by choosing from other racial/ethnic groups. This occurred largely out of necessity, and thus was excused. Certain acculturated attitudes and practices among some local Chinese were also topics of conversation, for example, men boasting about womanizing and their "trophies" (outside children). While such practices were tolerated among most locals as a sign of creolization, they usually embarrassed the more conservative, established locals as well as Chinese nationals.

With a strong sense of being a minority, sustaining and developing the ethnic community became a mission. Thus ethnic endogamy was inevitably recommended and marriage partners were selected carefully. This is still true today to a large extent. Although blatant racism has become latent, one is still expected to choose a *respectable* Chinese partner regardless of one's roots/routes. The issue of intermarriage is far from being simply a personal choice, especially to those who value their "authentic" ethnicity. It therefore has remained risky and controversial.

Within the Chinese community, ethnicity and gender have been tightly intertwined. For example, an unspoken guideline ("Chinese women should marry Chinese, avoid Blacks") has prevailed especially among the class-conscious established locals. They have valued patriarchy as their "tradition," and that has influenced their choice of spouse. Chinese masculinity and its stereotypes have been regarded as different, for example, from those of the Blacks and Indians. Chinese men have generally gained positive appraisal by women of other races/ethnicities and are considered fondly as more tolerant and magnanimous. This does not prove the lack of domestic violence and adultery among them, but there are generally not perceived to be widespread problems. Chinese women too have a good reputation with desirable attributes often combined with mythicized Oriental beauty.

From the traditionalists' perspective, women in particular were expected to contribute to the Chinese community by bearing children and parenting. Chinese women under strong parental influences usually accepted their norms and roles to maintain an ethnic boundary and to affirm their ethnic pride. They fulfilled their expected primary duty, which was based on Chinese patriarchy. Significantly, the norms and practices of the wider society also influenced their ideas and behaviors. Many Chinese women blended Chinese "traditional" and local Creole cultures cleverly, and their progressive adventures would be accepted as long as they stayed within or intended to maintain the ethnic boundary and networks.

Thus female intermarriages logically endangered the essentialist idea of Chineseness, hence they "deserved" censorship. When women wished to marry *out* (of the ethnic boundary), they usually made sure to choose "the right kind," or to marry *up*. If a Chinese woman chose a Black spouse,[28] she was often marginalized because she crossed the most "detestable" racial/ethnic boundary. She would be tolerated only if he had desirable bloodline, class or socioeconomic strata, and occupation backed by educational achievements.

For Chinese men, too, the idea of ethnic endogamy permeated for the sake of collective empowerment.[29] Interestingly, however, male intermarriages were not regarded so much as marrying *out* but even praised if they brought in prestigious additions (desirable non-Chinese partners and children, plus their families). Such spouses as a rule were welcomed into the Chinese community especially when they showed their appreciation and respect toward the Chinese and willingness to bring up their mixed-roots children with a highly charged Chinese identity.

Otherwise, they might be talked about behind their backs. It was the non-Chinese spouses who usually became targets of rumor, ridicule and even ostracism (e.g. being excluded from conversations as they talked in Chinese or were ignored even on special traditional occasions).

Half/part Chinese: mixed-race, mixed-roots offspring[30]

First let us consider the demographics. For example in Jamaica, the 1943 and 1960 censuses revealed a larger overall increase of "Colored" Chinese compared to "Pure" Chinese ("Pure": 3,388; "Colored": 9,418)[31] while the China-born decreased by more than half (22.9% to 9.5%). This shifting pattern of demographic distribution can still be seen today as people have started to adopt more liberal attitudes toward intermarriage and gender issues.

The "full"/"pure" Chinese on the whole regarded the local-born Chinese (both "full" and "Colored") as Chinese and embraced them as such. However this was tainted with the conventional patrilinial and patriarchal biases. The mixed-race children with "full"/"pure" fathers (or so perceived) were classified as Chinese, and usually welcomed by his family clan even if their physical features were "less desirable."[32] Mostly ("Colored" Chinese) sons, rather than daughters, used to be marked as an insider while daughters were not necessarily excluded.[33] Gradually with time, however, such females too became affectionately embraced within the Chinese community regardless of their physical features.[34]

Because of their visible distinctiveness, however, the mixed-race children themselves might feel awkward and were sometimes treated differently within the wider circle as if they stood narrowly on the fringe of the blurred ethnic boundary. Nevertheless, the values engrained in upbringing have largely influenced their often ambiguous and flexible ethnic identity, reflecting their multi-faceted "in-between-ness" (Chen 2005; Ho 1989; E. Lee 1998, 2001; P.A. Lee 2004; Look Lai 2006).

The mixed-race Chinese, despite their significance, have often been under-represented and inclined toward being marginalized even within the Chinese community. Their life histories are far from homogeneous, resisting essentialized images and even monolithic diversity, which still invite our genuine attention and scrutiny.[35] The limited official racial/ethnic classification of them in censuses, for instance, has confined their complexities, flexibilities and ambiguities into simplified labels at best. The category of "Colored Chinese" was briefly adopted in earlier censuses (e.g. 1943, 1960), but recent censuses simply classify them as "Chinese" without further sub-categorization. While categorical entries may not necessarily elucidate any vital cultural logic, how they were utilized and changed over the years shed light on what was thought relevant or important.

Chinese have intermarried with every possible ethnic group despite their "clannish" stereotypes, mostly with "Blacks." While hardly any new categories have been introduced to reflect this outcome, Jamaican colloquial terminologies exemplify interesting views on local mixed-race Chinese. "Half Chiney" and "Part Chinese" have been the most commonly used terms both inside and outside the Chinese community. These appellations may sound fairly neutral, but the negative connotation is deeply ingrained from the "pure"/"full" Chinese point of views; "part"/"half" Chinese can never be "full" or "whole." Lack of some "essence," imperfection and incompleteness is emphasized.

In addition to "Half Chiney," the local Chinese have called them "Eleven O'Clock," "Eleven Point," and "Half Past Eleven." The clock has been used as a metaphorical scale to assess the "purity" of the mixed-race Chinese; twelve o'clock represents "full" or "completeness." The number eleven signifies "not quite full," or "not twelve yet," reflecting the perception of the mixed-race as "lacking" Chinese blood, as opposed to "adding" foreign blood.

However, such expressions suggest the increased tolerance toward their "mixed" offspring and appreciation of their Chineseness,[36] compared to "Half Chiney" (metaphorically six o'clock). These clock-related phrases are now disappearing.

Before such English-based expressions came to be popular among the local Chinese, Chinese epithets were used. They are recalled by the old generation, who are second and even third generation Jamaican born. Here we will explore the labels *ban-ton(g)-fan*, *ban-rao-shee,* and *ship-yit-(t)diam* (Shitaba 2006b).[37]

The label *ban-ton(g)-fan* literally means "half Chinese" and "foreign" and has less disgraceful connotations. The more commonly circulated *ship-yit-(t)diam* is a Hakka expression, which literally translates to "eleven o'clock," the meaning of which has been explained above.

There are two accounts of *ban-rao-shee* according to the old folks. The first is as *ban-lao-si,* which literally translates to "half," "old"/"foreign," and "death." These three words together formulate the meaning of "half brain," hence "half literate/educated." To the "pure" Chinese and China-born, this has disdainful undertones indicating the imperfect and degraded intellect, knowledge and culture of these mixed-roots. Naturally the New Chinese understand these terms, but their spontaneous response to them has been with laughter and apologetic comments. Although the phrase is no longer used today, at least in public, it has not been completely forgotten.

The second interpretation is that of *ban laoxi*, *xi* meaning "west"/"western." The phrase probably stems from *rao-wai (lao-wai)* (*wai* meaning "outside") which is a more polite way of saying "foreigner" than *guirao (gweilo)* meaning "ghost"/"devil." Such words explain their China-centered worldview: westerners or foreigners were viewed as outsiders.

Overall, these epithets were addressed by non-native ("China-born") Chinese to refer to those who were native to the new land ("Jamaica-born"). In the case of *ship-yit-(t)diam*, they might emphasize that it simply meant "local" and "native to" the host society without necessarily translating into disdain. Thus *ship-yit-(t)diam* was a real "Creole" in both the literal and figurative sense. In due course, *ship-yit-(t)diam* came to signify not only Jamaican-born "pure" Chinese as authentic native Jamaicans but also those who could only be called "local-born," such as "Half-Chinese."

It is necessary to note that there are only a few local-born Chinese who could give insight into the linguistic origins. As little intricate linguistic knowledge has been passed on to more recent "local-borns," this may have given way to a leap of translation and re-interpretation. Above all, the Jamaican Creole expression "eleven o'clock," a direct and literal translation from Chinese, was *not* used by the "Half Chinese"; it was only used by the "pure" Chinese.[38]

The negative undertone of the labels has always come from the "full"/"pure" Chinese. The terms still carry some degree of insult when verbalized by them, but less so compared to the past. The "dilution of blood" or "loss of purity" was very much regretted by the "pure" Chinese who valued their impregnable linkages to the Chinese homeland. The inevitable increase of the local-born, particularly the "Half Chinese," appeared to threaten their essentialized ethnicity. For some, it was the hybridity itself that mattered, not its degree. For some others, however, their concern was which "other" blood intruded and to what extent, and how mixed they were.

It is significant to remember that the "Half Chiney" were never called "Half Black/Negro" when they were mixed with "Africans"/Blacks. Although seen less today, "*Chiney rial (royal)*" was popular. It was used somewhat in a contemptuous way, but a majority of locals, both Chinese and non-Chinese, had little knowledge of its meaning and etymology.[39] According to Cassidy and Le Page (2002: 381), "royal" is described as:

> A coin of low value. Note. This is an old form of royal and some people take this sense to be concerned with the ordinary meaning of "royal" "if so ironically". … Hybrid (Used in compounds: Chiney-Rial, Indian-Rial, Mule-Rial, Spider-Rial, Turkey-Rial).

Despite previous stigmatizations, the rise in the population and the contributions made by the local-borns and half Chinese have led them to be accepted as a part of the Creole community and its on-going creolization. The changing appellations and categories reflect the past and present positions of the local-born and the mixed-race both within the ethnic community and outside.

Conclusion: changing Chinese identity and ethnicity

The experiences of and their (re)-interpretations and the recent ethnic re-construction especially since the arrival of the New Chinese by Jamaican Chinese are not exclusive to themselves. Guyana also illustrates similarities albeit with differences. A large majority of Chinese currently residing in Guyana comprises newcomer Chinese nationals, and its "traditional" cultures and ethnic associations formed by the Old had nearly died out or become dysfunctional primarily due to emigration and intermarriage.

The newly elected (in 2004) president of the recently reorganized umbrella ethnic association was a successful New Chinese businessman. He embarked on reviving the moribund ethnic culture. He himself faced countless problems, including the language barrier. He, as a Cantonese-cum-Mandarin speaker, hardly spoke Hakka (ancestral language of a few remaining locals) and had somewhat clumsy English and little understanding of Creole (the very language of the locals who lost Chinese literacy). With his first name hard to pronounce properly by the locals, he was rather distanced, and treated with reservation by many locals who regarded him as an authentic "Other."

Nevertheless, with commitment, the president has advanced the visibility of Chinese presence with some localization. This ethnic project toward Sinicization, has been more saliently performed by the New Chinese in Guyana. One of the tasks in 2008 was to (re-)build the disconnected networks among the residing Chinese, including the transient newcomers who might hardly feel familiar with the local Chinese and culture, which they had begun to realize the necessity to appreciate if they intended to stay. Locality was very much the space of multiple negotiations and appropriation by different kinds of diasporas for identity and ethnicity.

The roots and routes (Clifford 1997) of these New Chinese were in fact more diverse, transnational and complex with higher mobility than those of the compatriots migrating in and out of Jamaica. This is largely due to Guyana's location, situated in the developing continent, next to Portuguese-speaking Brazil as well as Dutch-speaking Surinam and Spanish-speaking Venezuela, all of which connect directly again with North America and Europe.

Such above-mentioned similarities and differences, however ambiguous and ambivalent their boundaries might be, may still be the tip of an iceberg of the more diversified and transnational experiences of multiple diasporas, which seem to be destined to continue to re-interpret and re-member ethnicities. Untold memories and experiences await us for further collection and careful examination (see Chang 2004), to better understand the current and future changes yet to come.

Notes

1 In Trinidad, the initial "experiment" was attempted in 1806 with 200 immigrants to work for sugar plantations and to create a peasant community, but this scheme failed. The next introduction was between 1853 and 1866 as indentured laborers.

2 In 2002, 0.19% (1396) in Guyana (Bureau of Statistics, Guyana 2007: 27); in 2000, 0.34% (3800) in Trinidad and Tobago (CARICOM Secretariat 2009b: 28–29), and its peak reached 8,361 in 1960 (Look Lai 1998: 286). In 2001, 0.20% (5,153) in Jamaica (CARICOM Secretariat 2009a: 35), and its peak was around 1963 with 18,000.

3 Other factors such as associations, religion and cemetery, interactions with new immigrants, and transnational networks are also important but unfortunately omitted due to space.
4 647 men went to British Guiana (presently Guyana), 988 men to Trinidad in 1853, and 472 men to Jamaica in 1854 (Look Lai 1998: 278).
5 Close to half a million Indians and several thousand Portuguese came.
6 Their mortality was "extremely small-much less so than … Indian Emigrants." Quoted in Crawford (1989: 36).
7 Their troubling "lust" for women as well as robust "recalcitrant" traits was reported, and thus petitions were repeated to improve and increase the number of women.
8 Unlike Indians, a large majority of Chinese were not entitled to automatic free return passage upon expiration of their contracts. Some even left or deserted plantations before the expiration of their contracts to show their disobedience.
9 In 1871, 311 men, 123 women, 123 children (Crawford 1989: 44); Kirkpatrick (1993: 48) cited 133 children, totaling 567 persons.
10 After the policy to remedy the sex imbalance of immigrants, a small number of children were accompanied.
11 Re-migration was not uncommon. For example, a majority left British Guiana after their contracts, mainly to its neighboring Dutch Guiana (presently Surinam), Trinidad, and Jamaica; but, those who remained behind established a foundation of an ethnic community.
12 From 1890s, Guyana received individuals and small groups through chain migration, who entered small businesses.
13 A "Chinatown" was developed in downtown capitals of Jamaica and Trinidad (Kingston and Port-of-Spain, respectively) while only sporadic and short-lived concentrations (with names such as "Hong Kong", "Chinese Town") appeared in the capital Georgetown and in the countryside of Guyana.
14 Typically a Chinese shop used to be the only shop in a small rural village.
15 Sometimes married Chinese men with children in China went overseas and created another family in a settled society. If they decided to send their children "back home" (China) to be "educated" linguistically and culturally with the latent intention for the children to find marriage partners, they were sent to local schools so as to be educated. It was not uncommon for those children to feel embarrassment when they saw their fathers' Chinese family members and relatives.
16 In Jamaica in 1943, there were 12,394 Chinese. According to its census, intermarriages were already progressing and "Chinese colored" (5,515) was the majority. The second largest group was "local-born" (4,061). "China-born" (2,818) (first generation) occupying only a fourth. This made Chinese Jamaicans the second largest Chinese population in the Caribbean, behind Cuba (Look Lai 1998: 17).
17 In Jamaica, the first large-scale anti-Chinese riot occurred in 1918. The second one was in 1965.
18 A renowned Jamaican Chinese poet, who boasts both heritages of Chinese father and Jamaican mother, shares his rich and unique experiences in his poems. For example, in *Survival*, "The derision and the ridicule / cut deep into our early consciousness/ … our customs our behavior / a source of amusement and scorn / how we talked / how we walked / how we ate / what we are / Chiney nyam dog / and other insults rang daily in our ears / most times in malice / sometimes in jest / from the ignorant / those of the learned class too / having the knowledge / did not care / or chose to ignore who we were/ … " (Lee 2003: 132).
19 Quite a few Chinese may tell stories about those days jokingly. A typical one is related to their astuteness gained from minority experiences. It was not uncommon for an immigration officer to search for their money during re-emigration, to which the Chinese might reply, "*mi money gwaan already, now mi goin!*"
20 In Jamaica, the public views on these issues were broadcasted on radio filled with harsh opinions and criticisms and sometimes infiltrated ethnic stereotypes. Free zone workers were not exclusively New Chinese immigrants, but a large proportion of derogations were targeted at them.
21 The free zones were in direct competition with each other on national and international levels. The foreign workforce and capitals left accordingly. For instance, Jamaica lost out to Dominican Republic after some years as they could gain cheaper labor and demanded less state restrictions.
22 As is already known, origins/roots and routes since the initial stages of migration to the Caribbean have shown diversity, for example, with Central (e.g. Panama) and South America (e.g. Surinam, Venezuela, Brazil). With or without such historical memories and imaginations, current temporary destinations of contemporary migrants have also added further transnational routes and destinations and repeated return migrations.

23 "It is interesting to note that, *The Guiana Graphic* publicized an article with examples explaining Guianese mal-practices with correction in 1948" (quoted in Crawford 1989: 119–20).
24 Usually they were sent "back" at a tender age and stayed for several years. Many "returned" to their birthplaces in the Caribbean to join family businesses or to further their education in English until reaching marriageable age when they might be sent "back" again to find a spouse. However, especially around the time of the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), they were forced to stay in China, and their English (re-)acquisition was disrupted.
25 It is important to remember that in the Caribbean, while legal marriages are most respected, the percentage of "common-law" relationships (cohabitation, "shacking-up" in some societies) has been very high, particularly in Jamaica. "Intermarriage" here incorporates "shacking-up" because many intermarriages, especially in the past, were not legally authorized.
26 Chinese called them "*Gui zjai*" ("black men/boys"); for Portuguese, "*Patugui/Patugee*"; for Indians, "*coolie*."
27 For example, in Jamaica, the 1886 strike on Duckenfield Hall Plantation, was organized by Chinese indentured laborers against planters' violence. They were successful in gaining concessions and autonomy. The brave achievement by those industrious sturdy men has been remembered repeatedly within the Chinese community.
28 Such unions for the New Chinese have been hardly envisaged or expected.
29 This is also not to produce and increase the marginalized "nowhereians" (who are heading nowhere) (Look Lai 2006: 252).
30 Elsewhere I have pointed out that the issues of mixed-race Chinese have seldom been discussed, never highlighted in Jamaican cultural studies and under-represented (Shibata 2006b).
31 The total number of "Pure" Chinese grew from 6,879 to 10,267 (females: 2,541 to 4,574) between 1943 and 1960. The number of "Colored" Chinese increased from 5,515 to 9,672 (female: 2,931 to 5,041) (Bryan 1996: 195; Lind 1958: 152–3).
32 Preferences were not denied.
33 The figures given in the 1943 and 1960 censuses may see, to reflect Lind's insight that "half" Chinese sons were inclined to be brought up more as "pure" Chinese, while daughters were considered "Colored" (Lind 1958: 152–3), there is no clear evidence yet to support the assumption.
34 One of my "Half Chinese" informants has very dark skin and hardly showed "Oriental" physical features. Other people's usual first impression of her is that she is simply Black, but, her story tells us otherwise. She was treated as Chinese especially by her Chinese father. From time to time, she was immersed in Chinese culture and still cherishes the memories with fondness. As a proud Chinese, she has enjoyed seeing the reactions of others when she revealed her lineage.
35 Most of their realities based on inscrutable experiences, still untold except in a few published literatures, need more exposure and investigation.
36 Local Chinese explain the etymologies, with a sense of light teasing and amusement rather than serious ridicule and deep resentment.
37 As pronounced and written by the locals. On a separate note, its deviation from Hakka/Mandarin/Cantonese exemplifies creolization.
38 Other figurative expressions like "banana" and *juk sing* were used for "Half Chinese." The former is used in many other parts for Asian diaspora communities, where local-born (particularly mixed-race) generations usually experience similar dichotomous identity dilemmas. The latter means a "bamboo stick" (*jeet* in Hakka, *jit* in Cantonese) with its joints blocking the inside, hence meaning Chineseness is "blocked off" and "not through."
39 A few of my aged informants expressed a mixture of feelings of resentment and disappointment toward those Creole words. However, they also confirmed such negativity belonged to the past and emphasized their position as "guest people" meaning Hakka and felt the need to accommodate themselves to the local conditions whenever necessary.

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23

New immigrants: a new community?

The Chinese community in Peru in complete transformation

Isabelle Lausent-Herrera

Introduction

Just ten years ago, the interest in the Chinese Community of Peru was historical, sociological and anthropological. After retracing the conditions of the introduction of the first coolies (Stewart 1976), their role in the regional development as workers under contract in the haciendas (Macera 1977; Rodriguez 2009), then as immigrants integrated into the country's economy (Lausent-Herrera 1996, 1997), researchers have tried to understand the mechanisms which formed the Chinese community of Peru and they have begun to compare its formation to that of other communities (Wong 1978; McKeown 2001; Lausent-Herrera 2009a, 2009b, 2011). Quite recently, faced with the arrival of a great number of new migrants, attention is now given to its fragility and to its future (Lausent-Herrera 2009b).

Relatively isolated in the past compared with other overseas Chinese communities, the Peruvian Chinese community is now undergoing great changes. Its demography and its ethno-linguistic makeup are no longer the same, and this may in the near future modify the current institutional equilibrium. In addition to the arrival of a competing community at the end of the 1980s formed by new immigrants from Fujian, there was the entry of a great number of immigrants from the provinces of central and northern China just before the second millennium. These new immigrants are small and medium investors as well as employees in the big state or the semi-private Chinese companies recently implanted in Peru, who have seized the opportunity of their stay to remain in the country or to establish themselves in Latin America. In order to better know these new immigrants we have used four data bases set up from the data supplied by the DIGEMIN.[1] They contain a wealth of information about the number, the geographic origin and individual socio-demographic characteristics. We have also examined the commercial establishment projects which the immigrants are obliged to furnish to obtain Peruvian residence.

Faced with these changes, is the Peruvian Chinese community which, 20 years ago, was still homogeneous and integrated into the Peruvian nation, about to lose its unity, its Peruvianess?

In Peruvian eyes, the Chinese community is still made up of the numerous descendants of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century immigrants, the Tusans (*tusheng*), children born in Peru of Chinese parents, as well as three generations of Chinese descendants (Lausent-Herera 2009b). They are eternally symbolized on one hand by Lima's Chinatown and on the other hand by the Wong parade during the national holidays. There are more and more *chifas* (Chinese restaurants), as well as dragon- and lion-dances. But the Limeños and the inhabitants of the emerging quarters of the capital and those of the provincial cities are also aware of the arrival of the new immigrants, of their presence in the new economic sectors and unfortunately also of the increasing number of news items featuring illegal immigration, human trafficking, the Red Dragon Mafia and illegal miners operating in Amazonia. If the Chinese community as the Peruvians see it still exists, it is affected by these upheavals. Already its homogeneity is compromised and what appears is a many-layered community, a kind of superposition of groups of people having the same interests or origins but who never meet, are not linked to the history of Peru, do not have diasporic roots and who often do not know how long they will spend in this country. Faced with this situation, reactions are varied. It is this succession of upheavals and their implications which will be studied in this chapter.

The roots of the Chinese community in Peru: 162 years of immigration

The second half of the nineteenth century marked the economic expansion and modernization of a number of Latin American countries. This development would not have been possible without a strong migratory influx from Asia as well as Europe. The harvesting of guano and the sugar industry in Cuba and Peru were the first economic activities around which were organized the incoming Chinese under contract – respectively in 1847 and 1849 – destined to replace at more or less long term the employment of African slaves. It is estimated that nearly 100,000[2] coolies were brought into Peru between 1849 and 1874. The ill treatment they underwent is the cause of their high mortality which explains the loss of a great part of the young masculine population as it appeared on the occasion of the 1876 census.[3] Out of the 2,699,106 inhabitants registered, 49,956 were Chinese; representing at that time 1.8% of the total population. This does not represent the actual importance of this population grouped together in plantations scattered all along the coast of more than 2000 kilometers. What struck at the time was their strong concentration as in Lima where this same year they reached 10.8% of the population of the capital, or in the sugar valleys where they could represent up to half or more of the rural population. Everywhere this population, mostly masculine, began very early to integrate, thanks to intermarriage.

In 1874 the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was signed between Peru and China putting an end to human trafficking and giving the Chinese legal existence. Then a new Chinese immigration began in Peru, superimposed on that of the coolies. It was still in majority masculine, even if the arrival of a few women could be observed, and was made up of merchants, artisans and commercial employees from the southern Chinese provinces, the British colony of Hong Kong as well as from California. At the end of the 1860s the formation of secret associations and regional or native place associations (*huiguan*) allowed the Chinese freed from their contracts and the Chinese newcomers to create the foundation of a true community. This community affirmed its legal existence when Ambassador Zheng Zaoru came to Lima in 1884 and in 1886 during the creation under his authority of the society of charity and mutual aid, the *Beneficiencia China Tonghuy Chongkoc*,[4] following the model of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of America in San Francisco.

In 1909 Peru denounced the treaty of 1874 and, inspired by the Gentlemen's Agreement concluded in 1907 between Japan and the USA, asked for a new agreement to be signed with

China so that China would control and limit its immigration. The Porras-Wu Ting-Fan Protocol marked the beginning of a series of restrictions to the free entry into Peru of the Chinese or their relatives. Despite or because of the economic and social success of a part of the population of Chinese origin, immigration restrictions – demands for passports, photographs, health and marriage certificates, financial guarantees, as well as the demonstrations and laws against Asians: the obligation to employ a Peruvian personnel, prohibition to leave an inheritance to a foreigner – would multiply and lead those hoping to immigrate to circumvent these laws.

Starting the first year that restrictions on immigration were installed, an entire network of corruption between the two countries developed (McKeown 1996, 2001). In China there were substitutions of identity, fabrication of false certificates of marriage or filiation, authorizations bought from the personnel of the Peruvian consulate, while in Peru government employees closed their eyes to the origin of certain documents certifying that the immigrant was a merchant returning to Peru after a trip to China while actually he had never before left China. The regional Chinese associations or *huiguan*, produced attestations in their turn proving that the immigrant was born in Peru, in a city or village where he had been unable to be registered and then had been sent to study in China. Finally, the best organized were the great commercial houses such as Wing On Chong or the Pow On Who, using the networks both of relatives and those from the same original village, brought over employees accompanied by false "relatives."[5]

The main maritime route to enter Peru passed by Japan, then California, to finally go down along the Pacific coast to Chile; for steamships this took from two to four months. But several events turned the immigrants from this route. Thus the difficulties encountered after the Exclusion Act of 1882 which forbade the entry to the USA of Chinese who were not merchants and regulated their transit, led some of them to take the longest route, the one that obliged them to leave the South Seas and go by the Indian Ocean, stop in Marseilles before going either to Lisbon or Liverpool to finally board the ship which would take them to South America. This route was taken more frequently from 1908 onwards when, to protest against the economic and territorial imperialism of their neighbors, the Chinese began to launch anti-Japanese boycotts. The boycotts prevented the immigrants from taking the Japanese steamers and obliged them to go around the world. When they arrived in Liverpool or Lisbon, they embarked for Manaos in Brazil, then went up the Amazon to Iquitos, the rubber capital of Peru where the Chinese consuls gave them documents attesting to their residence in Peru and sometimes even certificates of birth in the Amazon region. Otherwise, a Chinese community composed of merchants and rubber collectors established in Iquitos since 1880 took them in (Lausent-Herrera 1996). From Iquitos they could settle in the district of Loreto or travel on to finally reach the Pacific coast near the city of Chiclayo where a very old and large Hakka[6] Chinese community awaited them. Despite the fact that from 1930 on the military/civilian Peruvian regimes[7] in power further hardened their policy of restricting the entry of new Asians,[8] use of this route, which offered at the price of a very long and dangerous voyage, free entry into Peru, came to an end. Another way, leaving from Ecuador, took its place. A Chinese community made up of merchants and farmers had been established since the end of the nineteenth century between Guayaquil, Quevedo and Babahoyo and came to serve as a relay to those who entered illegally by the Ecuadorian frontier. Once in Peru the immigrants changed identity and joined the members of their family. Illegal entry did allow among other things the continued entry of young Chinese girls, including mixed bloods or *Tusans*[9] living in China, who were destined to marry within the community so as to continue Chinese domestic culture within the main families.[10]

New immigrants thus continued to arrive legally in very small numbers but above all, illegally, coming to insure the renewing of the community. At its head, the first generation Chinese assumed the institutional responsibilities while at its base, the generation of Peruvian-born

children of Chinese parents, the Tusans, as well as the large community of mixed bloods who had made up their own associations and had their newspapers and schools, gave an image of a prosperous and integrated community. When after 1950 the People's Republic of China withdrew into itself and closed its frontiers, it became more difficult to leave and in particular, more dangerous. Up until this date in Peru, the Chinese community had progressed and prospered despite the numerous measures taken to stop its growth. From then on, the renewal of its "legitimate" members, those coming from China, went on only very slowly. The aging community authorities favorable to Guomindang gave way to the increasing influence of the Tusans without losing their power within the *Sociedad Central de Beneficencia China*.

The breaking off of relations with the mother country was thus a shock and it was felt all the more forcefully because between 1950 and 1955 Peru, fearing Communism and following a still present anti-Asian racism,[11] closed its doors tightly to refugees, to wives as well as children who left to study in China and were separated from their parents. Under the regime of President M. Odria (1948–56), all persons with a Chinese family name, including the Tusans as well, were deprived of passports. In 1958 the new law on immigration intended to authorize the entry of 150 persons was so hardly implemented that in the year 1965 only 33 Chinese were allowed to enter under a quota for 50 persons (Ho 1967: 11). Recourse to illegality which had never ceased to palliate the various restrictions for entry to Peru became thus a necessity. Despite the danger and difficulty, a certain number of Chinese decided as soon as the Communist regime was in power to find refuge either in Macao where they already had family or in Hong Kong.[12] From there the most fortunate and determined attempted to go on to Peru. Networks for leaving were set up in Hong Kong with the help of Taiwanese intermediaries who left the welcoming of the new arrivals to the families and associations. The new route went by plane from Hong Kong to Hawaii, then to San Francisco before going down to the south.[13] In Guayaquil the new immigrants, often supplied with Taiwanese passports and after a waiting period, took up the road taken before the war by their predecessors and passed the frontier. But Peru, the country of refuge, was soon in its turn to become a country of emigration.

In 1968 the arrival in power of a leftist military junta at first paralyzed the Chinese community. Affected by the agricultural reform and affronted by the recognition in 1971 of the People's Republic of China, a great many Chinese – the exact number remains unknown – chose to leave Peru and go to the USA or Canada. From a demographic point of view, the halt in the Chinese immigration to Peru and the departure of a large number of Chinese and Tusans was slightly compensated for by the arrival of illegal immigrants. This considerably weakened the community which kept its cohesion and its position partly because of the great number of descendants of the Chinese who composed it.[14] According to the 1981 census, there remained in Peru only a population of 1,714[15] residents of Chinese nationality, as opposed to 10,915 in 1940.[16] Even if we believe that the number of Chinese is underestimated, 1981 is a key year in Chinese immigration to Peru for it marks at the same time the weakest representation of the Chinese born in China, the beginning of a very large Peruvian economic emigration to the USA[17] (which would affect without distinction all the social and ethnic levels of the Peruvian population including the Tusans and the Chinese in Peru) and the onset of a new immigration composed of the reactivation of the traditional flux plus the arrival of Chinese immigrants from regions up till now unknown to the Chinese community.

New Chinese immigration to Peru: how many, who, where they are, and what do they do?

The old and new Chinese immigration to Peru, though visible through the myriad of new Chinese restaurants, small shops selling products imported from China; hotels, casinos and

"massage" centers and even in the informal gold mining in the Amazonian region of Madre de Dios, is not yet as visible in the official published statistics. In this section I will first assess how many and who are the old and new Chinese by analyzing critically published data and more detailed unpublished micro-data from different sources. As will become clear, not all sources tell the same story and none alone allows us to draw a complete profile of this population. In our analysis we will present first what the population census tells us about the long and short term Chinese immigrants. We will confront and complete this picture with official data on immigration flows. During my fieldwork in Peru, I had access to many detailed unpublished individual records from the National Immigration and Naturalization Directorate (DIGEMIN) concerning Chinese residents, entries and exits and requests made by Chinese immigrants to obtain a visa or to change their immigration status.

The difficulty of quantifying how many old and new Chinese are in Peru

Accounting for demographic fluctuations in the Chinese community in Peru is a difficult task since after the census of 1876 it was not until 1940 that new national figures were available. The 1876 census registered 49,956 Chinese out of a total population of 2,699,160 whereas the 1940 census registered only 10,915 Chinese. These figures reflect both the negative impact of restrictive immigration laws focusing on Chinese immigrants during the 1930s and the weakness of the population census to reflect the real situation insofar as illegal immigration through the northern and southern borders and via the Peruvian Amazon River (Manaos-Iquitos route) developed also quite rapidly during the same period. Moreover, the importance of the registered decline seems exaggerated considering the entry of 22,993 Chinese only at Lima's harbor, Callao, during the 1904–37 period (McKeown 1996: 63). The figure of 10,915 Chinese registered in 1940, even if underestimated, in any case reflects the uncertainties faced by the Chinese community during the period preceding the Second World War. The post-war period did not offer better prospects either.

Data provided by the next census of 1961[18] distinguishes between country of birth and nationality, so the number of people of Chinese nationality decreased by half to 5,932 (5,210 men and 722 women). From this total of 5,932 people, most of them (5,766) were born in China, while 166 others were either born to Chinese parents in other countries (Ecuador, Panama, USA) or were born in Peru but were declared as Chinese nationals. Ten years later, in 1972, the population census does not give a much more optimistic view about the future of the Chinese community in Peru. Unlike the previous one, the 1972 census[19] makes a further distinction between the Chinese naturalized Peruvian (numbering 242) and the non-naturalized (3,815 individuals), adding to a total of 4,057. Considering their age, more than one-third (1,338) of the Chinese non-naturalized were older people (aged 65 or more), suggesting that a big part of this group were motivated to rejoin family members already in Peru. Around two thirds (2,354 individuals) were 15–65 years old. Only 102 non-naturalized Chinese were children aged 14 and under.[20] The lack of gender balance and more disaggregated data for the age group of 15–39 does not allow us to make a more detailed diagnosis on the state of the community. The decline of the Chinese (by around 1,000) in spite of the arrival of new Chinese immigrants fleeing the Maoist revolution, may be partially explained by the departure of old residents triggered by the coming to power of the leftist military junta in 1968.

When in 1981 we observed the arrival of new Chinese, it was still very difficult to quantify the flow for different reasons: first because their number was not yet very important despite some visibility especially in Lima's Chinatown, and second because the Immigration Office (DIGEMIN) had not yet published any statistics[21] on the number of visas granted or on the inflows and

outflows of the country by nationality. In addition, the first Chinese to enter at that time – mainly Cantonese, received by relatives – arrived as tourists and after one or two years spent living in small places a few buildings away from Lima's Chinatown or around the factories in the working class district of La Victoria, their situation was regularized through the purchase of national identity cards or resident cards from corrupt officials. Even regularized, all these new migrants had long sought to render themselves invisible and escape the census, hiding their illegal status of undocumented immigrants. This may partly explain the subsequent drop in the number of Chinese according to the 1981[22] census, passing to 1,714 individuals. For the first time the census distinguishes between country of birth, Taiwan[23] (523) and mainland China (1,191). Not yet offset by the arrival of new legal migrants, this low figure is difficult to explain except by the non-replacement of those arrived before the Second World War, the very restrictive quota policy and departures.

Twelve years later, the 1993 census[24] recorded a total of 3,728 individuals born in China living in Peru; more than double than in the 1981 census.[25] In reality this growth, low in absolute terms, corresponds to the restart of Chinese immigration to Peru, a figure that, again, does not reflect the exact situation. The illegal nature of most entries occurring in the late 1980s is probably the source of the unrecorded Chinese. This new contribution of immigration results in a greater concentration of people born in China in the capital, Lima, an increase between the two censuses of 78% to 87% with respect to the total number of Chinese in Peru.

Between the census of 1993 and that of 2007 the number of immigrants never ceased to increase, as proved by the opening of the numerous restaurants in Lima and in the emerging districts ("*los conos*"). At the same time, in the Barrio Chino the stores were moving out and installing their warehouses in the outskirts of Lima, and the quarter of San Borja saw the growth of hotels, spas, casinos and restaurants, and that of La Victoria was repopulated by Chinese working among other places in the clothing industry. The censuses were never able to represent either the changes or the excitement visible to all in Lima as in the province; for their number was increasing all over the country. Their movements first led them to the regions where small local Chinese colonies existed (Trujillo on the coast, Iquitos in Amazonia) then to the new regions with the aim of starting business or undertaking new activities linked to mining or forestry.

The 2007 census[26] strikingly suggests a stagnation of the demographics of the Chinese population in Peru since 3,450 individuals born in China are recorded. It also suggests a slight decrease in the concentration of Chinese in the capital city of Lima (from 87% to 85% between the 1993 and 2007 censuses).

However, one notes an abnormal decrease in the family size of the "old" immigrants in 2007 versus the size of this type of family in 1993; this could reflect the underestimation of the population born in China. We made a new estimation for 2007 of the population born in China who arrived in Peru before 2002, beginning with the hypothesis that the family size of this population had diminished in the same proportion as that noted between 1993 and 2007 for all of the families of the capital. According to our estimations, we should have observed 5,166 individuals born in China in 2007 and not the 3,450 indicated in the census, that is 50% more.

Interestingly enough, in comparing the censuses we observe a gradual feminization of Chinese migration: the sex ratio was 18.8 men per woman in 1941 and 7.2 in 1961, going to 2.6 in 1981 and further reduced to 1.6 in 1993. The sex ratio drops to 1.2 according to the 2007 census. The registers on the total number of Chinese residents in 2010 held by the DIGEMIN shows a sex-ratio of 1.3, confirming this long-run feminization tendency of the Chinese immigrants in Peru.

The arrival of new Chinese in Peru

These figures reflect only the Chinese population in Peru but do not tell us anything about how many had arrived recently. To evaluate the importance of the flow of Chinese entering the country we must consider how many of those living in Peru in 2007 were residing abroad five years earlier. The same question was asked in the 1993 census so as to compare the evolution of the flow over a period of equal duration.

According to the 1993 census, 1,487 Chinese nationals (40% of the total identified) were not living in Peru before 1988. The 2007 census indicates that 801 individuals born in China and living in Peru were still living in China in 2002 (23% of all individuals born in China recorded in 2007). This would indicate that the flow of new migrants would have slowed considerably between 1993 and 2007, which again is unlikely.[27]

Indeed, official data from the DIGEMIN on migration flows (inflows and outflows) of individuals born in China or with Chinese citizenship can paint another picture (see Table 23.1). By combining the net flows during the period 2002–7 we can reconstruct the five years of cumulative flow in the 2007 census. Considering therefore the net cumulative inflows and outflows of individuals born in China it appears that the net migration flow is 3,726 people, well above the 801 persons recorded at the time of the census in 2007. One important weakness of this source is that it counts anonymous entries and exits instead of individuals. One individual may be counted several times if he or she enters and exits the country several times.

This demographic imbalance as the figures show will have an important impact on the evolution of the community between 1970 and 1980. These figures illustrate the ongoing crisis of the Chinese community (cf. Lausent-Herrera 2009b), whose institutional authorities are still Chinese born in China but the population is composed of many children of Chinese, Tusan and Peruvian mixed-bloods, who are very active in the community's social life.

Despite the creation in 1961 by a group of young Tusans encouraged by the Chinese curacy, of an association which represented them, relations between the Beneficencia China run by the "real" Chinese and the generations brought up in Peru are not good. This incomprehension pushed the Tusans to distance themselves from the associations led by the Beneficencia and to form their own associations, such as the Peruvian-Chinese Cultural Center (*Centro Cultural Peruano-Chino*). We then see a rupture both social and spatial insofar as the educated generation, aged

Table 23.1 Official (DIGEMIN) migration flows: individuals holding Chinese nationality

	Entries			*Exits*			*Net balance*
	Males	*Females*	*Total*	*Males*	*Females*	*Total*	
2001	2824	1025	3849	2753	1042	3795	54
2002	3861	1190	5051	3969	1228	5197	–146
2003	3935	1140	5075	3973	1256	5229	–154
2004	5522	1778	7300	5272	1579	6851	449
2005	5364	1682	7046	4689	1445	6134	912
2006	7041	2453	9494	5161	1631	6792	2702
2007	4976	1722	6698	5001	1734	6735	–37
2010	2741	1506	4247	2721	1464	4185	62
2011*	2081	1213	3294	2135	1252	3387	–93
Total 2001–7	33523	10990	44513	30818	9915	40733	3780

* Figures refer to January to September
Source: DIGEMIN

from 25 to 45, did not made the choice of leaving for the USA or Canada but remained, and employed in liberal professions or integrated into government jobs and engaged in the political life of Peru. The separation is also spatial for several reasons: loss of interest in the Chinese quarter along with its commercial family activities, the necessity of displaying economic success by joining the new Peruvian upper middle class in the residential quarter of San Borja and finally the desire to give their children an education chosen in the new Sino-Peruvian Catholic school, Jean XXIII, located outside Lima's Chinatown. One can say that a first rupture has taken place but the community has not questioned the ethnic homogeneity founded on a common Cantonese culture and the sharing of the same history. The new immigration which began at the beginning of the 1980s concerns first the Cantonese who would reactivate the migratory current, more balanced from the gender point of view, which will little by little control the community institutions, prosper in the import/export business and actively take over the Chinese restaurant business as well.

The drastic change took place only with the arrival, by the end of 1980 and during the 1990s, of the first immigrants from Fujian. The languages were different, and the conditions of their arrival, in the majority of cases through the human trafficking networks, disturbed the community. Many entered but there were also many who left, and it was during this period that Peru became an important country of transit for the Chinese from Fujian, but there were also the Cantonese who wanted to go on to the USA or Canada.[28] Their commercial audacity and the funds which some of them disposed of irritated the inhabitants of the Chinese quarter who found themselves in competition with their own countrymen often better connected in China to the big export centers (of costume jewelry, clothes, lamps, toys, hardware, etc.). This competition which appeared at the same time that Peru improved economically had woken the Chinese quarter. The renewal of the 1990s coincided also with the increasing arrival of immigrants from Fujian and the first family gatherings.[29]

The information given by the DIGEMIN allows us to estimate only the visible part of this new immigration since identity theft and the possession of a passport of another nationality are the frequent means of clandestine immigration. Moreover, the statistics published by the DIGEMIN, also used in a INEI Bulletin, report the numbers concerning mainly the Lima airport and do not take into account, or only much later, the entries and exits at other frontier posts. Other errors caution us to use the DIGEMIN numbers with precaution. Thus, one notes that according to this source, in 2006, 6,792 individuals with Chinese nationality left the country while the corresponding number for those born in China is 3,789![30] This is more surprising given the fact that the figures are nearly identical concerning the entries (9,344 for persons born in China and 9,494 for those with Chinese nationality). Finally it should be pointed out that at my request the statistical services of the DIGEMIN informed me that 18,604 Chinese had been naturalized between 1990 and 2003.[31] Given the numbers which we have exposed here concerning the total Chinese population residing in Peru, as well as the flow of new immigrants during this same period, it seems evident that a large number of them have not only escaped the census but also the statistics concerning the migratory flows produced by the DIGEMIN itself.

"Old" versus "new" Chinese

While there are reasons to doubt the veracity of the number of Chinese in Peru according to the census, this source is nevertheless precious for it contains information about the socio-demographic characteristics of this population. Actually, the access to the microdata of the censuses of 1993 and 2007 has allowed us to have more details about the profile of the Chinese in Peru and how it has evolved according to the flow of new arrivals.

Several aspects separate the immigration population of China from the rest of the population. That is, demographically according to the census of 1993, the average age of the individuals born in China was 40.4 while the national average age was 25. This indicates that the Chinese colony was made up of people already elderly, which the immigration before 1993 had not yet succeeded in rejuvenating. In 2007 the numbers are quite similar (41.6 and 28.4 years old, respectively). The new arrivals are on average about eight years younger than the "old" immigrants: average age of the new arrivals being 31 against 46.8 for the arrivals in 1993 and 32.8 versus 44.3 respectively in 2007. Another interesting feature is that the size of the families of the "old" immigrants is larger than that of the new arrivals in the census of 1993 as well as that of 2007.[32]

The new arrivals born in China counted in the 2007 census differed from the "old" immigrants but also from the wave which arrived between 1988 and 1993, whose characteristics we know, thanks to the 1993 census. Thus the proportion of children less than 15 years old has greatly diminished among the new immigrants, according to the 2007 census, in reference to those counted in 1993 (from 14.4% to 7.7%), but the number of individuals aged from 45 to 54 has increased. In addition, if one examines the relationship with the head of household, the proportion of heads of household but also that of the spouses has increased with the new immigrants in 2007 versus those of 1993. On the other hand, the category which has substantially decreased (from 25.5% to 18.2%) is that of "other relatives." This again may reflect the fact that these persons were able to evade the census in the context of repeated scandals concerning the trafficking of Chinese immigrants and the assassination of "serpent heads" relayed by the Peruvian press. The proportion of new immigrants married or living with someone increased (from 58.7% to 62.2%) significantly to the detriment of bachelors (who went from 38.8% to 34.3%).

One of the characteristics which most distinguish the old from the new immigrants but also from the newer immigrants of 2007 versus those of 1993 is their integration into the labor market. The proportion of independent or self-employed workers increased considerably among the new immigrants (going from 14.7% for those of 1993 to 32.7% for those of 2007). Laborers practically disappeared among the new immigrants of 2007 (1.9%) although they were 10% of the new immigrants in 1993. At the same time, the percentage of bosses increased among the old immigrants, going from 21.6% to 34.2%. This evolution in the composition of the occupational categories in the migratory flux of the individuals born in China may be explained by the fact that the proportion of individuals having a higher level of education among the new immigrants of the 2007 census is higher than that of the new immigrants who arrived in Peru between 1988 and 1993. In 1993 there was only a difference of 10 points in the proportion of individuals having higher education between the old and the new arrivals (21.6% and 31.9%, respectively); in 2007 the gap widened, even when the proportion of those with higher education rose to 35.3% among the "old" immigrants while that of the new immigrants reached 44.1%.

These figures, as we can see, are very far from those usually given in international publications, and they offer a different vision of the Chinese community of Peru. If we look again at the figures produced by the Overseas Economy Year Book Editorial Committee (OEYBEC) of 1992, there would have been 52,000 Chinese overseas in 1982, and in 1991 this number would have risen to 500,000 (Dudley *et al.* 1994: 637). Hung Hui who uses the same source (OCEYBEC 1991, 1992: 491–4) evokes a census which concerned 39,000 persons of whom we find no trace inside the community, and advances the number of 1 million persons for the number of descendants (Hung Hui 1992: 142).[33] Without starting a controversy on definitions and the use of the term "Chinese" in the statistics, these figures are overestimated and exaggerated, unless they include at least three generations of descendants. They are less credible than those produced by the Peruvian statistics, which actually underestimate. Dudley, Mao and Yun (1994) have noted an increase between 1980 and 1990 of more than 20% in Chinese

immigration to three Latin American countries; the increase may be even higher, but here too the numbers are lacking.

If they settle in Lima as part of the migratory chain with or without a plan of leaving one day to reside in the USA or if they are in Peru in more or less prolonged transit, these new arrivals are visible and invisible at the same time, and are diverse by their regional origins. The illegality of their situation and the legalization of their stay obtained by roundabout means do not allow us to know their exact number. Corruption among the frontier police and the government officials throws doubt upon all the statistics.

Immigrants or sojourner?

The sharp decline in the total Chinese residents according to the 2007 population census should be considered with caution. The DIGEMIN has individual records on the immigrant population resident in Peru in 2010 with its basic socio-demographic characteristics.[34] According to this unpublished source, in 2010 a total of 5,533 Chinese resided in Peru. This data base registers, among others, the year of arrival of all still present in 2010. Considering only those arrived until 2007, the data reveal that 2,683 Chinese were living in Peru, more than 50% than those registered by the 2007 census.[35]

Looking closely at arrival dates, around half (51.5%) of these 5,533 Chinese residents in 2010 arrived during the 2008–10 period. This not only reflects the renewed and very visible impulse of recent Chinese immigration to Peru but also give some clues to the apparent decline in the size of the Chinese population in Peru in the years before 2008. This may have several explanations. First, this situation may be explained by the great number of those who have obtained Peruvian citizenship, both legally and illegally. Second, it reveals that new Chinese immigrants do not come to Peru to stay for long periods (on average they stay for four years). According to the same source, one quarter of the Chinese residents in 2010 had in fact re-entered the country. This can be linked to the fact that almost one-third (32%) declare a Latin American country as the country they come from before arriving in Peru.

This is confirmed if we consider instead another DIGEMIN data source related to the flow of Chinese entering and exiting the country during the period January 2010 to September 2011 (see Table 23.2). The DIGEMIN database has 15,113 individual records (7,541 entries and 7,572 exits). This data gives an even more important proportion of Chinese nationals coming from neighboring countries. In effect, we observe that more than one-third (35.7%) entries come from one of the five neighboring countries around Peru (Chile alone accounting for 12.2%, followed by Ecuador and Brazil with 8.3% and 8.1%, respectively). Other Latin American countries also represent a big share of Chinese entries to Peru (21.5%). This reflects a great degree of (short distance, intra-regional) mobility and means that it would be more realistic to consider these flows as part of a circulatory movement in three big circles. The first has an intra-regional dimension in which the Chinese take advantage of business opportunities linked to different economic regulations. There is an active trade triangle formed by northern Chile and the Peruvian and Bolivian Titicaca lake region (much of this trade takes the form of smuggling of counterfeit products coming particularly from China). The second, concerning mostly Argentina, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, is probably linked to big business and capital investments. The Chinese going back and forth between Peru and China, notably those coming from and going to Holland (a hub for many flights linking China to South America) constitute the third circle of the migratory flows. They are probably the most established group (already having resident cards in Peru or other Latin-American countries).

The net balance of these circular migratory movements is almost zero, which reflects their high mobility. These short-term sojourners are more motivated by their investment and business

Table 23.2 Entry and exit flows for Chinese nationals from January 2010 to September 2011 by percentage

Country before entry to Peru/ Destination country when exit	*Entries*	*Exits*	*Total*
EE.UU	9.8	9.9	9.8
Canada	3.1	3.8	3.4
Holland	20.5	21.8	21.2
China (R.P)	3.29	6.16	4.72
International Waters	1.1	1.1	1.1
Neighbor Countries			
Chile	12.2	11.2	11.7
Ecuador	8.3	7.9	8.1
Brazil	8.1	7.3	7.7
Colombia	4.4	4.7	4.6
Bolivia	2.7	3.0	2.9
Sub-Total	**15.3**	**15.0**	**15.1**
Other Latin American Countries			
Argentina	6.5	5.5	6.0
Venezuela	4.5	4.0	4.3
Mexico	3.6	3.8	3.7
Panama	3.2	2.5	2.8
Cuba	1.3	1.9	1.6
Costa Rica	1.0	0.7	0.9
Other Countries	6.4	4.9	5.7
Total	100	100	100

Source: DIGEMIN, entry and exit flows to (from) Peru, January 2010 to September 2011, unpublished micro-data.

projects; whereas in the past they were more motivated by family reasons (rejoining parents already settled in the destination country, etc.). Finally, it is worthwhile to note that there were almost no Chinese expelled from the country (only five during the period analyzed) despite the big number of illegal residents. Probably, only those who are sought after by the Chinese justice fell into that category;[36] the others were allowed to stay or they moved to another country within the region.

Activities and regions of origin

In a preceding work using the data on visa applications by the Chinese for the first semester of 2003 (Lausent-Herrera 2009a: 87–8),[37] it was possible to analyze the situation of people who had declared themselves guarantors for the arrival of future immigrants. We noted then that the three-fourths of the guarantors were of Chinese origin who had arrived in Peru between 1995 and 2000, during the period of the regular increase in Chinese immigration and above all the arrival of the Fujian immigrants. The interest of this study was to show which sectors of the Peruvian economy they were able to integrate into. It turns out that 60% worked in the restaurant business and 52.5%[38] among them declared that they earned between $1,000 and $2,000, while 26.4% worked in the import/export business or in the workshops and factories. We can see that although they had arrived recently, the immigrants originating in Fujian were already well represented in the restaurant sector, in competition with the Cantonese. The very weak representation of Chinese from other provinces among the guarantors is explained by the fact that the people originating in the Northern and Central provinces had arrived as employees of Chinese companies

and were not part of the network favoring illegal entries and illegal stays. This system was most often dominated by the human traffickers who obliged their clients, once installed and their situation legalized, to be guarantors to allow other immigrants from Fujian or Guangdong to obtain a visa for Peru.

As we have seen, the arrival of new immigrants has changed the ethnic composition of the Chinese present in Peru. In the past, in spite of some linguistic diversity (Pun Yui, Hakka, Hokklo and Langtou from Chaxi in Zhongshan), the immigrants shared the Cantonese culture and spoke both their dialects and Cantonese. In this sense they formed a relatively homogeneous community. The present situation is different insofar as it is this relative ethnic and cultural homogeneity which is in question. According to the most recent data obtained from the DIGEMIN for the year 2009[39] concerning the total of 758 persons who requested a change in their immigration status after entering Peru with a tourist or business visa, the situation is the following. The Cantonese who number 275 still represent, with 36.3% of the total, the majority in terms of geographical provenance. The applicants from Fujian number 243 and they follow the Cantonese closely with 32.1% of the total. Among all of the Chinese provinces, only one is not represented: Qinghai. In terms of representation, the others can be grouped as follows: the southern part of the northern region (Shandong, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin) representing 13.2%, with 100 applicants; those of the central region (Shanxi, Shaanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Jingxi, Hunan) representing 6.2% with 47 applicants, the northeast region or Dongbei (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning), and Mongolia representing 5.2%, that is 39 applicants, and from the central southern region (Zheijiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu) representing 4.4% with 33 applicants. Grouping together the three regions of the central and the northern regions represents a relatively large 15.8% in clear opposition to the provinces of the west and southwest which make up only 2.8% of the whole.

A tradition of immigration: Cantonese and Fujianese

The first coolies embarked at Amoy were the Hokkiens from the southern Fujian, the Hakkas, then the Cantonese. With the shifting of the Chinese workers' embarkation point to Hong Kong and then Macao, a diversification in recruitment took place. With time the Hokkiens disappeared and the Hakkas were no longer from the northeast of the province of Guangdong but those dispersed in the Si-Yap counties and in the county of Xiangshan (Zhongshan). From 1868[40] the Cantonese (Punyui) and the immigrants from the San-Yap equally represented an important part of Chinese immigration to Peru. The Fujianese who arrived at the end of the 1980s came from Fuzhou, Quanzhou (the Anxi Valley, particularly Nanping) and Zhangzhou. These Fujianese have no relation with the first Hokkiens who for a long time now are no longer represented within the institutions. To the Cantonese established in Peru for 162 years, these immigrants have no ties with the present community. Their differences are along linguistic and cultural lines. However, they have the same history of diaspora, the same migratory behavior (associations, family networks) and share essentially the same commercial activities. Even if their relations are strained, they can, as immigrants, be considered as making up the same group.

Each region and each province has a different migratory representation. In comparison with the observations of the preceding years, among those applying for a change in their immigration status there is a resemblance between the behavior of the Cantonese and the Fujianese. However, several differences can be observed due to the conditions of the arrival of the first Fujianese through the mafia networks and because they are not yet "stabilized" since many of them residing in Peru still keep the idea of leaving one day for the USA or Canada. The rapidity with which the economy evolves and the change in the poles of attraction have resulted in Peru now appearing for many of them no longer only as a country of transit but also as a country capable



Figure 23.1 New immigrants distribution by origin 2009

of bringing them wealth. This evolution is perceived by the Cantonese in transit as well as by the workers under contract ready to stay in Peru longer than planned.

The first Fujianese[41] men and women who arrived at the beginning of the immigration and chose to remain in the 1990s now have adult children. DIGEMIN's 2003 sources indicate that immigration by family regrouping had begun already. Upon arrival, their first place of stay was the Barrio Chino, where they were the least visible and where they could profit from the aid of the Beneficencia China.[42] From an immigration point of view, the Fujianese who remained in Peru had thus the same behavior, the same strategies for economic integration. In 2009,[43] 73.7% of the Fujianese and 63.3% of the Cantonese requested immigrant status, which would allow them to go from the status of foreigner with a temporary visa to that of resident.[44] Among the applicants for a change of immigration status, the professional category most represented was that of merchants and entrepreneurs (60.5% in the case of the Fujianese and 46.6% of the Cantonese). Therefore more Fujianese arrived already established with a better defined commercial project, thanks to their contacts in China and Peru. The Cantonese are professionally less represented among the merchants but more of them would like to be investors: 12.4% of the Cantonese residents requested a requalification as investors; 9.5% requested it upon their arrival in Peru. Investor status is obtained only under the condition of depositing a capital of $25,000 in the Banco de la Nación. The 12.4% had thus found capital in Peru or, thanks to notarial paperwork, had become stockholders for an equivalent sum in enterprises already created. Inversely, according to the 2009 figures, the Fujianese, though very successful as traders, were much less present as investors. In effect, while 21.6% requested the merchant status, only 8.6% of them requested the investor status. The Fujianese are less numerous in requesting investor status, 8.6% in all compared to 21.6% for the Cantonese.

This difference does not correspond to the visual reality we have seen concerning the commercial activities of the Barrio Chino (Lausent-Herrera 2011: 92). When the migratory current from Guangdong started up again in the early 1980s, the economic situation in Peru worsened. During the following years the Chinese quarter saw its activities collapsed and there was insecurity. Hyperinflation and the terrorist attacks in Lima until 1994 hindered the economy. During this period the Cantonese, who controlled the entire Chinese restaurant sector, began to lose ground because the Fujianese, who among others needed a place of welcome and a waiting space for the illegal immigrants leaving for the USA, opened up more restaurants. At the end of the 1990s, with the economic upturn and renovation of the Chinese quarter's principal avenue, the Fujianese developed their activities, based on the import of Chinese manufactured products (lamps, hardware, costume jewelry, toys, medicines, apparel). By opening new restaurants in the residential quarter of San Borja, occupied mainly by rich Tusans, as well as warehouses in the emerging districts of the capital, they brought about the emergence of a new Chinese commercial cluster that will, perhaps in the near future, give birth to a new Chinatown. The new Cantonese immigrants and above all the Tusans accompanied them in this new commercial expansion. This dynamism, which put the Cantonese and the Fujianese in competition with each other, was carried along by Peru's remarkable economic growth and new-found stability. It also benefited from the advantages (sometimes unfair) given to Chinese producers and merchants not only in China but also through measures favoring imports and investments included in the Treaty of Free Commerce (Tratado de Libre Comercio) between China and Peru, effective by 1 March 2010. Another reason for such dynamism is the existence of the Tarjeta Andina de Migracion (TAM), which offered Chinese immigrants and residents the possibility to circulate doing business around the Andean countries.

Cantonese and Fujianese investors, equally attracted by the advantages procured by the new treaty as well as by the facilities given by the TAM card, increased in number each year and diversified. What is striking is the rapid reaction by the new Chinese immigrants to the new measures which Peru or any other country takes to promote commercial exchanges. In this case the modification of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Law (Ley ATPDEA) in 2008 allowed the Andean countries to export to the USA with reduced taxes formerly protected products, such as textiles. Investors, particularly the Cantonese, hurried to propose projects for the manufacture of textile products for re-export to the USA or to other Andean countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia) thus reproducing the system of the Maquiladoras.[45]

L. Huang,[46] in his "feasibility dossier" submitted to the DIGEMIN in 2010,[47] announces his desire to establish a textile industry (by importing Chinese fabrics) with three other stockholders. He states that he wants to be a pioneer by importing the latest techniques and states that he is ready to export to other Andean countries and to the USA. Huang finds himself in competition with another Cantonese, a recently naturalized Ecuadorian[48] who immigrated to Peru to enter the apparel industry, particularly in the fabrication of jeans. As for X. Ye, a Cantonese resident in Ecuador and a transient immigrant, he wants to create large warehouses in Peru for the import of electronic equipment.

The Fujianese, who upon arriving mainly chose the chifas, the spas, the Internet kiosks, are now investing in longer-term projects and taking over certain sectors already occupied by the Cantonese. This is the case of J. Luo who, intending to profit from tax exonerations and the ATPDEA Law, would like to create a fruit and cereal-based food products packaging enterprise, so as to export the products to the Andean countries. His compatriot C. Wang, already settled in Guayaquil and dealing with a Chinese in Peru engaged in the business of importing electronic products, has asked to benefit from the status of investor immigrant-TAM so as to invest in the enlarging of a textile factory, promising to transfer the technology. Like the Cantonese

who first invested in this sector as private owners, D. Cao too has a lugging project in Pucallpa (in the Amazonian forest) by implanting an industry of derived products in La Victoria district of Lima. Another investment project proposed by Liang M. relates to a sea cucumber aquaculture firm in the northern region of Peru.

Among the applicants for changing immigration status in 2009, 31.5% were women and among them 42.9% were Cantonese and 34.2% Fujianese. Compared to preceding years the proportion of women has not changed. However we found a difference in migratory behavior by ethnicity. This difference can be explained by the fact that the new Cantonese immigrants arrived a little before the Fujianese and benefited from their family networks to integrate more rapidly and begin regrouping their families earlier, in greater numbers and permanently. In the case of the Fujianese, the situation differed in that even if the women immigrated and worked, fewer of them were brought over as wives. Fujianese of both sexes were a long time in transit before deciding to bring over their family. Once they entered Peru few of them requested the status of investor; they were however more numerous in occupying places in commerce or in the import business. On the other hand, 16.4% of the Cantonese women and 14% of the Fujian women asked to remain in Peru under the status of "family gathering" and in their condition of "housewives." This confirms the fact that a part of the Fujian immigrants have chosen to remain in Peru.

The families of Lucy and Linda suffered a loss of status during the Cultural Revolution. Their father, an intellectual from Fuzhou (Fujian), was married to the daughter of a wealthy wood merchant of Shanghai when they were separated and he was sent to the mountains in Nanping. Of the four children, the two brothers are now in Shanghai but the two daughters have emigrated. Lucy, the oldest (born 1955), after her divorce in 1993, sold her shoes and clothing business and left with an Argentine visa and US $2,000 in her pocket. A Chinese friend established in Buenos Aires welcomed her to the restaurant where she worked as a cashier. Three years later Lucy was married and obtained Argentine nationality. As her father was ill, she sold everything and returned to China. After his death, with her Argentine passport she returned this time to Peru, as the local sale representative for a brand of shoes made in Shenzhen. In Peru she asked to be a resident immigrant, then divorced her Peruvian husband and brought over her sister in 2003 as a worker under a three-year contract. Linda (born 1963) who was divorced in China in 1983, saw in her sister's call the opportunity to leave behind her job as an employee in a local insurance company. After taking over the shoe business while her sister opened a chifa, Linda found herself alone. Lucy sold her businesses and, as an Argentine, requested a visa for the USA. Linda remains alone in Peru and tries to manage by opening a business in lamps imported from China.

This brief account shows that the women, whether Cantonese or Fujianese, are an integral part of this migratory phenomena and not all their experiences are successful. It also shows the enormous mobility of the immigrants and their ability to change nationality and to adapt to the immigrant status offered by their host countries.

Immigrants from other provinces under contract and emissaries[49]

As mentioned the Cantonese and the Fujianese form a separate group with a long-standing migratory tradition. The case of the immigrants from other regions is different, for these latter integrate, privately or as employees of the big groups, into a Chinese national project of economic expansion, of market conquest and a search for raw materials.[50]

Access to the applications for change in immigrant status as well as the inscription records in the immigrant registers for 2009–10[51] shows an evolution in comparison with past years.[52] There are more and more immigrants representing small and medium companies which send investors or open a branch office in Peru to sell to the Andean countries. The majority recruits in China

the professionals they need with no distinction of region. However, certain big companies who sometimes have a marked regional identity bring their personnel over from this region; this is the case of the mining company Junefield, subsidiary of Hunan Taiji Constructions, which brought over 35 people, mostly from Hunan. Others, such as the Huawei del Peru (telecommunications) bring over collaborators from all over China (Sichuan, Mongolia, Hubei, Shandong, Hunan, Shaanxi, Jiangsu and Guangdong). These new residents, who do not know the Chinese community of Peru, live among themselves but sometimes remain in Peru. Those who come on their own account are very mobile but may also settle down.

Immigrants from Zhejiang,[53] Shanghai and Jiangsu

C.H. Chang and X. Chen, from Jiangsu, are associated with two different corporations which import and distribute farm and industrial machinery and automobiles. The former's company has diversified by entering the construction sector. Another Chinese, S. He, also from Jiangsu, started a sawmill project in 2009 in the Peruvian Amazon (Pucallpa), no doubt attracted by the fact that other Chinese are already exploiting forest concessions. L. Zhong directs the import house LERC Industrial. The *Siglo Nuevo*, created as a company by a Chinese man from Zhejiang, has two textile factories in La Victoria (Lima) and in Callao (the port zone), and imports its cloth from the same province. These new entrepreneurs have joined other companies installed in Peru such as Fuda Mining,[54] the Wanxin group from Zhejiang, makers and distributors of motorcycles with enormous success in Amazonia as well as the service companies (development, financing, and engineering) from Shanghai such as Mexiasia or Mundo Bebe Co. where children's clothes are made, with subsidiaries in Ecuador and Colombia.

This region represents only 12.4% of the requests for change of migratory status but it stands out for two reasons: its masculinity, 90.9% of male immigrants, and its youth, 76% of the immigrants in the age group 21 to 40. We note also that three-fourths of the applicants are entrepreneurs already present in Peru showing in this way their desire to stay to develop their economic activities. The other requests made in 2009 come from engineers and fishermen called over under contract by private and state-owned companies. Among the group of applicants for 2009, this region has the most investment projects after the Guangdong-Fujian block.

If we consider the applicants for immigration status from the southern region of the North (Shandong, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin), the medium size investors are not numerous. However, we note the presence among those originating in Hebei[55] of a number of engineers (15%) linked to the increasing number of entries into Peru of large and small mining groups.[56] They are as solicited as those coming from the provinces in central China. But the large group among the applicants for immigrant status is that of the sea-faring personnel, 57%, or crewmen.[57] The professionalization of the immigrants from this region explains its high rate of masculinization (93%). Three fourths of them have answered an employment offer already formed by the Chinese employer. Unfortunately the document does not state who the employers are. During the last Business summit which took place in Lima in 2011[58] between Chinese investors and Latin Americans, the delegation of the Tiajin government showed its desire to promote its automobile industry, its production of machines for mining and the chemical industry. It is highly probable that the number of immigrants linked to these projects will increase in the next few years.

The provinces of Dongbei (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) and Mongolia

There are also migrants from this region of China. But unlike Europe, particularly France,[59] this is not apparently a migration of displaced workers. In Lima, the people from Dongbei form a

small group of persons whose distribution of men/women is relatively well balanced (43.6% women and 56.4% men), an equilibrium close to that reached by the Cantonese community thanks to family regrouping. Present for ten years in Peru, they come in regularly in small numbers and their activities are not yet "targeted": they may be fishermen, employees, accountants, engineers, distributors of Chinese products such as cell phones, etc. In 2009 12 applicants for a change of immigration status declared themselves entrepreneurs and merchants and three asked for a family regrouping. Thus there exists a small nucleus of independent immigrants from the Northeast, not linked to the big Chinese companies, who are now settling in. The projects of some of these new immigrants tend toward the sectors already occupied by the Fujianese, such as opening hotels and spas, building projects, forest development and mining prospections.[60]

Central China provinces (Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Jiangxi, Hunan)

Migrants from this region are sought after by the large Chinese mining groups. Certain companies (the Anhui Geology and Mining Investment or the Hunan Taiji Construction Materiel) come originally from these traditionally mining regions. A number of employees arrive with a contract made in China and then, once in Peru, want to regularize their situation and request immigrant status. As with the regions mentioned previously, we find a nucleus of persons already settled in Peru since the beginning of the 2000s, which shows that there is a certain regularity in their installation. What is exceptional is the quality of the immigrants, 70% of whom are highly qualified (70% are over 31 years of age, 76% are men); they are mostly engineers, company administrators, accountants, lawyers, technicians and geologists. Only 6.4% are merchants and entrepreneurs; their investments go into companies which import machines for mining, the import of chemical products also destined for mining, or the import of textiles. Some of them are involved in projects of small private companies for mining prospect.

The provinces of the West and South West

Migrants from these provinces are very little represented, but like those from central China, the immigrants requesting a change in their migratory status are related to contracts for qualified persons, the majority of which are men (62.5%): engineers, technicians, accountants, economists, professors and journalists and a few entrepreneurs. However, in the case of Sichuan the situation may change. Actually, several delegations of the provincial government of Sichuan have regularly shown interest in Peru.

The gold rush

The new Chinese immigrants are thus merchants, small and medium entrepreneurs and employees recruited in China by big companies such as Huawei (telecommunications) and the great mining and petroleum companies which have obtained concessions from the Peruvian Government. They are found with other foreign companies in the largest sites: the Jinzhao Mining at Pampa de Pongo (Ica), the Zijin and its crossborder deposits in the region of Piura, the Lumina Copper at Cajamarca, Chinalco and the Toromocho project (see Figure 23.2) in the Junin region. These companies have their own suppliers of mining material and chemical products. But next to them are a number of small and medium investors who devote themselves to prospecting, or more often to buying mining concessions from the Peruvians. They are also bringing in machines for the extraction of minerals and most often furnish the illegal (in the protected zones) and informal



Figure 23.2 Map showing Chinese communities in Peru

(in regions authorized but not controlled) mining concerns. Since 2008 groups of Chinese gold prospectors have increased and established themselves on the banks of the Malinowski (Inambari-Madre de Dios) and Nusiniskato (Carabana-Puno) rivers.[61] They are heavily armed, normal in this lawless Amazon region of multiple frontiers, and they resist the expulsion injunctions of the national authorities. The government forces have attempted several times to get them out but in vain and several complaints have been lodged. The attraction of gold, of minerals in general, is very strong among certain immigrants. This activity has revealed itself to be the refuge for a number of delinquents who have been accused of human trafficking.[62] Can they be considered ordinary immigrants? This is difficult to decide insofar as they remain in Peru for several years.

Concerning the immigrants whose profile we have attempted to draw according to the region they come from and their occupations, a large number of them are under contract and do not stay in Peru, but we should not exclude those who decide to stay and are difficult to quantify and locate. The merchants and investors, although legally residents and often even naturalized, are also mobile and adapt quickly to changes (success or failures) in their business. They enjoy mobility once Peru allows them to pass through all the South American countries. Finally, there also exists an invisible immigration, unrecorded: those who reside in Peru for a more or less long period of time, before being led to the USA, to Canada, and to Europe. The majority of them carry false identity papers and most often they work in the chifas. Some of them stay in Peru; this is the case of the Cantonese and Fujianese who renounce temporarily the continuation of their voyage. This group of immigrants can with difficulty pretend to form a community; however, they may weaken and challenge the present Chinese community of Peru.

Chinese community or Chinese communities in Peru

From an institutional point of view, the Chinese community of Peru groups together in Lima, under the thumb of the *Tong Huy Chong Koc* or the *Sociedad Central de Beneficencia China,* eight regional associations (*huiguan*) and a Beneficencia in the port of Callao,[63] whose founding goes back to the second half of the nineteenth century. There are 21 associations in the province among which a certain number have survived or regained life in the years 1970–80 thanks to the Tusans. A number of other associations, corporative, educational, sportive, for women or leisure, are attached to them but not dependent upon them. Their activities have evolved along with the age of their members and the arrival of new immigrants, the distancing of the Tusans,[64] economic crises and the more or less good management of the directors. There are some associations which have remained faithful to Taiwan[65] and whose members hesitate between their attachment to the old associations which have gone over to the People's Republic of China and their attachment to Guomindang. Only the presidents of the regional associations of Lima and the province can elect the three presidents of the Beneficencia China for a three-year term. The rules decree that only the Chinese-born may accede to the management positions most desired because they allow entrance into the most advantageous political, commercial and social networks. It is not rare that some presidents remain in power for nine years and when they leave their position, they still sit on a committee managing other powerful functions.

The present presidents are between 60 and 70 years old. They are part of the Cantonese who arrived just before the opening in 1980 and the renewing of the migratory flow. As in the case of the presidents of the regional associations, it has been difficult for them, despite the arrival of new immigrants, to maintain their activities during the years of hyperinflation and violence. The frequent visits of delegates from the regional governments, the district capitals, the party secretaries, their entreaties and invitations have reminded the directors that they should above all work for the interests of China.[66] By a phenomenon of mutual attraction and guided by the advantages to be gained, the Chinese of Peru including the Tusans have drawn closer to the Chinese Embassy. It is much more open for them, and it is interested in their activities. It encourages the generations of Peruvian-born Chinese and the second and third generation Tusans to go to study in China.[67] The cultural exhibitions, the creation of four Confucius Institutes[68] between 2009 and 2010, the scholarships, and the Chinese film festival tops off its policy of seduction of the Tusans as well as the Peruvians. But the situation is not as simple and idyllic as it appears.

Numerous regional associations little by little have been taken over by the new immigrants. This is the case of the associations in the North coast (Chiclayo, Chimbote, Huaral, Piura,

Trujillo), and in the South coast (Cañete) and in the Amazon (Iquitos). Helped by their embassy, the new directors openly favor Chinese politics and even support the propagation of an extremely positive image of China. In Lima, within the associations, the Cantonese who arrived after 1980 are insistent and will soon take power.

In the capital, the repeated visits to the different associations by the delegates from the Bureau of Chinese Overseas and the Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation often conclude with offers of cooperation at the economic level between their members and the cities or districts which send them. The associations bring their logistic support to their new friends. One notes therefore the appearance of the association of Dongguan whose members were previously attached to the Pun Yui society. Apparently in addition to the linguistic criterion, (the Dongguan are in majority Hakkas) it is above all the economic advantages which motivated its creation in 2009. The creation in December 2010 of the new Kaiping association also responds to the call of the Kaiping authorities to draw closer to their district of origin so as "to work in favor of Sino-Peruvian relations and collaborate together on projects for health, education and for the profit of Peruvian society,"[69] but it concerns above all common economic interests. In this case, in 2011 on the occasion of the visit of a delegation from Jiangmen, the administrative capital with authority over Kaiping, the association became a go-between of the Permanent Consultative Conference of the city in order to be connected with a Tusan personality. The Toishan society, which depends on Jiangmen too, was also formed around the same aim: to celebrate and enhance Mont Taishan, sacred mountain of Taoism in Shangdong. This creation led to a ceremony attended by a member of the Chinese Embassy and 500 people. The background of this assembly is the town of Zibo, hub of an industrial area (oil, organic chemistry) very interested in Peruvian resources. Contacts between China and the associations have started up again but they are perceived only as relays in the service of regional ambitions. The term "overseas," which used to imply distance and mutual aid, has now a purely economic resonance, the relation of a commercial house with its subsidiary. This is its original meaning but it had a less aggressive mercantile form.

The Tusans

After becoming independent from the old generation, abandoning the Chinese quarter and diversifying their professional activities, the Tusans have formed their own associations. The Tusan community is cemented together by their common education at the Juan XXIII primary and secondary school run by the Chinese curacy. The Tusans who came out of this school established in 1962 are very united; they get together in the Centro Cultural Peruano-Chino, the Peruvian-Chinese Cultural Center and its recreational center *Villa Tusan* and in the Instituto Cultural Peruano-Chino, the Peruvian-Chinese Cultural Institute. In a certain way, the Franciscans of the curacy have allowed the descendants of the Chinese to construct their own Tusan identity, to integrate themselves while still remaining in a closed universe. Erasmo Wong Lu, a Tusan particularly attached to the Confucian values of China, who possesses with his family the biggest supermarket chain in the country,[70] contributes to strengthening the relation links of the Tusans to China. In 1999, on the occasion of the celebration of the 150 years of Chinese presence in Peru, Erasmo Wong Lu created a new association, the APCH, Association Peruano-China. Its aim, clearly stated in its review *Integracion*: to reassemble all the Tusans of the old and new generations and form the young "Heirs of the Dragon" to work with China to develop commercial exchanges, to serve as a bridge between the two countries and become indispensable in the exchanges with Peru's first commercial partner. This generation is expected to create a return toward China while remaining profoundly Peruvian.[71] The APCH, led by a

wealthy Tusan elite, would like to impose the Tusan label, give the Tusans greater visibility, a pride, but it does not really reflect on what a Tusan is in relation to the new Chinese immigrants nor on what should be their relations with China. Nor does the APCH reflect on the reasons for its lack of success because of its weak capacity to integrate the new immigrants and their children, whether they are Cantonese or from another province; a failure which it shares with the Beneficencia. For the APCH, the Tusans should project an image of succes, as it is that of China.

The arrival of the new Chinese immigrants disrupts this equilibrium between the members of the Chinese community, and calls into question the foundation of its identity. The Fujianese continue to bring over the members of their family and choose to remain in Peru for a longer term. However, they are not drawing closer to the Cantonese. Although they formed a regional association in July 2008 and inaugurated the premises in 2010, the Fujianese, in Peru for more than ten years, still suffer from a bad reputation and are still not represented within the Beneficencia China. The difference in "dialect" is now disappearing with the use of Mandarin, but there exists a fierce competition in the import of Chinese manufactured products, particularly concerning their distribution in the Chinese quarter. The Fujianese are the first to leave the quarter to conquer new spaces in the "*conos*" or emerging quarters. But in these districts, very attractive because they are not yet totally urbanized and are advantageous for investors, one also finds, besides Fujianese and the Tusans, immigrants from different Chinese provinces, small investors looking for land for a factory or a warehouse.

The newcomers have no problems of identity. They apply very quickly for a change in immigrant status to obtain that of resident immigrant. The majority requests naturalization after four years' residence. This naturalization is easily bought;[72] it is considered a necessary step for the success of an economic project. This does not mean integration since the newcomers count on their mobility to react quickly as opportunities present themselves. They are helped by the publication of a review, *Nueva Vision* (*Xin Shiye*) which guides them in their approaches, warns them of all the dangers they might meet (thieves, counterfeit money, dangerous locations, how to pay taxes, open a shop, etc.). The *Diario Comercial* (*Bihua Shangbao*) welcomes their advertisements, the most numerous being those of the mining companies offering work to professionals who have studied exclusively in China.

In addition to the mobility of these resident-immigrants one observes the movements of circulation which concern Chinese Ecuadorians, Argentines, Venezuelans and Bolivians entering Peru on business or to try to settle there. As we can see in Figure 23.2, this mobility is also found in the interior of the country in their capacity to jump to the strategic points (frontier towns, mining centers, touristic towns, port cities) as much as to adapt to less attractive regions (emerging districts, small provincial cities). Their mobility explains why they do not involve themselves in community life. As for the immigrants under contract, they move very little and are confined either in the mines or in Lima to the place chosen by their employers. These immigrants do not think of the space in which they live as a territory or a nation, but only as an economic space.

Conclusion

The Chinese community, that is the legitimate Chinese and the Tusans, have become creolized. The essential traits of their culture have been preserved and their relation with China was more emotional than political and economic. Times have changed. The policy of seduction which China practices is not only directed toward the Peruvians or the Latin Americans but also has impacts on the institutions of the Chinese who have been there for a century and a half, including attracting the young generations. The return to Chineseness is taking place slowly.



Figure 23.3 Chinese traders register, district of Barranco (Lima) 1946 (Photograph by Isabelle Lausent-Herrera, Walter Huamani Private Collection, 2009)

Figure 23.4 Old Chinese restaurant (*chifa*) in a popular neighborhood in Lima (Photograph by Isabelle Lausent-Herrera, 2004)

Replacement of the authorities of the Beneficencia is already in place in the provinces and the speeches demanding unity and reassembling of the Chinese living in Peru are those of the presidents of the Beneficencia as well as those of the APCH. The Cantonese language and the Hakka most spoken in the past are retreating before the Putonghua spoken by the new immigrants and the young scholarship holders. The cultural as well as the economic links have been tightened. In spite of the important demographic changes it has undergone, the Peruvians still see the Chinese community as homogeneous. However, the coexistence of an "old" community comprising Tusans and Cantonese immigrants, and a new, mostly Fujianese, is source of internal tensions and carries the seed of future changes. In the past creolization was not viewed as bad although the preference was for marriages between the China-borns, followed by between the China-borns

and Tusans and finally among the Tusans themselves. This tolerance sheltered the community from an excess of nationalism. However, one sees in the new arrivals, not all but a majority, strong nationalistic feelings leading them to refuse mixed marriages and to doubt the usefulness of the old structures such as the *huiguan* and the Sociedad de Beneficencia, except purely economically.

The image of many layers to characterize the actual situation of the Peruvian Chinese community is tempting insofar as the Chinese immigrants from different provinces arrived in Peru, and there appear no link between them and those who had arrived before except for the common nationalism. The Beneficencia and the Tusans still form a communitarian whole which, by its identity and its institutions typically and exclusively Cantonese, cannot at present integrate the newcomers. On one side we have the Chinese community of Peru and on the other the Chinese immigrants, residents and the children of residents who do not form a community. Moreover, Peru which was a country of rapid transit for the Chinese entering with the aim of going to the USA has in recent years become a country of medium-term transit and thus of residence, too. These migratory phenomena are new, rapid, and at times fugitive. It is very difficult, in the case of Peru, to answer with certainty how this community will evolve. Will it be able to integrate the residents from all the provinces from China? Under the pressure of Chinese embassy officials, the most probable outcome would be a new supra-community structure and new governance rules, ending 160 years of Cantonese cultural domination and a community organization attached to that cultural tradition. How many Chinese will settle down definitively? Will the mixed marriages lead to more integration? There are no answers yet and it will take several years more to observe and understand these changes.

Appendix

Primary sources

I. General Direction of Migration and Naturalization (DIGEMIN)

DIGEMIN Trámites Aprobados de cambio de calidad migratoria solicitados por ciudadanos chinos años 2004–9, unpublished records.

- DIGEMIN Fichas de inscripción de los inmigrantes 2009–10. (18/12/2009 al 15/01/2010 et du 15/01/2010 al 2/12/2010). Tomo 2009, tomo 2010, unpublished records.
- DIGEMIN Depósito para el año 2010 de los proyectos de factibilidad por Inmigrantes (IIA). (inmigrantes residentes), unpublished records.
- DIGEMIN Solicitudes de visas temporales. DIGEMIN 2002, 1er semestre, unpublished records.
- DIGEMIN Naturalizaciones de Chinos, 2000–2009, unpublished data.
- DIGEMIN Chinos residentes en Perú en 2010, unpublished micro-data.
- DIGEMIN Flujos de entradas y salidas del Perú de Chinos. Enero 2010-Setiembre 2011, unpublished micro-data.

II. National Institute for Statistics and Information Technology (INEI)

V Censo de Población de 1940, INEI.
VI Censo de Población y I de Vivienda de 1961, INEI.
VII Censo de Población y II de Vivienda de 1972, INEI.
VIII Censo de Población, III Censo de Vivienda de 1981, INEI.
IX Censo de Población y IV de Vivienda de 1993, INEI.
XI Censo de Población y VI de Vivienda de 2007, INEI.

Notes

1 These micro-data bases concern visa applicants and guarantors in 2002–3; changes in migratory status during the period 2004–9, individual records concerning all the Chinese present in 2010 and the entries and exits of Chinese in 2010–11. Dirección General de Migraciones y Naturalización (General Direction of Migration and Naturalization), Lima. My thanks to INEI (National Institute for Statistics and Information Technology) and to Mr. Hererra for giving me access and processing the DIGEMIN micro-data base and the 1993 and 2007 censuses.

2 This estimation is more than the numbers given by the first researchers, among them Watt Stewart (1976) and M. Castro de Mendoza (1989) who for this period took the number of coolies who embarked and arrived at the port of Callao (Lima). Actually the list of ships is incomplete and it is recognized that the boats brought in their human cargoes directly in certain seaports close to the great sugar plantations, thus escaping the control of customs and tax collectors.

3 Ministerio de Gobierno Policía y Obras Publicas, 1878. *Censo General de la República del Perú formado en 1876,* imprenta del Estado, Lima. The bad conditions under which this census was carried out – particularly in the province – suggest that the number of Chinese was slightly underestimated.

4 Actually two other associations were created simultaneously in October 1881, the first at the initiative of the secret societies and the second, instigated by the Chinese Catholics; they preceded the official creation of the Tonghuy Chongkoc (on this theme, see Lausent-Herrera (1997: 133; 2000).

5 Lausent-Herrera (2007: 44) presents the case of the introduction of a widow and her two "sons".

6 It seems that this route was essentially taken by the immigrants from the Hakka dialectal group, from the county of Chockai (Chixi) and Zhongshan. See Lausent-Herrera (1996).

7 This concerns the regimes of L.M. Sanchez Cerro (1930–3) and O. Benvides (1933–9).

8 A quota of 20 people a month was installed but not respected. These quotas were more severely imposed on the Chinese than on the Japanese who from 1899 had immigrated to Peru. See Lausent-Herrera (1991).

9 *Tusan* in Cantonese or *tusheng* in Mandarin is the term used to designate the children born in Peru to Chinese parents. In the years 1930–40 this term tended to include mixed blood children. It is now used in a still larger sense and may mean Chinese descendants of the second or third generation.

10 On the role of the women and the story of their lives, see Lausent-Herrera (1997, 2007).

11 In May 1940 anti-Japanese riots broke out. Following this, in 1940, 1,800 Japanese were deported into internment camps in the USA while the rest of the Japanese community was under house arrest. The Chinese were spared but once again handled roughly after the war (Lausent-Herrera 1991: 28).

12 P. Kwong remembers that at the end of the 1960s the Chinese Government opened its frontiers voluntarily so that a flow of refugees arrived in Hong Kong, in order to destabilize the British colony (Kwong 1977: 28). The immigrants who arrived during this period illegally in Peru were a part of those who "profited" from this opportunity.

13 This route went through Panama which allowed the two communities linked by kinship and community and political institutions to keep close relations.

14 A certain number of interviews with women born in the years 1940–50 indicated however that there had been immigration, illegal but significant, of young men and women of this generation fleeing the great famines and the Cultural Revolution.

15 *VIII Censo de población, III Censo de Vivienda de 1981, INEI.* Total population: 17,762,231 inhabitants.

16 *V Censo de población de 1940*: total population of Peru, INEI: 7,023,111. Chinese: men: 10,365; women: 550.

17 In 1980 with the return to democracy hyperinflation began which in 1991 reached 8000% as well as a long period of insecurity due to the terrorist activities of the Shining Path and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru) (founded by a Chinese descendant). According to a publication of the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Relations, "*Secretaria de comunidades peruanas en el exterior: estadisticas, 2005"* there were between 1,800,000 and 2,200,000 Peruvian immigrants in foreign countries. According to the Peruvian source, there were 935,855 in the USA and 68,649 in Japan. J. Durand (2008: 36) uses the lower number of 233,926 Peruvians, according to the *US Census Bureau*, 2000.

18 *VI Censo de Población y I de Vivienda de 1961, INEI.*

19 *VII Censo de Población y II de Vivienda de 1972, INEI.*

20 There were 24 people with no information.

21 The entries and exits to and from the territory, by nationality, at the different customs posts were not systematically recorded. They were partially recorded in the 1990s and should be completely from

2009 on. Figures from before 1995, taken up by the INEI and the DIGEMIN come from the Ministry of the Interior.

22 *VIII Censo de Población y III de Vivienda de 1981, INEI.*

23 After 1971 the Chinese born in China residing in Peru had to choose their nationality. A certain number faithful to Guomindang asked for a Taiwanese or Peruvian passport and left the country because the tensions following the arrival of the diplomatic corps of the People's Republic were great. Another group, including those from the local associations (*huiguan*) chose the People's Republic. At present it is not possible to have access to the archives concerning the naturalizations for this period but from certain testimonies many Chinese born in China and their children born in Peru (*Tusans*) who were registered at the consulate in Taiwan became naturalized Peruvians. In the same way, these same Chinese, for political and economic reasons, left Peru for the USA and Canada. Finally, among the Chinese who had at that time the Taiwanese nationality, one should count those who left the People's Republic illegally, helped by the Mafia networks of Hong Kong and Taiwan.

24 *IX Censo de Población y IV de Vivienda de 1993, INEI.*

25 To which is added 63 Taiwan-born Chinese.

26 *XI Censo de Población y VI de Vivienda de 2007, INEI.*

27 A more plausible explanation, developed below, is that a big share of Chinese immigrants is coming not from China but from neighboring countries. Other explanations should consider naturalizations and Chinese holding false documents from other countries. In 2011 some Chinese restaurant owners were arrested holding "true false" Peruvian passports (*El Comercio*, 25 July 2011). The illegality, the confinement of the immigrants in transit in the houses or restaurants, explains in great part the difficulty to obtain the figures which correspond to the reality as well as the statistical "invisibility" of this population.

28 The routes taken by the snakeheads are multiple; they go either toward the Caribbean via Ecuador and Colombia or toward Central America. On this point, see Lausent-Herrera (2009a: 74).

29 Upon their arrival as tourists or businessmen, these immigrants are immediately taken in hand by people who are responsible for obtaining for them as quickly as possible, by paying, a change in their immigration status which allows them to get a commercial license, to find a place and to obtain a resident card. After waiting for two years they can bring over family members, (parents, grandparents, children) and after four years, be naturalized.

30 Since people acquiring Chinese nationality are very few, we expected the number of local-born Chinese leaving Peru to be as numerous as those holding the Chinese citizenship.

31 The figures communicated to me (31 July 2004) are all the more surprising – given the underestimation of the flux and the number of residents – that they concern almost equally men (9,767) and women (8,837) while today there still remains a strong imbalance between the sexes. Also, it is interesting to note that the years with the highest rate of naturalization coincide with the issuing in 1992 of the decree-law 663 "migración-inversión" (this point will be developed further on). The numbers diminish after 1996, after the beneficiaries of the law have acquired, in the two years following their arrival, Peruvian nationality. Later, when in December 2010 I requested the numbers of Chinese nationalized for the period 2000–9, the DIGEMIN director indicated that there had been 302 naturalizations of Chinese!

32 The situation is evolving and the size of the families of the new immigrants tends to increase. On this subject many of the women questioned do not want to have more than two children for economic reasons, especially if they already have a son. But many of them have nevertheless taken advantage of being in Peru to enlarge their family.

33 At the beginning of the 1980s there was a tentative, very detailed census carried out with the help of an American university, by the Franciscans who had just taken charge of the Chinese curacy in Peru. Few people accepted to fill out the whole form. The document has never been published.

34 "Chinese residents in Peru in 2010", DIGEMIN, unpublished micro-data.

35 This is a conservative estimate since it does not include those who left the country before 2010 nor those who adopted Peruvian citizenship and are no longer considered as Chinese by the Peruvian authorities.

36 The Peruvian authorities refused to extradite Wong Ho Wing accused of fiscal evasion with the argument that he will risk death for which there is no such punishment in Peru (*Peru 21*, 14 June 2011).

37 This concerns 235 files of visa applications by Chinese deposited at the DIGEMIN. These dossiers also contain references to 148 persons who were guarantors of the coming of future immigrants.

38 To be guarantor one must be resident in Peru for more than two years and in 2002 have a monthly revenue of at least $684, thus at the level of the upper middle class (Lausent-Herrera 2009a: 88)

39 DIGEMIN "Tramites Aprobados de cambio de calidad migratoria solicitados por ciudadanos chinos años 2004–9." The regional origin of the applicants is more precisely indicated for the year 2009; for the preceding years a great number do not indicate their geographic origin. Thus between 2004–7 around 80% of the applicants gave no information concerning their regional origin. It seems that from 2008 on information was collected more strictly (24% nevertheless gave no response). We have therefore retained only 2009, which has 6.1% of non-responses out of a total of 897 applicants, the sample is thus 758 persons.
40 In 1868 three "Agencias", associations or companies preceding the formal creation of the *huiguan*s, wrote a petition addressed to Prince Kung to request the protection of the imperial government. These three groups were the Cantonese, the Hakkas (Tung Sing) and the Ku y Kang (Guganzhou).
41 According to certain sources, an immigrant from Fuzhou who arrived in 1988 was at the origin of the organization of the arrival of numerous immigrants particularly from the mountainous region of Nanping. Other immigrants came from Quangzhou and Fuzhou.
42 Beneficencia China is run by three presidents, elected for three years from among the presidents of the native place associations. These authorities and the entire Cantonese community greatly distrust the Fujianese because their arrival was accompanied by the reinforcement of the mafia networks of human trafficking and the increase of extortions of the Chinese merchants. Beneficencia China helps the Fujianese (finding premises, Spanish lessons, low priced lodging, advice and care) but does not completely accept them. The Fujianese have recently officially formed their own association but it is still not integrated into Beneficencia China. After 20 years of presence in Peru the Fujianese have no position of responsibility at the community level.
43 DIGEMIN, 2004–9.
44 Residence is normally obtained after two years' presence in Peru. Corruption of the DIGEMIN employees, denounced for several years now, allows it to be obtained much more rapidly.
45 Maquiladora is an assembly plant operating on the US-Mexico border to which inputs and parts are shipped and from which the finished-assembled-final product is shipped to the USA. By extension this way of organizing production and trade can be found in other countries sharing a common frontier. The Ley ATPDEA was promulgated in 1991 to favor the diversification of production in the Andean countries and to allow their exportation to the USA so as to eradicate coca culture progression in these countries. Certain products in competition with American industry, such as textiles, could not benefit from the tax exemptions offered by this law. In 2008 its modification authorized textile products made in these Andean countries to enter the USA benefiting from the tax exemptions. See Documentos Informativos SG/di948 de la Comunidad Andina, 12 July 2009.
46 The names of the persons mentioned hereafter have been changed.
47 *DIGEMIN, Deposito para el año 2010 de los proyectos de factibilidad por Immigrantes (IIA)*. The applicants most frequently justify their project by citing unemployment (essentially in the most underprivileged classes) and the lack of technical innovations in Peru.
48 We should note here that from 20 June 2008, Chinese from the People's Republic of China no longer need a visa to enter Ecuador. From 20 June to 30 November 2008, 10,638 Chinese, the majority from Fujian, entered Ecuador, specifically at Guayaquil (*El Comercio*, 9–10 December 2008).
49 This part of our study was based on the unpublished data from the DIGEMIN
50 The Shougang Corporation (Beijing) is one of the first Chinese companies installed in Peru after buying *Hierro Peru*, a national steel company, privatized by President Fujimori in 1992. It is the first to have brought over its employees and workers in 1994. It was followed by a great number of mining and oil companies.
51 DIGEMIN.
52 For two decades the CCPPIT (Council for the Promotion of International Trade) has encouraged foreign visits of delegations from the Chinese provinces to support projects for promotion of products and provincial companies, offering them incentives and help in exporting and encouraging technological exchanges. Some small companies semi-privatized and privatized follow the same incentive. In this framework with an accelerated rhythm since 2000 a certain number of Chinese workers, executives, engineers, technicians, lawyers, prospectors and investors have been installed principally in the capital but also more and more in the province. It is not easy to situate them for several reasons: during a very long period these workers did not appear as immigrants, even temporarily, for they benefited from diplomatic passports issued by the regional governments.
53 Up till now we have not seen any regrouping of the Wenzhou immigrants in Peru.
54 Fuda Mining, created in 2009, is a subsidiary of the Anhui Geology and Mining Investment.

55 DIGEMIN Fichas de inscripcion de los immigrantes 2009–10.
56 Jin Zhao Peru, subsidiary of Zibo Hongda Mining. This mine has the project Pampa de Pongo in the south of the country, the Arequipa region.
57 Tianjin's vocation as a port explains this presence but as the definition of "Tripulante" is not stated by the DIGEMIN, it is not possible for us to know if these are fishermen linked to a fishing enterprise established in Peru or if they are sailors at the end of their contract, settling in Peru.
58 Fifth China-Latin America Business Summit, 21–22 November 2011. See the publication *Chinese Business Delegation* published by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT).
59 The Dongbei arrived in France as in Peru starting in 1999.
60 These activities and projects, at the small business level – but not the large groups – are generally associated with laundering money from China.
61 Communication from the Press Office of the *Federacion Minera de Madre de Dios*, 8 June 2010. *Los Andes*, 23 June 2010. Numerous articles have been published on this subject.
62 The arrest in July 2011 of several Chinese gold miners at Quincemil (Cuzco) and Yanamayo (*El Peruano*, 25 July 2011). *El Comercio* (25 July 2011) sheds light on several facts: several of the stockholders possessed false identity papers (false naturalizations), one of them had already been arrested for human trafficking and forging false passports. These Chinese were sometimes associated with Koreans who were also involved in these affairs. Finally, the cost of informal extraction is very high (a dredge costs $400,000) but this is quickly made up for by the profits. A certain number of investors are suspected of laundering money from corruption in China (see *El Comercio*, 29 February 2011 and *La Republica*, 22 March 2009).
63 These are from the regions of Zhongshan, Pun Yui, Cu Con Chau, Hok Shan, Tong Shing, Long Kong, Lung Sing Sea, Nam Joy and the *Sociedad* de *Beneficencia del Callo* formerly *Wa'An gongsuo*, (spelling according to variations in use in the community).
64 On the relations between the Asociacion Central de Beneficencia China, its associations and the Tusans, see Lausent-Hererra (2009b).
65 These are the *Sociedad Central de la Colonia China, la Sociedad Chung Wo* (Callao), *Peng Cheng Huy* (Miraflores), *Camara de Comercio de Taiwan en el Peru*.
66 In 1989 the Commission in charge of Chinese Affairs Overseas of the Popular Assembly of the PRC (People's Republic of China) visited the Chinese communities of Latin America, including that of Peru, to learn their economic situation and their contribution to the economy of the country in which they live.
67 On 13 November 2010, the universities and colleges of Beijing toured Latin America, and held a forum in Lima to introduce their campuses for the Tusans and China-born Chinese.
68 These institutes have agreements with the Catholic University of Peru, the Catholic University Santa Maria of Arequipa, the *Universidad de Piura* (Opus Dei), *Universidad Ricardo Palma,* whose rector is a Tusan, José A. Change who has also been Minister of Education under President A. Garcia (2006–11).
69 *Oriental* no. 975, August–September 2011.
70 In 2003 they sold their stocks to a Chilean group, CENCOSUD.
71 In 1986 Erasmo Wong organized a grand parade ("El gran corso de Wong") for the Peruvian national holiday. Each year this parade which delights the public has become the symbol of Peruvian nationalism.
72 On this subject, several scandals have broken out in Peru. See *El Comercio*, 21 February 2008 which already denounced the purchase of Peruvian passports. The employees of the DIGEMIN were accused as well as those of the *Registro nacional de identidad*.

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24

The Chinese diaspora

From China to Thailand to the USA

Jiemin Bao

Until recently, the ethnic Chinese often have been depicted as having assimilated well into Thai society. The adaptation of the Chinese Thai was seen as a "natural" progressive process. It was assumed that, as time passed, their "Chineseness" would diminish (Skinner 1973a; 1973b; 1964; 1958; 1957). However, drawing upon my research among Chinese Thai in Bangkok, Thailand, and the San Francisco Bay Area in the USA, I demonstrate that identity is flexible, inconsistent, and multiple rather than fixed, evolutionary, and singular. By situating the Chinese Thai in a time-specific political, economic, and cultural context, and by paying special attention to agency and structural constraints, I map out their transnational migration and identity formation in relation to learning the Chinese language and everyday gendered practices.

The meanings of being a member of the Chinese Thai diaspora have changed over time. Take the category "Chinese" in Thailand, for example. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, elderly Chinese immigrants I know identified themselves as Teochiu Chinese or Hakka Chinese and so on. Linguistic identity was very meaningful to them. They further distinguished among themselves according to how long they had lived in Thailand. *Laotang* [M] referred to "old Chinese" and *xingtang* [M] to "new Chinese."[1] ("*Tang*" is an ancient term for "Chinese.") Not only did the Chinese classify themselves and make claims about who they were, but Thais also created terms to identify their ethnic Chinese neighbors. *Chin nai* (inside Chinese), or *lukchin* (Chinese children), refers to Chinese descendants. *Chin nok* (Chinese from the outside) refers to Chinese immigrants. All these terms are invested with time-specific meanings. Today, some of these terms, such as *laotang* and *xingtang*, are rarely used, but they carry historical significance in understanding identity formation among the Chinese Thai. Meanwhile, new terms continue to be invented.

The Chinese Thai diaspora in this project have different connections to Thailand, the USA, and China. For many, Thailand or the USA is home, the place where they have chosen to dwell, earn a living, and with luck, realize their dreams. China is the place where their ancestors came from and, for many ethnic Chinese who grew up in Thailand or the USA, a mysterious or imagined homeland. The Chinese Thai share certain characteristics with other diasporas: they connect with more than one country; many speak more than one language; and all must negotiate with different cultural codes and engage with transnational networks (Hall 1995: 206). They may feel more attached to one home at a particular moment, then the other home at another moment. Multiple belonging does not mean rejecting one home for the other.

This chapter is divided into three sections. In each section, I first discuss the Chinese Thai in Bangkok and then the Chinese Thai in the San Francisco Bay Area. In the first section, I begin with migration from southern China to Thailand and then examine remigration from Thailand to the USA. In the second section, I look at the fall and rise in popularity of learning the Chinese language in relation to the state's control and regulations. Finally, I illustrate that identity is not neutral but rather informed by culturally specific constructions of masculinity and femininity. Throughout the chapter, I use the term "Chinese Thai" to capture aspects of both Chinese and Thai identity, in addition to the categories "ethnic Chinese" and "Chinese immigrants." "Lukchin" refers to the children of those immigrants who came to Thailand before 1949. "Chinese Thai American" refers to those Chinese Thai who have immigrated to the USA.

Transnational migration and geopolitics

For centuries, Siam (as Thailand was known before 1939) welcomed Chinese migrants, because laborers were in short supply (Skinner 1957: 116). In particular, King Taksin (1767–82), the son of an immigrant Chinese father and a Siamese mother, encouraged his speech group, the Teochiu Chinese, to migrate to Siam (ibid.: 45–6). The Chinese of Taksin's time were known as *chinluang* or "royal Chinese" (ibid.: 21).

Chinese labor migrants were divided into two categories: volunteers and contract laborers. Among the voluntary migrants, a few were merchants, but the majority of them were penniless peasants (Skinner 1957: 126–7). Most came from Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan. They shared the same written language, but spoke different varieties of Chinese including Teochiu, Cantonese, Hakka, Hailam, and Hokkienese. Among them, Teochiu was the principal spoken language used for doing business in Thailand up until the 1960s.

From 1882 to 1917, the total number of Chinese arrivals to Siam numbered 1,448,300 with 996,800 departures for that same period (Skinner 1957: 60–2). The migrant's dream was to make a fortune abroad and then finally return to live out a comfortable old age back in China. But, as Daniel Kulp noted in his study of Phenix Village in Shantou, the majority came home empty-handed, and many never returned at all (Kulp 1925: 86).

Before the mid-nineteenth century, almost all migrants were male. Chinese migrant laborers – except for the teenagers – tended to get married before they came to Siam. The lineage councils in China would not allow wives to leave the village for fear of losing the entire family (Landon 1941: 52; Skinner 1957: 126). Chinese families relied upon arranged marriage as a strategy to "fasten the heart" of a migrant son to his home in China. Such marriages recruited a new household laborer, the daughter-in-law, and ensured the family a more generous remittance from the overseas son. Such a division of labor – the son would accumulate capital abroad while the daughter-in-law took care of the family in China – was calculated and arranged across national borders.

At that time, only a few Chinese women migrated to Siam, mostly merchants' wives and daughters and prostitutes (Skinner 1957: 196). The merchants' daughters were appreciated because of the scarcity of marriageable Chinese women in Siam, and Chinese women were "prized by the Thai for their light skin color" (Skinner 1958: 8). By marrying his daughter to an elite-class Siamese man, a Chinese merchant gained far more symbolic power and greater access to socio-economic networks than by marrying her to a Chinese man. A few Chinese women even gained membership in the royal family through interethnic marriage. "Chinese of wealth," wrote the American missionary N.A. McDonald in 1884, "often become favorites with the rulers and receive titles of nobility, and these noblemen in return present their daughters to their majesties. Thus

we find Chinese blood flowing in the veins of the royal family of Siam" (p. 146). For example, the "daughter of an ennobled Chinese" was taken as a wife by King Mongkut, Rama IV, and later elevated to queen. She gave birth to Princess Saowapa, later one of Rama V's queens (and also his half-sister) and the mother of Rama VI and Rama VII (1925–35) (Skinner 1957: 26). In his reminiscences, former Thai Prime Minister Khukrit Pramote described how his great-grandmother was brought to Siam from China by her father at the age of nine or ten, was presented to the royal performance group of Rama I, and finally became the concubine of Rama II (Khukrit 1983: 12). In other words, at that time interracial marriages mostly took place between Chinese women and wealthy Siamese men.

Without much chance to marry ethnic Chinese women in Siam, Chinese migrant laborers married local Siamese women instead. Scholars have pointed out that by marrying a local woman, a migrant could benefit from his wife's labor, her network of relationships, and her ability to deal with local customers (Landon 1941: 55; Skinner 1957: 127–8). However, the ethnic Chinese themselves gave a quite different explanation for this gender-specific inter-ethnic marriage practice: when a Thai woman "married into" a Chinese home, she was regarded as "Chinese." She was expected to worship her husband's ancestors, and the children she bore used her husband's surname and were called *lukchin*, or "Chinese children." A well-known Chinese saying goes, "Marry a chicken, you run with the chickens; marry a dog, you run with the dogs." This "you" is always female, never male. An inter-ethnic marriage between a Chinese man and Thai woman does not structurally exclude the Chinese man from his local Chinese community. But if a Chinese woman marries a Thai man, she "marries out" into a Thai family, structurally losing her membership within the Chinese community. In addition, her children would not be considered lukchin.

With the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, an improved transportation system, increasing social instability, the occurrence of natural disasters and wars in China, the scale of migration grew. Rather than pulling overseas husbands back to China as the senior kin had planned, by the beginning of the twentieth century many "widows of living ones" used their conjugal connection to immigrate abroad. Women's immigration, which started as a trickle, soon became a steady stream (Skinner 1957: 126–7). Between 1919 and 1937 the number of Chinese women who migrated to Siam increased dramatically. From 1919 to 1929 female migrants increased 140%; from 1929 to 1937 the increase was 69% (see Table 24.1).

The formerly extensive Chinese bachelor society gradually disappeared, and the number of Chinese brothels in Siam also decreased, from 137 in 1929 to 63 in 1936 (Skinner 1957: 197). However, from 1937 to 1947 the number of women decreased by 16.5%, as a result of the Japanese presence in Thailand during the Second World War and an increase in "anti-alien" sentiment (Coughlin 1960: 24; Landon 1941: 204–14; Skinner 1957: 272–89). After World War II about half of the male immigrants in Thailand brought wives from China, and other China-born residents returned to China to marry or bring back to Thailand wives they already had there (Skinner 1957: 196). At that time, the sex ratio became more balanced due to the increase in female migrants and a larger pool of Thailand-born second generation women.

Table 24.1 Chinese immigration to Thailand by year[2]

Year	*1919*	*1929*	*1937*	*1947*
Male	205,470	313,764	335,524	319,196
Female	54,724	131,510	188,538	157,386
Total	260,194	445,274	524,062	476,582

Massive Chinese immigration to Thailand, however, ended in 1949 when Mao took over China. By 1952 only 100 Chinese persons annually were legally allowed to enter Thailand (Coughlin 1960: 26). Soon thereafter, however, a major influx of Chinese came from Yunnan Province by land into northern Thailand and this continued on a smaller scale throughout the 1960s. Most of the migrants were members of the Nationalist Kuomintang army and civilian refugees who moved into the hills on the Thai–Burma border after failing in their fight against the Chinese communist government. Later, some became farmers on marginal agricultural land in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai provinces (Hill 1983: 127). By 1979, the Yunnanese population in these two provinces probably exceeded 30,000 (Hill 1988: 54).

Politics in China and Thailand have greatly affected Chinese immigration. In the early 1950s, some lukchin went back to China to participate in the process of "building a New China." However, during China's Cultural Revolution (1966–76) many were persecuted and falsely accused of being "spies" or members of the "bourgeoisie." Since the mid-1980s, a small number of these returnees have managed to go back and resettle in Thailand.

In contrast to the long history of Chinese migration to Thailand on such a massive scale, the remigration of ethnic Chinese from Thailand to the USA has taken place on a much smaller scale and is a much more recent phenomenon.

The first Chinese Thai who migrated to the USA that we have records for were Chang and Eng, the famous conjoined twins, who arrived in Boston on 16 August 1829. Despite being perceived as biologically and racially "alien," the twins became popular entertainers and successful entrepreneurs, met with crowned heads of state, and inspired scores of literary works as varied as a satirical sketch by Mark Twain to a contemporary monologue by Garrison Keillor. After retiring from show business, against all odds, they became gentlemen farmers, married sisters, and fathered more than 20 children.

Chang and Eng were called the "Chinese Twins" in Thailand because they were born to an immigrant Chinese father and a Chinese Siamese mother (Wallace and Wallace 1978: 15.) In the USA, however, the twins called themselves "Siamese Twins," emphasizing where they came from instead of their ethnicity. The twins exhibited different attachments to China, Siam, and America throughout their lives. China was their ancestors' home. Siam was where they were born and grew up. The USA was where they settled down.

After Chang and Eng, we know of very few Thai or Chinese Thai who immigrated to the USA up through the first half of the twentieth century. However, we do know that a student, whose Thai name was Phraya Sarasin Sawamiphakh, and whose Chinese name was Huang Tianxi, graduated from New York Medical College in 1871.[3] Under the shadow of a Thai nationalist movement in the 1940s and during the Cold War, wealthy ethnic Chinese sent their Thailand-born sons and grandsons to college in the USA as a part of a family strategy to gain a foothold abroad (Niland 1970: 146–7). Ethnic Chinese with Thai nationality were among these early immigrants (Desbarats 1979: 308, 317–18).

According to a survey conducted among Thai students in Los Angeles, 50% were Chinese Thai (Desbarats 1979: 308). As the number of foreign students in the USA nearly doubled from 1960 to 1968 (Niland 1970: 13), 29.9% of the students from Thailand received financial support from their family, a rate much higher than students from India (5.1%), China (4.6%), Japan (1.9%), and Korea (10.3%). This number reveals the extent to which wealthy Thai and Chinese Thai families invested in their children's education. These students, or to be more accurate, these male students, made up a majority of Thai migrants in the 1960s (Desbarats 1979: 305).

Over the years, many graduating students did not want to return to Thailand and live under the Thai military regime, especially after the massacre on 6 October 1976, in Bangkok, so they stayed and found jobs, climbing up the corporate ladder, joining the professional and managerial

class.[4] Chinese Thai opened the first Thai restaurants in many cities throughout the USA. Others used capital from Thailand to start import and export businesses, hotels, print shops, gift shops, gas stations, travel agencies, or jewelry stores. A few even opened banks. Thus, white collar professionals and an entrepreneurial class have quietly but steadily emerged from the former student body.[5]

We have no statistics on the number of ethnic Chinese from Thailand who immigrated to the USA, because they were counted as part of the Thai American population (see Table 24.2).

The history of Chinese migration and remigration, first to Thailand and then to the USA, is inscribed with class, gender and educational differences. The early Chinese who migrated to Thailand were mostly laborers from peasant families who rarely knew how to read and write. In comparison, the early Chinese Thais who came to the USA tended to be college students; they also tended to come from urban, wealthy families. Although they migrated at different times via different routes to different destinations, all were affected by time-specific socio-economic and political circumstances in China, Thailand, and the USA.

Regulating teaching the Chinese language

Throughout history, China's government has without fail incorporated the Chinese diaspora into its causes, promoting learning the Chinese language as a means of connecting to the "motherland," fighting the Anti-Japanese War, and, more recently, modernizing China. In contrast, for most of the twentieth century, the governments of Thailand and the USA regarded those who learned the Chinese language as an ideological threat. However, since the end of the twentieth century, learning to read and speak Chinese is being represented as a means of attracting investors and improving trade and diplomatic relations. For the Chinese Thai, learning the language has had different meanings at different times and in different contexts: from being a patriotic overseas Chinese, to identifying as Chinese, to using Chinese as a tool for conducting business, as cultural and social capital, or as a way for an individual to connect with their ancestral home. In other words, learning Chinese springs from a variety of motivations and is deeply intertwined with geopolitics and social transformation.

The first modern style Chinese-medium school in Siam was established as a direct result of a request by Dr. Sun Yat-sen after his visit to Siam in 1908. Three members of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance (*Tong Meng Hui* [M]) founded a school in Thailand. Part of the purpose of establishing the schools was to connect overseas Chinese with China and to carry out Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People" – nationalism, democracy, and socialism. Chinese migrants, at that time, remained Chinese citizens. They were assumed to still have loyalties and responsibilities to China.

A few years later, the five major speech-group associations, Teochiu, Cantonese, Hakka, Hainanese, and Hokkien, key organizations among the Chinese immigrants at that time, started their own schools. As William Skinner reported "The Hakka Association founded the Chin-te school in 1913, the Cantonese Association the Ming-te school in 1914, and the Hokkien Association the P'ei-yuan school in 1916. Only in 1921 was the first Hainanese school, Yu-min, established" (1957: 168). All these schools were private and received no regular financial support

Table 24.2 Thai American population in the USA[6]

Year	*1960*[7]	*1970*	*1980*[8]	*1990*[9]	*2000*	*2007*
Thai Americans	458	5,256	45,279	91,360	150,283	210,850

from authorities in Siam or in China; they were funded by speech-group associations, wealthy merchants, and by charging limited tuition. Association leaders were expected to take on the responsibility of supporting these schools. For instance, Kasama, born in 1924, told me that her father, long time chairman of the Hakka Association, donated a large sum of money to the Hakka school.[10]

At first, Teochiu, not Mandarin, was the medium of instruction in Chinese schools (Skinner 1957: 169). Later, each speech-group used their *muyu* [M], or mother tongue, which reflects their emotional attachment to their own spoken language. Mandarin was called *gouyu* [M], "the national language" or *guanhua* [M], "the official language." Mandarin did not become the language of instruction in the schools until 1930. Using Mandarin was conceived of as *uniting* these different speech groups (Skinner 1957: 232).

Mandarin slowly became the medium of instruction in Chinese schools; textbooks were imported from China; and classes were taught essentially as they were in China. At that time, Thai language classes were not part of the curriculum at a Chinese school. Some migrants never sent their children to Thai school. In 1992, Sayan, an 82-year-old man whose grandfather came from Swatow, told me that he did not have a formal Thai education. "I learned Thai from a tutor, one hour every day," he said. The schools taught Chinese history, geography, and calligraphy in addition to the Chinese language.

In response, controlling and limiting Chinese education was a key strategy the Thai state used in an attempt to transform Chinese citizens into Thai subjects. As far back as 1918, the Thai monarchy had required that all Chinese school principals be Thai. The state regarded the Chinese schools' curriculum as an obstacle standing "in the way of the pupil's assimilation of the new Thai national spirit" (Landon 1941: 275). Eliminating Chinese education became a national project during the Second World War, partly because the Thai government, headed by Phibun, signed a mutual defense pact with Japan and joined with Japan in declaring war on the Allies (Keyes 1987: 69). In 1939, the Thai Ministry of Education "issued new orders that students in the compulsory age limits (seven to fourteen) could study Chinese language only two hours a week and that all other subjects must be taught in Thai" (Skinner 1957: 266).

From late 1941 to 1945, during the Second World War, Chinese schools were banned. Learning Chinese became illegal. Learning Chinese soon became an underground activity, as studying the language became a way to demonstrate patriotism and participate in the anti-Japanese movement. As a result, hundreds of young men went to China to attend Huangpu Military School and fought in the Anti-Japanese War. After the Second World War, the number of Chinese schools peaked immediately (Coughlin 1960: 150; also see Skinner 1950: 8). However, it did not last long. In 1947, the government restricted Chinese education in Thailand to only four years of primary school and no secondary school (Coughlin 1960: 150). In the 1950s, teaching hours were eventually cut to five hours per week; previous textbooks were replaced with ones which conformed to a pro-Thai nationalist ideology. By the 1960s, some middle-class ethnic Chinese had to send their children to Malaysia, Singapore, or Taiwan to receive a Chinese education.

The popularity of learning the Chinese language gradually waned, especially during the Cold War. Learning Chinese also became a sign of identifying with "red China" or being old-fashioned, or "covered with soil" (*dutu* [M]). Learning English, however, became increasingly popular and was associated with being "covered with gold" (*dujin* [M]). Learning English not only was seen as being sophisticated and modern, but English language courses, unlike Chinese language courses, counted for academic credit for entering a university. In 1991, a Chinese school principal told me that there were 27 schools operating in Bangkok and a total of 120 Chinese schools within Thailand. It appeared that Chinese education and Chinese language instruction would gradually disappear. Coughlin once predicted, "Unless there is a drastic change in the

government's policy, Chinese schools will never again reach the peak they held in the immediate postwar years" (1960: 153). More than 30 years later, this moment has arrived.

In February 1992, the Thai government lifted restrictions against teaching the Chinese language, realizing that Thailand was missing opportunities to attract Chinese-speaking investors. Since then, the number of people learning the Chinese language has increased. Chinese is now allowed to be taught from first grade through high school, and it is treated no differently than learning English. For the first time in history, Chinese has become a subject field in national college entrance examinations. In response to the new political climate, learning Chinese has become popular.

People hire tutors, or attend classes at night schools, day schools, or study via distance education over the Internet. Magazines run serials teaching Chinese phrases, and there are language instruction television programs. According to Thailand's Education Ministry, in 2003 approximately 310 schools in Thailand offered Chinese language courses.[11] As of May 2009, there were more than a thousand schools in Thailand specializing in teaching the Chinese language.[12] In addition, every summer, thousands of middle-class Chinese Thai and Thai send their children to the best universities in China to study Mandarin and other subjects. Learning Chinese is now gaining momentum in Thailand and has even become fashionable. As Preedee Kasemsup, president of the Oriental Culture Academy, put it, "Formerly we all flocked to study English. Now people flock to study Chinese" (Kazmin 2004: 2).

Nevertheless, restricting the learning of Chinese for more than half a century in Thailand resulted in a lack of qualified language teachers and suitable textbooks. Over the last ten years, Thailand's government has sought help from China. In 2002, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin asked Zhu Rongji, China's Prime Minister, to help promote Chinese-language education in Thailand.[13] In 2005 Thailand's Education Ministry decided that all high schools would be required to provide compulsory Chinese language classes by 2008 (Wu and Wang 2005). To better integrate the study of the Chinese language into Thailand's national education system by 2011, the Ministry signed an agreement with China in January 2006. It is hoped that about 20% of the high school students would be able to achieve a reasonable level of proficiency by 2010 (Sirikul 2003). Under this ambitious agreement, the Thai Education Ministry and Hanban – China's National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language, a unit under China's Education Ministry – provided 1,000 Thai teachers of Chinese an intensive three-month training course: two months in China and one month in Thailand (ibid.). In addition, China's National Language Institute provided 100 scholarships for teachers to go to study in China to reach the bachelor's degree level; and, beginning in 2006, 500 volunteer Chinese teachers came to Thailand to help teach Chinese (ibid.). More important, Hanban granted Thailand's Education Ministry the right to license its Thai-language textbook *Happy Chinese*.[14] These efforts have had visible effects. Thailand has been ranked as one of two top countries in Asia in terms of the popularity of learning Chinese (Erard 2006: 1–2). By 2009, Thailand had a total of 400,000 Thai people studying the language.[15]

What a transformation! Thailand has shifted from the country which restricted learning Chinese the most to the hottest spot for learning Chinese in Southeast Asia. Instead of enforcing laws to require Chinese instructors to pass a Thai language test before they can teach in Thailand, hundreds of young teachers from China who may know very little about the Thai language or Thai culture are coming to teach; instead of banning Chinese textbooks, the Thai state is using textbooks from China; instead of limiting learning Chinese mostly to primary schools, now the Chinese language is being taught to students of all ages and abilities.

The official discourse, nevertheless, tends to focus on the economic benefits of promoting learning the Chinese language. Education Minister Dr Chaturon Chaisang stated that learning

the Chinese language is of "significant importance for Thailand's future economic development" (Wu and Wang 2005: 1). Usanee Watanapan, the head of the Education Ministry's translation institute, took the same view, "China is an economic power and Mandarin is becoming increasingly important. If we try to avoid it, we will lose."[16] Kosak Chairasmisak, president of the 7-Eleven Company of Thailand, claimed that the lack of personnel who had in-depth and all-round knowledge of Chinese was hindering Thailand's "investment and competitiveness" (Sirikul 2003). Such a discourse legitimizes learning Chinese for economic reasons.

The official discourse and "Chinese fever" (*heochin/zhongguo re* [M]), or popularity of learning Chinese, ironically, have made some elderly Chinese Thai nervous, reminding them of the days when they struggled to learn the language surreptitiously. Michael Vatikiotis reports that his Chinese Thai friends still remember "learning Chinese in secret under the dining room table" (2006). Mr Kampol Strethbhakdi, the deputy secretary-general of the Thai-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, also could not forget the danger of learning Chinese in his day. He advised others to be cautious: "After all these years and the lessons from the past, it is still wise to do so quietly and slowly so as not to arouse the suspicion and fear of others."[17] Indeed, a private Chinese Thai university took the name the Overseas Chinese Celebrate His Majesty the King University. In other words, those who promote learning the Chinese language and culture want to try and make sure they are protected, in case the political winds shift again.

Interestingly, even though the Chinese Thai in Thailand and the USA live far apart, they share something in common. In the USA, learning Chinese was also unpopular, especially during the Cold War. Anti-communist sentiments ran so high that even learning the Chinese language risked accusations of being a Communist. Being new immigrants, Chinese Thai had pressure to improve their English language skills. Since some of these early Chinese Thai migrants could speak their parents' or grandparents' mother tongue: Teochiu, Hakka, Fukienese (Hokkien or the Southern Fujian language), or Cantonese, their language skills enabled them to connect Chinese Americans with Chinese migrants from other parts of Asia. Recent migrants, however, especially those in their 30s and younger, often only know how to pronounce their family name in Chinese.

As American society becomes increasingly pluralistic, with the improved relationship between the USA and China, and with China's recent economic development and political influence, learning Chinese has become increasingly popular. Some older Chinese Thai Americans who did not ask their children to learn Chinese now have encouraged their grandchildren to do so. Being bilingual is now also seen as a skill which may lead to a better job, a mark of being sophisticated, and a form of cultural and linguistic capital.

Some Chinese Thai also realized that being Thai or having a Thai name no longer carries the privilege it had in Thailand. The Thai are much less known than the Chinese in the USA. Mary's experience was typical: "When I say, 'I am Thai,' they say, 'Oh, Taiwanese.' I say 'Thailand' and they say 'Oh, Taiwan.'" In addition, many young Thai women are imagined to be sex workers (Borthwick 1999: 216; Cook 1998: 256). Mary noted, "Here [in Berkeley] people, including my TA [teaching assistant], think every Thai girl is a prostitute."

Pikul, a Chinese Thai graduate student, told me that when she first immigrated to Berlin, she was shocked to discover that in Germany being a Thai woman was synonymous with being a sex worker. Her anger and shame summoned up memories of similar emotions she had experienced for being Chinese in Thailand, where she had denied her Chinese identity and prohibited her parents from calling her by her Chinese nickname in front of her friends. Pikul's transnational experience made her rethink her identity and prompted her to enroll in a Chinese language class.

In order to avoid being misidentified, some identify themselves as Chinese to relocate themselves in a better position within the class- and race-stratified social order in the USA.

Different strategies are used, including playing with a family name. In Thailand, to become a citizen, one is required to adopt a Thai surname. The Chinese Thai invented Thai surnames that contained their Chinese name. For example, "Chen" in Mandarin became "Dang" in Teochiu. Then, a Thai term, for example, *charoentham* (prosperity) would be added to Dang. Thus, a new surname is created: Dangcharoentham. Such a practice not only preserved their Chinese family name in a Thai configuration, but also became an indicator of Chinese-ness in Thailand. In the USA, some restored their Chinese family names – for example, using Dang in general, but Dangcharoentham in the Thai American community and in Thailand. Thus, the surname itself bears a transnational print: Dang originated from Chen but also departs from it. Thus, changing a Chinese name into a Thai-ified Chinese name, then changing it back to a Chinese or an American name reveals a heterogeneous process of identity formation.

The transformation of masculine and feminine identities

The meanings and articulation of masculine and feminine identities in Thailand and the USA vary greatly. I suggest that thinking at the intersections – taking kinship, socio-economic conditions, and sexuality into account – is key to comprehending the ways in which Chinese Thai masculinity and femininity are interwoven with the family/business and money/sex. Put simply, marriage fosters and reproduces fundamental ideas of masculine and feminine identity. Husbands and wives' sexuality are regulated very differently in Thailand and the USA. In addition, husbands and wives are also faced with gender-specific constraints.

To be the family's main breadwinner is considered not just a social role but also a "natural" role for Chinese immigrant men to play. Often a lukchin man is encouraged by his ethnic Chinese parents or parent to become a business owner, but only rarely to become a Buddhist monk, a common vocation among ethnic Thai men. This breadwinner role is articulated through fulfilling one's "responsibility" (*khwam rapphitchosp*) to the family by "supporting the family" or "doing business."

Such economic responsibility, a key feature of ethnic Chinese masculine identity in Thailand, does not exclude participating in the sex industry, or being a polygynist, but rather legitimizes it through their economic capital and masculine cultural capital.[18] Many middle-class lukchin men I know emphasize their breadwinner role and use their economic capital to justify extramarital sexual activities as a "reward" for their daily hard work. Like their fathers, lukchin men have the privilege to cross inside/outside, or marital and extra-marital boundaries.

The "inside/outside" domain (*nei/wai* [M]) refers to social space inside and outside the family and includes both production and reproduction. The gender specific term "inside assistant" (*neizhu* [M]) refers only to women. Unlike their mothers, many lukchin women received good educations and have proven to be powerful economic players and skillful money managers. They have publicly transgressed the conventional inside/outside work domain. However, similar to their mothers, they cannot openly transgress inside/outside sexual boundaries. Their sexual rights are circumscribed, for they are disciplined to confine their sexuality within the marriage.

A lukchin woman is usually expected to work for the family business, if there is one, rather than working for "others." The family business, especially in Bangkok, is the most common form of business organization among ethnic Chinese in Thailand. The family business integrates home and work space into a single unit, crossing the boundary between production and reproduction. In this space, family/business, husband/wives, boss/employees, and money/sex are conflated into an inseparable nexus. The wife is considered the most desirable laborer in a family business, not only because her labor is cheap (Greenhalgh 1994; Hsiung 1996), but because her labor is so reliable. She is structurally bound to the family business by her own interests, her

obligations to the family, and her sexual commitment to her husband. Furthermore, masculine identity is tied to the wife's body and labor; and sexuality is one of the factors upon which all of this hinges.

Because business leadership has been masculinized, a husband often is prevented from seeing his wife as an equal player. Thus, a lukchin businesswoman encounters one problem that a lukchin man never faces: how to display her achievements and financial sophistication while having to identify herself as an "assistant" to her husband and a "mother" to her children, that is, how to be an active agent in her own right, but act as a subordinate within the hierarchical business and kinship structures.

Another problem that lukchin women face is that some of their husbands visit brothels. "Visiting women" (*tiao phuying*) can be an individual or group outing, and is often regarded as a form of socialization and male bonding. A female nursing supervisor put it this way:

> Visiting women is part of a man's network. It is a way to build up connections. If you do not go to the nightclub, you do not hear the inside story of the other companies. You will be at a disadvantage. Drinking beer together, confidentiality goes out the window; the truth comes out of their mouths. Much crucial information comes from socializing outside the office.

Thus, visiting women is normalized and often depicted as "a common matter" or part of "a man's nature." The effects of naturalizing men's sexual privilege are to compel men and women to perceive conjugal problems as personal rather than social issues.

Some lukchin men keep a secret "minor wife"; a few integrate these two seemingly separate practices – polygyny and the family business – together. Such integration amplifies conflict and forces each party to manage their emotions to keep the family and the business functioning (Bao 2008: 145–61). Lukchin polygynists visibly cross the boundaries between the presumed binary opposition between production and reproduction.

Most middle-class lukchin women I know regard a minor wife as a major threat to their family and class interests, for a minor wife can siphon off substantial amounts of money, endanger the major wife's status, and threaten her children's inheritance (Bao 2005: 88). In comparison, sex workers are less likely to disrupt kinship ties because their relations are based upon a temporary exchange of sexual services for cash. Having a minor wife is seen as engaging in a "relationship," but visiting a sex worker is seen as an occasional act of "entertainment." By distinguishing a sex worker from a minor wife, lukchin women develop a new strategy of negotiation with their husbands. Paradoxically, then, by perpetuating male sexual privilege, the sex industry tends to stabilize families by limiting polygyny.

Transnational migration from Thailand to the USA, however, has disrupted these practices. In Thailand, a husband's fidelity to his wife is not a primary indicator of his masculinity. In the USA, the appearance of fidelity is often considered crucial for the marriage. Candy, who was born in the USA, remembered that when she was very young she asked her mother, Watdi, why she and her father did not get a divorce, since the couple quarreled so often. Watdi replied, "I'm staying with him because of you. I want you children to have a father." But years later, when Watdi discovered that her husband had a mistress, she divorced him within two weeks. Candy recalled, "My mother said, 'This is not Thailand.'"

Thai and Chinese Thai American women have become less tolerant of womanizing masculinity and have the highest divorce rate among mainland Southeast Asian Americans (see Table 24.3). Today in the USA, especially in cosmopolitan areas, divorce does not automatically stigmatize women. A greater emphasis is placed upon love and less on the collective interests of

Table 24.3 Marital status for Thai American women

	Married	*Divorced*
Hmong	55.2	2.3
Cambodian	48.7	3.8
Vietnamese	54.9	4.1
Laotian	53.1	4.4
Thai	53.0	7.4

the family. Individualistic ideas are often expressed in statements such as "I have to love myself first." With kin members living so far away, they experience much less family pressure when they do decide to divorce, and their decision is less likely to be vetoed.

The criteria for expressing feminine identity or being a "good wife" also have changed (Bao 1999: 108–10). The typical Thai model of a "strong woman" is a wife who tolerates and negotiates with an unfaithful husband to preserve the marriage for the sake of the children. A divorced woman is often blamed for being selfish and for not working hard enough to maintain the marriage. The image of a "strong woman" in the USA differs: she may work during the day, attend school at night to earn a degree, and choose to be a single mother rather than put up with a womanizing husband. In Thai society, downplaying their breadwinner role became a way to avoid directly contesting their husbands. In the USA, there is little need for a woman to use the notion of motherhood to justify her breadwinner role.

Transnational migration displaces Chinese Thai masculinity. Much of the symbolic, social, and economic capital that they accumulated in Thailand is not recognized in the USA, as Asian immigrants are often equated with the working class. In order to reclaim middle-class status in the USA, they tend to focus on how to make more money. In their eyes, material wealth and symbolic capital – having a spacious house in a good area, driving a prestigious car, and sending the children to good schools – have become crucial measurements of being middle class in the USA.

In other words, the criteria for articulating masculinity in Thailand and the USA are not the same. While in Thailand, men from all different classes visit brothels or boast about having multiple sexual partners as a way to display their masculine prowess; such conduct is now considered out of place in the USA. What was previously a "common matter" is now transformed into a private act.

Performing American masculinity is not limited to the economic realm. Some young Chinese Thai men now take their wives' sexual pleasure into consideration, recognizing that a wife's sexual satisfaction can be an important part of a healthy marital life. And husbands express conjugal intimacy much more openly in keeping with the prevailing American cultural practice. In response, women no longer feel the need to hide their sexual desire, conceal their orgasms, or fear that if they do not offer their husband complete sexual pleasure in the bedroom he might visit a brothel, as was previously the case in Thailand.

Socialization and leisure activities are gradually moving away from being organized primarily along gender lines. Now when there is a party or social function, husbands and wives often jointly attend. And some husbands and wives also go to the temple or church together. Visiting the temple is no longer just a woman's activity but rather a social endeavor.

Nevertheless, greater social space does not necessarily mean that Chinese Thai women enjoy higher status in the USA than in Thailand. In the USA, women still do most of the housework, even if they have a full-time job. A woman's economic success and public leadership may still challenge her husband's masculinity, but her ability as a homemaker, no matter how sophisticated it may be, will not. Single mothers run a greater risk of suffering downward mobility. By negotiating

their gender relationships in their new home, Chinese Thai Americans have not only transformed their notions of masculinity and femininity but also shed light upon gender trouble in American society.

In short, expressions of gendered cultural identities vary from society to society and from time to time. No simple criterion of high versus low status can measure the social status cross-culturally (Errington 1990: 7). By paying attention to agency and structural constraints, we can see that the Chinese Thai diaspora are active game players and situational performers, instead of passive and homogeneous subjects. Thus, Chinese Thai transnational migration, identity formation, and gendered practices must be understood in relation to time-specific economic and political conditions. In this way, we can understand why the Chinese Thai diaspora remained silent about their Chinese cultural identity and preferred learning English over Chinese at one particular time, then talked openly in public about their Chinese Thai cultural identity and eagerly sought to learn Chinese at another time. Identity is never static or immutable, but rather often converges with geopolitics, gender, and cultural principles.

Notes

1 Chinese and Thai terms are sprinkled throughout the text. I use the symbol [M] to distinguish Mandarin from Thai.
2 See Coughlin (1960: 23).
3 "Thai American interesting facts," http://thailand-usa.com/statistics/thai-american-facts-and-information-thais-in-america-americans-in-thailand (accessed 11 April 2009).
4 The massacre was a brutal crackdown on university students and protesters who were demonstrating against the return to Thailand of Thanom Kittikachorn, a corrupt right-wing dictator. As many as 300 people were shot and killed by soldiers and police.
5 According to Codman-Wilson, in 1982 it was easy to get a green card through a temporary then a permanent visa; many undocumented Thais got their green card by 1985 (1992: 44).
6 1984 *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 4. US Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, vol. 2, Subject reports, PC80-2-1E, Asian and Pacific Islander Population in the United States, published January 1988. US Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population, Asian and Pacific Islanders in the United States, issued August 1993, table 1: General characteristics of selected Asian and Pacific Islander groups by nativity, citizenship, and year of entry, 1990. US Census Bureau, Census 2000, "American FactFinder," United States, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights. http://factfinder.census.gov. Selected Population Profile in the United States, Thai alone or in any combination, Table S0201, 2007 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, American Community Survey, 11–16, http://factfinder.census.gov, "Thai alone or in any combination" (accessed 18 August 2010).
7 The statistics on Thais for the period 1960–80, however, only include immigrants.
8 The 1980 Census was the first to provide data on Asian Americans.
9 Census 1990 and Census 2000 included Thais born in Thailand and those born in the USA who self-identified as Thai.
10 All names used here, except for public figures or those cited in newspapers, are pseudonyms.
11 Thummarat Kitchalong, *The Nation*, 29 April 2003, "Move to standardize teaching of Chinese," http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/hottopics/lnacademic (accessed 22 May 2012).
12 *Chinahourly*. "Flourishing Chinese teaching in Thailand," http://www.chinahourly.com/culture/201111/80797.html (accessed 22 May 2012).
13 *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 31 March 2002, "Back to Chinese roots," http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bmalaysia/message/23690 (accessed 22 May 2012).
14 *The Nation*, 12 January 2006, "Mandarin teachers on the way," http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/01/12/national/index.php?news=national_19636478.html (accessed 20 January 2006).
15 *Chinese Time School*. "Another 1,000 Chinese volunteers to teach Mandarin in Thailand," http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/24/content_11427411.htm (accessed 22 May 2012).
16 *The Nation*, 27 September 2005, "Ministry to promote Mandarin as alternative," http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2005/09/27/national/index.php?news=national_18716336.html (accessed 25 January 2006).

17 "Back to Chinese roots," http://groups.yahoo.com/group/bmalaysia/message/23690 (accessed 22 May 2012).
18 Thais usually call the first wife the major wife (*mia luang*) and the second one the minor wife (*mia noi*) regardless of the marriage's legality. Polygyny is defined by practice in Thai society. The Family Registration Act of 1935 states that only registered marriages are legal. However, customary or ceremonial marriages are accepted by most people. In 1987, only 55% of marriages by women between the ages of 15 and 49 had been registered (Napaporn 1989: 205–6). This disparity between customary marriage and marriage registration creates space for polygynists to manipulate the system. Some men have customary marriages with one wife and a legal marriage with another; and some have customary marriages with several women (Bao 2008). A seven-year survey conducted at Ramathibodi Hospital in Bangkok found that as many as one in four Thai men, especially businessmen between the ages of 30 and 50, had a minor wife (see *Bangkok Post* 2001).
19 Percentage distribution of population 15 years and older (see Reeves and Bennett 2004: 7).

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25

Tianhou and the Chinese in diaspora

Tan Chee-Beng

Introduction

Chinese migrants carried with them their beliefs and practices, of which the worship of ancestors and Chinese deities and the placation of ghosts, often described as the Chinese popular religion (hereafter Chinese religion), is important. In addition, Buddhism, particularly the Chinese Mahayana Buddhism, has remained an important religious affiliation. Influenced by various religious encounters and forces in their respective societies, many Chinese overseas have adopted other faiths, too, especially Christianity, but also Islam, Baha'ii and others. In the Philippines, for instance, due to the Spanish colonial policy of religious assimilation, today the Chinese there are predominantly Catholics, but those who observe Chinese religion often honor Jesus, Mother Mary and other Christian saints alongside Chinese deities. Christianity is of course important in North America, Europe and Australasia, but Chinese remigration has also brought along churches that are identified with various groups of Chinese; for instance some Chinese migrants from Malaysia have their own churches in Australia, and some churches have been instrumental to new migrants to North America, such as those in New York helping the Fuzhou migrants to adjust to their life in the USA (Guest 2003). In island Southeast Asia, there is an increasing number of Chinese Muslims although they remain a minority among the Chinese population (Ma 2012; Tan 1991).

Most of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, as are those in Taiwan, are Buddhists and followers of Chinese religion. The labels Chinese religion or Chinese popular religion are convenient labels, the people themselves merely practice aspects of Chinese cultural traditions without bothering how they are labeled or whether they constitute a religion or not. Religious practices can be seen in many aspects of their cultural life including wedding and funerals. Even in the USA, for those who are not Christians, their funerals are characterized by religious symbols and rites (see for example, Chung and Wegars 2005).

In this chapter we shall use the case of the worship of Tianhou, also called Mazu, to provide an example of Chinese religion and its significance among the Chinese overseas. Chinese migrants re-territorialized the popular deities from their emigrant communities (described as *qiaoxiang* in China). These include local deities that are specific to a particular emigrant region, but also the pan Chinese deities Guanyin (Boddhisatva Avalokestvara, as Guanyin in China she

has been popularly rendered in English as the Goddess of Mercy) and Guandi (that is, Guangong originally worshipped as a military god but now as a god that serves general functions including as a god of prosperity). While Mazu is not as universally worshipped throughout China, she is an important deity in South China, namely, Fujian, Guandong and Hainan, and also in Hong Kong, Macau and of course Taiwan.

The story of Mazu is narrated in various writings on her, such as, in English, Bosco and Ho (1999), Sangren (1988), Soo (1990) and Watson (2004), and there are many works in Chinese, although some historical facts are still debated.[1] We shall be concerned with the popular myth which devotees regard as true. The popular version is that she was born Lin Moniang in 960 (Song dynasty) on the 23rd of the 3rd Moon in Meizhou Island of Putian in Eastern Fujian, hence this date is observed as her birthday and an important occasion of celebration in Tianhou temples in and out of China. This version also said that she died a young woman in 987, but there are various stories about how she became deified, both directly from human to deity and from death to deity. By the time of the Republican period, a filial piety version about her being drowned while saving her father became popular (Lin 1980: 111).

Whatever the myths, Lin Moniang was honored and deified. Stories of fishermen seeing her image in storms and being saved popularized the worship of her as a seafaring goddess. Both prominent historians on Mazu, Li Hsien-Chang (1979) and Xu Xiaowang (2007: 8), point out that she was a *nüwu*, female shaman, and it was under the influence of the Confucianists that she became a pious daughter in legends about her. In fact many myths about Mazu spread especially after she became deified. As early as the Ming dynasty there was already a popular fiction about Mazu, entitled *Tianfei Niangma Zhuan*, written by Wu Huanchu of the Ming dynasty (see Wu 1990). The significance of this mythical biography of Mazu is that it reflects the inter-mixing of the Taoist religion, Buddhism and Confucianism by the time of the Ming dynasty. In this biographical fiction, Mazu is traced to Xuan Zhen (玄真), daughter of Miaoji Xingjun of the Northern Heaven (北天妙极星君). The Chinese belief in *xingjun* or star god (god of a star) is very Taoist, thus the myth places Mazu in the Taoist pantheon. But this is already a Chinese pantheon that includes Buddhist deities, too. In the myth, Xuan Zhen went to see the high Taoist female deity Xi Wang Mu who sent her to Guanyin, who played an important part in this fiction about Xuan Zhen reincarnating in the human world to subdue the monsters that plagued the humans.

In this fiction there is the story about the daughter of the Lin family (Mazu) learning weaving when she reached the age of sixteen. One day she fell asleep while weaving, and in the dream she fought a monster in the sea north of Meizhou to save merchants at sea. When she was awakened by her mother she lamented that she was not able to save all persons, and as she opened her mouth to answer the mother's call thus dropped the boat she had held in her mouth; the people in the other four boats that she used her hands and legs to hold were saved. The popular version today about Mazu saving her father and brothers in a similar dream must be a later variation that emphasized Confucian filial piety.

Originally deified as a local deity, the worship of Mazu spread along the coast as far north as Tianjin[2] where today there is still an ancient Mazu temple, and the worship is popular in South China; while migrants further brought the worship of Mazu to Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Quanzhou in Fujian as China's maritime center throughout Song and Ming dynasties no doubt played an important role in this spread of Mazu worship; furthermore its geographical administration historically included Putian, the homeland of Mazu. Thus Quanzhou Mazu Temple, first built in 1196, was historically significant; today it is still an important temple that attracts worshipers from around the region and also from Taiwan and Southeast Asia. The choice of Mazu as the sea deity of the Yuan dynasty had to do with Fujian which played an important

role in maritime trade and many sailors and people in charge of the junks were from Fujian, including many from Xinghua (that is Putian), from where Mazu originated (Xu 2007: 104).

The state approval of Mazu worship obviously legitimized it and helped its spread in China. James Watson's article highlights this very well. Local elites, defined by Watson (2004: 270) as "literate men with interests in land and commerce" played important roles for they were willing to contribute to the construction of an approved temple, such as that of Mazu. The imperial state's response to local appeal for certain cults to be recognized and the local elite's role in responding to both the local and the imperial state contributed to what Watson (2004) describes as the "standardization of culture", and in this case the promotion of the worship of Mazu. The imperial state's recognition of the worship could be seen in the conferment of titles for Mazu, from Tianfei (Celestial Concubine) in the Yuan dynasty to Tianshang Shengmu (Saintly Mother of Heaven) and Tianhou (Empress of Heaven) in the Qing dynasty.

In Hong Kong, the deity is popularly referred to in Cantonese as Tian Hauh, that is, Tianhou in Mandarin. Among Minnan-speaking people in Southern Fujian, Taiwan and Southeast Asia, she is intimately addressed as Mazoo (literally Great Grandma) or Mazu in Mandarin. Although the temple may be referred to as Mazu Miao or Mazu Temple, it is usually more formally written as Tianhou Gong or Tainhou Palace; *gong* meaning palace used here as "temple" is appropriate to her status as Empress of Heaven. In this chapter I generally use Mazu to refer to the goddess and Tianhou when referring to the temple. To show the significance of Mazu among the Chinese overseas, I shall first describe her worship in Southeast Asia, more specifically Malaysia,[3] followed by a brief discussion of the significance of Mazu worship in Macau, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Finally the original temple in China is described in relation to transnational networks to show the transnational significance of Mazu and the link between Chinese overseas and China via a religious tradition.

Tianhou, Chinese settlement and Chinese identities in Southeast Asia

Mazu, because of her role as a sea deity protecting fishermen and sailors, was understandably the object of worship by emigrants, some of whom carried her image on board. A migrant pioneer in a new settlement might therefore install the image at home or in a shrine. This was often the origin of a Tianhou temple in Southeast Asia. In the course of my research on the Peranakan Chinese (localized Chinese) in northeast Kelantan in the early 1980s, for instance, I found that the most important temples in Kelantan were those of Mazu. The oldest Mazu temple there is Shengchun Gong in Kampung Tokong of Ketereh which was built toward the end of the nineteenth century. As the oldest temple here the Mazu of this temple is referred to in Hokkien (Minnan language) as Toa Ma or Eldest Ma (Eldest Grandma). Later a second Mazu temple called Zhengxing Gong was built in the state capital Kota Bharu, deriving its "incense fire" from Shengchun Gong, and so the Mazu in the capital city is called Ji Ma or Second Ma (Tan 1982). Like many early Chinese settlements in Malaysia where the early access was by river, the temples were built to face the river, indicating the protective role of Mazu over people who travelled by river and also over the local Chinese settlement.

Mazu is worshiped not only in temples which perform communal functions; she, along with other popular deities especially Guanyin, Guandi, and Fude Zhengshen (Earth God), is also popularly worshiped at home. Indeed some rural Peranakan Chinese (localized Chinese) even make an elevated shrine of Mazu in front of their house. This is unusual as in Malaysia, Chinese worshipers may erect a shrine for the Tiangong (God of Heaven) in front of their house but generally not that of other deities. This shows the importance of Mazu worship in northeast Kelantan. In fact, Zhengxing Gong is the communal temple of the Chinese in Kota Bharu, a temple that belongs to all the Chinese there, and where communal celebrations are conducted.

In the neighboring state of Terengganu, Mazu is also the communal deity in the capital city Kuala Terengganu. In fact there are two communal temples there, both of which honor Mazu. The oldest of the two was established by the Hokkien and it is located in the "Chinatown" (Kampung China), the oldest Chinese quarter of Kuala Terengganu. Called He'an Gong (Temple of Harmony and Peace), the temple was built in the early nineteenth or late eighteenth century. There is a bell dated 1801, while my older informants said that the temple was originally built in the older Chinese settlement Pulau Babi, upstream from the Kuala Terengganu. The other Mazu temple is associated with the Hainanese. Its origin could be traced to the small temple built by the early Hainanese settlers to worship Shuiwei Shengniang, a sea deity associated with the Hainanese. It was said that the statue of this deity was found in a junk which was shipwrecked in Terengganu. This Shuiwei Shengniang (Holy Mother Shuiwei) temple was the forerunner of the Hainanese Association (Qiongzhou Huiguan). In 1895, a new building was built for the temple and the association. The statue of Shuiwei Shengninag was moved to the new temple. In addition the statue of Mazu was installed, and the new temple became known as Tianhou Gong, that is Tianhou Temple. Today the Terengganu Hainanese Association has a separate three-story building.[4]

In Malaysia and Singapore, the worship of Mazu is so closely associated with the Hainanese that the deity is worshiped in the Hainanese associations. In fact the early forerunners of these associations were often Mazu temples, or in the case of Terengganu, were associated with the worship of Shuiwei and Mazu. The forerunners of the associations of some other speech groups were associated with the worship of Mazu, too. In Singapore, for example, the forerunner of the Hokkien Association was Tianfu Gong, which honors Mazu (Yen 1986: 41). Here we see the significance of Mazu to the early Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia. In fact the association of a Chinese association (*huiguan*) with a patron deity has a long tradition in China. During the Qing dynasty, Fujian merchants going north to do business built a number of Tianhou temples, and a number of them actually served as Fujian associations. Li Yukun (1994: 115) mentions that other than serving as Fujian associations, some Tianhou temples also served as Shandong *huiguan*, Jianzhe *huiguan*, and Sanjiang *huiguan* (Sanjiang refers to the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Jiangxi).

In the 1980s, the Selangor and Kuala Lumpur Hainanese Association built a magnificent Mazu temple in Malaysia, which was officially opened in 1989. The worship of Mazu at this association has a long history since the association was founded in 1889. This temple in Kuala Lumpur not only shows the significance of Mazu worship but also the status of the Hainanese association. Soo (2009: 109) reports that in 2002, this Tianhou temple of the Selangor and Kuala Lumpur Hainanese Association brought back a statue of Mazu from the original temple in Meizhou, enabling it to establish its authority among the Tianhou temples of the other Hainanese associations in Malaysia. Since 2003, this Meizhou-origin statue has been invited by the other Mazu temples from other states in Malaysia for an "inspection tour," in their respective resgions, creating something similar to the cultural politics of the Mazu pilgrimages in Taiwan.

There are many Tainhou temples all over Malaysia.[5] The significance of these temples is most visible during the celebration of Mazu's "birthday," which highlights communal participation and support. There may be cultural parades and there are Chinese popular cultural activities, especially the performance of a lion dance. The significance of a communal temple is not just religious but also cultural, as shown in the Tianhou temples donating funds to Chinese schools, old folks' homes and charity organizations on such an occasion. There are also local variations in the style of celebration. For example, in Kota Tinggi, a town in southern Johor in Malaysia, part of Mazu's inspection tour procession involves boats touring on rivers. This is also common of some coastal communities in Hong Kong. The festooned vehicles of the procession parade in

celebration of the Mazu birthday at the Kota Tinggi Tianhou Temple on 24 April 2011 were contributed by various local Chinese associations (*Xingzhou Ribao*, 25 April 2011, JO, p. 9).

We have seen the significance of Mazu for the early Chinese settlers and for a specific Chinese group identity as in the case of Mazu and the Hainanese in Malaysia.[6] There is also an important identity associated with the Lin clan association, more accurately in Southeast Asia, the Lin-surnamed associations. As Mazu's surname was Lin, the Lin-surnamed associations generally honor Mazu as the patron deity, and indeed a Mazu temple may also house the office of the Lin-surnamed associations. In the case of the Tianhou Gong in Batu Pahat, Johor, Malaysia, today the Lin-surnamed association building stands next to the temple. In the temple in Batu Pahat, Mazu is worshiped in the front hall while the hall at the back is the Lin ancestral hall, where ancestral tablets are installed. This association of Mazu with the Lin-surname associations is not just a Malaysian Chinese phenomenon. In fact this has been a tradition in China. In my visit to the Lin Clan Association in Putian, Fujian in April 2010, I noted that the building of the association is also the temple of Mazu. In Honolulu, the Lin Clan Association building is also the site of Mazu worship.[7]

There are also many Mazu temples in Indonesia. Salmon and Lombard (1977: XLII), mentioning a number of Mazu temples in Indonesia, report that Tianhou (i.e. Mazu) appears in the oldest temple in Jakarta, called Jinde Yuan which was founded in the seventeenth century even though this is largely a Buddhist temple. The Chinese work by Ma Huan (1955: 10), written in the fifteenth century, mentions that there were Chinese in Tuban, Geresik and Surabaya, all in East Java. We do not know when the worship of Mazu began there but today all these places have major Tianhou temples.[8] Surabaya is the second largest city in Indonesia and the Tianhou temple there is called Sishui Fu'an Gong Tianshang Shengmu, and Mazu is affectionally referred to by the local Chinese in Hokkien as "Mahcoh Po," which is Mazu Po in Mandarin, *po* is the honorific address for an old or senior woman. Geresik is today a small town and the Tianhou temple facing the sea called Jinxing Gong 锦兴宫 (the local Hokkien name is Kim Hin Kiong) is the major temple there. A plaque in honor of the goddess mentions the date 1864. As is common of a major Chinese temple, a number of other deities are honored, with Guandi and Guanyin (the Goddess of Mercy) honored in the same main hall as Mazu, while the other important deity Fude Zhenshen locally called Dabogong (Earth God) is honored in a separate hall. Tuban is also a small town and the Mazu temple is one of the two major Chinese temples; the other larger temple honors Guandi. The Mazu temple is called Ciling Gong 慈灵宫. The plaque above the Mazu altar is dated 1850.

In August 2007, Myra Sidharta, an Indonesia specialist on the Chinese in Indonesia, accompanied my wife and me to visit Chinese temples from Jakarta along the northern coast of Java to Geresik and onto Maduri (see Figure 25.1). The Mazu temples that we visited include the following.

- Jakarta: Vihara Dewi Samudra. Despite the Buddhist name, this is a Mazu temple that is closely associated with the Lin-surnamed Chinese, and there is a place for installing the ancestral tablets for the Lin-surnamed people at the back of the temple. A stone stele about the Lin ancestors bears the date 3rd of *Tongzhi* or 1864.
- Semarang: Vihara Budhi Luhur (local Hokkien name Po An Bio, that is, Bao'an Miao in Mandarin). In this Mazu temple, the altar of Mazu is flanked by that of Fude Zhengshen on the stage left and that of Guanyin on the right. A stele about donors mentions that the temple was built during *Daoguang* (first part of the nineteenth century) and was renovated in 1903.
- Rembang: Cihui Gong 慈惠宫.This Mazu temples honors Mazu and a few other gods. A stone stele mentions that it was built in 21st year of *Daoguang* or 1841.

Figure 25.1 Map showing Malaysia and Java (Courtesy of Ms. Luo Jiting)

- Tuban: Ciling Gong. See above.
- Geresik: Jinxing Gong. See above.
- Mojokerto: Hok Sian Kiong (Fushan Gong 福善宫). The earliest dated inscribed board in the temple mentions *Guangxu dingyou nian* or 1897. While this is a communal temple, from the inscribed boards in honor of Mazu made by the Fuzhou people, this group of Chinese migrants from eastern Fujian appeared to play a significant role in the building of the temple. The altar of Mazu in the main hall is flanked by Guandi (stage left) and the Southern Fujian origin deity called Guangze Zunwang. Buddhist bodhisattvas are honored in a hall at the back of the temple.
- Kediri: Cihui Gong. This temple has the same name as that in Rembang. The Mazu altar is flanked on the stage left by Guangze Zunwang and the right by Fude Zhengshen. A leg of the offering table in front of the Thian Sang Sing Bo (Tianshang Shengmu, that is Mazu) altar is inscribed with the date *Tongzhi jisi nian* or 1869. The bell in the temple bears the date 17th year of *Guangxu* or 1891.

The worship of Mazu is also common among the Chinese in other Southeast Asian countries. Given the long cultural interaction with China, Mazu obviously had an early presence in Vietnam. Li (2011: 77–8) mentions that the main deities of the Chinese in Ho Chi Ming City include Mazu, Guanyin, Guandi and Fude Zhengshen, and that Wenling Maio 温陵庙 which today is popularly referred to as Guanyin Temple originally honored Mazu as the patron deity. The altar of Guanyin was added later. Mazu is also important among the Chinese in Thailand, many of whom are Chaozhou people. In the Philippines, Mazu is even associated with the Virgin Mary. In Batangas, a city about 120 km south of Manila, the image of the Virgin of Caysasay, is also worshipped as Mazu in the Tianhou temple there (Ang See and Go 1990). Overall, while the Chinese in Southeast Asia worship many Chinese deities, Mazu is an important one and was among the earliest to be re-territorialized in the South Seas.

Mazu in Macau, Hong Kong and Taiwan

The worship of Mazu is widespread in Macau, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and many temples are of early origin. In fact the main Mazu temple in Macau is today a popular tourist site, partly linked to the story that the name Macau was derived from the name of the temple in the local language, that is, Ma Gok or Mazu Temple. In Hong Kong, where Mazu is more commonly known as Tinhauh in Cantonese, there are Tianhou temples everywhere, and the map in Liu (2000: 16) shows that Tinhou temples are located in great numbers all over the coastal regions (where people inhabit) of New Territories, Kowloon, Hong Kong Island and other inhabited islands. Watson (2004) gives us a comprehensive analysis of the Tianhou belief among the New Territory residents. There are many Tianhou temples of the Cantonese-speaking majority people, but as Blake (1981: 25, 73) reports, Tianhou is also the focus of worship by the Hakka and the Hokkien-speaking boat people.

In Taiwan, the worship of Mazu is not only widespread, but it has a long history of cross-straits significance in identity politics. Today Mazu has assumed island-wide political significance, as well as cross-straits cultural politics. The annual Mazu pilgrimage processions (*jinxiang*) have wider political significance, and it is not surprising that these have attracted a number of researchers (for example, Song 1971; Sangren 1987; Chang 2003; Lin 2006). Sangren points out that in Taiwan Mazu is a symbol of common Taiwanese identity; at the same time it is also a symbol of differentiation as in the case of competition for legitimacy in the claim to history and importance between local groups (Sangren 1988: 693). The Chinese have the tradition of honoring the *zumiao* or "ancestral/original temple," viewing it as most legitimate and the deity there as having more ritual power. Thus visiting the *zumiao* is a way for a temple's deity to gain legitimacy and enrich its ritual power. The Mazu of Beigang claims to be the direct branch of the Meizhou Mazu, hence its special status as the *zumiao* in Taiwan and the focus as the destination of pilgrimage in Taiwan.[9] This special status was challenged by Zhenlan Gong of Dajia County in Taichung, when in 1987 17 temple committee members of Zhenlan Gong successfully flew to Meizhou via Japan, at a time when there was no direct communication yet between the mainland and Taiwan. They brought back a statue of Mazu and incense pots, allowing the temple to claim direct legitimacy. In the following year, the temple committee voted to terminate the historical pilgrimage to Begang (Chang 2003: 137). This is a powerful testimony to the politics of Mazu pilgrimage in Taiwan. While politically the Taiwanese see themselves as a separate entity from mainland China, in religion the ritual link between the straits remains important, and the political leaders in the mainland have not failed to notice this, as we shall see.

Religion, transnational networks and China

The original Tianhou Temple in Meizhou, being the *zumiao*, was and still is the site of pilgrimage by Tianhou worshipers in China and by those in diaspora. When I visited the Tianhou Temple in Lukang in Taiwan in August 2004, a person from the temple proudly showed me a photo of the Meizhou Tianhou Temple taken when the Lukang Temple organized a pilgrimage to Meizhou in 1911. This original temple was destroyed in 1966 during the Cultural Revolution. The opening of China in 1978 made it easier for temple groups and individuals outside mainland China to visit Meizhou. Attempts were also made to renovate the Mazu Temple. The Chinese government realized the political and economic significance of the Tianhou Temple in Meizhou. A temple management committee was formed in July 1987, and this further helped the revival of the temple. By 1998, with the support of the government, an ambitious plan to build a Mazu Cultural Park was launched. By 1997 with 36 buildings or architectural structures

Figure 25.2 Meizhou Mazu Cultural Park (Photograph by Tan CB, April 2010)

Figure 25.3 Meizhou Mazu altar (Photograph by Tan CB, April 2010)

Figure 25.4 Lukang Tianhou Temple (Photograph by Tan CB, August 2004)

Figure 25.5 Tianhou Temple and Lin Clan Association in Honolulu (Photograph by Tan CB, March 2011)

built, this was an impressive religious park that occupies 80 *mu* or more than five hectares of land. Known in Chinese as Meizhou Mazu Miao Fengjingqu, it is the popular pilgrimage and tourist destination of tour and pilgrimage groups from within China and from overseas.

The significance of Meizhou Mazu Temple as the destination of pilgrimage of the Chinese diaspora can be seen in the statistics provided by the temple management office.[10] In 2005 there were 3,026 *jingxiang tuantui* or pilgrimage groups from 15 countries and regions outside mainland China, with 2,065 from Taiwan, 385 from Malaysia, 302 from Thailand, 166 from Singapore, 30 from the Philippines, 23 from Indonesia, 13 from Hong Kong, 27 from Jinmen,[11] six from Japan, three from United Kingdom, two fom Macau and one each from Australia, France, Germany, and Vietnam – in all 3,026 groups making up 104,604 persons. By 2006 the number of pilgrimage groups increased to 3,852 with 111,528 persons (see Table 25.1). During the year there was a group from India, one from Mongolia, and two from the Netherlands,

Table 25.1 Pilgrimage groups to Meizhou Mazu Temple by countries and regions (2006)

Region	*No of groups*	*No of people*
Taiwan	2,891	89,053
Malaysia	346	12,616
Singapore	183	2,976
Thailand	290	4,283
Philippines	36	498
Indonesia	55	402
Jinmen	18	814
Japan	8	88
France	1	16
Mongolia	1	20
USA	5	38
India	1	7
Germany	1	6
Canada	1	48
Netherlands	2	23
Vietnam	1	20
Hong Kong	12	620
Total	3,852	111,528

Source: Mazu Cultural Park Office

countries that do not appear in the 2005 list. In 2009, there were 4,547 groups with 134,460 persons (Table 25.2).

From the statistics covering 2005 to 2009, it is clear that Taiwan sends the largest number of groups, followed by Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore, indicating these are the regions that have the greatest concentration of Tianhou temples, and where Mazu worship is most significant. While Cambodia does not appear in Table 25.1 and Table 25.2, in 2007 there was a pilgrimage group (24 persons) from Cambodia, and four groups (89 persons) in 2008. Thus Tianhou temples can be found in different parts of the world, with the greatest concentration in Taiwan, followed by Southeast Asia. These are places where there are many descendants of migrants from Fujian and in the case of Thailand, from Chao-Shan in Guangdong.

Conclusion

This chapter seeks to use the case of Mazu worship to illustrate the significance of religion among the Chinese in diaspora. In the case of voluntary migration as in Southeast Asia generally, the Chinese deities also migrated with migrants. Of these Mazu has special significance as the goddess was associated with the seas, being the major sea deity in late imperial China. The goddess provided emotional support for the early migrants and the worship provided the communal organization of the Chinese communities. Today Mazu is not just a sea goddess; she has evolved with time to become a multifunctional deity, serving the Chinese worshippers of different occupations, from fishermen and farmers to business people. This reflects the changing nature of Chinese deities across space and time.

Mazu in Taiwan has additional significance because of its role in temple politics and politics in Taiwan. It also plays an important role in the cultural politics between Taiwan and mainland China, with the latter hoping to promote closer identification of the Taiwanese with the mainland,

Table 25.2 Pilgrimage groups to Meizhou Mazu Temple by countries and regions (2009)

Region	*No of groups*	*No of people*
Taiwan	3,457	105,715
Malaysia	347	12,634
Thailand	328	5,634
Singapore	223	4,460
Philippines	46	688
Brunei	11	221
Jinmen	25	1,380
Indonesia	30	1,008
Vietnam	12	133
Macau	21	539
USA	3	39
Canada	4	91
Japan	21	1,008
Hong Kong	19	910
Total	4,547	134,460

Source: Mazu Cultural Park Office

although the Taiwanese have been interested in the ritual link only. Whatever the politics, Mazu has been lucky in receiving imperial and state blessing. Today, this blessing is very much associated with transnational links between the Chinese overseas and China, which the Meizhou Mazu facilitates.

Overall Mazu is one of the major deities of the Chinese in diaspora, that is, among the majority of the Chinese who still observe the traditional Chinese religion. She is one of the major deities worshiped at home and in communal temples, along with Guanyin, Guandi and others. In Southeast Asia, these other major deities include Fude Zhengshen, the Chinese earth deity popularly known as Toa Peh Kong (Duabehgong). However, unlike Toa Peh Kong, Mazu has transnational implications as the original temple is in Meizhou, China, and so through the transnational links between Mazu worship in the diaspora and the Tianhou Temple in Meizhou, the Chinese worshipers from overseas are always connected to China. This is so, too, with the worship of other deities or founding ancestors which have a *zumiao* in China.

Notes

1 There have been many Chinese and Japanese accounts on Mazu. Among the earliest comprehensive study is that of Li Hsien-Chang (1979). See Xu (2007: 4–14) for a discussion of the Chinese academic study of Mazu including his comments on Li Hsien-Chang.
2 The Tianhou Temple in Tianjin was first built in 1326. I visited this renovated temple in March 2005.
3 The data for the description on Southeast Asia, Malaysia in particular, is based on my field research since the early 1980s.
4 For more of my description of the Mazu temples in Terengganu, see Tan (2002: 24–9).
5 For a survey of the Mazu temples in Malaysia, see Su and Liu (2007, 2008).
6 Today in Hainan Island, one does not see the same significance of Mazu worship as among the Hainanese in Southeast Asia. The famous Tianhou temple (Tianhou Gong) in Haikou, the capital of Hainan, has lost its glory after the main building was taken over by the communists after 1949 and turned into the Overseas Chinese Shop (Huaqiao Shangdian). Built in the Yuan dynasty and renovated in 1861 (according to *Qiongshan Xianzhi* or Qiongshan county gazettte), the temple now has only a small place of worship at the back of the original building. I visited the temple on 9 July 2009.
7 I visited the Lin Clan Association in Honolulu twice, in 1978 and in 2011.

8 My then doctoral student Ding Yuling and I visited the temples in Surabaya, Geresik and Tuban in December 2002.
9 The Mazu statue of the Beigang temple is said to have been brought by a monk from the Meizhou temple in 1694. However the earliest Tianhou temple in Taiwan is that of Lugang Tianhou Gong. This popular temple in Lugang traces its history to 1591 when it was built and the statue was said to have been brought by General Shi Lang from the Meizhou original temple. In Lugang there is also another major Tianhou temple referred to as Xin Zu Gong (New Mazu Temple) to differentiate from the popular and older one nearby. Xin Zu Gong was built in 1788 by Qing officials and was officially managed. Today this temple is visited mainly by tourists and it is the older temple of the masses that remains very popular with the local people.
10 I am grateful to Mr Lin Jinbang, chairperson of the temple management committee, for asking his staff to prepare the statistics for me. I thank Mr Yuan Zunxi for following up my request with Mr Lin and for accompanying me and my wife to visit the Mazu Cultural Park.
11 The countries in the tables are listed in the sequence as provided by the office of the Mazu Cultural Park. For obvious political reasons, Jinmen is listed as a separate region apart from Taiwan.

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Part VI

Education, literature and media

26

China's rise and (trans)national connections

The global diasporic Chinese mediasphere

Wanning Sun

In April 2008, only a few months before the Beijing Olympic Games, a series of riots broke out between pro-Tibet and pro-China protesters in a number of major cities in North America, Europe, Australia, and East Asia. Various Chinese communities living outside China from different ideological allegiances, socio-economic backgrounds, and migratory trajectories were united in the pro-China rallies, spontaneously voicing strong opposition to the Western media's pro-Tibet stance in the coverage of the Olympic Torch Relay. Most Chinese-language newspapers and publications in these global cities, with the exception of pro-Falun Gong publications, provided effective discursive space to accommodate as well as mobilize anti-Western and pro-China sentiments. These displays of strong nationalism, observed by many Western bystanders, formed a stark contrast to the diasporic Chinese communities' explicit denouncement of the heavy handed crack-down on pro-democracy students on Tiananmen Square by the Chinese government.

The highly charged emotions and nationalist responses displayed by the diasporic Chinese communities caught the West by surprise. Some pro-Tibetan and anti-PRC (People's Republic of China) protesters in Australia thought that it was ironic – even somewhat ludicrous – that Chinese students now studying overseas were taking advantage of the new-found freedom of expression in the West to defend the authoritarian regime of the Chinese Party-state which they had willingly left behind. Western journalists scrambled to understand the curious phenomenon of diasporic Chinese – including those older generations of migrants who have no connections with the PRC, except in the cultural sense – willingly and without obvious coercion from the PRC voicing their support for the Beijing Olympics, hence implicitly supporting the soft power diplomacy project of the Chinese government. Unbeknownst to some Western journalists, the pro-China protesters' anger was partly directed at the Western media's failure to report China "objectively" despite its religious adherence to the *ritual* of objectivity.

To scholars in the sub-disciplines of Chinese media and Chinese diaspora studies, the pro-China demonstrations all over the world represent the most recent example showcasing the tension, uncertainty, and ambiguity that increasingly mark the diasporic Chinese consciousness. Yet again, they are forced to rethink the unpredictable formations of transnationalism. Against this

backdrop, this chapter has three objectives. First, by way of taking stock of the growth and development of the Chinese media in diaspora, I sketch the contour and texture of the Chinese-language media among the Chinese communities outside China. Then, I provide a much needed update on the global Chinese diasporic mediasphere by considering the recent and much touted strategy of "going global" on the part of the Chinese Party-state.

Finally, in the concluding section, I argue that a critical rethinking of Chinese transnationalism, a principle that so far has informed our conceptualization of the global diasporic Chinese media, is in order to nuance and update our understanding of the complexity of the global diasporic Chinese mediasphere.

The central tenet of my argument is this: Key moments in the development of diasporic Chinese media are invariably responses to the dramatic political and cultural shifts and transformations in China. And while a post-1989 outbound migration from China, the speed of adoption of new media, and a range of de-territorializing strategies of global capital accumulation have led to the formation of a global diasporic Chinese mediasphere characterized by a distinct transnational dimension oriented toward the project of de-centering China, recent developments in the past few years have thrown doubt on this vision of transnationalism as a totalizing trajectory. Instead, these developments point to some tendencies whereby the "national" is asserting itself to assume a more dominant place in the diasporic Chinese mediasphere. I argue that these developments make it possible to envisage a "(trans)nationalism," or in other words, a transnationalism that is nevertheless bracketed with the growing presence of the nationalist agenda of the PRC.

The formation of a global diasporic Chinese mediasphere

If transnationalism can be understood at the levels of identity, networks, and economic activity (Ong and Nonini 1997: 9), then an account of the development of the diasporic Chinese mediasphere is at the same time an account of the formation of modern Chinese transnationalism. This is because the production, circulation, and distribution of diasporic media content rely on transnational networks in material and infrastructural terms. Diasporic Chinese media networks often develop from entrepreneurial initiatives of individuals. The legendary history of Aw's family business, which is indelibly associated with *Singtao* Newspapers and Tiger Balm ointment, is a most telling illustration of the triumphs of transnational capitalism and modernity Chinese-style. Originally emigrating from Yongding County, Fujian province, in Southeast China to Rangoon, Burma, the Aw family made their name selling medicines in Rangoon. Tiger Balm, a humble ointment made from a family remedy, became a popular brand name in 1923, initially in China and Hong Kong, and then in the rest of Asia, Europe and the USA, and became a common household product in places as far-flung as the Caribbean, South America and Africa.

The reputation of Tiger Balm was soon paralleled by another global product invented by the Aw family, attesting equally powerfully to its capacity to grow transnational networks of capital accumulation. In 1929, Aw Boon Haw, the son of the Fujian migrant, started *Sing Chew Jit Pao* (*Sing Jew Daily News*) in Singapore in order to promote the famous family medicine, starting what was later to become a ceaseless expansion of a global newspaper network. Launched in Hong Kong in 1938, *Sing Tao Daily News* was in the 1950s taken over by Sally Aw Sian, Aw Boon Haw's daughter, who expanded her father's press empire by publishing editions of this Chinese language paper offshore. Now, via satellite, the paper sends its core content from its headquarters in Hong Kong to major cities around the world – Sydney, Auckland, London, San Francisco, New York, Toronto and Vancouver – where local content is added. For this reason, it is perhaps fair to say that *Singtao* is the most global Chinese newspaper in terms of reach, yet at the same time it is the most location-bound and thus highly place-specific. In fact, it is this

simultaneously global and local dimension that accounts for *Singtao*'s enduring appeal. Nowadays, Sally Aw's other papers include the *Sing Tao Evening Paper*, the *Tin Tin Daily News* and the *Hong Kong Standard*. And its ongoing impact in the provision, across the globe, of Chinese-language news and current affairs, which is nevertheless not China-centered, is believed to be crucial in the formation of a transnational Chinese mediasphere.

The story of *Singtao* reminds us that a global diasporic Chinese media operates, first and foremost, as a series of entrepreneurial initiatives, and, as such, operates according to the logic of flexible capital accumulation. Interestingly, the history of empire building among these global Chinese newspaper conglomerates is seldom taken into account in the narratives of Chinese transnational business networks, despite the fact that materials from Chinese-language newspapers of the time are often used as evidence of social formations of various Chinese migrant communities. And, despite the distinctly commercial nature of the global diasporic Chinese media networks, few scholars have paid much attention to them as an economic activity that, together with other forms of enterprise, e.g. banking, manufacturing, investment in infrastructures, or trade in natural resources, demonstrates the "wildness" (Nonini and Ong 1997: 19) of Chinese transnational capitalism.

This wild transnational Chinese capitalism manifests itself in some fairly unique media forms, media practices, and media economics, which, I suggest, are an integral part of, as well as the metaphor for, the "guerrilla tactics" often identified with Chinese ways of doing business. In many cases, much of the advertising dollars in the Chinese-language media come from niche businesses catering to their own community (Ip 2003). Also, quite potentially baffling to Western readers (though perhaps not so baffling to other ethnic groups in these Western countries), it is a common phenomenon that a significant proportion of newspaper space is devoted to advertising, making it possible to provide these publications as complimentary copies that are mostly distributed through businesses in areas with a high concentration of Chinese residents, rather than through local news agencies. This, of course, has implications for the readers' perception of the function of these publications. Instead of expecting these publications to be objective or bias-free, they are more likely to regard them as consumer's guides to local businesses and services instead of news and current affairs.

In other words, many of these publications are developed with the clear and explicit intention of promoting trade in certain products – a practice that has its historical precedent. For instance, as mentioned earlier, *Sing Chew Jit Pao* in Singapore was started in 1929 by the Aw family to promote its Tiger Balm product and other pharmaceutical products; and the Malaysian Chinese newspaper *Nanyang Siang Pau* (Nanyang Business Daily) was established by well-known business tycoon cum cultural philanthropist Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng) in 1923 to promote rubber-related products (Cui 2002; Sun 2005). This trade-based nature of the Chinese diasporic media in the early phase of development, at least prior to the 1960s (Ma 2003), is crucial to the identity formation of many migration groups in the Chinese diaspora who found themselves in a politically marginal and economically central position (Hsing 2003; Rigg 2003). There, these media outlets saw their primary responsibility to be the provision of information pertaining to trade, commerce, and business personalities, activities, and networks. What is usually referred to as "business journalism" in the West, a particular sub-genre of journalism covering the domain of trade and commerce, is, in fact, the core content of some of these Chinese-language media.

During the past several decades, various other, and smaller, Chinese media empires have developed since *Singtao*, further diversifying the modes of production and consumption of the diasporic Chinese media landscape. For instance, Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB), a Hong Kong based provider of Chinese television content in a number of countries, including New Zealand and Australia, targets, via satellite, Chinese student sojourners as well as long-established migrants

for subscription to television programs from the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Sun *et al.* 2011). Developments in new media and the proliferation of web-based information and content providers make the direction and volume of content circulation all the more unpredictable. The technology of the Internet and email, enabling instant digital reproduction, image transmission, and hyper-textual links have virtually overcome the tyranny of distance, making it possible for global Chinese communities, especially those in English-speaking regions such as North America, Europe, and Australasia, to voice solidarity. For instance, the incidents of rape and violence against ethnic Chinese women and the Chinese communities in general in Indonesia in May 1998 generated an unprecedented response from Chinese communities across the globe, mostly thanks to the effective role played by huaren.org, a global website, in transmitting information and mobilizing sympathy (Tay 2000; Ong 2005). Further, the political and ideological landscape of the diasporic Chinese media was also somewhat marked, in the earlier decades, by the difference between Hong Kong-owned media (independent of the PRC) and Taiwan-owned media (anti-PRC), in contrast to the current scenario of an intense opposition between pro-China media and the equally globally circulating pro-Falun Gong media, including, for instance, the New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV) and the *Epoch* newspaper.

In other words, the increasingly pervasive presence of satellite and other forms of digital, deterritorializing media technologies, both for media organizations and in everyday personal consumption, has made the flow of the Chinese-language media content in diaspora more fluid and multi-dimensional. However, without wanting to diminish the implications brought about by the advent of digital, visual, and electronic communications technologies, it is the print media, i.e. daily newspapers, weekly papers and periodicals, which reliably cater to the *local*, place-specific needs of migrant communities. So far, local news about migrants' host nations, including local Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and American news involving the Chinese communities in these places, has mostly relied on the Chinese-language print media published and distributed in various local places, rather than overseas electronic outlets, to reach the Chinese reading public of that particular locality (Sun *et al.* 2011). For instance, during times of state or even federal elections, Chinese-speaking communities living in Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, are most likely to access information about major political parties' policies on a range of issues – health, education, employment, and migration – through the Chinese-language newspapers and weeklies produced in Sydney in order to inform themselves of their voting options.

The past two decades or so have witnessed the exponential growth of the diasporic Chinese media, but have also seen the consolidation of diasporic Chinese media studies as an established, though minor, field of scholarly research. Drawing on migration studies, media studies, and China studies, this body of scholarship produced in various disciplines encapsulates a number of by now well-established findings. For instance, the Chinese-language media among various diasporic Chinese communities represents one of the "three pillars" of the ethnic Chinese community – the Chinese-language media, the Chinese-language schools, and the Chinese social and business networks.[1] In addition, the Chinese-language media not only reflects, represents, and often advocates the political, economic, social and cultural interests of the Chinese communities in their host societies, but it also plays an irreplaceable role in communicating crucial economic, legal, and educational knowledge – policies, rules, and regulations in the host country – to Chinese-speaking citizens and residents who live there. Furthermore, apart from the practical function of keeping up one's command of the mother tongue through regular exposure to Chinese-language cultural products, the consumption of the Chinese-language media is generally felt to be an integral part of the identity formation of ethnic subjects in multicultural societies.[2]

Print media, i.e. daily newspapers, weekly papers, and periodicals, continue to be an important part of the cultural life of migrant communities. Apart from the *Singtao Daily*, which is

globally distributed with the insertion of local content, most print publications are operating at or beneath the national scale, with some of them state- or city-based. Even Perth, the capital city of Western Australia, for instance, boasts several Chinese local papers and magazines, which are not available in the eastern states of Australia.[3] In addition, despite the perceived "placelessness" of online publishing, websites run by and catering to various Chinese communities across the globe still exist primarily to address local concerns, thereby often bearing a specific territory code (for example, www.waiwai.com.au serves the Chinese communities in Australia, in contrast to www.huaren.org or www.cnd.org, both of which are based in North America). For another instance, while www.sgwritings.com is an integral part of the global diasporic Chinese mediasphere, it is intended to retain and showcase a distinctive Singaporean flavor of the PRC migrant writings, which otherwise runs the risk of being subsumed by, and made indistinguishable from, diasporic Chinese writings from other nodes of transnational circuit.[4] Furthermore, much of the online material exists to complement, not replace, the existing print media. For instance, waiwai.com.au is owned by the Wai Wai Pty Ltd, in Australia, which also publishes the Wai Wai Magazine.

Similar to the print media, Chinese-language radio, which plays a very visible role in representing the local interests in the Chinese diaspora (see, for instance, Gao 2006 for the history of a Chinese radio station and its growth), also considers its online component an integral part of its business. In comparison to print media and radio, it is much harder to set up indigenous Chinese-language television networks which meet the viewing needs of various diasporic communities, hence making it possible for Chinese television networks – either based in Hong Kong (such as TVB) or the PRC (such as CCTV) – to make their inroads.[5] Put together, perspectives on the relationship between the Chinese communities in multicultural host societies and Chinese-language media in a number of national and geographic locations assemble a picture of complexity and fluidity.[6] It is also apparent that in these transnational Chinese media networks lies the possibility of imagining a number of transnational Chinese reading publics, united by an identity politics in relation to, on the one hand, their own respective, and often multicultural, host societies, and on the other hand, the Chinese communities elsewhere, independent of the political agenda of the PRC.

China's rise and the bracketing of transnationalism

Some significant developments in recent years, especially since the Beijing Olympic Games, seem to suggest that in the media and communications sector, the state space of the PRC has clearly spilled over the territorial border to overlap with the transnational space of the diaspora. Broadly speaking, these developments are the consequence of, as well as shaped by, two parallel processes: the increasing dominance of PRC in the global arenas of labor, business, tourism, education, and migration; and the implementation of China's recently enunciated "going global" policy, which results in the full-scale push for the internationalization of Chinese media and culture. I suggest that there is a close connection between these two processes, and each process effects change in articulation with the other to pose real challenges to our current thinking of Chinese transnationalism.

PRC nationals overseas and the upscaling of the Chinese diasporic media

Until recently, the growing presence of PRC nationals outside China has been a direct consequence of the socio-economic stratification in China and the emergence of the middle class. With more and more Chinese families being able to afford an international education for their

children, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of students and skilled migrants from the PRC over the past several years, mostly in the English-language speaking countries, such as the USA, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, and Singapore. As a direct consequence, the size and the demographic composition of the Chinese-language media consumers has changed considerably with the arrival of large numbers of PRC students now studying in a wide range of educational contexts, including universities, technical and further education institutes, colleges and high schools. These Mandarin-speaking young PRC students, in addition to the post-Tiananmen PRC students who became permanent residents in a number of countries such as the USA, Canada, and Australia, have superseded, both in number and influence, the older generations of Cantonese and dialect-speaking Chinese migrants. These students – potential migrants – not only have different consumption habits and higher spending power than their predecessors (the Tiananmen generation), they also bring with them a closer allegiance to the political and ideological values of the PRC, contrary to the widespread assumption in the West that the middle class in China is critical of China as an authoritarian regime. This gradual but steady change in migrant population also explains many changes in the style and format of the Chinese newspapers. For instance, the Chinese-language newspapers prior to the arrival of the PRC migrants predominantly catered to Chinese-reading migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan, mainly using traditional Chinese characters and layout (i.e. from top to bottom rather than from left to right). The emergence of many newspapers and periodicals in simplified Chinese characters in recent years is a testimony to the changing terrain of readership, education, politics and migration in the Chinese community.

From the perspective of the Chinese government, these students, as well as all other Chinese migrants living outside China, are now the target audience of China's international media content. Chinese embassies and consulates all over the world make systematic efforts to reach out to these students and migrants alike, including providing free cultural events and participating in various diasporic Chinese gatherings during Chinese festivals. Within the context of China's increasing global prominence and expanding soft power, Chinese students and former PRC nationals in diaspora live out the reality of China's ascent in their everyday cultural production and consumption practices, at both the individual and the collective level.

At the same time, the number of transnational Chinese individuals – people who hold Chinese passports but have gained permanent residency overseas – are practitioners of what Ong refers to as "flexible citizenship." Although not all of the PRC students end up taking permanent residency or foreign citizenship upon completion of their studies, the sharp increase of young Chinese students in the universities and colleges has significant implications for the production and distribution of Chinese-language cultural products and cultural trafficking between various geographic nodes within the Chinese diaspora.

The Chinese-language media in Singapore is a telling case in point. Prior to the arrival of Mandarin-reading students from the PRC and their families in Singapore, Chinese-language dailies such as *Lianhe Zaobao* and *Lianhe Wanbao* had genuine worries about the fast dwindling number of Chinese-literate readers. These media outlets were also facing the crisis of the thinning pool of Chinese-writing journalists. The arrival of PRC writers and students since the 1990s brings a renewed hope for the survival, sustainability, and even prosperity of these Chinese-language media organisations. However, this also has created tensions between the need to take advantage of the PRC Chinese to strengthen the Chinese-language media sector and the fear of the Singaporean Chinese-language media becoming too close to the PRC. This is a tension of which the *Lianhe Zaobao* is acutely aware. Interestingly, but perhaps somewhat worryingly to the Chinese-language media industry in Singapore, whether it is possible to stay clear of "too much" Chinese influence has become increasingly questionable. *Lianhe Zaobao*, for instance, is

the most authoritative Chinese-language national daily, and is, in the words of Lee Kuan Yew, a quality paper which every Singaporean has a duty to promote (Wu 2004: 123). However, in its attempt to negotiate between the "bottom line" and the "Party line," the paper has had to make a number of choices. To start with, the newspaper increasingly looks to China as a source of advertising revenue. This implies that though a national newspaper outside China, it cannot assume immunity from the turbulences of the Chinese market as well as politics. In addition, now available in hotels with three stars or above in major Chinese cities, *Lianhe Zaobao* is increasingly aiming to gain permission to compete with local Chinese papers in the Chinese market (Peng 2009). These developments represent both the enormous opportunities and challenges facing the Chinese-language press in Singapore in the era of the increasingly globalized Chinese mediascape. However, even if we are prepared to put aside these speculations about the future, the very fact that currently as much as 87% of the *Lianhe Zaobao*'s on-line readership comes from the PRC raises questions regarding the future viability of its "citizenship, not ethnicity and culture" policy.

The growing visibility of the Chinese nationals in these countries is also reflected in a number of changes in the content of Chinese-language dailies, weeklies and magazines. There has been a gradual increase in news and information about China. Major Chinese-language newspapers in major global cities find it necessary to designate pages for Chinese news and current affairs, including Chinese regional and local news, and thus provide a space where readers can engage in regular imagining of being Chinese. More importantly, there is also a growing quantity of news and information that is either from PRC sources or from PRC perspectives. For instance, while major and established Chinese newspapers in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA covered the Chinese students' demonstration against pro-Tibetan riots prior to the Beijing Olympics in a more or less factual and "neutral" manner, many smaller publications, particularly those with close affiliations with the Chinese embassies, adopted a more strident pro-China stance. For another example, during the time of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, in September 2009, the Chinese embassies and consulates in various cities around the world held extravagant celebrations, which were enthusiastically covered, and Chinese government VIP speeches were freely relayed by many newspapers.

Interestingly and perhaps even ironically, while it is imaginable that new media technologies would make it likely for the diasporic Chinese media content to reach the domestic audience inside the PRC, thereby working toward discouraging a China-centered transnational imagination, the reverse could also be true. Due to the ease of transnational movement by the formal PRC nationals and de-territorialized modes of production, it is increasingly possible for migrant individuals with Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, American and European passports to be based in China yet running their Chinese language media businesses in the host countries. For instance, a few recently launched newspapers, such as the *Chinese Herald*, are remotely controlled and managed by editors who reside in China but have gained Australian citizenship.

This noticeable increase of media content either about China or from the Chinese perspective in the diasporic Chinese media is also a result of China having in the last decade intensified its strategies of extracting natural energy resources from "developing" countries. With the flow of development and investment capital and technology into these places, the movement of people, flow of media, and the Party's attempts to dictate the content of these media outlets have followed. Also, courtesy of the Chinese-language media outlets, many of which are owned and operated by PRC migrants, Chinese government bodies and embassies and consulates have found an effective platform and pathway to extend their patriotic ideology beyond the national border. Chinese students, migrants, short-term laborers, and tourists overseas all become targets of China's state propaganda.

Nowadays, with the sizable number of Chinese contract laborers and business people in Africa, the Pacific, and Latin America, the movements of these migrants, sojourners and expatriates have given rise to the cultural needs of these Chinese expatriate communities, making it possible for the first time to talk about the emergence of the diasporic Chinese newspapers and locality-specific Chinese websites *beyond* the earlier destinations of Western countries and southeast Asian countries, enlarging, in scope and composition, the diasporic Chinese mediasphere. For instance, the recently launched *Oriental Post*, the first Chinese-language weekly published in Botswana in 2009, was reported in Botswana's local press and the *People's Daily*, which has a partnership with the *Oriental Post*. Touted as the first Chinese-language outlet in southern Africa, the publication prominently displays both *African Oriental Post* (Feizhou Huaqiao Zhoubao) and *People's Daily* on the banner-head of the newspaper, marking the inroad of the *People's Daily*, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party in China, into the diasporic Chinese mediasphere, blurring the hitherto well-demarcated boundary between the PRC national media and diasporic Chinese media (Martinsen 2009). Similarly, *West African United Business Weekly*, the first newspaper in Chinese, started in Lagos, the commercial capital of Nigeria, in 2005, was the first of its kind in Western Africa (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 2008). These newer initiatives have broken the dominance of the African Chinese-language print media publishing out of Johannesburg, South Africa, with its *China Express* (Huaqiao Sinew) launched as early as 1994 (Martinsen 2009). Given that these countries are often cash-strapped, they would welcome subsidies, technical and hardware assistance, and infrastructural support from the Chinese government.[7] Furthermore, evidence suggests that China is beginning to introduce its own media practices to African media practitioners (Wu 2012).

Chinese media going global

Indeed, building partnerships with both local media and the Chinese-language media organizations in diaspora has proved to be a winning strategy of "going global." Partnership with overseas organizations enables the Chinese media to "piggyback" on the existing infrastructure set up by the local partners, while at the same time acquiring instant access to a pre-existing audience. These initiatives are spatially grounded cultural, political and economic activities, which aim to expand the reach of the state place of the PRC. This partnership does not just happen in the arena of print media, as was the case with the Chinese press in Botswana, but more significantly, in the electronic media such as radio and television. In fact, if the conflicts between the pro-Tibetan and pro-China demonstrations during the Olympic Torch Relay taught the Chinese government one thing, it is this. On the one hand, China's rise on the global stage as an economic and political powerhouse has not improved China's international image; instead, it brought about a higher level of anxiety or even disapproval about China's performance on the international stage. On the other hand, China does not want to wait for the Western media to become sympathetic to China. Instead, it must push Chinese perspectives and voices into the international arena in order to contest the discursive power of the West. Hence, the mandate to build what Li Changchun, the chief of propaganda in China, calls the "communication capacity" of the Chinese media, so as to extend more Chinese media content farther and faster:

> We must go "global," strengthening our foreign language channels, expanding our partnership with foreign television organizations, vigorously pushing for the international transmission of our television programs, so that our images and voice can reach thousands of homes in all parts of the world.[8]

The rapid expansion of China Radio International (CRI), China's official radio broadcaster, in recent years, is but one example of how to create and extend state discursive space. So far, there is no evidence that China has adopted a one-size-fits-all strategy of expanding its media empire. Instead, its approach is piecemeal, sensitive to local possibilities, and pragmatic in implementation and execution. Currently broadcasting in 43 foreign languages and dialects to the whole world, using a range of transmission methods, including FM, AM, Internet radio, satellite, and podcast, CRI has adopted a range of pragmatic pathways, including joint ventures with foreign local media content providers. CRI now has 117 international FM radio partners, as well as 32 AM radio partners in Asia, Africa, North America, Europe, and Oceania. In North America, for instance, CRI broadcasts can be heard on the medium-wave AM band in many areas, including the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area, via WUST, formerly a rhythm and blues station in Washington, DC, which also now broadcasts brokered foreign language programming (China Radio International 2006). CRI's transmission in Australia also is a story of the Chinese government working in partnership with the diasporic Chinese business media and business community. 3CW, Australia's first-ever Chinese radio station, has been in operation since 1999. Tommy Jiang, the owner, a former PRC national who now owns five Chinese-language newspapers in Australia and other businesses, pushed his radio business westward to Perth, the capital city of Western Australia, now home to around 100,000 Chinese-speaking migrants. Jiang started Perth Chinese TV, Perth Chinese Radio 104.9 FM – Perth's first and only free to air, 24-hour commercial Chinese-language radio station – as well as taking over, in 2008, *Oriental Post*, one of the Perth's widely circulated English and Chinese bilingual newspapers. In 2007, Jiang secured a deal with CRI to transmit CRI content in Perth, and then in Canberra, the capital of Australia, in addition to the content-sharing arrangement between 3CW and CRI in Melbourne (Sun 2010a).

However, expansion of state discursive space is not limited to becoming a partner in the Chinese-language media in foreign countries. It can also take the form of setting up its own subsidiaries and engaging in a more direct and aggressive push for Chinese media content. China's official television network, CCTV (China Central Television), has gradually infiltrated the diasporic market, with CCTV-4 reaching around 10 million viewers globally, and its English-language channel CCTV-9 now having around 40 million viewers overseas (Wong 2009). The network also controls about 75% of Chinese-language television stations in North America (Zhu 2009). CCTV's Great Wall TV Platform, carrying an enormous amount of program content from China's national and provincial channels, was launched in North America in 2004, and has now pushed into the Asian region, including Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea, Myanmar, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Ethnographic work on Chinese Fujian migrants in Europe also suggests an extremely high uptake of CCTV's programs (Pieke *et al.* 2004).

Of course, the most quotidian and effective way of redrawing the boundary between the PRC and the Chinese diaspora is the staging and live coverage of media events, which, through transmission via satellite and online technologies, can simultaneously reach a domestic and diasporic audience. The level of sophistication which marks the staging of media events – including the ceremony of the Hong Kong handover, the successful launch of the Shengzhou Space Shuttle, and more recently, the rescue and relief efforts during the Sichuan earthquake, followed by the Beijing Olympic Games, not to mention the annual Spring Festival – speaks volumes about the clear intention of the state media to promote patriotism offshore. These events work effectively because, by addressing viewers as national audiences – including both domestic and diasporic viewers – they ingeniously blur the line between diasporic Chinese and the PRC, hence writing the *huaren* (people of Chinese descent) into the narrative of the "motherland." De-territorializing technologies have also greatly assisted in the expansion of Chinese state media's footprint.

CCTV's annual Spring Festival gala event, which started in the early 1980s as a domestic nation-building media event, has now become a highly anticipated global media event, with the state-of-the-art technologies delivering, in 2009, to 200 million viewers in 140 countries, using four modes of transmission – Internet TV, mobile TV, transmission via mobile telephony, and Internet Protocol Television (IP TV) (SARFT.net 2009).

Rethinking Chinese transnationalism

Transnationalism and diasporic Chinese media can be pursued in a number of directions. One can explore how the mobility of media images across national and regional borders impacts the ways in which a diasporic Chinese group perceives and relates to its counterparts elsewhere in the world. Similarly, one can explore the – often uneven and unequal – formation of diasporic consciousness through the prism of the strategies and struggles of the migrants to acquire and maintain political and cultural legitimacy in their adopted countries. Finally, but not least importantly, one can examine the complex ways in which "China" and the "Chinese communities outside China" interact to produce a transnational imagination that is necessarily complex and often unpredictable.

Transnationalism, thus conceptualized, has three integral dimensions. First, transnationalism refers to the movement of people as well as the circulation of capital, ideas, media images, and communications and transport technologies across national borders. Second, transnationalism emphasizes connectedness, flows, linkages, and networks marked by inequality and unevenness, More importantly, as Ong and Nonini observe, transnationalism is often "independent of place," "self-consciously postmodern," and "subversive of national regimes of truth" (1997: 26). Third, transnationalism necessarily has a temporal dimension. Here, my argument is at odds with the somewhat linear view of diaspora held by Shih (2007), who argues that diasporic existence will, given enough time, eventually end, as one's transnational sensibility progressively and irreversibly moves further away from the culture one migrates from to the culture one migrates to. Instead, I suggest that paying attention to the temporal dimension allows us to take a historically longitudinal view, accounting for both the back-and-forthness and the zig-zagness in the formations of transnational identity, networks, practices, and, not the least importantly, imagination.

The last conceptual dimension of transnationalism deserves particular attention. This chapter has demonstrated the increasingly complex and unpredictable nature of Chinese transnationalism, and argues that the current transnationalist framework must be updated and nuanced so that it can adequately deal with the "China factor." To be fair, theorizations of transnationalism in the Chinese context have never denied the towering presence of the PRC. They are, rather, marked by an insistence on treating the PRC as no more than a geographic node, and to accord it an epistemological and intellectual status that is equal to, rather than higher than, other nodes and ways of being Chinese.

Scholarship on Chinese transnationalism, particularly produced before the Beijing Olympic Games, is often prone to either celebratory or resistant discourse in its narratives of the cultural/economic activities of the diasporic Chinese. Much of this is driven by a desire to de-center the PRC as the privileged site of analysis. Shih (2007), for instance, suggests that cinema and television, the segment of the media industry that gives us visualization, are crucial in the establishment of the "Sinophone," a world inhabited by producers and audiences of diasporic Chinese who no longer have any connection with mainland China. This Sinophone sensibility, argues Shih, is significant, as the process of its identity construction resists Sino-centrism and debunks either a centrifugal or centripetal vision of China's place in relation to diasporic Chinese communities. For another instance, Chua Beng Huat's (Chua 2000) configuration of the Pop Culture China, focusing largely on music and entertainment products, seems to be driven by an equally political

desire to "peripheralize" China in the production, trafficking, and circulation of Chinese language products. There, the PRC is configured to be little more than a "consumption site," which, along with Singapore, constitutes the receiving zone of media and popular cultural products from other Chinese-speaking locations such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, which are the major "production sites."

This intellectual agenda to de-privilege China in the project of accounting for Chinese transnationalism is perhaps most effectively executed in Ong and Nonini's work on the cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism. Their vision of a transnational public is almost euphoric. Pointing to an "intersection and mixing of different flows of information, images, ideas, and peoples, transnational publics provide alternatives to state ideologies for remaking identity," and are "forming Chinese subjectivities that are increasingly independent of race, self-consciously postmodern, and subversive of national regimes of truth" (Ong and Nonini 1997: 25–6).

In other words, transnationalism, as an alternative to a Sino-centric vision of the Middle-Kingdom surrounded by concentric circles of less authentic Chinese, is often embraced for its capacity to take into account a powerful set of political and cultural forces which exist independently of, and in parallel to, the Party-state agenda of the PRC. And the globalization of media and communication technologies and their capacity for de-territorialization and individuation is seen to promise new horizons in furthering this desire. It is also the consensual view that the globalization of media, which to a large extent follows the contemporary movement of peoples, allows diasporic individuals to remain in touch with the events and ways of life in their homeland, as diasporic media provide a buffer enabling them to remain connected to an ongoing culture and to resist the forces of assimilation to which previous generations of migrants were much more exposed.

With ample evidence presented here, I suggest that this political and intellectual agenda to de-couple "China" and the "Chinese diaspora" in the theorization of transnationalism may become increasingly inadequate in accounting for wide-ranging changes in the domains of media and cultural production. The political will and technological capacity of the Party-state of the PRC to *re-center* transnational Chinese imagination simply cannot be wished away. Here, at the risk of appearing Sino-centric, I argue that transnationalism remains a crucial concept of understanding the social, economic and cultural processes and activities of the Chinese diaspora. However, its enduring analytic purchase depends on its capacity to be sensitive to, and theoretically account for, the implications and impacts of new forces – political, economic and cultural – which shape the dynamics and new texture of specific transnationalist formations.

Notes

1 For writings on the Chinese-language media in diaspora published outside the sub-field of Chinese diasporic media studies, see Carstens (1988).
2 For literature pertaining to these findings, see, for instance, case studies of the Chinese-language websites in Singapore (Chan 2005, 2006) and the consumption of Chinese-language media in Australia (Sinclair *et al.* 2000).
3 On regional Chinese papers in Western Australia, see Sun (2005).
4 Conversation with Li Yeming on this topic in Singapore in December 2009.
5 Multicultural mainstream media in the host countries do try their best to provide Chinese-language content, but their scope is too limited to be of much impact. For instance, Australia's Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) broadcasts half an hour's news and current affairs relayed from Chinese TV (CCTV). Also, it has recently launched a weekly program called Mandarin News Australia, the nation's first free-to-air, locally produced Mandarin news service, which will be subtitled in English.
6 A large body of work has become available to establish the diversity and complexity of the diasporic Chinese media landscape. See, for instance, Wu (2012) for the Chinese media in Africa, Zhou and Cai

(2002) for the Chinese-language media in North America; Ip (2006) for the case of New Zealand; Gao (2006) for the case of the Chinese-language radio in Australia; Hoon (2006) for research on Indonesia; and Khor and Ng (2006) for research on Malaysia. See also So and Lee (1995); Lee (2001); Tay (2000); and Sun (2002, 2005, 2006, 2010b). This body of work addresses a wide range of issues, including the history of Chinese-language media outside China (So and Lee 1995; Lee 2001; Zhao 2002; Zhou and Cai 2002; Sun 2006); migrants' media production and consumption practices (Sinclair *et al.* 2000; Sun 2010a); ethnic politics in multicultural polities (Sun, Gao, Sinclair, Yue 2011; Sun, Yue, Sinclair, Gao 2011); new technologies and cultural identities (Tay 2000; Sun 2002; Chan 2005, 2006); and the transnational cultural economy of Chinese-language cultural production and consumption (Chua 2000, 2004, 2006).

7 I am indebted to Barry Sautman and Hairong Yan for making the information on the Chinese press in Africa available.

8 Li Changchun's full speech was accessed in October 2010 from http://www.gxcic.net/News/shownews_83527.html. The translation of Li's speech quoted in this chapter is mine.

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27

Chinese education in Southeast Asia

Chia Oai Peng

Introduction

In this chapter Chinese education refers to Chinese-medium education and the learning of the Chinese language, particularly Mandarin. The term Chinese overseas is used in a broad sense to refer to Chinese living outside China, most of whom have assumed local citizenship although there are also people who have not attained citizenship due to historical reasons. This chapter will describe the general situation of Chinese education in Southeast Asia.

There have been rather few comprehensive studies of Chinese education among the Chinese overseas. One of the earlier comprehensive reports on the Chinese education in Southeast Asia is that of Murray (1964), which focuses on the political repression of Chinese education. In more recent years, we have Lin (2000), who traces the beginning of Chinese traditional and modern schools in Southeast Asia, providing a comparative study of the development of and challenges faced by Chinese education in Southeast Asia and that of the USA, Europe, Australia and Africa. Another recent work, edited by Choi (2010), covers the economic activities, education, print media, population and communities of the Chinese globally. There are some country-specific studies, especially on Malaysia, such as that of Tan Liok Ee on the politics of Chinese education in Malaya (see Tan 1997).

Chinese migrating in large numbers was a significant phenomenon since the later part of the nineteenth century until the first part of the twentieth century. Living as minorities, the relatively large overseas Chinese settlements in Southeast Asia were persistent in ensuring cultural continuity and maintaining their Chinese identity. This was made possible by the establishment of temples, associations, schools and newspapers, the four pillars that supported the overseas Chinese communities. The temples were places where the migrant Chinese worshiped and maintained ethnic cohesion. Associations provided connections and social support among them. Chinese schools provided Chinese education, while Chinese newspapers promoted Chinese culture and social reform.

For Chinese who sojourned overseas during the second half of the nineteenth century, education in Chinese was regarded as very important for their descendants. It was perceived as a means to perpetuate their culture and identity. Thus they founded schools at their respective places of settlement. The schools established were primary schools, while the teachers and textbooks

were brought in from China. Upon finishing the primary education, some boys were sent to China for secondary and higher education. As the overseas Chinese population grew toward the end of the nineteenth century, there was demand for both primary and secondary-school Chinese education.

The beginning of Chinese education in Southeast Asia

Chinese education in Malaya began in the early nineteenth century. For example, there were three Chinese schools in Malacca around 1815 (Yen 1986: 296). The early Chinese schools were private schools taught in the respective Chinese speech groups' languages. The founding and development of Chinese schools in Malaya and Singapore shared the same history until 1965 when Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia which was formed in 1963 comprising Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. In Singapore as early as 1849, a private Chinese school was established in Chongwen Ge, which was later converted into Chongfu Girls' School. In 1854, the well-known Straits Chinese Tan Kim Seng and his son together with ten other Babas[1] donated money to build Cuiying Shuyuan (cf. Lin 2000). In 1954 this school was merged with the other school established by the Hokkien association. In 1885, Gan Eng Seng founded the Gan Eng Seng School to provide free education for the poor (Lin 2000). It was initially set up in Gan's shop lots. As the student population grew with increased demand, in 1893 Gan built a new school with a capacity for 300 students. The school taught both Chinese and English (see Table 27.1).

According to Suryadinata (1978: 3), the first traditional Chinese school in Indonesia was founded in 1729, although this existed only briefly. The increase of newly arrived Chinese in the later half of the nineteenth century created the demand for Chinese schools to educate their children. Thus in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the number of Chinese schools began to increase. By 1787, classical Chinese texts were taught and the teacher was brought in from Fujian. Suryadinata (1978: 32) wrote that the Peranakan Chinese later on preferred to send their children to Dutch schools when they became accessible. The reason was that the texts taught in Chinese schools then were classical Confucian texts and the teaching emphasized memorizing rather than understanding.

Information on the early Chinese education in other Southeast Asian countries is rather scant. During the early seventeenth century, education in the Philippines under the Spanish colonial rule was already established. A Catholic university was founded in 1611. However, Chinese education did not start until the late nineteenth century. In Brunei the early Chinese school was Yucai School founded in 1918, this was renamed Zhonghua Primary School in 1922.[2] The Chinese residing in Thailand around the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century were believed to have established the first Chinese school in Thailand (Fu 1994). In Burma, the earliest Chinese schools were established toward the end of the nineteenth century. In Yangon the Cantonese and Hokkiens who founded the Guanyin Temple also established a traditional Chinese school. In Mandalay the Guangdong Association there established a Chinese primary school in 1892 (see Duan 2009). The Chinese population in Laos has always been very small and we know very little about the early Chinese education there. Similarly we know very little about the early Chinese education in Vietnam that had much Chinese cultural influence, making it even more difficult to determine the beginning of Chinese education.

Because of William Willmott's work, we have relatively more information on the early Chinese schools in Cambodia, where Chinese speech groups established their respective schools to provide mother-tongue education for their children. The Teochius established their school in 1914 and the Hokkiens in 1927. The Cantonese temple served as the headquarters of the

Table 27.1 Chinese schools established in Singapore and Malaya at the turn of the twentieth century

Names	*Year established*	*Place*	*Initiators*
Wufu Shuyuan	1819	Penang	Private owned. Initiator not known.
Chongwen Ge/ Chongfu Girls' School 崇文阁/崇福女子学校	1849	Singapore	Private owned. Initiator not known.
CuiyingShuyuan 萃英书院	1854		Tan Kim Seng and four others.
Gan Eng Seng School 颜永成义学	1885		Gan Eng Seng
Singapore Chinese Girls' School 星洲女学	1899	Singapore	Dr. Lim Boon Keng
Zhonghua School	1902	Penang	
Leyu Primary School	1903	Kudat, Sabah, Malaysia	
Yangzheng School/ Chongzheng School 养正学堂/崇正学校	1903	Singapore	Wu Shouzhen 吴寿珍, Chen Chunan 陈楚楠, Zhong Anding 钟安定, Wang Hu 王庑, Huang Yubang 黄玉棒, Yan Zhennian 颜贞年, Wang Huiyi 王会仪等
Zhonghua Yixue	1904	Penang, Malaysia	
Guangzhao School/ Yangzheng School 广肇学堂/养正学校	1905	Singapore	Zhao Peitang 赵沛堂等 (Cantonese)
Confucius School 尊孔学校	1906	Kuala Lumpur	
Yingxin School 应新学校	1906	Singapore	Zhong Xiaoting 钟小亭, Tang Xianglin 汤湘霖, Huang Yunhui 黄云辉, Chen Rongguang 陈荣光, Liang Xinghai 梁星海, Chen Mengtao 陈梦桃, Xia Caiting 夏采亭, Tian Shengqi 田省齐等 (Hakka)
Qifa School 启发学校	1906	Singapore	Chen Longzeng 陈龙曾, Luo Shutang 罗树棠, Zhang Rangxi 张瓖溪, Liu Chunnong 刘春农, Yang Jiangzhong 杨江中、蓝口臣等 (Hakka)
Duanmeng School 端蒙学校	1906	Singapore	Chen Yunqiu 陈云秋, Liao Zhengxing 廖正兴、Zhang Xiasheng 张霞生等 (Teochew)
Daonan School 道南学校	1907	Singapore	Wu Shou zheng 吴寿珍, Zhang Shanqing 张善庆, Lin Zhuzhai 林竹斋, Zhou Runxiang 周润享, Wang Huiyi 王会仪, Li Qingyuan 李清渊, Xie Youxiang 谢有祥, Chen Zijun 陈紫君等 (Hokkien)
Yuk Choy High School	1908	Perak, Malaysia	
Yuying School 育英学校	1910	Singapore	Wang Shaolun 王绍伦, Huang Youyuan 黄有渊, Chen Kaiguo 陈开国, Yun Changlang 云昌朗, Fu Changbin 符昌邠, He Yulin 何玉麟, Lu Xiyao 卢熙耀等 (Hainanese)
Pei Yuan Secondary School	1912	Perak, Malaysia	

Table 27.1 (continued)

Names	*Year established*	*Place*	*Initiators*
Aitong School 爱同学校	1912	Singapore	Wang Jiamo 汪嘉谟传道士 (Hokkien)
Confucius School	1916	Kuala Lumpur	
Guangfu School 广福学校	1916	Singapore	Mei Yunqu 梅云衢
Chung Ling High School	1917	Penang	Tan Sin Cheng, Khoo Beng Cheang, Chee Yong Aik, Lim Joo Teik and Khaw Seng Lee and others
Nanyang Girls'Secondary School 南洋女子中学	1917	Singapore	张永福、陈楚楠, 庄希泉, 林瑞轩, 黄肖岩, 庄丕唐, 甘清泗, 洪神扶
Xingya School 兴亚学校	1918	Singapore	爪哇商务公局创办
Guanghua Girls' School /Guangyang School 光华女校/光洋学校	1918	Singapore	Lin Heping 林和平, Chen Changsheng 陈长胜、Chen Youtai 陈有泰, Wang Boda 王伯达, Li Dehe 李德和, Wang Gaolai 汪高来, Wang Wenchuang 王文闯, Zhou Bacui 周拔萃, Wang Tainci 汪天赐, Huang Zhong 黄仲
Zhong Hua Secondary School	1919	Kuala Lumpur	
Han Chiang High School	1919	Penang	Teochew Association of Penang and Lim Lean Teng
Huaqiao Secondary School 华侨中学	1919	Singapore	陈嘉庚, 林义顺, 曾江水
Nanyang Gongshang Tuition School 南洋工商补习学校	1920	Singapore	Shi Su 施苏, Lin Zeyang 林则杨, Hong Shiting 洪石亭, Li Chengjia 李承嘉, Chen Wengui 陈文珪, Ke Chaoyang 柯朝阳, Zhuang Guoying 庄国影, Huang Xiaoyan 黄肖岩, Huang Runjian 黄润鉴, Zhuang Pitang 庄丕唐, Ye Yixiu 叶贻秀, Huang Zhuoshan 黄卓善, Guo Fulai 郭福来, Chen Juemin 陈觉民
Hongwen School 宏文学校	1921	Singapore	
星洲幼稚园	1921	Singapore	
Nanyang Pingmin School 南洋平民学校	1923	Singapore	Xu Zhiyu 许治宇
Jingfang School Girls' School 静方女校	1928	Singapore	Zhang Zhaolan 张兆兰, Zhu Wotang 朱沃堂, He Zhongming 何仲明, Jian Jichen 简绩臣, Situ Shi 司徒仕, Zhong Jueqing 钟爵卿, Guo Jinhua 郭锦华, Zhu Zhaokun 朱兆焜, Zhu Zhaohua 朱兆华, Huang Fu'an 黄福庵
公立合群义学校	1930	Singapore	
Nanguang School 南光学校	1938	Singapore	
Huayi Secondary School 华义中学		Singapore	
Overseas Chinese Girls' School 华侨女校		Singapore	
Zhonghua Girls' School 中华女校		Singapore	

(Continued on next page)

Table 27.1 (continued)

Names	*Year established*	*Place*	*Initiators*
Zhongzheng Secondary School 中正中学		Singapore	
Nanyang University 南洋大学	1953-1980	Singapore	
Wong Nai Siong Secondary School		Sibu	

Source: compiled from Dong Zong 2004.

Cantonese association and also as a school venue providing informal schooling before the school building was built (Willmott 1970: 30). In 1928, the Cantonese tore down their temple to build a school building on the temple ground. The temple was re-established on the ground floor of the school building (Willmott 1970: 35). The Hainanese established their school in 1941 and the Hakka in 1942. By this time, most of the schools in Cambodia were already teaching in Mandarin (Putonghua). (See Table 27.2.)

The establishment of modern Chinese schools in Southeast Asia

From 1898 onwards until before the Second World War, many modern Chinese schools were established in Southeast Asia. In 1905, the Qing government, which adopted some of the measures of the Hundred Days' Reform, sent Zhang Bishi and Liu Shiji to Southeast Asia to encourage the Chinese to set up guilds and schools. The speech group associations and prominent Chinese businessmen responded to the call. These associations initially educated only the children of their own speech groups. It was later that they accepted pupils from different speech groups. The revolutionist movement led by Dr Sun Yat-sen also encouraged supporters to establish modern schools. These schools taught Chinese and English languages and such subjects like history, geography, mathematics, science and physical exercises. The language of instruction was the respective speech group's language. The competition for resources and supports between the revolutionist and the royalist movements was reflected in the establishment of Chinese schools. Schools founded by their respective supporters tended to incline toward their respective political ideals. Before the Second World War, most Chinese in Southeast Asia then were sojourners and were emotionally attached to China. They were very much influenced by the politics in the country. We should also note the local concern with educating children without connection with political orientation in China. For example, the Straits Chinese in Singapore established the Singapore Girls' School in 1899 (Song 1984: 197). This is a significant development in providing education for girls.

The success of the 1911 revolution inspired more modern Chinese schools at primary and secondary levels to be set up. The May 4th Movement in China, which was anti-imperialist and nationalistic in nature, influenced the development of overseas Chinese schools, which adopted Mandarin as the medium of instruction instead of the various dialects previously used. Such a development worried the colonial government, and it began to introduce rules to control Chinese schools. In 1920, the British authorities in Malaya created the school registration act whereby schools with ten pupils or more had to register, and that the curriculum, administration and hygiene had to meet the requirements set by the colonial government. Singapore, then part of

Table 27.2 Early Chinese schools in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia and Brunei

Year	*Place*	*School/Venue*	*Pioneer*
1690	Batavia, Indonesia	Mingcheng Shuyuan	Guo Junguan
1782–1809	Thailand	School name not known	Huaqiao
1872	Yangon, Burma	Guanyin Gumiao Temple	Cantonese
1899	Manila, Philippines	Zhongxi Xuetang	
1901	Jakarta, Indonesia	Zhonghua School	Zhonghua Huiguan
1903	Burma	Zhonghua Yixue	Hokkien
1905	Burma	Yishang School	Hokkien
1912	Indonesia	Huaqiao Seconary School	
1914	Thailand	Mingheng School 明衡学校	Kwong Siew Association
1915	Philippines	Zhonghua Secondary School	
1916–66	Semarang, Indonesia	Huaying Secondary School 华英中学	Hokkien, Oei Tiong Ham 黄仲涵
1918	Brunei	Yucai School	
1920	Bangkok, Thailand	Peiying School 培英学校	
1921	Burma	Chinese Secondary School	
1922	Brunei	Zhonghua Primary School	
1923	Philippines	Qiaozhong Xueyuan	
	Thailand	Huagai School 华盖学校	Sun Yat-sen's effort
	Thailand	Xinmin Xueshu Zhonghua School 新民学术中华学校	Teochew
1925	Thailand	Zhenqiao Gongli School 振侨公立学校	
1931	Medan, Sumatra, Indonesia	Su Tung Middle School 苏东中学	
1937	Brunei	Zhonghua School	
1938	Brunei	Zhongzheng School	
1947	Thailand	Peiyuan School 培元学校	Hokkien
	Thailand	Jinheng School 进衡学校	Hakka
	Ho Chi Min City	Zhangmin School	
	Cambodia	Xinmin School	
1948	Surabaya, Indonesia	Zhonghua Secondary School	

Sources: compiled from Murray 1964, Skinner 1957, Willmott 1970.

Malaya was also affected by this. Myanmar, then also under the British, was also subjected to the same regulation. The Chinese community in Malaya and Singapore were not successful in opposing the act. Between 1925 and 1928, a total of 315 Chinese schools in Malaya were deregistered as a result of the act (Dong Zong 2004: 183). Influential Chinese education leaders like Zuo Xiquan, Chen Xinzheng, Yu Peigao, Song Linmu, Zhong Lechen and others were deported to China. Nevertheless, in 1916 the Confucius Secondary School was established in Kuala Lumpur. This was followed by Guanghua Secondary School in Sibu, Sarawak. In 1919, Tan Kah Kee founded Huaqiao Secondary School in Singapore.

The flourishing of Chinese schools in Malaya and Singapore before World War II led to the establishment of teachers' training classes. However, with the invasion of the Japanese, all Chinese schools ceased operation. For example in Malaya and Singapore during the Japanese occupation

from 1941 to 1945, Chinese schools were occupied by the Japanese authorities, which forced them to close or convert to teach Japanese language. After World War II, Chinese schools in Southeast Asia immediately resumed, and more Chinese schools were established. Overall Chinese education was most established in Malaya and Singapore. Chung Ling and Han Chiang high schools in Penang and Huaqiao and Nanyang Girls' high schools in Singapore were the best Chinese high schools in Southeast Asia, and their alumni included those from Burma, Thailand and Indonesia.

In 1899, Indonesia had 217 Chinese schools with 4,452 students in Java and Madura, and 152 schools with 2,170 students in the Outer Islands (Lin 2000: 3). The Indonesian Peranakan Chinese were then unhappy with the Dutch colonial government which was indifferent toward the education of Chinese children and there was limited access to Dutch schools. A Peranakan leader of Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (Zhonghua Huiguan) called Phoa Keng Hek, started the Zhonghua School in 1901 (Suryadinata 1978: 5). In the following year, Mingcheng Shuyuan merged with Zhonghua School. Huaqiao secondary school was set up in 1912. Four years later, the Hokkien at Semarang established Huaying School. In 1931, the Su Tung Middle School was established at Medan to provide further education opportunities for students who had completed the primary education. By 1952, the school became one of the best Chinese schools throughout Southeast Asia.

In the Philippines, the first Chinese school, Anglo Chinese Academy (Zhongxi Xuetang, also known as Tiong Se Academy) was established in 1899 (Palanca 2004: 4). The subjects taught were classical texts and the teaching emphasized memorization. The school set up a dual system in 1902 whereby the students would follow the Chinese session for half a day and the English session for the other half day. The arrangement was due to the importance of English in the job market as the Philippines was then under American colonial rule. From 1912 until 1935, more Chinese schools were established. These schools had both Chinese and English sessions.[3] The Chiang Kai Shek College, also known as Zhongzheng College was founded in 1939. Today it comprises a kindergarten, primary and secondary schools and a college. From 1898 until 1946, Philippines was under the American colonial rule and during this period the Chinese schools enjoyed relative freedom.[4]

Between 1782 and 1809, there were Chinese schools in Thailand but their names are not known (Fu 1994: 22). The Chinese speech group associations founded the Chinese schools, of which the majority were primary schools. By 1938, there were already more than 293 Chinese schools in Thailand (Fu 1994: 23). However, the Thai government soon controlled Chinese education tightly. The control on Chinese schools began in 1918 when rules regulating Chinese schools were implemented. Under the rules, Chinese teaching in Chinese schools were required to pass the Thai language examination and the students were required to learn the Thai language. Three years later, it was ruled that all school children between the ages of 7 and 14 needed to have a minimum of four years' education in Thai language. In 1933 as the Thai government started the assimilation policy, Chinese could only be taught as a foreign language. In the same year, 100 Chinese schools were forced to close as they did not meet the official requirements (see Fu 1994). By 1940, all Chinese schools were closed.[5] After World War II, Thailand and China signed the Siam–China Friendship Treaty in 1946 and this inspired the revival of Chinese schools. By 1948, there were 426 registered Chinese schools with a student population of 60,000 as compared to 293 schools with student population of 16,711 in 1938. By the middle of 1948 after Phibun Songkhram became Prime Minister, he closed 500 Chinese schools (Fu 1994: 23). Chinese secondary schools were not allowed and in Chinese primary schools, Chinese was taught as a foreign language while other subjects were taught in Thai.

In Burma, we have seen that the earliest Chinese schools appeared toward the end of the nineteenth century. In 1903 Zhonghua Yixue was founded by the Chinese entrepreneur Xu

Zanzhou and Zhuang Yin'an. Two years later, Xu established another school named Yishang School (Hong 1982: 6). By 1935, there were at least 65 Chinese schools enrolling about 3,800 students.[6] By 1953, there were 235 Chinese schools (Murray 1964: 79).

The Chung Hwa School in the capital of Brunei was established in 1916.[7] In the 1930s, Chung Hwa Middle School (1931) in Kuala Belait and Chung Ching School (1938) in Seria were founded.[8] Today there are three secondary and five primary Chinese schools. They are independent schools funded by the local Chinese community, specifically the Chinese associations. However, the curriculum, teaching hours and staff employment are supervised by the related government department.

The dynamic growth and development of Chinese education in Southeast Asia during the first three decades in the twentieth century involved the support of Chinese business people. Chinese entrepreneurs who were able to accumulate wealth were also community leaders in their respective countries of residence. For example, Tan Kah Kee donated extensively to the funding of Chinese schools in Singapore and in Fujian, China. The initial laissez-faire attitude of the colonial governments in the region made it easier to establish Chinese schools. Where there were restrictions on Chinese education, Chinese entrepreneurs, who were also philanthropists cum educationists, were resilient in finding ways to abide by the regulations and still set up Chinese schools. This was possible by following government requirements but at the same time negotiating and pledging with the authorities for the teaching of Chinese to be allowed.

The post-war period

The post-World War II era witnessed a period of nationalism in Southeast Asia. The governments of the new nation states began to curb Chinese education. In 1948 Thailand closed all Chinese secondary schools and converted all Chinese primary schools into Thai schools, although the Chinese language was permitted to be taught from year one to year four only. All these Chinese schools were required to be registered and the teaching hours of the Chinese language were reduced to not exceeding ten hours per week while other subjects were taught in the Thai language. Furthermore, teachers teaching in Chinese schools were required to pass the Thai language examination (Fu 1994: 22). After 1949, learning Chinese became illegal in Thailand, and anyone learning the language was also deemed a communist or a sympathizer (Masuntisuk n.d.: 1). The situation changed after Deng Xiaoping's visit to Thailand. In 1975, Thailand and China established formal diplomatic relations. The Chinese language then became popular again and by 1992, both ethnic Thai and Thai Chinese had access to the study of Chinese.

Indonesia and Burma also required the local Chinese schools to register and to teach the local language, and the Chinese language teaching hours were restricted. During the post-war period, Chinese Indonesians quickly re-established Chinese education. In 1946, the Surabaya Lianhe Secondary School was established. Soon the school was split into two factions of different ideologies, Communist and Nationalists. In July of 1948, one of the two factions left Lianhe Secondary School and set up Zhonghua Secondary School. During the 1950s and until 1966 when the school was forced to close, it was one of the popular schools attracting students from the Java Island and other parts of Indonesia.[9] By 1957, there were over 1,600 Chinese schools in Indonesia enrolling about 300,000 students (Murray 1964: 77). In the same year, the Ministry of Education announced a national education policy. Indonesian government restricted the places for establishing Chinese schools and later on closed Chinese schools that were pro-Taiwan (Murray 1964: 78). After Suharto came to power in 1965, Indonesia banned all Chinese schools and newspapers and the public display of Chinese culture. Before the closure, there were at least 1,600 Chinese schools in Indonesia with a total student population of more than 425,000 (Choi 2010: vol. 1, 117).

In 1998 the cultural restrictions on the Chinese were lifted, and Chinese New Year could be celebrated in public. Chinese education and newspapers resumed operation but did not attain their past capacity and vigor. Until today, the rule still prohibits the establishment of Chinese schools. Chinese education in Indonesia today refers to tuition centers that teach Mandarin, Chinese schools set up by business people from Taiwan, and the teaching of Mandarin as a foreign language in national schools and private schools that teach Indonesian, English and Mandarin. In 1999, Mandarin became one of the optional foreign languages taught at national schools. By 2007, there were 16,000 national schools that offered Mandarin as a foreign language with a total student population of 20 million (Choi 2010: vol. 1, 117–18). The 33 years of discriminatory legislation had resulted in generations of Indonesians who did not get to study the Chinese language nor practice Chinese culture. The immediate challenge facing Chinese education and Chinese media in Indonesia is the lack of human resources fluent in the Chinese language.

The Burmese nationalist movement after the Second World War led to the government's control of Chinese education. The Burmese government proclaimed rules to supervise and to register non-Burmese schools. The rules instructed Chinese schools to teach the Burmese language and restricted the hours in teaching Chinese. After Ne Win came into power in 1962, Chinese education was banned. In 1965, all Chinese schools were nationalized and converted into Burmese schools. Chinese education then went underground, taking the form of private tuition. It also took the form of Buddhist texts' learning which the government allowed. Chinese education in Burma is resilient as in other parts of Southeast Asia. Today the number of Chinese schools has begun to grow again due to China's strong economic influence globally. However, the Burmese Chinese are still cautious about learning Chinese (see Duan 2009).

In the 1950s, all Chinese schools in the Philippines came under the government's supervision. The Chinese language teaching hours were reduced and the English and Tagalog languages were taught. By 1976, all Chinese schools were localized and the Chinese language teaching hours were reduced to ten hours per week. From 1950 onwards, the curb on Chinese education began with a series of nationalization laws and the "Filipino First" slogan. In the 1970s, Chinese schools gradually became localized. The teaching of the Chinese language as a foreign language was restricted to not more than 100 minutes per day, and text books had to be published locally. The localization policy had negative impacts on Chinese education, including deterioration in the quality of teaching and learning as well as a drop in enrolment. During the mid 1960s, the enrolment of Chinese students in Chinese schools began to drop and about five Chinese schools were closed as a result. When the Philippines and the People's Republic of China established diplomatic relations in 1975, the Philippine Chinese were given the opportunity to become local citizens. This promoted the integration of Philippine Chinese into local society and culture. By the following year, all Chinese schools became Filipino schools fully financed by the Philippine Chinese community, and Chinese language was taught as a subject. The interest to learn Mandarin became strong again with the rise of China's robust economy. This is hastened with the help of volunteers from China, particularly form Fujian province. However, learning has focused more on communication skills (see Ang See 1997: 93–104; Palanca 2004; see Table 27.3).

Chinese education in Malaya and Singapore reached its peak in 1953 when Tan Lark Sye founded the Nanyang University with the strong support of the local Chinese community. The campaign for fund-raising showed the sentiments of the Chinese in their concern with Chinese education. Nanyang University was the only overseas Chinese university that used Mandarin as the medium of instruction. After World War II, Chinese education in Malaya immediately resumed. In the following year there were 1,105 schools enrolling 172,101 students (Dong Zong 2004: 184). After independence, the government enacted educational policies to try to nationalize the Chinese schools. These attempts were rejected by the Chinese Malaysian

Table 27.3 Number of Chinese schools and students in the Philippines over the years

Years	*No. of Schools*	*No. of Students*	*No. of Teachers*	*Remarks*
Post WWII	34			
1955	150	48,000	1,649	
1960	166	62,841		
1962		66,074		18.54% were Filipino students.
1966	152	52,998		Including primary and secondary schools. Number of student enrolment began to drop.
1974	154			
1975		>60,000		
Early 1980s	140			Chinese schools became fully localized with more Filipino students.

Source: figures taken from Te 2003: 67, 80, 83 and 89.

community. Chinese education in Malaysia thus experienced half a century of tug-of-war with the government to retain the use of Mandarin as the medium of instruction. Today Malaysia is the only Southeast Asian country that has a 200 year Chinese education system providing the learning of Chinese from the kindergarten level to the tertiary level. In 2011, there are 1,293 Chinese primary schools, 60 private Chinese secondary and high schools and three private university colleges.[10] The Chinese Malaysian community, especially the Chinese entrepreneurs, subsidized the private Chinese schools and university colleges. At the tertiary level, there is one national university that has a Department of Chinese Studies. Nevertheless Mandarin is taught as a foreign language in some national universities.[11]

After 1965 Chinese education in Singapore followed a different path. As Singapore was shaped into an international entrepôt, English became an important lingua franca. English-educated graduates fetched relatively higher salaries than the Chinese-educated. Gradually parents were reluctant to send children to Chinese primary schools, so causing their demise in the 1970s. However, Mandarin is retained as a language subject with focus on conversational skills, while other courses are taught in English. During Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's administration, Nanyang University was strictly monitored, and in 1980 it was merged with the University of Singapore to form the National University of Singapore which uses English as the medium of instruction.

Chinese schools in Brunei are thriving with keen support from the local Chinese community. In the 1970s, the government wanted to convert the Chinese schools to national type schools which teach in Malay. After much negotiation, the plan was aborted and the Chinese schools were no longer entitled for government subsidies. The community leaders accommodated to local politics and had a good relationship with the king, who occasionally visited Chinese schools, and this gesture helped to strengthen the position of Chinese education in the country. Today the Chinese schools population includes local Malays (18% in 2007) and Indians (Choi 2010: vol. 1, 231). Currently there are three Chinese secondary schools and five primary schools.

Between 1950 and 1970, the Chinese in Vietnam were coerced to assimilate into local society. The government put restrictions on Chinese occupations, dissolved Chinese associations and prohibited Chinese language as the medium of instruction in Chinese schools (Choi 2010: vol. 1, 191–203; Murray 1964: 84–5). In 1975 when Vietnam was united and implemented the socialist reform, the government confiscated Chinese property and closed more than 300 Chinese schools (Choi 2010: vol. 1, 191–203). In the 1980s, restrictions on Chinese schools began to loosen. Chinese were then allowed to learn the language in evening schools and tuition centers. In 1995,

the government returned the confiscated property to the Chinese, and allowed them to operate small- and medium-scale enterprises and industries, as well as to have joint ventures with foreign capital (Choi 2010: vol. 1, 191–203). Up to the first decade of the twenty-first century, there were more than 20 tuition centers and foreign language centers which enrolled 30,000 students (Choi 2010: vol. 1, 191–203). Among these are Yingchuan Chinese Center, Mai Jianxiong Chinese Center, Chen Peiji Chinese Center, Qi Xiuhua Chinese Center, and Liwen Chinese Center (Choi 2010: vol. 1, 191–203). The Chinese are still not allowed to establish the normal Chinese schools. At present there are eight universities that have departments of Chinese studies with a total of 1,000 students who are mostly Vietnamese (Choi 2010: vol. 1, 191–203).

In 1963 Cambodia had about 50 Chinese schools in the capital and its vicinity, of which three offered education beyond the sixth year (Willmott 1970: 75). According to Willmott, the Cambodian government control on Chinese education was not as stringent as other Southeast Asian countries during the same period.[12] He also noted that Chinese schools helped to perpetuate the distinctions between Chinese and Cambodians (Willmott 1970: 116). Choi (2010: vol. 1, 183) provides some updated information on Chinese education in Cambodia and Laos. In Cambodia today, there are 70 Chinese schools with a student population of more than 40,000, out of which 80% are ethnic Chinese while the others are Cambodians and Vietnamese. The schools are fully funded by the local Chinese community. Chinese students attend Chinese schools for the morning session and Cambodian schools for the afternoon session. For some Chinese families, sending their children to Singapore for Chinese education is an alternative.

Laos in the 1970s had more than 20 Chinese schools. In 1979, Laos–China relations became strained. The government confiscated Chinese property, closed Chinese factories and shops, and allowed Chinese to run petty businesses only. Chinese education and press were banned. This resulted in an exodus of Chinese to Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and the West. The Chinese who remained in the country accepted Lao culture. In 1986, Laos and China reinstated their relations. Since the 1990s, many Lao Chinese in Southeast Asia have returned to Laos. Today there are five Chinese schools in the country.[13] The schools operate kindergarten, primary schools and high schools, and they are fully funded by the local Lao Chinese community. As there is a high rate of intermarriage between the Lao and Chinese, the students in the Chinese schools are mostly children of Lao-Chinese intermarriages. The Chinese schools have accommodated by also teaching the Lao School curriculum. Some Chinese families have chosen to send their children to study abroad and at present both Beijing and Guangzhou have become popular sites for overseas university education (Choi 2010: vol. 1, 165).

Chinese education during the post-war period began with an immediate revival and vigorous progress. At the same time Chinese education had to accommodate to challenges from the the nationalism of the new nations. With the exceptions of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, the Chinese schools in the other Southeast Asian nations experienced closure for two to three decades due to political repression. With the rise of China as an economic power since the 1980s, the learning of Chinese for communication purposes has become popular. In grasping this opportunity, Chinese education is passed on in normal Chinese schools and tuition centers. The definition for Chinese education today may have to include the learning of Mandarin that is promoted jointly by Southeast Asian governments and the Confucius Institute from China.

Conclusion

Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia established Chinese schools for their children. The history of Chinese education has evolved from the provision of China-linked education for the Chinese sojourners' children to maintaining Chinese education for local Chinese cultural identity. The

history of development shows the influence from political events in China as well as the impacts of colonial and post-colonial nationalistic policies in Southeast Asia. Despite the hindrances, the Chinese have viewed maintaining Chinese education in whatever form possible as crucial to maintaining their Chinese identity.

The opening up of China since the 1980s and its emergence as an economic power in the world have eased the government restrictions on Chinese education in Southeast Asia, and in fact encouraged the study of Chinese worldwide. This is most evident in Indonesia, where the use of the Chinese language was once banned, and since 1998, Chinese along with Bahasa Indonesia and English are taught in many private trilingual schools. In 2007, there were in Jakarta at least 50 trilingual schools (Dawis 2008). In particular China has played an active role in the revival of learning Mandarin through opening Confucius Institutes in many countries. China helps to provide teaching staff and texts for these institutes. The Confucius Institute is a joint effort between China and the local government as it is only feasible with the partner university's commitment to providing a space for learning. China also provides local hospitality in the form of yearly winter and summer camps that receive thousands of international youths who go to China to learn about Chinese culture. Overall the learning of Mandarin seems to be flourishing with fast momentum. However, Chinese education in the form of normal schools with Mandarin as the medium of instruction has not regained its vigor as was the case up to the 1950s.

Notes

1 The Baba were localized Chinese in the Straits Settlement. For an introduction, see Tan (2010).
2 http://www.hwjyw.com/schools/Brunei/zhonghua/files/search/searchtext.xml (accessed on 3 January 2012)
3 For the list of Chinese schools set up during this period, please refer to the hyperlink http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_schools_in_the_Philippines.
4 http://hanyu.ecnu.edu.cn/xyjs/xydt.asp?id=107
5 When Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsongkram (1897–1964), often known as Phibun Songkhram, was Prime Minister of Thailand from 1938 to 1944 and 1948 to 1957, the Thai Chinese were discriminated against and Chinese schools were closed.
6 Victor Purcell (1951: 95) quoting from *Annual Report on Public Instruction in Burma 1935–36*.
7 http://www.lib.nus.edu.sg/chz/chineseoverseas/oc_brunei.htm
8 Ibid.
9 http://www.qiaou.com/uhasan/818-231601.aspx
10 Current figures from Dong Zong and the Chinese Schools Teachers' Union.
11 At Universiti Putra Malaysia and Universiti Teknologi MARA, Mandarin is offered as a foreign language.
12 The Cambodian Chinese schools did not observe closely the rules regulating the number of students permitted for a class (Willmott 1970: 74–78).
13 These are Liaodu School in Vientiane, Xinhua School in Luang Prabang, Huaqiao School in Thakhek in Khammouan Province, Chongde School in Savannakhet in the south and Huaqiao School in Pakse in Champasak Province.

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28

Chinese diasporas and their literature in Chinese

Yow Cheun Hoe

The Chinese diasporas have much to record and reflect on from their myriad trajectories of migration and settlement.[1] The literary works they produce are among the important texts and subtexts capturing their memories and imaginations, apart from other artistic expressions such as art, music, and film. The literary content usually starts with a depiction of longing for their homeland, a common theme also evident in literatures by fresh migrants of other diasporas. Nevertheless, things often become increasingly complicated when concepts and forces of nationalism, citizenship, and ethnicity come into play. This is especially so for Chinese diasporas which are concurrently faced with a seemingly perennial presence of China, in many and various forms and symbols, as well as the often regulative policies and laws of the nation-states where they reside.

This chapter provides access to the terrains where diasporic Chinese literature has been evolving out of interactions that Chinese writers have with larger communities and institutions in the larger contexts of political and cultural changes. The focus is on the literature in vernacular Chinese that the Chinese diaspora started to work on in the early twentieth century, following China's May Fourth Movement in China that desired a new culture to counter encroachments of colonialism and imperialism from western countries and Japan. It does not concern works in classical Chinese, which were used and appreciated only by a handful of scholars among diasporic Chinese communities before the twentieth century and which have become less significant as social texts since vernacular Chinese was adopted by far larger numbers of writers.[2] Writers under examination here include both early and recent migrant writers from mainland China and also local writers who grew up in diasporic Chinese communities. This also covers diasporic writers with profiles already established in and still attached to Taiwan and Hong Kong before leaving the two territories.

This chapter is divided into five main parts in an attempt to map the history of diasporic Chinese literature. First, it traces the geography and demography in which diasporic Chinese literary sites are created and sustained, and explores possible systems in which the sites can be incorporated. Second, it examines China as a driving force, informing and impacting the identity of diasporic Chinese writers, and subsequently as a symbol that has lapsed into negotiation and contestation amidst localizing processes in nation-states where Chinese diaspora reside. The third to fifth sections address production of literary works and discourses in Malaysia, Singapore, North America, and Europe.[3]

Mapping: sites, centers, and systems

The creation of early literary sites of Chinese diaspora was a direct result of migrant writers arriving from mainland China. The conventional understanding of Chinese migration patterns basically goes along the timeline of (1) merchants until 1850, (2) labor, 1850–1930, (3) *huaqiao*, with nationalism orientated to China, 1900–49, and (4) Chinese descendants, since 1949, with tertiary migration from their first adopted countries (Wang Gungwu 1992). However, intellectuals who fled the chaos in China from the 1920s to 1940s were numerically small and yet culturally impactful. Many of them came to Southeast Asia and worked in Chinese newspapers and schools, two main reproduction lines of Chineseness and China nationalism. Some were editors of literary supplements in newspapers, others dealers and publishers of books, and yet other writers contributing literary works and advocating literary ideologies. The combined results were the emergence of migrant writers who pioneered and expanded literary sites, the major of which were in Singapore, Penang, Kuala Lumpur and other cities and towns in Southeast Asia where diasporic Chinese communities thrived (Lim 1978; Guo 1999).

These migrant writers dominated diasporic Chinese literary sites and discourses before and during the outbreak of World War II. The demography and hierarchy of power of the literary sites started to change only in the late 1940s in favor of local writers. On the one hand, enticed by the hope of a new China and subsequently the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, many migrant writers returned to mainland China to rejoin their families and participate in socialist projects. On the other, local writers became visible outside China in the 1940s after more female Chinese immigrants were allowed in during the preceding two decades, resulting in an increase in diasporic Chinese families. In Singapore and Malaysia, local writers have made up the mainstreams, particularly amidst the national agendas of emphasizing loyalty and solidarity (Tang 1988; Yow 1998: 23–56).

In some places, however, diasporic Chinese literature has not been sustained. In certain Southeast Asian countries, national projects tend to assimilate immigrant cultures rather than maintain multiculturalism grown from the colonial era and even from pre-colonial times. Some regimes of nation-states have even gone as far as to attempt to weed out Chinese culture that Chinese diaspora have brought in over hundreds of years of immigration. Chinese schools were closed down while Chinese newspapers diminished. In present Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Chinese literary works and activities have been reduced drastically, confined to the literary generation that grew up in the first or two decades after World War II and with no significant new breed of writers.

There have been no key diasporic Chinese literary sites beyond Southeast Asia. Before World War II and also afterwards, a small number of Chinese intellectuals and professionals made footsteps and footholds in Japan, Europe, North America, and Australia where some of them wrote literary works. However, Chinese education systems and cultural production in these places have never made good hotbeds for further concentration of writers as a cohesive literary community. The writers in these places are more aptly regarded as either individual or traveling writers. There has been no self-sustaining and self-generation system running on their particular tracks of literary imagination and discourses, other than in Singapore and Malaysia. In comparison, diasporic writers in the USA and North America look more to mainland China and Taiwan for their identities and for readership and consumption of their works.

There is one more feature in diasporic Chinese literary demography that is distinctive from Chinese migration patterns in general. Diasporic Chinese writers tend to be drawn to where Chinese literature flourishes. Since the 1950s, Taiwan has enticed a considerable number of Chinese writers from Southeast Asia who came for tertiary education and also for the vibrant literary life.

To these writers, Taiwan was like another China, inheriting genuine Chinese culture and history, and subsequently becoming a modernity chapter of cultural reproduction in the Chinese language. Some diasporic writers earned a reputation and a living space in Taiwan, while others returned to their own countries after years of education and working experience there. On the other hand, mainland China started to draw diasporic Chinese writers after its further opening up in the 1990s, but its position as a literary magnet has yet to challenge Taiwan (Yow 2006).

Therefore, the current map of diasporic Chinese literature shows Singapore and Malaysia as two vital sites for the production of works and discourses, along with a handful of individual writers scattered elsewhere in Southeast Asia, North America, Europe, and Australia. Literary genealogy charts that mainland China, Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, Hong Kong are the origins of a wide range of literary aspirations and influences for Southeast Asian literary sites and writers among the Chinese diaspora. To identify the structure of literary systems, however, has been problematic when it comes to positioning the sites and writers in relation to not only China but also the nation-states in which they live. The Grand China narratives, written mainly by writers and scholars in mainland China, go by a reductionist version that the diasporic Chinese literary simply classify under the umbrella of "Overseas Chinese literature" (*haiwai huawen wenxue*) or as a segment of "World Chinese literature" (*shijie huawen wenxue*).[4]

Resistance has been staged by diasporic writers and critics to counter the grossing effect that the Grand China narratives have over the subjectivities of Chinese literature outside China. "Sinophone literature" was coined, obviously with ideas borrowed from the colonial and postcolonial experiences of Anglophone and Francophone literatures, to claim a rightful place for Chinese language works, including those produced in Taiwan and diasporic Chinese communities elsewhere, that are arguably not supposed to be counted as part of Chinese or China literature (Shih 2010; Wang Dewei 2006a, 2006b). More recently, "Global Chinese literature" was invoked to reaffirm the need to pit diasporic Chinese literature against the literature of Han Chinese in mainland China (Tsu and Wang 2010).

On the other hand, in view of national politics and local realities that have deeply entrenched Chinese diaspora, national labels are matched with ethnic markers to refer to certain literature sites and works, such as *Mahua* (Malaysian Chinese) and *Xinhua* (Singapore Chinese) literatures. None of these identifiers and benchmarks appeals to all scholars, literary critics, and writers who are involved. The problem lies in the very multifarious nature of Chinese diaspora with many overlapping and interconnected areas that see conflicting rather than complementary discourses. Thus, it is not surprising that diasporic Chinese literature has been increasingly attracting notice and inquiry under the multi-disciplinary and multi-faceted topics of Overseas Chinese, Chinese overseas, and Chinese diaspora (Wang Gungwu 2005).

China: from political to cultural

Topics about China were found most popular in diasporic Chinese literature before 1949, a year when many other countries started to distance themselves from the socialist regime established in China. The proliferation of modern Chinese literary concepts and ideologies from mainland China started in 1919, when the May Fourth Movement immediately persuaded diasporic Chinese writers to use vernacular Chinese in literature in order to herald a new culture that would tackle tumors of decaying Chinese traditions and defend against foreign colonialism. In the 1920s and 1930s, diasporic Chinese writers adopted proletariat literature emanating from literary circles in China and also as part of a larger trend of burgeoning leftist ideology and communism closely linked to China, in addition to other sources. From 1937 to 1942, in response to the call in China for the "Literature of Anti-Japanese for Salvation" (*kang Ri jiuwang wenxue*), the diasporic

literature features enormously and vociferously the suffering of Chinese people and the desperate need to unite against the Japanese invasions (Wong Seng-Tong 1978, 1984).

Qiaomin wenxue, the literature of sojourning nationals, is a term coined during this period of time and an accurate descriptor of literary happenings among the then diasporic Chinese who were largely affiliated with China in many ways. As fresh migrant writers, they wrote emotionally about the natural landscape, seasons, and social life in their native homelands in China. As China's nationals, they mused passionately about political incidents and currents in China.[5] Indeed, they were psychologically attached to China, even though physically away. China informed their consciousness and set the tone that diasporic literature should be incorporated into the literature of China for good reasons, the most important being that the fate of Chinese diaspora was entwined with whether or not China could survive from its critical internal and external crises.

Even with the adoption of localized terms, such as *Nanyang*, *Malaiya*, and *Mahua*, the discourses and works implied no distinctive local orientation for the diasporic literature. Coined during a time that witnessed massive Chinese migration and also expanding Western colonialism, *Nanyang* (literally South Seas) relates more to China's perception of Southeast Asia as a maritime region situated at the south of China. *Malaiya* is a transliteration of Malaya and *Mahua* a combination of "Malaya" and "Chinese." Literary controversies occurred between 1934 and 1936 as to what forms and contents should be used for *Nanyang* and *Malaiya* literatures. Writers in Singapore and British Malaya, including Qiu Shizhen (born 1905), agreed with the need for labels to reflect where the Chinese diaspora resided, but highlighted that *Nanyang* and *Malaiya* literatures should still serve China, particularly for its political purposes (Yow 1998: 166–81).

At that time, under China's great shadow, local concerns were but a minor note in diasporic Chinese writings. In the second half of the 1920s, slogans were invoked to "place Nanyang color inside the works," "get literature to have local color," "build the iron tower of Nanyang literature with blood and sweat," and "promote Nanyang culture." These manifestations, advanced in literary supplements of the newspapers *Sin Kok Min Jit Poh, Lat Pau, Yik Khuan Poh,* and *Nanyang Siang Pau*, were merely nominal, clarifying very little of what local subjectivities implied (Yeo 1988a–d). From the late 1920s to the early 1930s, the proletariat literature, or *xinxing wenxue* in Chinese, saw a number of works focused on Chinese labor miserably mired in economic recession, but the themes and representations of class conflicts and struggles appeared universally rather than locally (Yeo 1988e).

It was after World War II that orientation toward China became prickly and started to encounter serious criticism in diasporic literature sites. For instance, the controversy of the individuality of Mahua literature (*Mahua wenxue dutexing*) happened in 1947 and 1948, when local writers in Singapore and Malaya criticized migrant writers from China over what particular mission Malayan Chinese literature should be tasked with. The migrant writers considered the literature could rightfully help with political changes leading to the establishment of a new China, but the local writers saw the justification of the literature only in its relevance to local politics.[6] This occurred against a larger backdrop where the Chinese in Malaya were increasingly engaged in pursuing independence for the country, where they were to be legitimate citizens and active nationals. Neither side of the literary controversy could win over one another. What turned up in the following few years were the return of many migrant workers to China and a brand new era for local writers to face the issues revolving around the nation-state and ethnicity.

In general, China has gradually appeared less a political center and more a cultural motherland in most of contemporary diasporic Chinese literature. However, as the subsequent discussion shows, Chinese ideology is still being negotiated and contested in the areas of how much diasporic literature should derive its culture and history from China and how far diasporic writers should pursue their own identity. What has complicated China's position is the very fact that Chinese

diaspora always need to face another nation and other races at the same time. The symbolism of China has been questioned and contested most in the diasporic Chinese literature in Southeast Asia, where Chineseness is under siege or pressure of assimilation. Elsewhere, China has been comfortably represented in literary works.

Malaysia: ethnicity consolidated

Diasporic Chinese literature in Malaysia and Singapore was essentially conjoined before Singapore's separation and independence in 1965. Before then, the Chinese communities, including their writers, on both sides of the Straits of Johor were intricately connected, socially and culturally, under the British colonial administration (Fang Xiu 1974). The 1956 "Patriotic literature movement" manifested the united views of Chinese writers in Peninsular Malaya and Singapore to support the independence of Malaya that was to come about on 31 August 1957. It also clearly evinced the hope that diasporic Chinese writers invested in joining other ethnic groups as citizens of the new nation-state (Du 1956; Ma Fen 1956). What they had not expected down the path was the tightened racism and diverging national discourses in Malaysia and Singapore.

The proletariat literature that emerged in the 1920s, with influence from China, continued into the 1970s among the local writers who were regarded as leftist in Malaysia as well as Singapore. In the 1950s and 1960s, the leftist literature written locally did not display any difference between Malaysia and Singapore. It had a common feature of heavily making use of rhetorics and techniques appropriated from the Cultural Revolution in China. The shared doctrine was to reveal social injustice and correct class oppression. Many of the fictions, essays, and poetry were written with local settings, but shared the universal objective with leftist writings in other countries (Xie 2009; Zhu Chengfa 2004). Local politics gave a twist to leftist writings, absorbing elements of anti-colonialism and the desire to build a new nation. Social doctrine warranted the leftist writers to come up with a literary mission that would accurately mirror social life, which made up literary realism or new realism prevalent in Malaysia as well as Singapore before the 1980s (Han 2004).

It can be argued that Malaysian Chinese literature crystallized as an ethnic literature starting from the early 1970s amidst Malaysia's national agendas that further tended toward racial demarcation. The Malay special rights were inscribed in the 1957 Constitution, and Malay hegemony was initiated in 1970 through the New Economy Policy, which aimed to restructure the socioeconomic order but has profoundly drawn racial lines in all fronts. A direct literary blow to Chinese language literature came from the 1971 National Cultural Proclamation, which defines officially that national culture is premised on Malay culture, customs, and religion. This cultural programming officially determined only Malay language literature could be considered national literature, while literature written in Chinese and other languages could only be regarded as *sastera sukuan* (literally means a partial literature), thus implying it would never be able to represent the nation as a whole (Wignesan 1983; Xu 2004: 26–7). This imposed another layer of cultural anxiety on the Chinese in Malaysia, the government of which has since the 1950s never abandoned the ultimate aim of education – to breed a nation of one language.

One common reaction that writers had to Malaysia's national framework of bounded ethnicity was to reaffirm Chineseness in cultural terms. The 1970s saw the wide spread of modernist renditions of ethnicity in Malaysian Chinese literature. Telling examples are works written by Wen Renping (born 1944), particularly in his famous anthology of poetry, *Liufang shi yi zhong shang* (Exile is a kind of sorrow) and collection of essays, *Huang pifu de yueliang* (The moon with yellow skin) (Wen Renping 1977, 1978). The Sirius Poetry Society (Tianlangxing Shishe) that he founded had hundreds of members, whose literary works use modernist styles that emphasize symbolism and contain abundant imagery pertaining to China and the Chinese as an ethnic

group (Zhang Guangda 2009). A few critics in the 1990s condemned this tendency of "weaning" (*duannai*) from mainland China as a hindrance to Malaysian Chinese literature standing on its own (Zhang, Zhang and Lin 2002: 309–409). Nevertheless, it is also rightfully possible to read these works as a literary deliberation to incorporate things about cultural China as but one component of the hybridity of Chinese diaspora (Yow 2010).

Another reaction was to devise words as weapons to protest against and resist the government's racist mentality. Having written significant works in the 1980s and 1990s, the poet Fang Ang expresses his doubts about whether Chinese diaspora have been treated as citizens and notes that they have instead been earmarked as immigrants in Malaysia (Fang Ang 1990). Upon return from his tertiary education in Taiwan, Fu Chengde (born 1959) wrote poetry in the 1980s to paint overtly the melancholia of the Chinese community as a result of the suppressive state machines (Fu 1988). Using more sophisticated styles of postmodernism and futurism, the poet Looi Yook Tho (born 1969) began in the 1990s to question the state policies and politics that granted favoritism to Malays (Looi 1999, 2008).

Diasporic Chinese history has been re-thought and re-worked by writers in an attempt to reconstruct what make up the Chinese communities in Malaysia. Remarkable are the fictions written by Zhang Guixing (born 1956), particularly *Houbei* (The monkey cup) and *Wo sinian de changmian zhong de Nanguo gongzhu* (I miss sleeping South Seas beauty) (Zhang Guixing 2000, 2001); fictions by Huang Jinshu (born 1967), with his famous *Meng yu zhu yu li ming* (Dream and swine and aurora) and *Wu an ming* (Dark night) (Huang Jinshu 1994, 1997a); and novels by Li Zishu (born 1971), particularly *Shanwen* (Mountain ghost) (Li Zishu 2001). Zhang was born in the state of Sarawak in East Malaysia, while Huang and Li respectively in Johor and Perak in West Malaysia. Read together, their fictions do not merely depict the old days that Chinese migrants and descendants lived through with pain and joy, but also robustly challenge the stereotypes associated with the Chinese and other races, either in colonial settings or in the new nation-state era (Tan Xi Zhe 2009).

A significant number of Malaysian Chinese writers gained their reputations in Taiwan, one of the key centers for Chinese literary productions. Starting from the 1960s, these writers joined many other Malaysian students in their pursuit of tertiary education in Taiwan. Some of them were already well known as writers before leaving Malaysia, while some became famous only after arriving in Taiwan (Zhang Jinzhong 2003). Some of the brilliant names have double identities, associated with both Malaysian Chinese literature and Taiwan literature. Indeed, they are involved in transnational literary production where their literary works generate effects in Malaysia as well as Taiwan (Chiu 2008).

The literature that these Malaysian Chinese writers worked on in Taiwan is culturally divided by the 1990s when Taiwan's search for autonomy and independence were increasingly pronounced. Before the 1990s, Wen Rui'an (born 1953) and Fang Ezhen (born 1954) had their works published in Taiwan with strong cultural attachment to mainland China (Wen Rui'an 1977; Fang Ezhen 1977). Starting in the 1990s, Huang Jinshu, teaching in Taiwan, attacked links with mainland China (Huang Jinshu 1997b). Nevertheless, the celebrated novelist, Li Yongping (born 1947) shows the absurdity of denying the experience of any particular place where a Chinese diaspora has lived. In Li's novels, China, Malaysia, and Taiwan are ever-shifting and ever-mingling as homes in the terrain of his diasporic imagination (Li Yongping 2002, 2008, 2010).

Singapore: language and a new national identity

After World War II, diasporic Chinese literature was further localized in Singapore. In the aforementioned 1947–8 Controversy of the Individuality of Mahua Literature, Miao Xiu

(1920–80), a local-born novelist in Singapore, rejected political and literary inclination toward China. In order to go further along the localization line, Miao wrote many fictions which drew significantly on local material and used local vocabulary. His famous novel, *Huolang* (Fire waves), tells a story about how the Chinese community, particularly Chinese intellectuals, suffered during the Japanese Occupation in British Malaya (1942–5) and subsequently shifted their orientation to local reality and regarded the place as their second home (*guxiang*) (Miao 1960). Miao's works were comparable to another novelist, Wei Yun (1913–96), who spent much of his life in the Malay Peninsula after early years in Hong Kong and Guangzhou. Wei's short story, "Jingjicong" (Thorny bush), embodied a growing sense of wanting to see their current place of abode as their new home (*zuguo*) (Wei 1961). However, in the 1950s and early 1960s both Miao and Wei did not anticipate the birth of Singapore as a new nation-state and the literature had to separate the subjectivity of Xinhua from the discourses surrounding Mahua.

The terms Xinhua and Mahua literatures refer to the literary works written in the Chinese language in Singapore and Malaysia respectively. The major difference between them lies in their respective positions within two different national frameworks. Xinhua literature enjoys official recognition by the Singapore government, while Mahua literature is marginalized in the Malaysian government narrative of national culture.[7] Chinese is given equal treatment as one of Singapore's official languages, along with Malay, English, and Tamil. In Singapore, national literary awards have always been considered and given in four language categories. In short, Chinese language literature is officially part of Singapore's national literature, and Chinese language writers are lauded at national level.

Despite nominal recognition from the Singapore government, the Chinese language has been losing ground while English has been gaining premium status. In 1980, Nanyang University merged with the University of Singapore to become the National University of Singapore, thus drawing an end to the only Chinese-medium university outside Greater China. In the mid-1980s, all primary and secondary schools adopted English as the medium of instruction and students could only take Chinese and other languages as a subject of second language. The government's drive for economic growth and modernization has added value to English in both official and corporate capacities. Chinese is far from significant in career success and is at best regarded as a mother tongue to retain certain traditional values and more recently a tool which enables business connections with China.

To many Singapore Chinese writers, grappling with the devaluation of the Chinese language and thus the crisis of losing Chinese culture and ethnicity in Singaporeans as a whole is an emotional undertaking. They see the Chinese language as the essential carrier of Chinese culture and history and as the bottom line for the survival of the whole community as an ethnic group. Such passion and anxiety are utter expressions in the works produced by members of the Wuyue (May) Poetry Society, founded in the late 1970s to become one of the most heavyweight literary clubs in Singapore (Zhu Lili 2008: 166–77). For instance, one of its members, Liang Yue (born 1950) expressed his deep love of Chinese culture as well as his uneasiness with it being despised in the increasingly Westernized environment (Liang Yue 1984). Another example is Wu Mu (born 1961), who is worried about Chineseness being totally eradicated in Singapore (Wu 2003).

While such cultural crisis also prevails in Mahua literature, the contributing factors and criticism targets make a difference between Xinhua literature and its counterpart in Malaysia. Mahua literature has to face Malay favoritism and Malay hegemony as important subjects of contestation and negotiation. Xinhua literature has to deal with a different, significant "other," which is English hegemony, either as a postcolonial legacy or as an elitist power. As a social fact, Singaporeans are grouped into language streams of English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil, apart from

the divisions along the lines of race. The subordination of Chinese to English and thus the sufferings of the Chinese-educated group are one of the major themes for Xinhua literature. Over decades of his literary career, the modernist Ying Pei'an (born 1947) has portrayed how Chinese-educated male characters have been belittled in love life, career path, and political creativity, particularly in his novels, *Yi ge xiang wo zheyang de nanren* (A man like me) and *Saodong* (Commotion) (Ying 1987, 2002). In her famous short story, "Ren Muzhi", Zhang Xina (born 1954) attempts to reveal the psychological stress and collapse of the Chinese educated in the face of pressure from Westernization and modernization (Zhang Xina 2007).

Nevertheless, a growing identification with Singapore as a nation is visible in Xinhua literature. This is in recognition of the fact that the Chinese diaspora are living among and with other ethnic groups in a multicultural Singapore. This is further enhanced by the pride that Singapore has had since the 1980s, when it developed into a modern nation that sustains a delicate equilibrium between economic prosperity and social stability.

The highly acclaimed playwright, Kuo Pao Kun (1939–2002), showcased in his dramas the lively, beautiful mix of various languages and cultures (Quah and Pan 2005). The literary writer and songwriter, Liang Wern Fook (born 1964), has embraced the glory of Singapore as an integrative nation of myriad cultural elements. This is a broadened vision from his early works which focused primarily on things pertaining to Chinese communities (Liang Wern Fook 1988, 2001). A new breed of writers, who grew up in the 1970s and 1980s, has demonstrated fluidity about cultural markings with a firm nationality premised on Singapore. A collection of poetry, essays, and fictions by these young writers, *Xinjiapo de 99 fu wenxue fengjing* (Singapore Literature Landscape 99), clearly shows the ease with crossing and shifting between languages and cultural codes (Liu Ruijin 2004).

A minor reconfiguration has taken place in the Singapore literary scene and production since the 1990s, with the influx of new migrants from mainland China (Yow 2009). Again, like their predecessors, certain writers among these new migrants show in their works nostalgia about hometowns and yearning for families and friends in China. An example of this is the collection of works written by mainland Chinese students at Singapore universities, *Beiyan Nanfei* (Northern geese fly south) (Xin *et al.* 1999). What is special is that localization started almost immediately when the writers set foot in Singapore, unlike with writers of the sojourning literature before World War II, who took a long time to sink roots.

For new Chinese migrants, localization often translated into conflicts with the local Chinese, who had already evolved with a new national identity. The famous novel on women from China, who mingled with Singapore men, *Wuya* (Crow), and also a number of fictions on study mamas, depict vividly how Chinese females suffer along their journey to gaining local residency and recognition (Jiu 2001; Min Zhou 2003; Xi 2005). Also different from the diasporic writers before World War II is a cohort of resourceful writers among the new Chinese migrants. Mostly working in newspapers and schools, these writers and their works are more globalized, seeing that localization sits well with China ties (He 2004; Xuan 2007a, 2007b).

USA and Europe: travel and crossing

Studies point out that one of the earliest literary works by Chinese diaspora in the USA is the Angel Island poetry.[8] These are poems written on the walls by Chinese labor detained in the immigration station on the island between 1910 and 1940, to reflect the harsh conditions in the station and the writers' yearning for the distant homeland (Lai, Lim and Yung 1991). The poems are mostly in classical Chinese. Works in vernacular Chinese began around the time of the May Fourth Movement in China, with occasional works that famous writers and intellectuals, such as

Hu Shi (1891–1962), Bing Xin (1900–99), Wen Yiduo (1899–1946), Liang Shiqiu (1903–87), and Lin Yutang (1895–1976), produced when traveling to and in the USA. Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45, vigorous literary activities bearing slogans defending China against Japan were run by the Chinese diaspora in the USA (Huang Wanhua 2000). In short, before the end of World War II, what happened in the USA was similar to the situation that had taken place in Southeast Asia, with a *qiaomin* mentality prevalent in diasporic Chinese literature.

Unique to the American Chinese literary scene is the strong presence of Taiwan writers after the 1960s. Some of these writers hailed from mainland China and came to the USA en route via Taiwan. Some were born in Taiwan and furthered studies and pursued careers in the USA. The historical background for this can be found in the period characterized by loosened immigration laws in the USA and the immense fervor of young Chinese to study there. Among others, Nie Hualing (born 1925) and Yu Lihua (born 1931) are well known for their novels reflecting the drifting and miserable nature of Chinese diaspora who were displaced from China and found difficulty in forging a total sense of belonging to society in the USA (Nie 1968, 1976; Yu Lihua 1966, 1978). Nie and Yu are representative of what is called the *liuxuesheng wenxue* or "foreign student literature."

Two reputable modernist poets and essayists, Yu Guangzhong (born 1928) and Yang Mu (born 1940), demonstrate diversity in literary styles as well as identification. While the former firmly embraces Chinese history and culture in mainland China, the latter inclines to regard Taiwan as a land of affections (Yu Guangzhong 1969, 1974; Yang Mu 1977, 1975). The novelist Bai Xianyong (born 1937) mirrors poignantly the lives of feudal Chinese families and homosexuals (Bai 1978, 1983). Zhang Xiguo (born 1944) attempts in his novels wider humanitarian concerns (Zhang Xiguo 1976, 1989). Most of these writers have had their works published in Taiwan, and are thus more Taiwanese than American in terms of literary production and readership. Their works are widely read in Taiwan and in diasporic Chinese communities.

A more distinctive case is the great novelist Zhang Ailing (Eileen Chang) (1920–95). Born in China, she produced most of her major fictions and essays in Shanghai and Hong Kong before relocating to the USA in 1955. She married American screenwriter Ferdinand Reyher in 1956 and passed away in Westwood, California in 1995. Her fictions, ironically revealing the dark sides of feudal families and love lives with backgrounds in mainland China, enjoyed enormous popularity in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and among the Chinese in diaspora (Zhang Ailing 1977, 1995b). Many writers were inspired by her style and her literary influence is particularly pronounced in Taiwan (Chen Zishan 2004; Liu Shaoming 2007). As her novels *Yangge* (The rice sprout song) and *Chidi zhi lian* (Naked earth) are seen to criticize the Land Reform by the Communist Party of China (Zhang Ailing 1954, 1995a), Zhang did not gain recognition in literary circles in Mainland China until the country further opened up in the 1990s.

There are yet other writers who have established their works more on American soil and thus have shown more conspicuous local identity. Huang Yunji (born 1932), for instance, portrays in his novel, *Benliu* (Running currents), the life experiences of Chinese diaspora in the USA (Huang Yunji 1998). Understandably, the material and inspiration for Huang's fictions are derived from his own decades of settlement and struggle for survival. Liu Huangtian (born 1948) also addresses local reality not long after his arrival in the USA. His works, *Tangrenjie de hunyan* (A wedding banquet in Chinatown) and *Jiujinshan fusheng* (The floating life in San Francisco), tell the stories of what Chinese diaspora dream of and how they make a living (Liu Huangtian 1997, 1998). The themes for these localized works range from dreaming of gold mountains to surviving the brutality of new life and to bracing oneself for the climb up the social ladder (Huang Wanhua 2000: 48).

Indeed, local material was soon picked up by new Chinese migrants for literary works. Chinese literary production in the USA witnessed the participation of new Chinese migrant writers starting from the 1980s (Chen Ruilin 2006; Li Yaping 2006). As a comparison, Singapore Chinese

literature only began to see works by new Chinese migrants in the 1990s, following the belated establishment of Sino-Singapore diplomatic ties in 1990. In general, the new migrant writers in the USA gained higher recognition and reputation in terms of literary skills and style. The famous novel, *Guasha* (The skin scraping treatment), by Wang Xiaoping, reflects the cultural conflicts Chinese migrants had with local society (Wang Xiaoping 2001). The novels written by the outstanding Yan Geling (born 1958) show her versatility in recounting things about the USA as well as China (Yan 2001, 2003). Yan fetched many prestigious literary awards in China and Taiwan.

Before World War II, Europe was frequented by a number of Chinese writers who were famously associated with the May Fourth Movements. Many of them were actually students in European universities and colleges. A considerable number of literary works they produced during their studies and travels gained immediate popularity among the readers in China during their time and have since enjoyed wide readership. These writers include Xu Zhimo (1897–1931), Lao She (1899–1966), Ba Jin (1904–2005), Lin Huiyin (1904–55), Su Xuelin (1897–1999), and Dai Wangshu (1905–50) (Huang Wanhua 2009). Fewer literary activities, such as literary campaigns organized by literary associations, have since been organized in Europe, as compared to in North America, Malaysia, and Singapore.

Europe has witnessed the ebb and flow of works by Taiwanese writers, less than the USA, but more than Malaysia and Singapore. One outstanding writer is Zhao Shuxia, who sees the benefits of mixing Chinese culture with Western culture. In his novel *Sainahe pan* (By the Sainai River), the main character, who is a Chinese writer and painter residing in Paris, eventually succeeds in his creative works by blending Chinese aesthetics into Western art (Zhao 1986). Another of her novels, *Sai Jinhua*, tells a story about how a famous late-Qing dynasty prostitute, by the same name as the title of the novel, found her human dignity while traveling with her husband in Europe (Zhao 1990). In fact, many other Chinese writers in Europe have extolled the multitude and hybridity of culture as a vehicle that transports Chinese diaspora to a higher quality of life and gets them closer to humanitarian truth.

New Chinese migrant writers are fewer in Europe, but feature a number of heavyweight figures. One of them is the poet Bei Dao (born 1949) who has since 1987 lived in exile in England, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, and also the USA. Since 2007 he has been teaching at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. As his poetry is highly charged with inspiration for pro-democracy movements and deemed dangerous by the Chinese government, he enjoys popularity among readers but finds a return to his homeland unlikely (Bei Dao 1999). Another eccentric writer in the eyes of the Chinese government is Gao Xingjian (born 1940), the first Chinese who won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2000. Migrated to France in 1987 and granted French citizenship in 1997, he amazes literary critics with path-breaking techniques and cultural insights in his novels and dramas (Gao 1990, 2000, 2001). Also notable is Hong Ying (born 1962), who moved to London in 1991 and returned to Beijing in 2000. Winning many major literary awards, her fictions are concerned mainly with the hardships of marginalized groups, including homosexuals, in contemporary China (Hong 2000, 2005).

Conclusion

Texts and contexts of Chinese diaspora are more than intriguing to read. Diasporic memories and experiences are subject to constant reconstruction when the diasporas are routing from one place to another. Diasporic Chinese writers have been using words as devices to mirror how they perceive their homelands and current living places. As an ethnic category, they have also been deploying texts as defensive weapons and as a tool to react with others. As the very diasporic nature entails, neither a singular script nor a static narrative can be made of the various situations

and experiences. Diversity and multitude prevail in the stories that diasporic Chinese writers have told and continue to tell.

The vernacular Chinese literary history of Chinese diaspora started in the early twentieth century with sojourning writers who traveled to alien lands outside China. The subsequent literary demography showed a growing number of local-born writers, overtaking their counterparts from China in some countries. A critical mass of Chinese communities in Malaysia and Singapore sustained literary production, supported by Chinese education and newspapers. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the outlook of Chinese literature turned grim when confronting draconian measures used by governments to curb Chinese culture and ethnicity. The literary scenes in the USA and Europe stayed fresh with the arrival and participation of writers from Taiwan and new migrants from mainland China.

China is never absent from diasporic Chinese literary sites. More specifically, China is a temporal modality, with its images and implications changing over different periods of time. During the first half of the twentieth century, China injected heavy doses of homeland sentiment and nationalism into diasporic Chinese literature. Since World War II, China has been criticized for demanding its people in diaspora, who are increasingly engaged as citizens of other nation-states, to deliver such nationalistic literature. Some literary and cultural critics push for cutting off all identification with China, as a further move following the relinquishment of political affiliation with China and also in the pursuit of a more consolidated identity of their own. However, inherent in Chinese language and culture, China's presence still continues in myriad forms of cultural legacy and creativity in diasporic Chinese literary works.

Other lands are competing with China as the subject and theme for diasporic Chinese literature. Local realities require diasporic writers to heed social elements and political forces surrounding them, following or leading the diasporic Chinese communities to react and interact with their local environments. This spells an excursus from China and compels local discourses to reign. In Southeast Asia where state agendas adopt favoritism toward the indigenous, diasporic Chinese literature shows a tendency to look inwardly for Chinese ethnicity and to resist government policies that are not treating Chinese communities rightfully. In places where both governments and the market mechanism tilt to Westernization at the expense of Chinese culture, diasporic Chinese writers are at the frontlines, defending the Chinese language as the bottom line that upholds Chineseness. However, in the USA and Europe where multiculturalism is observed, diasporic Chinese writers are more at ease with crossing cultural boundaries while sustaining things Chinese.

Notes

1 The term "diaspora" is adopted here as a loose reference that simply points to people with direct or historical experiences of migration and in recognition of origins, destinations, routes, and residing places along migration trajectories. This is an attempt to set it apart from the terms of "Overseas Chinese" and "Chinese overseas," which imply a blatant dichotomy of what is "overseas" and what is "domestic." As such, the definition of diaspora is in line with what Clifford (1994), Cohen (1997), and Axel (2004) see as a subject with evolving identities and various classifications.

2 Among others, outstanding scholars who wrote remarkable poetry and essays outside China, in classical Chinese and with traditional style, include Huang Zunxian (1848–1905) and Qiu Shuyuan (1874–1941). For studies on these two scholar-writers, see Yang Shengyong (1997) and Wang Zhiwei (2000).

3 For studies on Chinese language literature in other specific countries, see Wang Lipu (1989) on the Philippines, Zhang Guopei (2007) on Thailand, Wang Zhaoying (2001) on Brunei, and Qian (2002) on Australia. References can also be made to Salmon (1981) and Suryadinata (1993), who wrote essays on literature that Chinese diaspora had written in Chinese and other languages in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. On Chinese literature in Southeast Asia, see Wong and Pastoors (1989).

4 For a discussion on the definition of "World Chinese Literature," see Shan (2005).

5 Literary works orientated toward China were featured commonly in newspapers across Southeast Asia. Useful as a starting point to reading the works are the compilations by Fang Xiu (1970–72).
6 The essays involved in this literary controversy were published mainly in *Nan Chiau Jit Pao, Sin Chew Jit Poh, and Minshengbao*. They are selected and collected in Xin She Editorial Committee for the Great Anthology of Singapore and Malaysian Chinese Literature (1971: 197–278).
7 On the history of Xinhua literature, see Huang and Xu (2002). On comparative studies between Xinhua and Mahua literatures, see Xu (2008) and Tan Lay Ken (2009).
8 For a longer perspective on diasporic Chinese literature in the USA, in both English and Chinese, see Yin (2000).

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29

US immigration laws and Chinese American literature

Wenying Xu

Produced by and productive of historical moments, literature often offers us an introspective view of a past and a prophetic projection into a future. Chinese American literature's incorporation of US immigration laws draws our attention to the fact that discriminatory legislation structured the imagination of many Chinese American writers. Their writings not only serve as a voice of protest but also help raise the political consciousness of Chinese American communities. During the early years, this body of literature mobilized Chinese American activism in challenging the legality of these laws in the courts, and in recent decades, it has nurtured a Chinese American historical consciousness. Although it is difficult to empirically prove that Chinese American literature has had a direct influence on Chinese American activism against US discriminatory laws, it is irrefutable that literary depictions of injustices, of resistance to and subversion of these injustices have partly constituted the cultural milieux in Chinese American communities, cultural milieux in which challenges to legalized racism have been organized and executed. In order to illustrate the relationship between Chinese American literature and US immigration laws, I need to first introduce some of the legislation.

US immigration laws

Initially, Chinese were welcomed in California, and Chinese labor was actively recruited for railroad construction, laundries, and domestic service. Bill Ong Hing remarks, "In 1852 the governor of California recommended a system of land grants to induce immigration and settlement of Chinese" (Hing 1993: 20). However, Chinese immigrants soon began to experience racial animosity. In the same year that the governor recommended land grants to attract Chinese immigrants, a California Assembly Committee "issued a report critical of Chinese labor, warning of 'the concentration within our State limits of vast numbers of the Asiatic races'" (Ancheta 1998: 21). It argued that the Chinese were inassimilable and, therefore, a threat to American democracy. The anti-Chinese platform was thus set for many Californian politicians and political entities such as the Know-Nothing Party, the Workingmen Party, and "anti-Coolie" clubs. Their nativist rhetoric inflamed racial hostility against the Chinese. In the late nineteenth century, the anti-Chinese sentiment accelerated into riots that burned down Chinatowns and killed many Chinese on the West Coast and in the Northwest and Mountain states. Roger Daniels

records, "the earliest urban anti-Chinese riots … in 1871 in … Los Angeles, twenty-one Chinese were shot, hanged, or burned to death by white mobs. … Over one hundred Chinese were killed in Idaho in 1866–67" (Daniels 1988: 56). Similar riots against the Chinese also occurred in the Northwest and Mountain states, such as Denver and Wyoming. In Wyoming the violence occurred in 1885. "The official toll was 28 Chinese dead and 15 wounded; property damage was officially assessed at $147,000" (Daniels 1988: 62).

The anti-Chinese sentiment was a fertile environment for discriminatory laws. State and municipal governments of California not only enforced legislation limiting the economic opportunities and civil rights of the Chinese but also attempted to prohibit the entry of the Chinese at California ports. When the Chinese challenged these laws, however, the US Supreme Court found them unconstitutional, "because they were in conflict with the Burlingame Treaty,[1] the 14th Amendment, or the Civil Rights Act of 1870" (Hune 1982: 94). In addition to local legislation, there were two other major forms of anti-Chinese laws: (1) federal naturalization laws that excluded Asian immigrants from citizenship, and (2) federal immigration laws severely limiting Asian immigration. The original Nationality Act of 1790 dictated that only a free white person who had resided in the USA for two years was eligible for naturalization, effectively barring blacks and Native Americans from citizenship. When Asian immigrants began to arrive in the mid 1800s, this law applied to them as well. In 1868, the enactment of the 14th Amendment extended citizenship to anyone born in the USA as well as to "aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent" (Sanders 1871, vol. 16: 254). However, racial exclusion continued to apply to other groups. In 1878 a federal court in *In re Ah Yup* upheld the racial bar against Chinese immigrants, declaring that a Chinese person was not white. Consequentially, because the Chinese couldn't become naturalized, they were forbidden to testify in court either for or against a white man. Racial discrimination in nationality laws persisted for 162 years; it was not until 1952 that the US Congress lifted the racial bar on naturalization.

In addition to the racist nationality laws, other federal and municipal laws prevented the Chinese from gaining the full rights of US citizenship. These laws were not only motivated by racial prejudice but also class and gender discrimination. The first federal law limiting Chinese immigration was the Fifteen Passengers Bill passed in the US House of Representatives in 1879; it prohibited any vessel from bringing more than 15 Chinese passengers into the USA on any one voyage. Violators could be fined $100 for each passenger and imprisoned for six months. Although President Rutherford B. Hayes vetoed the bill because of its violation of the Burlingame Treaty, this legislation effectively opened the door to one of the most draconian immigration bills – the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. This bill was the first piece of federal legislation that singled out a group based on nationality and class to bar from immigration. This act specifically prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the USA for ten years, with certain classes exempted, such as merchants, teachers, diplomats, students, clergyman, and travelers. This law unmistakably targeted working-class Chinese. The consequence was a rapid decline of the Chinese population in America. Ancheta comments, "The decline in Chinese immigration was precipitous: in 1882, over 39,000 Chinese entered the USA; in 1884, only 279 entered the country; and in 1888, only 10 were admitted" (Ancheta 1998: 25). The Chinese Exclusion Act allowed reentry of those who left the USA temporarily with return certificates. However, the Scott Act of 1888 revised the earlier act by prohibiting the entry of all Chinese, including those with return certificates. Lee reports, "The Scott Act of the same year nullified 20,000 return certificates already granted and immediately denied entrance to returning Chinese laborers" (Lee 2003: 45). Many of those barred from returning had families and property in the USA. What is new in the Scott Act is the removal of "laborers"; the new provisions excluded *all* Chinese except "teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for pleasure or curiosity" (Lee 2003: 45). Four years later, US

Congress passed the Geary Act, which extended Chinese exclusion another ten years. In 1902 Congress renewed Chinese exclusion, and in 1904, Chinese exclusion was extended indefinitely. The Chinese exclusion laws were not repealed until 1943 when China became an American ally during World War II.

Chinese women became a target for discriminatory legislation as early as 1866, when California passed "An Act for the Suppression of Chinese Houses of Ill Fame." During the gold rush and for several decades thereafter, prostitutes of many nationalities lived in San Francisco. The city government singled out Chinese women for punishment from the very beginning. Sucheng Chan explains of the 1866 Act, "The statute declared Chinese prostitution a public nuisance, made leases of real property to a brothel operators invalid, provided for the retaking of such premises, and charged landlords who allowed their properties to be so used with a misdemeanor that carried a maximum penalty of $500 or six months in jail" (Chan 1991: 97). This state law paved the way for the Page Law of 1875, which was the first federal immigration legislation that excluded a group based on its race and gender. It was made to stop the immigration of Asian women for the purpose of prostitution, and the immigration officers effectively barred the entry of nearly all Chinese women by classifying them as prostitutes. Furthermore, Section 3 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 determined that "any American woman who marries a foreigner should take the nationality of her husband" (Sanders 1871, vol 34: 1228). Until 1931, when expatriation of women married to Asian immigrants was rescinded, an American-born Chinese woman would lose her US citizenship if she married a Chinese immigrant ineligible for naturalization.

The consequence of these legal actions was the severely unbalanced sex ratio in the Chinese American population. Because of the traditional gender ideology, few Chinese women attempted migration to the USA even before the Page Law was passed. According to Lee, 4.4% of the Chinese admitted into the USA were women in 1873, 1.8% in 1874, and 2.3% in 1875, the year the Page Law was passed. This bill effectively sharpened the decline in the number of Chinese women entering the country. Lee reports that in 1876 Chinese women entering the country were 1.1% and 0.7% in 1877 (Lee 2003: 117). Daniels points out:

> As late as 1920, seventy years after the migration began, women numbered fewer than ten percent of the Chinese American population. During the late nineteenth century, women were even less numerous. In 1880, for example, California listed more than 70,000 Chinese men and fewer than 4,000 women. In the rest of the USA, the imbalance was even greater; almost 30,000 men and fewer than 1000 women.
>
> *(Daniels 1988: 16)*

The impact of this severe imbalance between the sexes made it very difficult for the Chinese American community to regenerate itself; it also created a very conservative and patriarchal culture in the aging bachelor societies of Chinatowns.

Compounded by the federal laws were state and local ordinances that legitimated discriminatory practices against the Chinese precisely through the federal racial prohibition on naturalized citizenship. For example, California enacted a foreign miners' license tax on every foreign miner who was not eligible for citizenship, and this law targeted mainly the Chinese miners. In 1856, the California legislature passed "An Act to Prevent Further Immigration of Chinese or Mongolian to this State," and in 1862 it passed another law entitled "An Act to Protect Free White Labor against Competition with Chinese Coolie Labor." Similarly, city ordinances increased the burdens on Chinese immigrants and made their livelihood extremely difficult. For instance, San Francisco's laundry ordinance in 1873 imposed the heaviest tax on laundries transported

without horse-drawn vehicles, which were the Chinese who could not afford any form of vehicles. The Cubic Air Ordinance in San Francisco, calling for at least 500 cubic feet of air for each inhabitant, was enforced only in Chinatown.

Legal discrimination against the Chinese was most pernicious at the intersections of race, class and gender. Chan observes, "Chinese prostitutes were seen as potent instruments for the debasement of white manhood, health, morality, and family life" (Chan 1991: 138). White workingmen were the strongest opponents of the Chinese presence; excluding Chinese laborers became an expeditious means for politicians to win votes.

> By the 1920s, a hierarchy of admissible and excludable immigrants had been codified into law, reinforcing ideas of "fitness" that were measured by immigrants' race, ethnicity, class, and gender. … Even resident aliens and native-born Chinese American citizens faced potential exclusion if they left the United States and tried to return.
>
> *(Lee 2003: 5)*

The sharp decline of the Chinese male population, the extremely small number of Chinese female immigrants, and the anti-miscegenation laws[2] in the majority of the states crippled Chinese American communities and rendered family formation almost impossible.

Despite individual hardships and damages to the community, the Chinese didn't submit to exclusion but found ways to enter the country legally or illegally.

> Despite its intent, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act failed to end Chinese immigration altogether. From 1882 to 1943, an estimated 300,955 Chinese successfully gained admission into the USA for the first time, or as returning residents and native-born citizens. In fact, the number of exclusion-era Chinese admissions is greater than that during the pre-exclusion era, from 1849 to 1882, when 258,210 Chinese entered the United States.
>
> *(Lee 2003: 12)*

Chinese resistance assumed several forms, such as illegal immigration, legal immigration, legal immigration through deceit, and litigations against exclusion laws. Illegal immigration occurred at porous borders and seaports as it does today. As undocumented immigrants, they were vulnerable to immigration raids, arrests, and deportation. Therefore, more Chinese resorted to deceit in order to enter the country legally. Some falsely claimed to be a member of the exempt classes, such as merchants, teachers, and students. They obtained the necessary documentation or witness testimony to verify that claim. Lee describes, "Identification papers for children or spouses of exempt class immigrants were especially useful because the US government often lacked reliable documentary evidence verifying births and marriages that had taken place either in the United States or in China" (Lee 2003: 190).[3] A transnational network emerged through family connections in China, Hong Kong, Macau, and the USA to produce and exchange such identification papers. It was common among Chinese immigrants to claim more children than they had and to report fictional births of children during their visits home in order to sponsor relatives or to sell the slots. One of the most referenced identities is "paper son." The young man who purchased the fake identity must memorize the family history of the "paper father" to pass immigration officers' interrogation, and if successful he would bear the "paper father's" name for the rest of his life. Lee explains, "The paper son system, thus instituted a chain of migration pattern that allowed multiple generations of Chinese to enter the country, using fraudulent papers, and it facilitated the reunification of family member's (mostly male) within the United States" (Lee 2003: 204). The high success rate is also due to the fact that "[p]rofessional immigration agents

provided expertise and connections – often with corrupt immigration officials" (Lee 2003: 195). The business of illegal immigration flourished.

The kind of activism Chinese Americans are most proud of is the challenge to the legality of exclusion laws through the judicial system as individuals, and through community organizations. Soon after the 1882 Exclusion Act, Chinese immigrants began such challenges. They pooled money to hire lawyers, through whom they used the courts to affirm the rights of merchant families, returning laborers, and American citizens of Chinese descent and their families to enter and reenter the country.

> Many of the early court cases were sponsored by the Chinese consulate or the Chinese Six Companies … Chinese were extremely successful at using the federal courts to overturn individual denials by the immigration service. At the same time, Chinese in America also used the courts to challenge the policy of exclusion itself, including a failed Supreme Court challenge to the 1892 Geary Act.
>
> *(Lee 2003: 123)*

One significant case that tested the nationality law was *United States v. Wong Kim Ark* in 1898. Wong was born in San Francisco to Chinese immigrant parents but was detained after returning from a trip to China on the grounds that he was not a US citizen. The Supreme Court ruled in Wong's favor, holding that all persons born in the USA, even those born to parents ineligible for naturalization, are citizens. This decision settled once for all the question of the birth right to citizenship.[4]

Contrary to the result of *United States v. Wong Kim Ark,* many cases failed. For instance, in *Chae Chan Ping v. United States,* Chae challenged the 1888 amendment, which prohibited any Chinese laborers from reentering the USA, even if they had been issued certificates entitling them to return. Chae came to the USA in 1875 and left for a trip to China with the requisite certificate in hand. According to the Burlingame Treaty, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and the Act's 1884 amendment, he had the right to reenter the USA. However, the 1888 amendment barred him from landing. "Chae argued that the 1888 act deprived him of rights vested under law. He also asserted that the legislation abrogated explicit provisions of the 1880 treaty. However, in this case … the Supreme Court held that the act of Congress was entirely valid" (MacLain 1994: 149). There were numerous other cases.

> Between 1882 and 1905, the federal district court for northern California and the state circuit court heard over 9,600 Chinese habeas corpus cases, which alleged that the Chinese petitioners (many of whom claimed US citizenship) were indeed entitled to land and that they were being unlawfully detained.
>
> *(Lee 2003: 47)*

These cases in challenging Sinophobia perfected the US legal system. As Charles MacLain comments: "These [Chinese] cases, challenging discriminatory local, state, and federal legislation, raised highly complicated legal issues. Some established important precedents and contributed significantly to the legal and constitutional history of the United States" (MacLain 1994: 5).

Chinese American literature

Richard Posner in *Law and Literature* discusses vengeance as a pre-legal or extralegal system in works of literature (Posner 1988: 1). Although Chinese American writers have not portrayed

legal cases like those in *The Merchant of Venice*, *The Brothers Karamazov*, *Billy Budd*, etc., vengeance is explicit and implicit in the depictions of human actions resisting and subverting racist legislation. The act of representing how Chinese immigrants combated legal injustices is in itself a kind of vengeance – vengeance against the power that attempted to shut out and shut up Chinese immigrants. By doing so, Chinese American literature helped mobilize Chinese American activism and kept these memories alive in the community's political consciousness. Many Chinese American writers portray Chinese American lives as fashioned by exclusion laws. The following discussion provides an analysis of several major examples of them such as Lee Yan Phou, Sui Sin Far, the anonymous poetry Chinese detainees left on the walls of the detention center in Angel Island, Louis Chu, Maxine H. Kingston, and Fae Myenne Ng.

The first known Chinese American writer writing in English was Lee Yan Phou, whose memoir, *When I Was a Boy in China,* was published in 1887. Lee came to the USA in 1873 as a member of the first government sponsored group of Chinese students. He chose to attend Yale. The Qing government, however, changed its mind a year later and recalled the students. Several years later, Lee returned to resume his studies and graduated from Yale in 1887. In his graduating address, he protested,

> By passing a discriminating law against an already persecuted class, the Central Government yielded to the demands of the mob, and to that extent countenanced its violence and lawlessness. The Anti-Chinese Act is a cause of all the outrages and massacres that have been since committed in Rock Springs and Denver, in Portland, San Francisco and other parts, which, if they had been perpetrated in China against Americans, would have resounded from Bedloe's Island [whereon stands the Statue of Liberty] to the Golden Gate.
>
> *(Lee 1887)*

Lee's indignation was shared by many Chinese students studying in the USA or who had returned to China. According to Sau-Ling Cynthia Wong, "a vast body of anti-Exclusion literature" arose "from the 1905 Chinese protest boycott of American goods" (Wong 1997: 43), and this body of literature was written in Chinese.

Most Asian American literary scholars regard Sui Sin Far (or Edith Maude Eaton, 1865–1914) as the first Chinese American writer, because she was the first to write fiction. Far was born in Macclesfield, England to a Chinese mother and an English father. The Eatons moved to Hudson, New York for a brief while before they relocated to Montreal, Canada. Far, as a young girl, published articles in Montreal's English-language newspapers on the Chinese people. She moved to San Francisco first and then Seattle before she went to Boston. Although she could easily pass as an Englishwoman, she embraced her mother's culture and the cause of counteracting the hatred and prejudice against her mother's people. She adopted the pseudonym Sui Sin Far, narcissus flower in Chinese, and wrote articles about what it was like to be a Chinese woman in North America. She lived among the Chinese and remained single all her life. When she died in Montreal, the Chinese community there erected a memorial to her inscribed with the characters "*yi bu wang hua*," which translates as "The righteous one does not forget her country." In her memoir, "Leaves from the Mental Portfolio of a Eurasian," Far writes,

> I meet many Chinese persons, and when they get into trouble I am often called upon to fight their battles in the papers. This I enjoy. My heart leaps for joy when I read one day an article signed by a New York Chinese in which he declares, "The Chinese in America owe an everlasting debt of gratitude to Sui Sin Far for the bold stand she has taken in their defense.
>
> *(Far 1995: 223)*

In her collection of linked short stories, *Mrs. Spring Fragrance* (1912), Far depicted the lives of Chinese Americans in a way that counters the prevailing racist stereotypes, and critiques legislative discrimination against the Chinese in America. For instance, one of Far's best known short stories, "The Smuggling of Tie Co," is set against the background of the discriminatory laws against the Chinese. This strange love story between a cross-dressing Chinese girl and a white Canadian smuggler occurs at the border between Canada and the USA. This story is indirectly critical of two discriminatory laws – the Page Law of 1875 that prohibited Chinese women from entering the USA on the ground of immorality and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, with its subsequent extensions and revisions, that barred the entrance of Chinese laborers. Due to the Page Law, Chinese women had to seek illegal ways to enter the USA to join families or to work. Far's portrayal of Tie Co can be interpreted as a critical response to the Page Law, even though Tie Co lives in Canada before he attempts to enter New York. More strongly related to Tie Co's story is the background of the Chinese Exclusion Act, which created a black market for human smuggling. The story involves two main characters – Tie Co, who appears to be a Chinese young man working at a Chinese laundry, and Jack Fabian, a smuggler who traffics Chinese from Canada to the USA. While Fabian is in prison, the smuggling business has changed. Far explains, "Some ingenious lawyers had devised a scheme by which any young Chinaman on payment of a couple of hundred dollars could procure a father which father would swear the young Chinaman was born in America – thus proving him to be an American citizen with the right to breathe United States air" (Far 1995: 105). Tie Co's secret attraction to Fabian motivates him to ask the latter to smuggle him to New York for no other reason than to help Fabian make $50. In their nocturnal crossing, they are spotted by the government officers. To save Fabian from further imprisonment for human smuggling, Ti Co throws himself into the river. When Ti Co's body is found the next day, people discover that it is "the body of a girl – a woman" (Far 1995: 108). Although "The Smuggling of Tie Co" does not directly engage in challenging and criticizing the legal racism Chinese immigrants faced in the USA, it exposes the inhumanity of the Page Law and the Chinese Exclusion Act.

In another story, "In the Land of the Free," Far explores her usual themes of racial insensitivity, the human costs of bureaucratic and discriminatory laws, and the humanity of the Chinese. The story begins with the arrival of a mother and her two-year-old son at the port of San Francisco. The mother, Lae Choo, being a returnee with a return certificate, is allowed to enter the country. However, her two-year-old son is detained by immigration officers because he was born in China, even though conceived in the USA, and therefore does not have a return certificate. Far makes the ironic statement through her characters, "There cannot be any law that would keep a child from its mother!" (Far 1995: 96). For ten months the child is detained while his parents are denied visits. After paying a large lawyer fee, they are finally allowed to take their son back from the mission nursery where he has been kept. However, the little boy hides in the folds of a white missionary woman and screams at his mother, "Go'way, go'way!" (Far 1995: 101). The heart-wrenching ending exposes the dehumanizing laws. At the same time, the story also challenges the dehumanizing depiction of the Chinese, particularly Chinese women, popular in American culture, by portraying Choo as a loving mother who would do anything to be united with her son.

Far's baton was carried on by Chinese "poets" who carved anonymous poetry (all in Chinese) into the wooden walls at Angel Island Immigration Station. More than 175,000 Chinese men and women entered the country as new immigrants, returning residents, and US citizens between 1910 and 1940 (Lai *et al.* 1980: 8). The majority came through San Francisco and Angel Island, and approximately 100,000 Chinese were detained at the immigration station on the island (Yung and Lee 2010: 69). "More than 135 poems from Angelo Island barracks had been

recorded. … All of the poems are written in classical style" (Lai *et al.* 1980: 23–5). Many poems express anger and frustration, such as "America has power, but not justice. / In prison, we were victimized as if we were guilty. / Given no opportunity to explain, it was really brutal" (Lai *et al.* 1980: 58). Many depict the shame and despair, such as "I am ashamed to be curled up like a worm on island. / I grieve for my native land. What else can I say?" (Lai *et al.* 1980: 19). A good number of the poems exhibit a powerful political consciousness. For example, "I am stressed that we Chinese are detained / in this wooden building. / It is actually racial barriers, which cause / difficulties on Yingtai Island. / Even while they are tyrannical, they still / claim to be humanitarian. / I should regret my taking the risks of coming / in the first place." Another one goes like this, "I thoroughly hate the barbarians because they / do not respect justice. / They continually promulgate harsh laws to / show off their prowess. / They oppress the overseas Chinese and also / violate treaties" (Lai *et al.* 1980: 100). These poems are the best rebuttal of the racist depiction of "the Chinese character" during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Contrary to the stereotype of the Chinese as passive, complacent, and ignorant of democracy, these poems in their direct and simple language offer an indomitable spirit and a strong sense of justice. Peter Kvidera argues that "the poems turn a legally inscribed absence into a literary presence. The aesthetic that the Angel Island and Chinatown writers developed allowed them to imagine a Chinese position in the United States that ideally, if not materially, defied legal definitions remaining otherwise beyond their control" (Kvidera 2005: 531).

If Sui Sin Far is regarded as mother of Chinese American literature, the father figure would be Louis Chu (1915–70). Born in Guangdong, China, Chu immigrated to the USA with his family when he was nine. He attended Upsala College and majored in English and minored in sociology. Between 1943 and 1945, he served in the US Army and was stationed in Kunming, China. He was able to bring a Chinese wife to Chinatown, New York because of the War Brides Act of 1945. Chu is regarded as an extremely important figure in Chinese American literary history even though he published only one novel, *Eat a Bowl of Tea* (1961). This is because his portrayal of the Chinese and Chinatown departed from the stereotypes that dominated then literary representations of the Chinese in American literature. Chu's *Eat a Bowl of Tea* depicts New York Chinatown in a way that neither exoticizes nor reviles it. Instead, it draws realistic pictures of its inhabitants as three-dimensional human beings who experience such problems in an aging bachelor society as patriarchal oppression, racial oppression, sexual deprivation, marriage crisis, etc. Chu attributes these problems to the US immigration laws prejudicial against the Chinese. He depicts New York Chinatown of the early twentieth century as populated mostly by old men tormented by anxiety about the community's regeneration. Chu gives the novel an authentic Chinatown flavor by using creolized Cantonese English.[5]

The New York Chinatown of Chu's time was the product of the Page Law, the Chinese Exclusion Act, and Anti-Miscegenation Laws. It was an aging bachelor society where the scarcity of women and children rendered its future unviable and its culture ultraconservative. The old male population, though living in the USA, attempted to maintain the old social order even when it was already weakening its power in China. The more stagnant Chinatown was, the more closed and conservative it became. In addition, shaped by the discriminatory laws and practices as much as by cultural affinities, Chinatown was hardly a true community; one may describe it as an artificial community. Or as Chan concludes, "the Chinatowns that emerged during the early decades of the twentieth century were not so much the products of natural social forces as the distorted outgrowths of immigration and naturalization policies that discriminated against the Chinese, as a people in general and against specific classes among them in particular" (Chan 1991: 139). In other words, the forces of racial discrimination, economic immobility, and cultural marginalization made it extremely difficult for Chinese immigrants to live outside Chinatowns.

Chu's New York Chinatown is set against the historical background of a few significant pieces of legislation. Ben Loy's father Wah Gay returned to China in 1928 to marry only to leave his wife behind permanently, and 20 years later Ben Loy also returned to China to marry. As Jinqi Ling remarks:

> The intervening 20 years witnessed the adverse effects, a series of US immigration laws that profoundly affected the life of Chinese immigrants. The 1924 National Origins Law established a permanent numerical restriction of immigration to the USA from all parts of the world. Under this law, also known as the "Second Exclusion Act," entry of Chinese students was restricted,[6] and Chinese wives of US citizens were not allowed to enter the USA.
>
> *(Ling 1995: 35)*

It is not difficult to interpret the intention of the US Congress, which was to severely delimit the population growth of the Chinese in America. As mentioned above, it was not until 1943 that the National Origins Law was lifted. In 1945 Congress passed the War Bride Act enabling American soldiers to bring wives home from Asia and Europe. Connected with this act was a separate legislation that allowed the wives and children of Chinese Americans to apply for entry as "none-quota immigrants." The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 for the first time allowed Chinese women to immigrate under the same conditions as men. In other words, Chinese women finally could come to the USA not as wives or daughters of men, but for their own purposes of business, education, and others. Three years after the War Brides Act, Ben Loy, a veteran, returns to his ancestral village in Guangdong to fulfill his marriage with Mei Oi, which their fathers have arranged. Ling recognizes Ben Loy's visit to China as a significant moment in Chinese American history, for it "takes place precisely at a time of historical change both in Sino-American relations and the New York Chinatown's population composition" (Ling 1995: 38). Unlike his father, Ben Loy is able to bring his bride to America.

Surrounding their marriage, Chu's novel presents a realistic portrayal of Chinatown's bachelor society after World War II, and in its very realism it is a satirical depiction of Chinatown's mores. Symbolic of Chinatown's future, the newlyweds are forced to carry an impossible burden of hope – vested in them is a contradiction: Chinatown's future ironically coexisting with old bachelors' faith in the old social order. This symbolic beginning of a new era that promises the community's renewal, however, is fraught with disappointments. Ben Loy becomes impotent soon into their honeymoon. Chu highlights two occasions in which Ben Loy fails in the nuptial bed. His first experience of impotence occurs in Hong Kong on their way to America, in a hotel where he has slept with prostitutes during the war. Soon after they arrive in New York, one of the prostitutes who used to visit Ben Loy knocks on their door and wakes up the newlywed. Chu clearly associates Ben Loy's impotence with his shame of his past – a way of life "normal" to the aging bachelors (Chu 1961: 64). Contrary to the old-timers' belief in the uprightness of Ben Loy, he has indulged in the same vice as his elders and is no more fit for married life than they. Li Shu-Yan comments fittingly, "Ben Loy's identification with the stagnant closure of the New York Chinatown culture already cripples him" (Li 1993: 100). One can interpret Ben Loy's sexual impotence to symbolize the socioeconomic and cultural impotence of Chinatown itself. Partly created by discriminatory legislations against the Chinese, Chinatown in New York was simultaneously a refuge and a prison. Ling puts this similarly, "Ben Loy's failure to live a married life thus becomes the generic metaphor of the social 'emasculation' of the Chinatown bachelor society in the face of the limitations imposed by law in their adopted country" (Ling 1995: 41).

Newly initiated into this community, Mei Oi, the bride, becomes deeply disappointed in her life in America. In Chinatown she finds no community, no friendship, and no employment, except for the licentious gawking of old men and the impatient expectation of her pregnancy. Confined to their small apartment, Mei Oi's only comfort lies in her husband. However, his "monk-like behavior" makes her feel "unwanted and useless" (Chu 1961: 65). Out of frustration and loneliness, she responds to the seduction of a middle-aged bachelor, Ah Song, and becomes pregnant with his child. Her adultery, more threatening to the old social order than her husband's impotence, fundamentally undermines the symbolic value of their marriage and satirizes the myth that the community's renewal must stem from the union of two pure and innocent youths. While Ben Loy has already been tainted by the life style of aging bachelors, Mei Oi also is not the typical young girl that old men in Chinatown fancy. She belongs to a new generation of young women in China who have acquired from their limited education and English language modest ideas of freedom, agency, and happiness. Chu's characterization of Mei Oi debunks the old bachelors' belief about the purity of China-born girls versus the contaminated American-born "Jook Sing girls."[7] Not so different from the American-born, Mei Oi responds to Ben Loy's slapping with self-assertion, "You wife-beater, that is the only thing you know how. What kind of a husband have you been? Why don't you ask yourself that? … I didn't do anything wrong. … I thought I've married a young man … but it turns out that I've married an old man … an old man who was too old to make love to me" (Chu 1961: 145).

Ben Loy must embrace the new way before he can have a family. Swallowing his male pride, he comes to recognize the validity of his wife's position and decides to forgive her and to raise the child as his own. Interestingly, Chu chooses to rescue his young protagonists from the stagnant New York Chinatown by relocating them to the West Coast to reconstruct their life. Although they move to San Francisco's Chinatown, which actually is an older enclave than the one in New York, it is the literary code of the West frontier that opens a new horizon and offers a new beginning for the young couple. By organizing such a plot, Chu points his finger at racist legislation for the degenerate mores of New York Chinatown and its stagnation.

Maxine H. Kingston (1940–) is the most celebrated and most widely read Chinese American writer. She became instantly famous upon the publication of her first book of nonfiction, *The Woman Warrior: Memoirs of a Girlhood among Ghosts* (1976), which won the National Book Critics circle Award and the *Mademoiselle* magazine award. It tells the stories mostly of the women in her family, such as her paternal aunt, her mother, her maternal aunt, and herself. *China Men* (1977), a recipient of the National Book Award, is her second nonfiction and focuses on the male members of her family. Rich in mythology and family history, *China Men* depicts the Chinese American contribution to America, such as the Chinese labor that grew sugar cane in Hawaii, built the US transcontinental railroad, cultivated an agricultural economy in California, and fought in the Vietnam War. She went on to publish her first novel, *Tripmaster Monkey: His Fake Book* (1989), a fusion of prose and poetry, *To Be the Poet* (2002), an autobiography, *The Fifth Book of Peace* (2003), and *Veterans of War, Veterans of Peace* (2006), a collection of personal stories by veterans.

In *China Men*, she spends an entire chapter cataloguing US legal discrimination against the Chinese at the federal and local levels, and the entire book records her family history of male members who subverted and survived the harsh laws. Kingston points out that the 1878 California Constitutional Convention settled "the Chinese problem" not only without any Chinese representation but also with the representation of white non-citizens. "Of the 152 delegates, 35 were not American citizens, but Europeans. The resulting constitution, voted into existence by a majority party of Working Men and Grangers, prohibited Chinese from entering California" (Kingston 1977: 153). This state law created the political climate that made possible the Chinese

Exclusion Act of 1882. California instituted other discriminatory laws, such as barring Asians from attending public schools, exacting taxes on Chinese fishermen for shellfishing and to police tax on Chinese older than 18. Furthermore, Kingston points out, "Though the Chinese were filling and levying the San Joaquin Delta for thirteen cents a square yard, building the richest agricultural land in the world, they were prohibited from owning land or real estate" (Kingston 1977: 153). Encouraged by the anti-Chinese state laws, San Francisco instituted a queue tax exclusively targeting Chinese men, cigar taxes, shoe taxes, and laundry taxes – businesses conducted mainly by the Chinese. Kingston explains that although some of these state and city laws were challenged by the Chinese and ruled by federal courts as unconstitutional, "the repealed laws were often reenacted in another form" (Kingston 1977: 154). Throughout this chapter, titled "The Laws," Kingston chronicles the racist anti-Chinese legislation made by California as well as the federal government. It was not until 1978 that this history of legal discrimination officially ended.

Kingston places the chapter, "The Laws," at the very center of *China Men*, separating the first eight sections from the last nine. That it occupies the central position suggests to the reader its structural as well as thematic significance. Written in a monotone, the chapter on the US immigration laws sharply contrasts with the surrounding chapters, which are poly-vocal, imaginative, and kaleidoscopic. The voice of the laws seems to be a thin slab of ice wrapped up by rich tapestries; its cold, heartless, and mono-logical effect is ironically deepened by the contrast to reveal the singular intention to exclude, punish, and persecute Chinese immigrants. Kingston's chapter on laws is a long litigation against legalized discrimination in the USA against Asians, ranging from the Nationality Act of 1870 that designed America to be a nation of "Nordic fiber" (Kingston 1977: 153) to the law of San Francisco in 1906 that "all Chinese, Japanese, and Korean children be segregated in an Oriental school," and the California Alien Land Law of 1913 that prohibited "aliens ineligible for citizenship" from owning land or real estate (Kingston 1977: 156).

Kingston depicts the difficulties her family endured because of these discriminatory laws. Fearful of deportation, her father hid his true identity and refused to tell his children of his history. Kingston addresses her father in *China Men*, "You say with the few words and the silences: No stories. No past. No China. … You fix yourself in the present, but I want to hear the stories about the rest of your life, the Chinese stories" (Kingston 1977: 14–15). Because of his silence, Kingston and her siblings grew up not knowing who their father was. *China Men* was Kingston's effort to imagine and reconstruct the lives of her family's male members. She could only speculate, "My father was born in the year of the Rabbit, 1891 or 1903 or 1915" (Kingston 1977: 15). The family's fear of the law made them particularly vulnerable to blackmail. When her father was operating a laundry, some customers wrongfully accused him of damaging their clothes and demanded compensation. As soon as the police became involved, her father would pay rather than go to small claims court (Kingston 1977: 13).

Kingston is also particularly imaginative in portraying the longing and agony that Chinese male immigrants experienced because of the absence of women. She also re-affirms Chinese American masculinity through depicting the men's creative resistance to emasculating forces. In the chapter "Great Grandfather of the Sandalwood Mountains," Kingston re-creates the life of Chinese immigrants on sugarcane plantations in Hawaii. In response to the deprivation of female companionship and the punishment for talking on the job, the Chinese men dig a hole in the ground and shout greetings to their mothers, wives, and girlfriends in China. Like the tale of King Midas, Kingston renders the digging of a hole and burying words in it a masculine action that symbolizes penetration and sowing of their seeds. In another chapter, "The Grandfather of the Sierra Nevada Mountains," Kingston tells the story of Ah Goong working with dynamite in

constructing the transnational railroad. Whenever he is lifted in the air, he is overcome by sexual urges.

> He curled up, overcome by beauty and fear, which shot to his penis. He tried to rub himself calm. Suddenly he stood up and squirted out into space. "I am fucking the world," he said. The world's vagina was big, big as the sky, big as the valley. He grew a habit: whenever he was lowered in the basket, his blood rushed to his penis, and he fucked the world.
>
> *(Kingston 1977: 133)*

Ah Goong's action not only serves as a masculine assertion of his irrepressible sexuality in the face of social, cultural, and legal emasculation in his adopted country, but also as a challenge to the dominant representation of Chinese American men as undersexed or asexual.

The stories of Kingston's father, grandfather, and grand uncles colorfully demonstrate human creativity and tenacity. However, their stories vacillate between two poles – legal and illegal entry or citizen and noncitizen, as Shan Te-hsing notes, "It is this focus on 'legal or illegal' and the presentation of different versions of the same person's life story that characterized the story of Baba, Kingston's father" (Shan 1995: 247). Structured by the US history of legal discrimination against the Chinese, her narrative cannot escape the constructed identities that confine immigrants. Kingston imagines both the legal and illegal ways of her father's entry into the USA. She first depicts the smuggling of her father: "The father's friends nailed him inside a crate with no conspicuous air holes" (Kingston 1977: 49). After months of travel on the sea, "At last the smuggler led him out; the ship had docked at a pier in New York" (Kingston 1977: 52). As if refuting herself, Kingston goes on to say:

> Of course, my father could not have come that way. He came a legal way. … Arriving in San Francisco Bay, the legal father was detained for an indefinite time at the Immigration Station on Angelo Island, almost within swimming distance. … There must be the hundred China men who could enter America, he thought. But the quota was one hundred a year, not one hundred per day, and here were packed more than one hundred, nearer two hundred or three.
>
> *(Kingston 1977: 53)*

After a lengthy confinement and numerous interrogations by the immigration officers, her father was finally allowed to enter the USA. Kingston satirizes the legal process, insinuating that the legal way is as illogical as the illegal way, for her father "was not sure on what basis they let him in – his diploma, his American lineage (which may have turned out to be good after all), his ability to withstand jailing, his honesty, or the skill of his deceits" (Kingston 1977: 60). Kingston's legal and illegal scenarios of her father's immigration suggest that US immigration laws were as idiosyncratic as they were dehumanizing.

The most recent Chinese American fiction that sets its plot against the background of exclusion laws is by Fae Myenne Ng (1957–). Her first novel *Bone* (1993), nominated for the PEN/Faulkner Award and a national bestseller, tells the story of a Chinese immigrant family in San Francisco's Chinatown and explores the themes of identity, alienation, and the "paper son." Her second novel *Steer toward Rock* (2008), winner of the 2008 American Book Award, continues the theme of the "paper son." Again set in San Francisco's Chinatown, the novel portrays a Chinese man who comes to America at the price of a fictional identity and a fake marriage.

One of the major themes Ng explores in *Bone* is the power of paper in the eyes of the law, which fetishizes passports, identity cards, return certificates, documentations, and so on. Paper

renders blood and bone powerless in the eyes of bureaucracy, whereas blood and bone rule the lives of human beings, legal or illegal. Leon, the father figure, often remarks, "In this country, paper is more precious than blood" (Ng 1993: 9). In consequence, the incommensurability between paper and blood results in family tragedies. Set in Chinatown, San Francisco, *Bone* tells the story of the Leong family tormented by secrets kept in order to evade the discriminatory laws and conflicts caused by these secrets. From the start, the reader is told that the middle daughter of the Leongs, Ona, has committed suicide by jumping from the roof of a Chinatown housing project. Ng then initiates the reader into the snarl of family secrets centered on Leon's legal/illegal immigration status, and his paper and blood relations.

Leon is 15 when he arrives at the port of San Francisco, with a purchased identity, as a (paper) son of Grandpa Leong. In addition to $5,000, Leon has to promise Grandpa Leong that he would send the old man's bones back to China after his death. Successfully passing "the interrogation at Angel Island" (Ng 1993: 9), Leon is permitted into the country as a legal immigrant. However, his American life is riddled with confusion and uncertainties. Ng describes, "Leon was always getting his real and paper birthdays mixed up; he's never given the same birthday twice. Old-timer logic: If you don't tell the truth, you'll never get caught in a lie. What Leon didn't know, he made up. Forty years of making it up had to backfire sometime" (Ng 1993: 55). After 50 years as a "legal" immigrant, Leon finds himself ineligible for Social Security precisely because of the lies. The white guy who interviews Leon asks "why he had so many aliases? So many different dates of birth? Did he have a passport? A birth certificate? A driver's license?" (Ng 1993: 56). Ironically, the paper son is penalized for not having the right paper; "the laws that excluded him now held him captive" (Ng 1993: 57).

Leon often works as a cook on a ship, away for long stretches of time. Grandpa Leong died when Leon was away. Leon blames himself for breaking his promise and believes that his "family's bad luck started when he broke his promise to Grandpa Leong. Leon worried about the reckless bones, and for years, whenever something went wrong – losing a job, losing the bid for the takeout joint, losing the Ong and Leong Laundry – Leon blamed the bones" (Ng 1993: 50). Losing one of his daughters is the last straw and sets Leon off to find the bones. At the cemetery, the guard refuses to let him in, because "you've got to have a piece of paper saying you got people buried here," which Leon does not (Ng 1993: 73). Ng conveys the message that in a world obsessed with paper, rigid classification confines people to binary categories according to a bureaucratic rationality, marking human beings as legal or illegal, insider or outsider, and citizen or alien. Ng's novel portrays the Leong family as a casualty of this rationality.

In her second novel, *Steer toward Rock* (2008), Ng once again explores the contradictions and the consequent pain brought about by discriminatory legislations. The narrator, Jack, opens the novel with a confession: "The woman I loved wasn't in love with me; the woman I married wasn't a wife to me. Ilin Cheung was my wife on paper. Indeed, she belonged to Yi-Tung Szeto. In debt, I also belong to him. He was my father, paper, too" (Ng 2008: 3). Jack falls in love with an American-born, Joice Qwan, who "was my ghost of love, better chased than caught" (Ng 2008: 17). In order to free himself for love from the tangle of lies, Jack goes to the Immigration Office to confess his true identity.

> I am willing to concede alienage and wish to apply for Suspension of Deportation. I voluntarily surrender Certificate of Identity No. 387046, which shows that I was admitted to the USA as a citizen, and passport No. 362891, issued by the Department of State, Washington, D.C. I have this day voluntarily registered as an alien.
>
> *(Ng 2008: 57)*

The immigration officer, who interviews Jack, documents, "In a sworn statement at San Francisco on February 2, 1965, attached as Exhibit A, SUBJECT confessed that his true name is Yuo Seen Leong and made no claim to United States citizenship. His immigration father is not related to him. SUBJECT has no true brothers or sisters" (Ng 2008: 63). As the result of Jack's confession, his paper father is arrested and charged of being unlawfully in the USA. The immigration officer states, "you entered without inspection under the immigration laws Section 20, and in that you entered in violation of another ('any') law of the USA, to wit, the Chinese Exclusion Laws, Section 21 of the Act of February 20, 1907" (Ng 2008: 104). Jack's paper father is deported after living nearly 60 years in the USA.

It is with this contrast between the language of the heart and the language of bureaucracy that Ng succeeds in portraying the absurdity of the US legal system that aimed at excluding and dehumanizing the racial other. It is through the convoluted relationships made necessary to evade the laws that Ng also succeeds in restoring humanity to her characters. The human heart moves unpredictably in defiance of laws and designs. Jack's confession neither secures Joice nor breaks away from his fake but legal wife, Ilin. Joice leaves San Francisco after delivering their daughter, Veda, leaving her mother and Jack to raise the child. Jack and Ilin find themselves in a love affair, and the fake yet legal marriage becomes real. The novel ends with Veda, now a grown woman, convincing her father to become legal through naturalization. When compelled by the immigration officer to choose a name for his legal identity, Jack wants both. He cannot choose between his true identity and his paper identity, which has become his true identity by now. Veda chooses for him. She thinks, "I chose Jack Moon Szeto. I chose his fake name, the name he lived half his life with, the name he made with his own sweat, the name he surrendered for love, the name that made him true" (Ng 2008: 225).

Themes exploring experiences stemming from racist legislation, such as paper son, lonely old men pining for home, estranged couples due to lengthy separations, borrowed identities, displacement, parenting crisis, etc., are abundant in Chinese American literature. Naked racial discrimination against the Chinese, masked under the cloak of law, structured the lives of most Chinese immigrants in America before 1965. Chinese American literature has attempted to reflect historical reality by fictionalizing courageous acts of resistance, subversion, creative agency, love, and dignity. Many more writers than those discussed above have exposed and avenged injustices engendered by US immigration laws. Engaged in a critical and dialectical exchange with the American juridical system, these writers wield continuing influence over the politics of race in the USA in general and Chinese American activism in particular.

Notes

1 The Burlingame Treaty (1869) between the Chinese and US governments granted citizens of either country the freedom of migration and certain privileges while residing in the other.
2 Antimiscegenation laws in the Western states were repealed from 1948 to 1967, and *Loving v. Virginia* overturned them in the Southern states on 12 June 1967.
3 Kitty Calavita, in her article "The paradoxes of race, class, identity, and 'passing': enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts,1882–1910," points out the difficulties of enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Law because of the self-contradictory logic underlying

> a number of the most stubborn difficulties that the Chinese inspectors and their superiors in the enforcement bureaucracy faced. For it was their task not only to define specifically what constituted an exempt class but to apply that definition to individual, concrete cases. In the process, not only did they confront the usual categorization difficulties, but also operational definitions that were inevitably no more than arbitrary occupational distinctions.
>
> *(Calavita 2000: 34)*

4 Currently, this question is reopened by the Republican Party in the USA concerning the citizenship of the children born to illegal immigrants.
5 *Eat a Bowl of Tea* was made into a film in 1989, directed by Wayne Wang.
6 According to Maxine Hong Kingston

> the number of persons allowed in the category of immigrant was set by law at one-sixth of one percent of the total population of that ancestry in the United States as of the 1920 census. The 1920 census had the lowest count of ethnic Chinese in this country since 1860. As a result, only 105 Chinese immigrants were permitted each year.
>
> *(Kingston 1977: 156)*

7 This translates as "bamboo hearts," referring to American-born Chinese girls who were empty of Chinese values and traditions.

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